AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

MARCH 1991
VOLUME 85 NUMBER 1

MANAGING EDITOR

Samuel C. Patterson
Department of Political Science
Ohio State University, 112 Derby Hall
Columbus, Ohio 43210-1373

BOOK REVIEW EDITOR

Helen M. Ingram
Department of Political Science
University of Arizona, Social Sciences 315
Tucson, Arizona 85721

EDITORIAL BOARD

Gregory A. Caldeira
Ohio State University

Pamela J. Conover
University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill

Matthew Holden, Jr.
University of Virginia

Robert Jervis
Columbia University

Malcolm E. Jewell
University of Kentucky

Charles O. Jones
University of Wisconsin,
Madison

Donald R. Kinder
University of Michigan

Anthony King
University of Essex

Allan Kornberg
Duke University

Arend Lijphart
University of California,
San Diego

Gerhard Loewenberg
University of Iowa

Thomas E. Mann
Brookings Institution

Robert H. Salisbury
Washington University

Arlene W. Saxonhouse
University of Michigan

Elaine B. Sharp
University of Kansas

Kenneth A. Shepsle
Harvard University

Randolph Siverson
University of California,
Davis

John M. Bruce
Martha Ellis Crone
APSR Interns

Lynda V. Williams
Editorial Assistant

Christine M. Harrington
Associate Editor

Michael K. Lane
Copy Editor

Rachel Quenk
Associate Book Review Editor

J. Steven Brundage
Todd O. Lutes
Book Review Interns

John J. Theis
Book Review
Research Associate

The *American Political Science Review* (ISSN-0003-0554) appears in March, June, September, and December of each year. It is published by the American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, and sent to all members. Dues: Regular Members with gross calendar income: under $30,000, $55; $30,000–$40,000, $75; $41,000–$50,000, $85; $51,000–$60,000, $90; over $60,000, $95; Student Members (limited to 5 years), $25; Retired Members (who have been members 25 years) with gross calendar income: under $25,000, $20; $25,000 and over, $40; Life Members, $2,000; Institutional Members: Domestic, $130; Foreign, $145. Dues allocated for a subscription to the *APSR*: $15 for individual members; $104 for institutional members. Changes of address sent to Membership Secretary of the APSA. Postmaster: Please send notification regarding undelivered journals to 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C. and at additional mailing offices. Copyright © 1991 by the *American Political Science Association*.

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

Redeeming American Political Theory
Judith N. Shklar 3

U.S.-Soviet-Chinese Relations: Routine, Reciprocity, or Rational Expectations?
Joshua S. Goldstein & John R. Freeman 17

Lobbying for Free Trade in 19th-Century Britain: To Concentrate or Not
Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey 37

The New Household Economy
William James Booth 59

The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics
Timothy Mitchell 77

Declarations of Independence: Arendt and Derrida on the Problem of Founding a Republic
B. Honig 97

Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness
John T. Scholz 115

A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems
David P. Baron 137

The Impact of Presidential Campaigning on Midterm U.S. Senate Elections
Jeffrey E. Cohen, Michael A. Krassa & John Hamman 165

RESEARCH NOTES

Macropartisanship: An Empirical Reassessment
Paul R. Abramson & Charles W. Ostrom, Jr. 181

Do Endorsements Matter? Group Influence in the 1984 Democratic Caucuses
Ronald B. Rapoport, Walter J. Stone & Alan I. Abramowitz 193

Debunking the Myth of Interest Group Invincibility in the Courts
Lee Epstein & C. K. Rowland 205

CONTROVERSY

Feminism and Liberal Theory
Richard C. Sinopoli & Nancy J. Hirschmann 221

REVIEW ESSAY

Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Toward Complementarity
Elinor Ostrom 237

BOOK REVIEWS

Defenders of the Constitution 251
Political Theory 257
American Politics 279
Comparative Politics 304
International Relations 332

NOTICE!!

Until September 1, 1991 manuscripts to be submitted to the *Review* should be sent to the present managing editor, Samuel C. Patterson.

Effective September 1, 1991 all new manuscripts should be submitted to the new managing editor, Professor G. Bingham Powell, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York 14627.

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

MARCH 1991
VOLUME 85 NUMBER 1

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

PRESIDENT:
Theodore J. Lowi
Cornell University

PRESIDENT-ELECT:
James Q. Wilson
University of California, Los Angeles

VICE-PRESIDENTS:
William J. Daniels
Rochester Institute of Technology
Gerhard Loewenberg
University of Iowa
Kenneth Prewitt
Rockefeller Foundation

SECRETARY:
Charles Lipson
University of Chicago

TREASURER:
David Brady
Stanford University

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR:
Catherine E. Rudder

PROGRAM CHAIR:
George Quester
University of Maryland

MANAGING EDITOR, *APSR:*
Samuel C. Patterson
Ohio State University

COUNCIL, 1989–91:
Charles Bullock
University of Georgia
Gregory Caldeira
Ohio State University
James Caporaso
University of Washington
Kay Lawson
San Francisco State University
Michael Lipsky
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sandy Maisel
Colby College
Judith Stiehm
Florida International University
Ronald Walters
Howard University

COUNCIL, 1990–92:
Thomas E. Cronin
Colorado College
Rodolfo O. de la Garza
University of Texas, Austin
Jean Bethke Elshtain
Vanderbilt University
Joanne Gowa
University of Pennsylvania
Virginia Gray
University of Minnesota
Nolan E. Jones
National Governors' Association
Ruth S. Jones
Arizona State University
Ian S. Lustick
Dartmouth College

The American Political Science Association And Academic Information Systems/IBM

Announce

Poli-Ware

A POLITICAL SCIENCE SOFTWARE REVIEW PROGRAM

The APSA has a pilot project to identify, evaluate and disseminate instructional software. The project is supported by IBM's Academic Information Systems.

Authors of political science software for students are invited to submit their programs, with the information requested below, for review by the APSA Software Review Committee. Software must be IBM compatible.

Software submissions should include:

- Five copies of the program
- A statement of the program's purpose and learning objectives
- Descriptions of:
  1. student audience, topics and courses
  2. methodology and teaching strategy
  3. hardware and other software needed to run the programs

This information will be the basis of a user's guide to the software.

Instructional and research software judged by the Review Committee to be of exceptional pedagogical and technical quality will be offered for sale. Proceeds will be used to pay royalties to authors and underwrite the peer review process.

The political science software will be widely distributed through APSA as part of The Academic Software Library (TASL) in cooperation with Wisc-Ware Software Distribution Center.

Submissions/Information:
Poli-Ware/APSA
1527 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20036

ARTICLES

REDEEMING AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY

JUDITH N. SHKLAR
Harvard University

American political theory has been accused of being uniformly liberal; but its history is diverse and is worth studying to understand the development of political science and the institutions it reflects (representative government, federalism, judicial review, and slavery). While modern social science expresses a slow democratization of values, it has been compatible with many ideologies. This can be seen in Jefferson's anthropology, Madison's theory of collective rationality, and Hamilton's empirical political economy. Jacksonian democracy encouraged social history, while its opponents devised an elitist political sociology. Southern defenders of slavery were the earliest to develop a deterministic and authoritarian sociology, but after the Civil War Northern thinkers emulated them with Social Darwinism and quests for causal laws to grasp constant change in industrial society. Though social critics abounded, democratic empirical theory emerged in the universities only in the generation of Merriam and Dewey, who founded contemporary political science.

As is evident, I am in some ways an unusual president of this association; and I feel my responsibilities tonight particularly deeply, both as a woman and as a political theorist.

What I plan to do in this talk is therefore quite ambitious, namely, redeem American political theory, in order to bring out both its intrinsic intellectual importance and its significance for American political science. Far from being demeaning and scientifically superfluous, I would like to show that we have much to gain from seeing our present work as a continuation of the history of political thought in America. Such an outlook would serve to integrate political theory into political science, where it belongs; and it would also offer mainstream political science the self-understanding that only a historically grounded analysis can give it.

Such an effort is necessary, I believe, because American political theory has long been neglected. It has been charged with an obsessive and unconscious commitment to a liberal faith that prevents it from asking profound and critical questions. Incapable of envisaging alternatives, American political thought is said to be mired in the legacy of John Locke and a mindless optimism. The fact that there have always been many lively controversies, moreover, does nothing to dispel this bland uniformity, because all parties are at some level said to be liberal. In any event our petty intellectual squabbles are mere shadowboxing compared to the *real thing*, the kind of ideological combat that feudalism and class war generated in Europe.

I do not think that American political thought is a compulsive repetition of the same theme. Nor has it suffered a single fall from grace, as some now claim, when it abandoned a premodern republicanism in favor of an amoral, atomized individualism. Nor, finally, need we continue that endless Jeremiad about the absence of socialism and conservatism. I believe that when we take a good look at our actual tradition of political theory, we will find something better than a drab and cheerless heritage, a poor thing, but our own.

On close examination American political theory is not, in fact, just our own; for it has not been hermetically sealed off from European thought. Isolating it in order to illuminate its peculiarities is bound to reduce it to charmless uniformity. We do have special political traits; but from Locke to Social Darwinism, from the negative to the positive state, from Montesquieu to the Chicago School of political sociology, the controversies and the agreements have been shared, even if not shared identically by both sides of the big puddle. One should not overlook the local circumstances that give a special color to American political ideas, but there is no reason at all to treat them either in quarantine or contemptuously.

At least four obvious political phenomena have contributed to distinguishing American political thought from its cultural neighbors: the early and painless acceptance of white adult male suffrage, federalism, judicial review, and most deeply, the prevalence of chattel slavery long after it had disappeared in the rest of the European world. Not racism—which is universal—but *slavery* in a modern constitutional state is truly unique. Until the Civil War amendments America was neither a liberal nor a democratic country, whatever its citizens might have believed. Yet it did have in place a set of institutions that were capable of becoming so and to an unequaled degree. This country had embarked upon two experiments simultaneously: one in democracy, the other in tyranny. This list of the characteristics of our political development is hardly complete (I would add our unique university establishments), but it does point to features that have set American political institutions apart and have had a decisive impact upon its most reflective citizens.

Of all aspects of this political culture none might seem more peculiarly local than political science, in all its many manifestations and eclecticism. To be sure, political science is only one of the modern social sciences; but it is the one that has flourished most in America, where it has also lately become notably democratic. At the deepest level all the social sciences are part of a process of intellectual democratization. For only recently (in the last two centuries) has either the inclination or the political need to think seriously about the lives of ordinary people as intrinsically significant emerged at all. The history, remote or contemporary, of great men and dramatic events has only very lately made a place for people who are absent from the annals of monumental history. These lives can never be more than statistics; but they have come to matter, partly because social scientists became convinced that they were important in and of themselves and partly because the many began to assert themselves as urban citizens, as voters, as strikers, and as members of increasingly diverse and lay-oriented religious denominations.

All the social sciences are submerged biographies of the silent majority of humanity: the peasant, the artisan, the immigrant, the slave, women, and (in our case) that basic irreducible unit of representative politics, the voter. All of them, even as mere numbers, have surfaced in the human sciences as part of a long and slow democratization of values in a period whose ideologies were often in every degree hostile to these aspirations. This is the historical context that makes the fact-mindedness of the social sciences different from that of those ancient bureaucratic regimes that also liked to keep minute records about their subjects. At their purest, the social sciences are knowledge for its own sake about everyone, because everyone is interesting as a social being.

We should not be surprised that this expansiveness has not been a continuous movement in either America or Europe. It would also be far too facile to attribute either the ups or the downs of scientific concern only to ideological commitments. Some of the finest social scientists from Alexander Hamilton to Vilfredo Pareto have been utterly opposed to democracy. Others have been ardently democratic. The democratization of values that is implicit in the social sciences in general is entirely compatible with a great variety of political beliefs and theories, including some of the most destructive and cruel. Nevertheless, I do want to argue that within a welter of diverse ideas the social sciences are fundamentally inclusive in their orientation and that given the institutions of American government, a democratic political science was eventually to be expected. It need hardly be mentioned that this trend was in no way incompatible with a rich tradition of flailing every aspect of America's political culture.

I see no homogeneity and no straight line in our history at all; but I do think that our end was in our beginning, and that those who originally framed our institutions can be seen in retrospect to have given us, in embryonic form, the elements of a science that would best correspond to our political institutions and the social circumstances within which they arose. The works of Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton display the intellectual germs of several kinds of political science, all responding integrally to the government that they created and understood.

The authors of the *Federalist Papers* and Jefferson belonged to a fact-minded and science-oriented cosmopolitan culture. In the brief experience of democracy that the French enjoyed after the Revolution, Jefferson's close friend, Condorcet, went well beyond anything that had been done in America by applying advanced mathematics to voting in legislative bodies. The older administrative science of the Colbertian tradition was Alexander Hamilton's acknowledged inspiration. And Madison admired Montesquieu as the master of the new science of politics.

There were, from the first, three political sciences in America. Jefferson's was speculative and physiological. Madison's was institutional and historical, and Hamilton's was empirical and behavioral. None was perfect, all were prophetic. Let me begin with Jefferson's occasional writings. He had an undeniably scientific mind in the sense that he had fully absorbed the advances in the natural sciences of his age and that he took a scientist's interest in the physical characteristics of the New World and its inhabitants, especially in order to refute Buffon's slanders upon our flora and fauna. He also accepted Locke's cognitive psychology, which encouraged the empirical study of humanity within its many social and natural environments. As an observer of the human species, he examined his objects exactly as a naturalist would study the beasts and vegetation of an area. The extent to which this set him apart from them is worth noting because Jefferson, who was ideologically by far the most democratic of our intellectual ancestors, was enormously elitist as a scientist and educator. I stress the point and its implications in order to insist that ideology does not determine scientific work nearly as simply or as completely as has been assumed.

Jefferson was sure that our beliefs and preferences were not a matter of choice but that each one of us had been quite differently endowed by nature. We are also the creatures of our environment, which impinges upon us as we try to form a cognitive picture of our experiences. It follows that any effort to impose a single belief system upon us was as futile as it was psychologically unscientific. What we needed was an education to protect us against false associations of ideas imposed upon us by superstitions, traditions, and other errors. Free government was to be sustained by public education from compulsory primary school to the university. An educated meritocracy, open to all talented citizens, was to prevail, as natural aristocrats were annually "raked from the rubbish" to become the political and scientific leaders of Virginia. Public education was not a random public good for Jefferson, it was based on a scientific theory of learning with obvious political implications. If more democracy was the cure for political ills (as he certainly believed), it was because all governments were to be distrusted. The prosperity of the new nation could not be left to governments, but would depend on the educational system.

These attitudes point to an extraordinary faith in the social and practical value of learning. Schools may, of course, also become constricting institutions—a point that Condorcet understood better than Jefferson, who had no interest in the study of how educational institutions function both to enhance and restrict freedom. He was simply sure that the arts and sciences would underpin liberal democracy.

There were other implications in this anthropology. If Jefferson looked at his fellow citizens as educable subjects, the native American was just part of the scenery. It was his great regret that "they had never been viewed by us as subjects of natural history." He was also sorry that their languages had not been recorded in time in the service of linguistics, a science in which he was deeply interested. It comes as no surprise, then, that in his dealings with the native American population he was in some respects even less just than with his slaves. At least he acknowledged guilt and shame in the latter case. The Indians were told to behave like the Anglo-Americans; and if they could not do so, they must expect to be exploited. He consistently treated them as children and openly boasted of his intention to bribe them into submission.

The truth of the matter is that it is not social science as such but the kind of inquiries we choose that are often questionable. Jefferson wanted to assimilate social science to natural history. Current psychology permitted him to believe in progress through education for his own kind and to treat the native populations as subjects of physiological speculation and manipulation. Having remained, as it were, natural rather than political beings, they were to be scrutinized and classified, as if they had no rights. This had nothing to do with Jefferson's consistently democratic ideology; he certainly trusted those yeomen, but we should recall that most of the ethical objections to the sciences of man have been rooted in the perception that no human beings should be treated like laboratory animals.

What of Jefferson's friend and loyal associate, James Madison? No man was ever more conscious of public unsteadiness, of change and mutability. He had a historian's mind, which was a great intellectual advantage. It enabled him to penetrate to the logic of collective action even when on the surface there seemed to be nothing but random irrationality and partisan wrangling. By reflecting upon previous occurrences and experiences he was always able to see a pattern amid the confusion of men and events. Consider his papers on representation and the likely conduct of legislators under various rules. Too large an assembly puts Michel's law of oligarchy into effect. The group that sets the agenda is bound to dominate the whole. How long should terms of office last? Long enough for the representatives to learn their jobs, not so long as to make them forget the voters and the fact that they would soon be private citizens again, obliged to live under the laws they had passed. Here, too, size and the interactions of parties and factions are considered. Or take his response to Jefferson's suggestion that the Constitution be rewritten every twenty years to allow every generation to decide its own fate. Against this daft proposal, Madison offered two arguments, one psychological, the second prudential. First, there is a need for habit and emotional attachment to institutions if they are to function. Second, deinstitutionalization creates intolerable economic and political instability. No credit will be extended to such a country and there is no guarantee that some future generation might not be swayed to abolish republican government and ruin the system permanently.

Madison devised a profound theory of political rationality that recognized that individuals must be expected to bring limited and self-directed policies to the public arena but that in a constitutional system not only do they become collectively more rational as a whole people, but they also learn to appreciate the necessity of limiting their interests in response to the rights of others (as well as the best possible outcome for the country as a whole). The critics of procedural republicanism have often misread Madison and the institutions he championed. The individual political agent learns to adapt and is forced to become more public-spirited as he accepts and follows the procedures that institutions compel him to follow.

When the question of universal white adult male suffrage came up in Virginia, he cut right through the rhetoric of both parties. If the majority of landless citizens were disenfranchised, they would have every reason to rise up against the freeholders, he warned. In a republic the inequality of property depends upon the consent of the majority. That is its only security. Here was a deeply functional view of democracy, which held that even some political rights might be institutionally validated. Thus, Madison did not expect the freedom of the press or "the right to aminadversion" to promote truth or learning. Nevertheless, they were the only way to keep the citizens informed about what the government was doing; and republican government depended on an electorate that could check up on its representatives.

Madison was intellectually not only remote from Jefferson, he was also very unlike his one-time coauthor, Hamilton. I must confess to an intense admiration for Alexander Hamilton as a political scientist but also because he proves how shallow ideological analysis can be. Hamilton was not a democratic or even a liberal politician, but he was quite capable of giving a sophisticated and unbiased account of how electoral politics worked in New York and subordinating his immediate political concerns to his scientific ambitions. His friend Chancellor Kent said of him that he had contemplated "a full investigation of the history and science of civil government . . . and to have the subject treated in reference to past experience upon Lord Bacon's inductive philosophy." And it is with this in mind that all of us here can share his distress when he wrote to Robert Morris in 1782 about New York's balance of trade, "These calculations cannot absolutely be relied on because the data are necessarily uncertain, but they are the result of the best information I can obtain." Here is a fact-minded thinker who fully knows the difference between basing one's policies on always-incomplete information and lusting after certainty.

To understand republican government—which he accepted as necessarily based on the consent of the majority—he looked to its irreducible unit, the individual voter. The first thing that impressed him was "the alarming indifference discoverable in the exercise of so valuable a privilege as voting." When the citizens do exert themselves, however, they behave quite rationally. Mechanics and manufacturers will always be inclined, with a few exceptions, to give their votes to a merchant in preference to a person of their own profession because they see a friend and patron in him (since he trades in their products) and so are quite ready to trust him to promote their interests. They vote not identity but agency, in short. Hamilton also thought that the electoral chances of "the learned professions"—by which I think he meant lawyers—were good by virtue of their education and presumed impartiality. Voters certainly do want candidates "to understand their feelings and interests," Hamilton noted; but they also want reliable brokers to bring diverse preferences together, which calls for the skills of the lawyer.

Hamilton's greatest contribution to a disaggregating science of political economy was surely his *Report on Manufactures,* in which he displays as much of an interest in individual producers and the incentives to which they might respond, as his political reflections centered on voters. This inclination may well have been fueled by his frantic efforts to make America a strong and active state. Such a structure would demonstrate (even as the frail and miserable Constitution of 1787, which he despised, might fail to demonstrate) that good government can be established by societies of men "from reflection and choice" rather than being driven by "accident and force." The modern state that he envisaged depended on information as no older regime had to, because it must regulate, indirectly, not only a single, unified military, administrative, and productive system but a system based on the rule of law and the consent of its citizens. Its government needed to know exactly not only what should be done but what its citizens would agree to do, individually and collectively.

Starved for sovereignty, Hamilton put his hopes into the Supreme Court; but it was not what he had really wanted. What he got was a far from centralized or coherent state, but it did require information just as much as his administrative model. Representative democracy also needs information. Hence, the Constitution mandates a national census every ten years, and there is a built-in interest among elective officials in the actual interests and beliefs of the voters. Constitutional democracy is inherently a fact-hungry political system, in which both those who govern and those who are governed yearn for solid information.

So far, I have only tried to show how diverse and complex American political theory has been from its very origins. Not all periods in our history have been as creative as the Enlightenment. We have in our bitter century learned again to appreciate their ideals of freedom, human rights, and justice. The founders have left us not only several ways of trying to make sense of American politics but also an enduring public ethos.

In one important respect all three also illustrate the limits of political science. Not one could even suggest a plausible solution to America's greatest single failure, black chattel slavery. History, institutional analysis, and economic calculation were all equally useless. For all their confidence in political knowledge and in their own ability to determine the fate of a nation, they were unable to imagine a multiracial citizenry. No one saw the likelihood of a sectional conflict more clearly than Madison did, yet no one temporized more disastrously than he did when he came up with the federal ratio. The narrowness of the politics of rational compromise confront us starkly (as do those of merely accurate knowledge) when we recall the drift to the Civil War.

Nevertheless, for the study of democratization few eras in American history are more revealing than the first four decades of the last century. This is not only because of the enduring political changes that emerged at that time but also because the vocabulary of American political controversy was transformed. President Jackson's use of the language of his most radical supporters in the course of his war against the Bank of the United States really justifies the phrase Jacksonian democracy. This new political style was forged in the state constitutional conventions called to establish white adult male suffrage as a right and not as a limited privilege. No less significant was a new and radically democratic journalism that stressed the dignity of work, equal rights, and free public education not as a means to create a natural aristocracy but as the ground upon which equality of opportunity and self-respect would be built. If economic inequality appeared natural to these democrats, political inequality was excoriated. From the first, fairness was the very essence of their notion of justice. And *rights* was a word that appeared in every democratic sentence. For they were threatened by "aristocrats"—citizens who used wealth to acquire an unfair share of political influence and corrupted the laws. They were the tarnished remnants of Europe and a cultural and a political menace. The European past should be forgotten.

The sense of political isolation from Europe was not felt as a deprivation, but it did raise enduring and perhaps insoluble questions about the proper education for a democratic people. History is not a useful subject. It was all about undemocratic practices and ideologies, and it stuffed young minds with inappropriate fantasies. The sciences, natural and social, were safer. They were also more edifying, reminding the young of the contribution that the inventions of artisans had made to civilization. Madison's plea for reverence as a politically positive state of mind had no appeal for these democrats, but they longed for a usable past of their own. The study of the unsung many is as much a demand for recognition by the democratized public as it is an object of interest to scientific observers. Unhappily, both were so self-absorbed that they simply ignored what did not touch them immediately. Fearing and hating both slavery and the slave, they looked the other way until they were forced to consider both.

The democrats' ferocious attack on aristocracy could, however, not go unchallenged. One response was to rewrite American history relegating the Revolution to the background and stressing the disciplined Puritans as the fathers of America's free, but hardly egalitarian, political institutions. Literary Whigs, such as Rufus Choate of Massachusetts, offered a disgruntled upper class just such a reading of the past. Tocqueville was one among several visitors who were disturbed by this commercial aristocracy, who disdained the free institutions of their country. These commentators received a perceptive answer from Frederick Grimké, who, in his remarkably dispassionate study of American government, *The Nature and Tendency of Free Institutions,* noted that these elites had no hereditary caste features and no distinct military ethos.

It was also among Whig opponents of democracy that one can discern the beginnings of a political sociology with a special interest in the functions of elites. Choate quite agreed with Tocqueville that the bench and bar had an extraordinary position in the United States. He saw them as bringing tradition, continuity, and stability to the political system. They tied the generations together. Not legislation, but the accretion of judicial precedents must determine the rules; and they develop inarticulately as a slow process, comprehensible only to a few. The law is a single moral unit; but significantly, it did not, for Choate, exist in a social vacuum. It was the creation of a special group that operated within a political system and was meant to impose itself upon wayward majorities and elected governments. Fortified by this view of the primacy of law as an unchanging inheritance and by the constitutional jurisprudence of Kent and Storey, the operative ideology of the courts became that they were meant to protect every form of property by building an infrangible wall against the threat of democratic legislation.

These conservative thinkers, with their sense of society as a fragile structure, were not opposed to slavery. It was part of the historical inheritance. Nevertheless, political sociology could also serve the few abolitionists who were not moved by religion. Richard Hildreth's truly remarkable book, *Despotism in America,* was, as its title indicates, partly an answer to Tocqueville but also a close analysis of the entire plantation system of the South. Hildreth was no Jacksonian democrat. He defended democracy as the most stable of political systems and the one most likely to promote economic prosperity. All his work on comparative government and on slavery was deeply indebted to Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws,* both in the analysis of equilibrium and disorder in various forms of government and of despotism as a distinct political system. That is what he saw in the South, where fear was the active principle of rule and where the ruling class possessed no discernible political virtue or will to improve. They were not Tocqueville's decadent aristocrats but despots on their plantations, and democracy could not compromise with them. Also like his master, Montesquieu, he saw much that was vital, as well as much that was crushed, in the lives of the enslaved. Finally, Hildreth tried to demonstrate that the bench and bar could use their authority and the existing law to abolish slavery in the United States. Mercifully, he died some years before the Civil War.

One cannot think of Emerson as either a Jacksonian democrat or an aristocratic Whig. No label could do him justice. He remains, after all, *the* American philosopher. And it was as such that he tried to grasp and represent the entire world in which he lived. He not only responded intensely to the stirrings around him, but he also tried to show his enormous public what they meant. The two warring parties were not really the few and the many, they were the party of memory and the party of hope; and America needed both. If Emerson found memory as hard to bear as his democratic neighbors, he also met the reformers with an irony that was truly devastating. They were not at all self-reliant, just self-centered and futile. Nevertheless, his "American Scholar" is all hope, a scientists' Declaration of Independence. It is not just a Jacksonian rejection of the European past but a passionate affirmation of the spirit of discovery. And his essay "Young America" is a hymn to the independent Yankee lad and to the democratic ethos of the age.

Emerson was, however, not only repelled by the frivolity of radical gestures; he was also haunted by memory, especially of the great men of the past. He might believe that we *should* say, "Damn George Washington" every morning; but he was not up to it. Instead, he remembered those who were truly great and tried to integrate them into a democratic faith. *Representative Men* was Emerson's answer to Carlyle's hero worship. The term *representative* was deliberately political. Great men could not be great unless they were able to move, and to be moved by, their public. Greatness was a transaction in which we all had a part. Aristocracy was tamed.

It was a way to encapsule the age in a vision of social interaction in which the normal and the rare could live with each other on democratic, if isolated, terms, bound by a direct unmediated understanding. Thus, also, science and common sense had for Emerson an equal dignity, not because they yielded any certain knowledge but because both were acts of personal and public creativity. Scientific knowledge was not merely Baconian power but an adventure and a door to the new. Though he was utterly skeptical and solitary, Emerson's generous ambition was the same as Lincoln's: to sum up and renew the promise of pre-Civil War America. And they still remind us of it.

If Emerson and his New England disciples defined themselves in contrast to Europe, many Southerners came to think of themselves as a culture distinctly opposed to that of the North. It may well be that political sociology flourishes amid conflict. The defenders of the "peculiar institution," no less than the abolitionists, perceived that they were defending two different ways of life, not just two incompatible labor systems. The Civil War was not only a monumental bloodbath and the first modern war, it was also an ideological struggle that had raged for decades before the first shot was fired.

I wish I could do full justice to the intricacies of Southern political thought; but as I cannot, I will just point to its more lasting characteristics. One was an emphasis on the ethical primacy of society as an organism. The second was a celebration of its elite. And finally, there was the affirmation of personal authority as both inevitable and inherently good. In most cases these notions were couched in the language of social science. Baconian fact-mindedness was very much an overt feature of secular Southern political thought. Malthus and Comte were the accepted authorities. Demographic pessimism and the sociology of hierarchical integrity had an instant appeal. Jefferson's natural rights were abandoned, but not his scientific inclinations.

To any careful reader of pre-Civil War Southern political theory, it is perfectly obvious that this mixture of ideas constituted an indigenous authoritarian ideology that was as utterly unique as was the slavery it encompassed. The secular defense of Southern society took three forms. Slavery might not be just in the abstract, it was conceded, but the idea of the right was not primary. Communal, shared values rooted in the very structure of society really defined the social good. Slavery was woven into the fabric of Southern life, which, as a whole, was well worth defending. It was a bastion of republican values. Generosity, civic duty, honor, a lively sense of the public good, and a martial spirit—all the essence of republican virtue—marked the planters, in contrast to their mercenary and rights-oriented Yankee opponents. Jefferson, who lamented the effects of slavery on the masters, had been wrong. Solidarity and public virtue were rooted in slavery and more than justified it.

Southern political science also supported this view. A good deal of it was exceptionally neologistic. The invention of new words to give readers the impression that they were absorbing an objective, nonevaluative, systematic treatise was a marked trait of its most Baconian writers. Henry Hughes's *Treatise on Sociology* is a particularly intelligent example of this style. Society was divided into *warrantors* and *warrantees* in the South. The warrantees had a peculiar ethnic character but were not slaves, since, as in all societies, the warrantors were limited by obligations and restraints. They had to provide safety and comfort, as well as public hygiene, already a matter of much social concern.

Third and last, there was the sociology of the ineffable George Fitzhugh's *Cannibals All*, which has received more attention now than it did when it was written. His argument was that free labor was pure exploitation, since the laborers lacked the paternal benefits enjoyed by slaves, who, as the planters' capital, were valuable assets. Even more interesting was his claim that this was indeed a despotic regime but that despotism was really a benign system, because it gave the weak a whole range of informal ways of asserting themselves within a society in which each one had a suitable niche. Given that all political regimes were exploitative, despotism was quite tolerable. So much for Montesquieu and Hildreth.

These political theories were heralds of things to come. In a way the South won the war of ideas. Northern social scientists certainly did not come to approve of slavery, but after the Civil War they adopted the sociological fatalism that had been so notable a mark of Southern thought. Moral pessimism was nothing new in America. It had its roots in Calvinism, and both John Adams and John Calhoun shared its overwhelming sense of human depravity. Ambition, avarice, violence, and guile marked the few no less than the many, and both feared for the fate of the republic. Yet in very different ways, both put their minds to devising governmental institutions that might withstand the inevitable onslaught of corruption. Adams looked to checks and balances, Calhoun to an intricate system of vetoes; but both took it for granted that institutions could and should stem the tide of political decay. The fatalism of the post-Civil War period was quite different. It was not moral but biologistic and was indifferent to political initiative, which seemed irrelevant in an overdetermined social world.

The intellectual tone of the veterans was often coarse and aggressive. One can find it in the letters of Justice Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollock no less than in the writings of William Graham Sumner. Facts are always hard and insuperable. They function as weapons against the "sentimental," the "humanitarian" and presumably feeble. The hopes that had rung in the essays and speeches of Frederick Douglass during the struggle for the Fifteenth Amendment were soon dispersed. Indeed, rights were said to be meaningless, except as acts of force. The end of Reconstruction, especially, had a deadening impact. Both Burgess and Dunning, the founders of academic political science, wrote books on it, applauding the nationalization of politics that Reconstruction had achieved and deeply deploring the effort to secure the rights of the freedmen. Their equality was impossible for Burgess because of racial reasons, for Dunning because blacks were socially backward and only military force could ever impose them on their former masters. Peace and justice required their exclusion from Southern politics. Sumner, to be sure, was no racist; but Reconstruction was his favorite example to illustrate the power of custom and the impotence of the state. Southern black and white mores were simply too different to be joined. A total separation of the two populations would thus quickly reestablish harmony. This, we might recall, was the social science written into *Plessy versus Ferguson* of unlamented memory.

The end of Reconstruction was only one inducement to sociological fatalism. A baffled inability to understand the world that followed the Civil War had the same effect. Social scientists felt overwhelmed by changes that reminded them of the forces of natural necessity. This sometimes served as an alibi for inaction; but it was also a pathway to a new science, one that would at last uncover the interactions of all the human elements that compose society and order them according to comprehensive laws. If only the underlying causes of change could be grasped, then certainty and even predictability might restore a measure of intellectual control. Southern sociological fatalism—now amply fortified by new race sciences, Social Darwinism, and classical economics—revealed regulative impersonal forces, which would explain the effect of new immigrants, urbanization, and the new technological industrialism. Every conceivable biological and geological theory was snapped up and ground to fit what passed for "hard" facts and to assuage the need for intellectual certainty.

With this in mind, one ought to read *The Education of Henry Adams* with some respect. He took the message of evolution and perpetual social change to its logical end. Given that nothing endured, education was simply impossible. Every lesson learned in youth was false and burdensome in one's mature years. The America he had left before the Civil War was gone forever and all its doctrines had been shown to be absurd. There was no point in trying to teach anyone anything, except perhaps history, since it was settled (though merely ornamental). In politics all was vanity.

But if Adams was the extreme that illuminates, William Graham Sumner and Lester Ward were the norm that defined an intellectual generation. They really put Spencer and social evolution on the intellectual map as they labored to give the social sciences the same prestige that the natural sciences enjoyed. At first Sumner had used the vocabulary of natural selection to justify the new captains of industry but also to hammer in such facts to prove that political action was futile. When he came to write *Folkways*, he had, however, given up biological analogies. It is in many ways a very remarkable book. Nothing endures, and nothing can be done. Even scientific knowledge is temporary. We are all the blind prisoners of the mores of our time and place. In America democracy is above being questioned, and evolution is the fad of the age. Sumner was the real inventor of the paradoxes of the sociology of knowledge. *Folkways* is both dogmatic and skeptical. We may know nothing, but he was sure that Hamilton had been wrong in believing that will, rather than fate and force, could determine the government of a people.

Ideologically, Sumner's most outspoken and admired critic was Lester Ward. The argument between them was by no means the only ideological conflict of this contentious period, but the scholars of the time regarded it as by far the most significant. Ward did not challenge Sumner's scientific assumptions. He only added Comte's taxonomies to them, which hardly made his system more flexible. His message was that evolution had made humanity capable of mastering nature and of transforming society through democratic governmental action, which meant not a return to ideas of rights and consent but universal education guided by social science. This would bring about a "sociocracy," in which an informed public and a powerful executive would soon prove that art could triumph over nature. Not that Ward offered any specific examples of how political invention or social technology would work. He was keen on statistics and on the diffusion of knowledge; but beyond that, the big picture was his real terrain. And while Sumner finally recognized that science was unstable, Ward never doubted that it was the rock upon which social engineers would stand. Yet for all their differences, they inhabited the same intellectual universe, in which society was a determined organic whole, subject to laws that social science would eventually fully grasp.

Even Thorsten Veblen shared many of these assumptions, but he does stand out as a conspicuous nay-sayer. His eyes were fixed on the enemies of progress, on the atavistic, nonproductive plutocracy of America that stood in the way of the productivity, the instinct of workmanship, and the egalitarian values that industrial society demanded and could evoke. Quite apart from the lasting interest of his assault on the betrayers of the work ethic, Veblen is a fine example of the diversity of American social theory. He was also an unclassifiable moralist. In this no one resembled him more than Charlotte Perkins Gilman, who argued that the domestication of women away from the productive process was out of step with the demands of a society geared to efficient production. Every line Gilman wrote shows an outraged sense of justice, but she could not resort to the liberal vocabulary that could best have expressed it. The notion of individuals as items in an evolutionary whole seemed no less necessary to her than to Veblen. These were certainly voices of protest, and they illustrate two things at least: that American intellectual life even in that rather dismal age was anything but uniform and that one cannot pin conventional ideological labels on them. And none of them—not Sumner any more than Veblen—felt at home in the muscle-flexing, imperialist and megapolitical world of Theodore Roosevelt.

It was time for a generational change and for the emergence of reform-minded political movements, of which a new political science was to become a part. It was more modest in its intellectual ambitions and perfectly frank about its civic ideals. I refer specifically to the birth of the study of public administration and of municipal government, inspired by what Charles Merriam called "a saturnalia of political corruption," which mobilized political scientists. They took an empirical turn to the investigation of actual political conduct and institutional functions and considered what could be done to put them on a more honest path. It was the beginning of contemporary political science.

As the memory of the Civil War receded, neither fatalism nor struggle seemed quite so ineluctable. Their and our university culture favored more contained, pragmatic, and specialized social sciences. The surrounding cities offered an open field for reform-minded study, as their condition affected many a conscience. Charles Merriam was the perfect representative of this new, university-based, city-wise social science but also a Janus figure; and that is why I shall end with him. He looked back to Sumner and ahead along with John Dewey. And through his students he became the architect and guide of American political science as it developed after World War II.

The great theoretical question for him was, "What did democracy mean in the days of the union, the railroad, the trust and of modern business organization. . . . What was to be the theoretical and practical program of democracy?" He had no use for the crude Darwinism that equated social success with biological fitness, nor was he a racist in any of its numerous forms. Nevertheless, in retrospect, it does seem clear that he was as overwhelmed by change and uncertainty as his predecessors. And so he looked to statistics and to depth psychology—both poorly understood—and applauded all that was being done in the name of eugenics with little reflection and with baseless expectations of permanence. However, he also followed Dewey in his efforts to construct a meaningful democratic theory that took change for granted.

Merriam and Dewey did not return to the doctrines that had guided American politics before the Civil War. The Constitution was thought to be seriously flawed, especially the separation of powers. In any case, processes, not structures, mattered. Everything Dewey said against abstraction took root among Merriam's students. This was not, however (as it is often said to be), just a revolt against juristic formalism. It was, rather, an effort to realize an ideal of an impossibly perfect science that had reached the ultimate determining causes of change, which would permit accurate predictions, professional expertise, and unchallengeable political reform.

Merriam's own theory restated Dewey's notion of social planning not as a matter of fixed governmental blueprints imposed on the citizens but as a continuous process. If Dewey insisted on the need to create a public, that is, a body of actively engaged citizens, Merriam hoped for political learning by doing and for a new prudence. Both mixed democratic participation and social science, and this corresponded to the emerging practices of both state and national governments. Perhaps regrettably, Merriam was less inclined to see science—as Dewey did—as a state of mind, rather than as an accumulation of facts. In the face of unceasing change, however, both did offer a philosophy of citizenship in which the capacity for perpetual adaptation to novelty was sustained by information and communal activity. The outcome was that the democratic tendencies of the social sciences generally and the overt ideology of mainstream American political scientists were now in harmony. They were to be both good democratic citizens and rigorously objective adherents of the ethos of science.

With that, I have come to the door of the present. But I cannot close without remarking that in the wake of World War II and the Civil Rights movement, we no longer feel compelled to despise the values expressed in the language of rights, justice, liberty, and consent with which American political theory began. I hope that I have shown that its history has been a profound meditation upon our political experiences and our peculiar and often tragically flawed institutions. I expect—indeed hope—that others will give different accounts. However, if one were to cast aspersions on American political theory, it should not be that it is Oedipally attached to liberalism but that like the rest of the political classes of Europe and America, it failed to understand itself and lacked the imagination to project a plausibly better future. If we can learn to do better, it will be because democracy is itself dynamic. The history of American political science is a part of its development, which was neither painless nor uniform; but it has been an intellectual adventure of the first order.

Note

This essay is the presidential address presented on 30 August 1990 at the 86th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in San Francisco. I offer these remarks for the records of the Association rather than as a scholarly paper.

Judith N. Shklar is Professor of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138.

U.S.-SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS: ROUTINE, RECIPROCITY, OR RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS?

JOSHUA S. GOLDSTEIN
University of Southern California
JOHN R. FREEMAN
University of Minnesota

International relations theorists disagree about whether great power behaviors reflect bureaucratic routine or reciprocity. Recently, some have suggested that these behaviors result from great powers' rational expectations rather than from simple routine or reciprocity. The debate is flawed in several respects. The quasi-experimental studies of great power behavior suffer from specification and measurement errors. Furthermore, most studies of great power behavior focus exclusively on the superpowers, without adequately appreciating China's role in world politics. We present an improved analysis that recognizes the potential effects of Chinese behavior and ameliorates the methodological flaws in existing work. The results indicate that the behaviors of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China are a relatively stable mix *of bureaucratic routine and reciprocity. The results also indicate complex, asymmetrical connections among U.S.-Soviet, U.S.-Chinese, and Soviet-Chinese relations, consistent with the notion of a strategic triangle.*

To what extent and how do great powers respond to each other's behavior? This question lies at the heart of much writing and thinking about international politics. Yet, surprisingly, we still do not have a definitive answer to it. One body of work argues that great powers' behaviors are an outgrowth of bureaucratic routine—that great powers are insensitive to the behavior of other countries. Another body of work maintains that great powers not only respond to the behavior of other powers but reciprocate the behaviors directed toward them. This reciprocity is presumed by some theorists to provide the basis for the evolution of international cooperation (see Axelrod 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Gowa 1986; Huth 1988; Jensen 1986; Jervis 1981; Keohane 1986; Larson 1988; Leng and Wheeler 1979; Makins 1985; Oye 1986; Stoll and McAndrew 1986).

Quasi-experimental studies of reciprocity have produced contradictory findings. Some researchers claim to find widespread evidence of reciprocity as an international norm; others find evidence of bureaucratic momentum and a complete lack of reciprocity; and still others find reciprocity only in certain countries at certain times (see Zinnes 1980).

Recently, a group of scholars has suggested that great powers respond not to the actual behaviors of other powers but to rational expectations of others' future policies or to departures from these expected policies. Because great powers have rational expectations, reciprocity is not immediately evident as a lagged response to another country's past actions

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOLUME 85 NO. 1 MARCH 1991

but only as a response to surprises in other countries' behaviors (McGinnis and Williams 1989a, 1989b; Williams and McGinnis 1988). Unfortunately, rational expectations theorists also obtain contradictory empirical results regarding the nature of great power behavior.

We shall critically evaluate this debte about the nature of great power politics and provide a sound answer to the questions of whether and how great power behavior reflects bureaucratic routine or reciprocity. We show that the existing research on great power behavior is flawed in that it fails to appreciate China's relations with the superpowers and it suffers from specification and measurement errors. We construct an improved quasi experiment that includes Chinese behavior and ameliorates these methodological problems. The results of our analysis indicate that great power behavior combines both bureaucratic routine and reciprocity. Our results also reveal complex, asymmetrical connections among U.S.-Soviet, U.S.-Chinese, and Soviet-Chinese relations—connections that imply the existence of a strategic triangle. The workings of the triangle differ somewhat from earlier descriptions (e.g., Starr 1982) but are largely consistent with the Kissingerian notion that U.S.-Soviet détente, U.S.-Chinese rapprochement, and Sino-Soviet enmity are coordinated and self-reinforcing (Talbott 1981, 84).

The discussion is divided into four parts. First, we briefly review the quasi-experimental literature on the issue of bureaucratic momentum versus reciprocity. This review shows the need for a new approach that recognizes the causes and consequences of Chinese behavior, bases causal inference on a weakly restricted model of U.S.-Soviet-Chinese relations, and employs multiple, temporally disaggregated time series for great power behavior. We present such an approach by developing a multiequation model for Sino-Soviet-U.S. relations and assembling three sets of events time series on these countries' behaviors. We then present the results of our analysis and briefly sketch some theoretical implications of the results.

Reciprocity and Reality: A Short Review

The quasi-experimental studies of great power politics can be divided into three groups, depending on the indicator of behavior they employ; there are conflicting results regarding bureaucratic routine and reciprocity in each case.

The first and most extensive set of investigations focuses on *military spending* patterns. These studies attempt to determine whether the superpowers increase (decrease) their military spending in response to increases (decreases) in spending by the adversary. Many of these studies conclude that superpower military spending shows no evidence of reciprocity. Rather, military spending is an outgrowth of bureaucratic routine and other purely internal factors (see the reviews in Cusack and Ward 1981 and Ostrom and Marra 1986).

Recently, several researchers have proposed a new explanation for the apparent lack of reciprocity in military spending. These scholars argue that reciprocity is not evident because countries respond not to the actual spending levels of their adversary but only to *errors* in expected spending levels. For example, Williams and McGinnis (1988) contend that superpower behavior is a function of expected cost (C_t), expected threat (T_t), and the information that countries have about the international system (Z_t). Formally, superpower foreign policy behavior (FP_t) can be written as $FP_t = f(C_t, T_t; Z_t)$ where $C_t = g(Z_t)$ and $T_t = h(Z_t)$. Assuming that f is a simple linear additive function and that expected costs and threats are calculated according to the identities $C_t = C_{t-1} + u_t$ and $T_t = T_{t-1} + v_t$, where u_t and v_t are unexpected shocks or innovations in costs and threats, it follows that superpower behavior will *appear* to be a random walk: $FP_t = FP_{t-1} + e_t$, where $e_t = (u_t + v_t)$. Then, since superpowers obtain and efficiently process essentially the same information, they can form unbiased forecasts of each other's behavior. In turn, only the error terms (surprises) will be correlated. Williams and McGinnis' analysis of annual estimates of superpower military spending indeed fits this pattern: each superpower's spending is approximately a random walk, and the residuals of their equations are correlated at about .60.[1]

Rational expectations theorists also have addressed the questions of whether and how superpowers reciprocate each other's cooperative or hostile initiatives. In their framework, a cooperative initiative is essentially an unexpected or surprise act of cooperation on the part of one country toward another. It is defined, operationally, as the residuals from the respective equations in the fitted models for U.S.-Soviet relations. The correlation between these residuals presumably indicates the tendency of countries to take, and/or respond to, such initiatives simultaneously. The response of the fitted models to a hypothetical but historically grounded (estimated) residual shock indicates the likely effect that a surprise policy initiative will have on the two countries' behaviors. In these ways, the rational expectations framework allows researchers to conduct more realistic simulations of the effects of superpower policy initiatives than the more familiar "reactive linkage" framework (see McGinnis and Williams 1989a).

Unfortunately, these new studies also produce somewhat contradictory results. For instance, Majeski (1985) found that only the United States forms and employs current expectations of its adversary's military expenditures; the Soviet Union's spending pattern is not responsive to any current expectation of U.S. spending. Williams and McGinnis' (1988) findings, on the other hand, imply that both the United States and the Soviet Union respond to current expectations. Williams and McGinnis also show that both countries respond in the same way to contemporaneous shocks—positive, expectational errors in spending—by increasing spending in response to a shared positive surge of spending by both countries.

A second cluster of studies of superpower reciprocity focuses on patterns of *events* rather than of military spending. These studies analyze the causal links among countries' cooperative or hostile behaviors toward each other. For instance, using a Richardson-type model of behavior and annual events data from the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), Ward (1982) finds evidence of both bureaucratic routine (self-driven behavior) and reciprocity. The Soviet Union appears to react more strongly to U.S. behavior than does the United States to Soviet Behavior.[2] Other studies of events data reach similar conclusions about U.S.-Soviet relations (Starr 1982, 236; Thompson and Rapkin 1982). However, in a follow-up study, Rajmaira and Ward (1988) obtained contradictory results. Their application of somewhat more sophisticated least squares estimation techniques to quarterly events data turned up little evidence of direct reciprocity. The only exception was the seemingly reciprocal responses of the United States and the Soviet Union to *hostile* acts directed toward one another.

A third set of investigations focuses on the links between military spending and event patterns. These studies are motivated by the realization that responses to defense spending policies may take many forms (Most and Starr 1984) and by the idea that policymakers' perceptions or expectations may be altered in the face of cooperative or hostile acts by an adversary (see, e.g., McGinnis and Williams 1986, 1989a). Once more, the results are contradictory. For example, in studying the influence of relative military forces on superpower defense spending, Ward (1984, 306, 308) finds that the United States responds reciprocally to Soviet behavior while the Soviets increase (decrease) military spending *inversely* in response to cooperative (hostile) acts by the United States. But McGinnis and Williams (1986) find no direct relationship between the hostile behavior of the superpowers and defense spending patterns. In a recent follow-up study, McGinnis and Williams (1989a) continue to find few *direct* relationships between superpower spending levels and superpower hostility. But they again find high contemporaneous correlations between shocks in the corresponding variables as well as some mutually reciprocal responses to these shocks and therefore conclude that the superpowers employ rational expectations.[3]

In sum, existing studies produce three competing propositions about great power relations:

1. *Routine.* Great powers' behaviors are essentially self-driven by bureaucratic routine and other internal factors. Great powers do not respond to the actions of other great powers.
2. *Rational Expectations.* Great powers' behaviors only appear to be self-driven but actually reflect rational expectations about other powers' behaviors. Great powers react to (or mutually take) unexpected policy innovations in ways that connote reciprocity.
3. *Reciprocity.* Great powers' behaviors respond, in some part, in kind to the actions of other countries. Note that great powers' behaviors may be partly self-driven and partly reciprocal, reflecting a mix of routine and reciprocity.

Critique

The debate over bureaucratic momentum versus reciprocity is flawed both substantively and methodologically. Substantively, the great majority of studies seek to resolve the controversy by analyzing patterns of U.S. and Soviet behaviors alone, ignoring the potential role of a third key great power, China. This omission may seriously bias the results of the studies.

China's status as a great power is undisputed; that China's behavior at times influences the behavior of the superpowers is well recognized. Only China shares with the superpowers the combination of vast territory, very large populations and military forces, nuclear weapons, great regional clout, and messianic ideologies (Robinson 1987, 4). There is evidence that China, rather than the United States, poses the chief security threat to the Soviet Union in the minds of both Soviet policy makers and Soviet international relations scholars (Lynch 1987, xix). While U.S. policymakers, for their part, show greater concern about the Soviet Union than China, in the Cold War era they were deeply preoccupied with the conflict areas around China's borders (Korea, Vietnam, and others) in addition to the East–West standoff in Europe. Finally, while other great powers such as France, Britain, Germany, and Japan have played relatively constant roles in East–West relations, China has shifted its relations with the superpowers dramatically over time, repeatedly demonstrating an independent foreign policy.

Arguments explicitly connecting the state of superpower relations with Chinese behavior are frequently made by scholars and policymakers. For example, Dittmer (1981) explains U.S.-Soviet relations in part in terms of a three-person game among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. And Bull argues that a "concert of great powers in our time" depends on the strengthening of U.S.-Soviet detente "and its extension to include China" (1977, 298). Policymakers in the Carter administration worried that U.S. arms sales to China would lead, by way of increased Soviet-Chinese tensions, to a "fundamental reassessment" of Soviet behavior toward the United States, stiffening Soviet positions on SALT negotiations (*New York Times,* 24 June 1977; on actual Soviet reactions to U.S.-China improvements in 1972 and 1978, see Garthoff 1985, 240, 710). The view that U.S. support for China could provoke Soviet hostility toward the United States also surfaced among U.S. officials in the 1960s (Segal 1982) and the 1980s (Friedberg 1983, 141). Likewise, Sino-Soviet relations have reportedly been sensitive to developments in U.S.-Soviet relations both in the mid-1960s (Segal 1982, 91) and the 1980s (Dittmer 1987, 42).

The few quasi experiments that include Chinese behavior suggest that great power relations have become increasingly triangular in nature. Starr's (1982) analysis is illustrative. Using monthly events data for 1971–79 and correlational and multiple regression techniques, Starr finds several triangular relationships among U.S., Soviet, and Chinese behaviors. For example, he finds that during the Carter administration hostile acts by the Chinese toward the United States were correlated with cooperative acts by the United States toward the Soviet Union (see also Cusack and Ward 1981). For all these reasons a thorough analysis of great power routine and reciprocity should include China, not just the superpowers. The existing literature is substantively flawed by the frequent omission of China.

This literature is flawed methodologically as well.[4] First, it suffers from specification error—notably, omitted variables. The failure to include variables for behavior by and toward China in equations for U.S. and Soviet behavior may render regression estimates biased and inconsistent. Omitted variable bias plagues existing studies in another way when researchers misspecify the lag length on their right-hand-side variables. In such circumstances, the equations for U.S. and Soviet behaviors may contain an incorrect or insufficient number of lagged values of the variables.[5] There simply is no consensus about the correct lag lengths for these equations or about the appropriate set of equation restrictions generally. Yet the equations must be correctly specified or inaccurate inferences may be drawn about the existence of bureaucratic routine or international reciprocity in great power behavior. Such concerns about specification error suggest the need for weakly restricted models that include variables for Chinese behaviors and also a relatively large number of lags for behavioral processes (see Freeman, Williams, and Lin 1989).

Second, existing studies suffer from measurement error. The data base for many of them is highly aggregated in a temporal sense. Temporal aggregation tends to mask causal relationships. For example, temporal aggregation can transform one-way causal relationships into feedback (reciprocal) relationships; and it increases the importance of instantaneous feedback or contemporaneous correlation—the main indicator of mutual responsiveness according to the rational expectations school. The implication is that some of the results mentioned above may be flawed by the use of annual data—data that span the true or natural time unit of countries' policymaking processes and hence confound causal inferences. If more disaggregated data were used, we would obtain more accurate and consistent results about great power behaviors.[6]

Of course, military spending data normally are available only on an annual basis. Events data, on the other hand, can be disaggregated to monthly levels. This allows us to address the inferential problems mentioned above. With events data we can, for example, resolve the inconsistencies between the results obtained by Starr (1982) and Rajmaira and Ward (1988).[7] Finally, the general quality of events data (Achen 1987) requires the use of *multiple* indicators of behaviors. We need more than one (temporally disaggregated) time series to gauge the reliability of our results.

To resolve the debate about bureaucratic routine and reciprocity in great power relations, then, we must construct an improved quasi experiment that ameliorates the specification and measurement errors in existing research.

Research Design

Model and Method

We used the vector autoregressive (VAR) approach to test the three propositions.[8] This approach addresses the problem of specification uncertainty, and it also yields insights into the effects of (unexpected) cooperative initiatives by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. The VAR model is a multiequation, reduced form in which each country's recent past behaviors toward the others are included in each equation. Our model has six equations—one for each country's behavior toward each of the other two—with the same six variables on the right-hand side of each equation:

$$\begin{aligned} US_t = \alpha_{10} &+ \Sigma\, \alpha_{11i} US_{t-i} + \Sigma\, \alpha_{12i} UC_{t-i} \\ &+ \Sigma\, \alpha_{13i} SU_{t-i} + \Sigma\, \alpha_{14i} SC_{t-i} \\ &+ \Sigma\, \alpha_{15i} CU_{t-i} + \Sigma\, \alpha_{16i} CS_{t-i} \\ &+ e_1 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

$$\begin{aligned} UC_t = \alpha_{20} &+ \Sigma\, \alpha_{21i} US_{t-i} + \Sigma\, \alpha_{22i} UC_{t-i} \\ &+ \Sigma\, \alpha_{23i} SU_{t-i} + \Sigma\, \alpha_{24i} SC_{t-i} \\ &+ \Sigma\, \alpha_{25i} CU_{t-i} + \Sigma\, \alpha_{26i} CS_{t-i} \\ &+ e_2 \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

$$\begin{aligned} SU_t = \alpha_{30} &+ \Sigma\, \alpha_{31i} US_{t-i} + \Sigma\, \alpha_{32i} UC_{t-i} \\ &+ \Sigma\, \alpha_{33i} SU_{t-i} + \Sigma\, \alpha_{34i} SC_{t-i} \\ &+ \Sigma\, \alpha_{35i} CU_{t-i} + \Sigma\, \alpha_{36i} CS_{t-i} \\ &+ e_3 \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

$$\begin{aligned} SC_t = \alpha_{40} &+ \Sigma\, \alpha_{41i} US_{t-i} + \Sigma\, \alpha_{42i} UC_{t-i} \\ &+ \Sigma\, \alpha_{43i} SU_{t-i} + \Sigma\, \alpha_{44i} SC_{t-i} \\ &+ \Sigma\, \alpha_{45i} CU_{t-i} + \Sigma\, \alpha_{46i} CS_{t-i} \\ &+ e_4 \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

$$\begin{aligned} CU_t = \alpha_{50} &+ \Sigma\, \alpha_{51i} US_{t-i} + \Sigma\, \alpha_{52i} UC_{t-i} \\ &+ \Sigma\, \alpha_{53i} SU_{t-i} + \Sigma\, \alpha_{54i} SC_{t-i} \\ &+ \Sigma\, \alpha_{55i} CU_{t-i} + \Sigma\, \alpha_{56i} CS_{t-i} \\ &+ e_5 \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

$$\begin{aligned} CS_t = \alpha_{60} &+ \Sigma\, \alpha_{61i} US_{t-i} + \Sigma\, \alpha_{62i} UC_{t-i} \\ &+ \Sigma\, \alpha_{63i} SU_{t-i} + \Sigma\, \alpha_{64i} SC_{t-i} \\ &+ \Sigma\, \alpha_{65i} CU_{t-i} + \Sigma\, \alpha_{66i} CS_{t-i} \\ &+ e_6 \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

US_t represents behavior by the United States toward the Soviet Union at time t, UC_t represents behavior by the United States toward China at time t, SU_t represents Soviet behavior toward the United States at time t, and so forth. The α's are coefficients of particular variables in each equation; the summations are for $i = 1, \ldots L$, where L is the number of lags of the right-hand-side variables in each equation. The e's are error terms. As described below, the lag lengths of the right-hand-side variables in the VAR model are chosen through an analysis of the data rather than imposed a priori.

Tests of hypotheses are based on the now-familiar notion of Granger causality (Freeman 1983; see also Majeski and Jones 1981), the contemporaneous correlation of residuals from the fitted model (McGinnis and Williams 1989a; Williams and McGinnis 1988), and the response of the fitted model to an unexpected shock in one of the variables corresponding to the positive, one-standard-deviation, orthogonalized value of the respective residuals (Freeman, Williams and Lin 1989; Williams and McGinnis 1988). This last part of the statistical analysis amounts to a realistic evaluation of the effects of hypothetical surprise increases in the level of net cooperation of one country toward another. The realism derives from the fact that the magnitudes of these cooperative initiatives are based on the actual values of the corresponding residuals of the fitted model.[9]

The competing claims about the causal connections among the behaviors of great powers (or lack thereof) can be represented in the following way. The first proposition, that the behaviors of the three countries are purely self-driven by bureaucratic routine and other internal factors, implies that the coefficients on all but the endogenous right-hand-side variable of the corresponding equation are jointly zero—e.g., that in equation 1 for U.S. behavior toward the Soviet Union, $\Sigma\ \alpha_{12i} = \Sigma\ \alpha_{13i} = \Sigma\ \alpha_{14i} = \Sigma\ \alpha_{15i} = \Sigma\ \alpha_{16i} = 0$ (where summation across i denotes the lagged terms for each right-hand-side variable in the equation).

The second proposition, that the three countries' behaviors are outgrowths of rational expectations, implies that because the three countries all have rational expectations, their behaviors are random walks. But this second proposition, unlike the first, implies that shocks (surprises) in countries' behaviors toward one another —the residuals from the six equations— are highly intercorrelated. And reciprocity will be found in the sense that a (simulated) unexpected positive surge of cooperation in the policies of one country toward another produces a cooperative response toward it by the latter.

The third proposition suggests that in addition to the possibility that some of the coefficients on the right-hand-side endogenous variables are nonzero ("routine"), there are also nonzero coefficients on response variables, indicating direct bilateral response, or perhaps triangular response(s). In the US_t equation, for instance, the coefficients α_{13i} might be nonzero, indicating bilateral response of the United States toward the Soviet Union; and/or the α_{14i}, α_{15i}, or α_{16i} coefficients might be nonzero, suggesting triangular response(s). Like the second proposition, the third proposition implies that countries react in kind to a surprise act of cooperation toward them and perhaps toward other countries.

Data

In order to counteract measurement error, we assembled three events data sets. The first data set, Azar's (1980) COPDAB, contains 9,072 events for the U.S.-Soviet, U.S.-Chinese, and Soviet-Chinese dyads for 1948-78. The second, McClelland's (1971) extended World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS) contains 9,828 events for the three dyads; it covers the period 1966-86 (extended data for 1980-86 were generously shared by Charles McClelland). The third data set, Ashley's (1980) U.S.-Soviet-China events data (ASHLEY), contains 14,397 events for the three dyads for 1950-72.

Each data set was transformed into six monthly time series—one for each country's behavior toward each of the other two—representing levels of net cooperation (weighted cooperation minus weighted hostility). Each monthly data point was the weighted sum of actions taken by one country toward another during the month, with each action weighted according to the amount of cooperation or hostility implicit in the category of action taken. The presumption here is that policymakers think in terms of monthly aggregations of events and that in so doing they weigh the relative balance of cooperative and hostile actions that a country has taken.[10]

Our net cooperation time series are displayed graphically and discussed at length elsewhere (Goldstein and Freeman 1990, 36–66). Suffice it to say that the time series capture conventional wisdom about the ebb and flow of relations among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. For example, the U.S.–Soviet data indicate that relations were particularly hostile in the first years after 1948 (Berlin, Korea), the early 1960s (U-2, Cuba), and the early 1980s (the "second Cold War"), while relations were most cooperative in the early 1970s (détente). As regards U.S.–Chinese relations, the data show persistent hostility with intermittent crises from 1949 through the 1960s, with particularly hostile periods around the Korean and Vietnam Wars. In the 1970s these relations became more cooperative. Meanwhile, Sino-Soviet relations appear consistently cooperative in the 1950s (Sino-Soviet alliance), then turn hostile in the 1960s (culminating in the border fighting of 1969), and gradually stabilize at a modest level of hostility in the 1970s and early 1980s. The face validity of the raw data (i.e., their consistency with conventional accounts of the trends and turning points in U.S.–Soviet–Chinese relations) increases our confidence that the data capture the essence of great power politics in the 1948–86 period.

Two criticisms might nonetheless be leveled at our measurement strategy. The first is that policymakers do not weigh cooperative and hostile acts together but rather treat them in fundamentally different ways, reacting mainly to *hostile* events (McGinnis and Williams 1989a; Rajmaira and Ward 1988). Recognizing this possibility, we also analyzed a set of COPDAB time series constructed from hostile events only. As reported below, we obtained essentially the same results in this ancillary analysis as for our analyses of the net cooperation time series. A second criticism derives from the nature of events data, which are thought to be unduly "noisy." Coding and weighting of reported events from the press gives only a rough approximation of countries' behaviors. The monthly movements in countries' measured behaviors may well contain random fluctuations. Statistical analyses of such data accordingly will be biased *against* finding causal links between one country's behavior and the prior behavior of another country. In our case, the use of events data biases our analyses toward confirming propositions 1 and 2 while disconfirming proposition 3; that is, our measurement strategy creates a very stringent test of the third proposition—a test that makes it difficult to find much evidence of direct reciprocity between great powers because events data are so noisy. Nonetheless, in fact, our results support the third proposition. So our findings cannot be criticized on the grounds of these data problems.

Model Calibration and Evaluation

In calibrating our model we were sensitive to the fact that the nature of Sino-Soviet–U.S. relations may have changed at various times over the last forty years as a consequence, for example, of leadership changes in the three countries. The coefficients of the model in equations 1–6 therefore may take on different values in different historical eras.[11] In addition, the three teams that coded the data sets may have emphasized different characteristics of the three countries' policymaking processes; and as a result the lag structures of the statistical models for the three data sets might be different.

With both these considerations in mind, we analyzed the three data sets with respect to lag length and temporal stability. A modified likelihood ratio statistic was used for both purposes.[12] Analysis of the time frame of response processes showed that six, three, and two monthly lags were needed for the models with COPDAB, WEIS, and ASHLEY time series, respectively; that is, the great powers' past behaviors affect subsequent behaviors for no more than two to six months (see Goldstein and Freeman 1990, 71, 168). This again suggests that many existing studies are in error in using *annual* data aggregations (see Freeman 1990; Goldstein n.d.). These results also suggest that relevant lags of right-hand-side variables have been omitted from the models (such as Starr's [1982]) that include only a single lag of monthly measures.

As for the temporal stability of Sino-Soviet-U.S. relations, many possible periodizations and "break points" have been proposed by students of great power politics. Most of these are defined by leadership regimes in each country and major international incidents in which great powers were involved. We examined the stability of our models across all U.S. and Soviet leadership transitions and across several key Chinese and international episodes. The results of these stability tests suggest three break points at which patterns of behavior among the three countries changed: the early 1950s, the late 1960s, and the early 1980s. We based our analysis for each data set on the longest period of overall stability of coefficients. In the COPDAB analysis, the instability of the late 1960s appeared to be only temporary, with no permanent, significant change of coefficients; hence, we analyzed the period of overall stability from April 1953 to December 1978 (309 months). The WEIS analysis indicated break points around July 1969 and November 1982, so we analyzed July 1969 to October 1982 (160 months). The ASHLEY analysis indicated break points around July 1955 and January 1969; we analyzed July 1955 to December 1968 (162 months). We will refer to the statistical representations of each of these periods as the COPDAB (1953–78), WEIS (1969–82), and ASHLEY (1955–68) models, respectively.[13]

Thus, our analysis was based on weakly, but appropriately, specified models in terms of both lagged terms and stable coefficients. Again, our goal was to determine which of the theoretical propositions—routine, rational expectations, or reciprocity—best describes great power relations for all three models, each model being based on relatively independent measures of great power behaviors.[14]

Results

The results of the *F*-tests for the three models are reported in Table 1. They show considerable evidence of bureaucratic routine and provide support in certain instances for rational expectations theorists' claim that great power behaviors approximate random walks. There is also compelling evidence, however, that great powers respond to the behaviors of other great powers.

Consider, first, bilateral responses—the tendency for one country's behavior toward another country to depend on the other country's prior behavior toward it. There are six possible bilateral responses among the three countries. In the COPDAB model, four of the six bilateral relations are statistically significant at the .05 level; in the WEIS model three of the six bilateral relations are statistically significant at the .05 level, and a fourth relationship is statistically significant at the .10 level; and in the ASHLEY model two of the six relations are statistically significant at the .05 level, and a third is statistically significant at the .10 level. Figure 1 summarizes these results.

In addition, there is evidence of triangular responses, but interestingly only for the Sino-Soviet dyad. As in Starr's (1982) analysis, actions by and toward the United States affect Soviet and Chinese behavior toward each other. Of the many possible triangular influences, those affecting Sino-Soviet relations accounted for almost all the significant triangular effects in the three models (see Figure 2).

These results contradict the first and second propositions. They imply quite

Table 1. Tests for Direct Causal Connections among Behaviors of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China

Variable		COPDAB (1953–78)		WEIS (1969–82)		ASHLEY (1955–68)	
Dependent	Independent	*F*-Statistic	Significance	*F*-Statistic	Significance	*F*-Statistic	Significance
United States/ Soviet Union (US)	US	6.00	.001***	2.95	.035*	5.18	.007**
	UC	1.28	.265	2.96	.035*	.64	.528
	SU	2.73	.014*	2.24	.087†	2.51	.085†
	SC	.29	.940	1.86	.140	.18	.838
	CU	.98	.441	2.02	.114	.43	.651
	CS	.89	.504	.67	.569	.49	.613
United States/ China (UC)	US	.72	.636	.37	.774	.04	.956
	UC	3.10	.006**	1.13	.340	4.28	.016*
	SU	2.40	.029*	2.11	.102*	.88	.417
	SC	1.28	.265	1.76	.157	2.06	.131
	CU	2.89	.010**	.52	.671	.12	.891
	CS	1.02	.415	.43	.729	.54	.582
Soviet Union/ United States (SU)	US	1.05	.396	3.52	.017*	.51	.600
	UC	.60	.729	2.14	.098†	.02	.981
	SU	10.66	.001***	2.07	.107	6.90	.002**
	SC	1.52	.173	.13	.945	.41	.662
	CU	.57	.751	.79	.503	.64	.528
	CS	.97	.445	.79	.499	.47	.627
Soviet Union/ China (SC)	US	2.13	.050†	.36	.780	4.95	.008**
	UC	1.56	.158	.33	.801	1.85	.161
	SU	.96	.451	2.52	.061†	1.39	.253
	SC	5.33	.001***	2.72	.047*	4.26	.016*
	CU	1.07	.383	3.77	.012*	3.19	.044*
	CS	3.77	.002**	3.95	.010**	5.81	.004**
China/United States (CU)	US	.46	.836	1.87	.138	.24	.788
	UC	.53	.782	4.73	.004**	4.09	.019*
	SU	1.37	.227	1.72	.166	.17	.844
	SC	.96	.452	1.02	.385	1.19	.308
	CU	12.54	.001***	7.43	.001***	5.89	.003**
	CS	.59	.737	.90	.444	.15	.861
China/Soviet Union (CS)	US	2.46	.025*	1.69	.172	5.33	.006**
	UC	.64	.697	.68	.565	1.54	.217
	SU	1.05	.392	4.92	.003**	2.58	.079†
	SC	4.04	.001***	.51	.673	.33	.716**
	CU	1.94	.074†	1.68	.175	.39	.678
	CS	4.02	.001***	2.97	.034*	4.56	.012*
Number of cases		303		157		160	

Note: *F*-statistics test relationship between lags of independent variable and unlagged dependent variable. Variable names represent behavior of country denoted by first letter toward country denoted by second letter (e.g., UC means United States behavior toward China). Statistical significance levels for *F*-statistics are shown; levels *below* .001 are listed as .001 (.001–.0025 listed as .002).

†$p < .10$.
*$p < .05$.
**$p < .01$.
***$p < .001$.

Figure 1. Results for Bilateral Direct Causal Connections among Great Power Behaviors in Three VAR Models


Summary of All Three Data Sets
US toward Soviet
US toward China
(U.S. Actions)
Statistical significance at less than .10:
Three data sets
Two data sets
One data set
Soviet toward US
China toward US
(Soviet Actions)
(Chinese Actions)
Soviet toward China
China toward Soviet
COPDAB 1953–78
US toward Soviet
US toward China
Soviet toward US
China toward US
Soviet toward China
China toward Soviet
ASHLEY 1955–68
US toward Soviet
US toward China
Soviet toward US
China toward US
Soviet toward China
China toward Soviet
WEIS 1969–82
US toward Soviet
US toward China
Soviet toward US
China toward US
Soviet toward China
China toward Soviet
Statistical significance:
Less than .01
Less than .05
Less than .10

Note: Arrows indicate statistically significant relationships between lags of independent variables and unlagged dependent variables in model. Arrows thus indicate direction of causality (pointing toward responding country).

Figure 2. Results for Triangular Direct Causal Connections among Great Power Behaviors in Three VAR Models


Summary of All Three Data Sets
(U.S. Actions)
US toward Soviet
US toward China
Statistical significance at less than .10:
Three data sets
Two data sets
One data set
Soviet toward US
China toward US
(Soviet Actions)
(Chinese Actions)
Soviet toward China
China toward Soviet
COPDAB 1953–78
US toward Soviet
US toward China
Soviet toward US
China toward US
Soviet toward China
China toward Soviet
ASHLEY 1955–68
US toward Soviet
US toward China
Soviet toward US
China toward US
Soviet toward China
China toward Soviet
WEIS 1969–82
US toward Soviet
US toward China
Soviet toward US
China toward US
Soviet toward China
China toward Soviet
Statistical significance:
Less than .01
Less than .05
Less than .10

Note: Arrows indicate statistically significant relationships between lags of independent variables and unlagged dependent variables in model. Arrows thus indicate direction of causality (pointing toward responding country).

Table 2. Correlation Matrices for Residuals from Three VAR Models of Great Power Relations

	COPDAB Oct. 1953–Dec. 1978					WEIS Oct. 1969–Oct. 1982					ASHLEY Sept. 1955–Dec. 1968				
	UC	SU	SC	CU	CS	UC	SU	SC	CU	CS	UC	SU	SC	CU	CS
US	.05	*.49*	-.09	.07	-.08	-.15	*.47*	.13	-.13	.03	-.01	*.66*	-.09	.01	-.05
UC	—	.05	.01	*.26*	.07	—	-.00	-.02	*.42*	.04	—	-.04	-.03	*.26*	.06
SU	—	—	-.06	.12	-.01	—	—	-.01	.12	-.03	—	—	-.03	.08	-.00
SC	—	—	—	-.10	*.78*	—	—	—	.00	*.24*	—	—	—	-.01	*.69*
CU	—	—	—	—	.08	—	—	—	—	.20	—	—	—	—	.03

Note: Row and column labels indicate equations from which residuals come, in VAR model connecting behaviors of United States, Soviet Union, and China. For example, the US/UC cell in the upper left contains the correlation of residuals from the equation for U.S. behavior toward the Soviet Union (US) with those from the equation for U.S. behavior toward China (UC). Residual correlations for each dyad (e.g., US with SU) are italicized.

strongly that great power behavior is not solely an outgrowth of bureaucratic routine or of other internal factors. Nor are the three countries' behaviors consistent with "idealized" or sophisticated rational expectations; U.S., Soviet, and Chinese behaviors do *not* appear to be random walks. Rather, each country reacts to the actions of at least one other country in a way that reflects a mix of routine and reciprocity.

Some support for the rational expectation theory is evident in the matrices of contemporaneous correlations (Table 2). The matrices show that in a bilateral sense, the "innovations" or shocks in the three countries' behaviors are correlated. For example, the residuals from the equations for US_t and SU_t are correlated at about .50 in all three data sets. But the residuals for the equations corresponding to triangular linkages in the behavior of the great powers are not highly correlated contemporaneously (even where lagged responses give significant *F*-tests). For instance, the residuals for the equations for U.S. behavior toward the Soviets (US_t) and for Soviet behavior toward China (SC_t) are correlated at only −.09, .13, and −.09 in the three data sets, respectively. Likewise, the residuals for the equations for SU_t and CS_t are correlated at less than −.03.

Our simulations of the effects of hypothetical shocks in the variables on the fitted VAR models for the strategic triangle also show much evidence of bilateral reciprocity. A positive surge in net cooperation from each country toward the other produces a reciprocal response in all six cases for the COPDAB model, all six cases for the WEIS model, and five of the six cases for the ASHLEY model. These results are clearly consistent with the notion that U.S.–Soviet–Chinese relations are governed by a norm of reciprocity.

The results of these simulations are more difficult to interpret with respect to triangular responses. Briefly, they affirm that Sino–Soviet behaviors are more triangular than behaviors involving the United States: in their actions toward each other, the Soviets and Chinese consistently take into account U.S. behavior. But this Sino–Soviet triangular response takes several forms. For the COPDAB and ASHLEY models, for example, surges of U.S. net cooperation toward the Soviets evoke Soviet and Chinese hostility toward one another. This is consistent with the notion that an outside threat increases dyadic cohesion. For the WEIS model a surge of net cooperation by the Soviets toward the United States evokes a hostile Chinese response toward the Soviets, and a surge of Chinese net coop-

Table 3. Tests for Direct Causal Connections among Great Power Behaviors Using COPDAB Data Set, Hostile Events Only

Variable			
Dependent	Independent	F-Stat.	Signif.
US	US	5.60	.001***
	UC	.80	.571
	SU	3.31	.004**
	SC	.58	.749
	CU	1.58	.152
	CS	.90	.496
UC	US	.80	.570
	UC	2.36	.031*
	SU	2.84	.011*
	SC	.88	.508
	CU	4.96	.001***
	CS	.51	.802
SU	US	1.10	.360
	UC	1.21	.304
	SU	16.75	.001***
	SC	1.13	.346
	CU	1.40	.214
	CS	.67	.674
SC	US	1.08	.378
	UC	.92	.478
	SU	.84	.543
	SC	6.62	.001***
	CU	1.43	.204
	CS	5.10	.001***
CU	US	.68	.667
	UC	.30	.938
	SU	1.36	.232
	SC	2.44	.026*
	CU	13.00	.001***
	CS	1.37	.225
CS	US	2.19	.045*
	UC	.43	.860
	SU	1.75	.110
	SC	6.02	.001***
	CU	3.05	.007**
	CS	6.00	.001***

$^{\dagger}p < .10$.
$^{*}p < .05$.
$^{**}p < .01$.
$^{***}p < .001$.

Note: Format follows Table 1. Variable names indicate direction of behavior, e.g., SC indicates Soviet behavior toward China. Statistical significance of F-statistic indicates relationship between lags of independent variable and unlagged dependent variable. Significance levels *below* .001 are listed as .001; (.001–.0025 listed as .002). Residual correlations are between equations in which variables indicated are dependent variables. Number of cases = 303 (months). Below is the correlation matrix of residuals, following the format of Table 2.

	UC	SU	SC	CU	CS
US	–.03	.44	–.02	.02	.04
UC	—	.08	–.05	.22	.06
SU	—	—	–.05	.09	–.01
SC	—	—	—	–.03	.81
CU	—	—	—	—	.13

eration toward the United States evokes a hostile Soviet response toward China. This is consistent with the notion that China and the Soviet Union punish each other for cooperating with the United States (or reward each other for hostility toward the United States). Most triangular responses in the WEIS simulation were opposite in nature to those in the COPDAB and ASHLEY models; this pattern suggests that the nature of triangularity (though not its asymmetry in terms of affecting the Sino-Soviet dyad) may have changed from the earlier period covered by COPDAB and ASHLEY to the later period covered by WEIS. This would not be surprising in view of the shift in China's alliances over these decades (more details on our analysis of triangularity can be found in Goldstein and Freeman 1990, 79–83).

Overall, our results are quite robust. In a COPDAB model based solely on hostile events (Table 3), we find essentially the same causal connections among the three countries' behaviors. We also obtain the same kinds of bilateral and triangular responses in simulations that employ a different ordering of our variables.[15]

Implications

Our analysis places the study of great power politics on much stronger empirical footings. We have identified serious specification errors in previously published research. We have shown that more than one monthly lag of variables must be included in models of great power relations and that temporally disaggregated (monthly rather than annual) measures reveal direct causal connections among the behaviors of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. We have shown the importance of including behavior by and toward China in studies of great power politics and have identified an important asymmetry in the nature of the strategic triangle composed of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. We also have shown that most existing studies employ incorrect periodizations of great power relations; the time frames of these studies span periods of structural instability. Hence, the coefficient estimates in these studies are most likely inaccurate. Our investigation, by contrast, is based on specifications that are much less likely to be in error; it covers time frames that by all indications are structurally stable. Our results are generally robust for three separate data sets on great power behavior and for a data set based on hostile behavior only. Our findings about the nature of great power politics are thus sounder than previously reported findings.

Our results are of substantive and theoretical importance. To begin with, they confirm the existence of a strategic triangle in which China plays a key great power role, especially in relation to the Soviet Union (see Lynch 1987; Robinson 1987; Starr 1982). However, our analysis shows, contrary to some works (e.g., Dittmer 1981), that this triangle is characterized by a distinctive asymmetry, in which only the Sino-Soviet dyad is directly affected by triangular influences. The continuity in this triangular asymmetry from the 1950s to the 1970s implies that the strategic triangle took form long before scholars and policymakers became preoccupied with it (see Kim 1987; Segal 1982).

Our results yield new insights about great power policy making. They clearly illuminate "reactive links" between the behaviors of the three countries—links that belie the notion that great power decisionmaking is purely self-driven by bureaucratic routine and related internal factors. The results provide some support for rational expectations theories insofar as they confirm that the innovations or shocks in the variables for U.S., Soviet, and Chinese (bilateral) relations are contemporaneously correlated. However, our findings also challenge these theories in revealing direct causal connections between the behaviors of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China (Table 1) and an absence of contemporaneous correlations of residuals across equations corresponding to triangular responses (Table 2).[16]

Our research identifies three "break points" at which patterns of great power behavior changed somewhat—the early 1950s, the late 1960s, and the early 1980s.[17] This periodization corresponds roughly with the three major interventionary wars of the Cold War era—Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan—and with the points of greatest hostility in the strategic triangle as a whole (see, e.g., the cold war cycles of Rostow 1987, 834). Interestingly, the periodization also roughly conforms to major Soviet leadership transitions: the death of Stalin in 1953, the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964, and the death of Brezhnev in 1982. And it corresponds with partisan shifts in the U.S. presidency, Republicans regaining control in 1953, 1969, and 1981.

Finally, our research defines an empirical battlefield for international relations theorists. For scholars who study international cooperation in terms of two-person prisoner's dilemma games, our results challenge the idea that great powers actually play simple tit-for-tat strategies. We have identified pervasive reciprocity among the United States, the

Soviet Union, and China, providing heartening news for those who view reciprocity as a key norm underlying the possibility of international cooperation. But we have also shown that reciprocity operates in a more complex environment than most theorists realize, an environment with considerable bureaucratic routine as well as asymmetrical triangularity. Great powers appear to employ strategies that mix routine and reciprocity while responding, in some cases, to the behavior of third parties.

Our investigation also poses challenges for theorists who represent great power relations in terms of other kinds of games and models (e.g., Snidal 1985; Wagner 1983). A valid game-theoretic model of great power politics must predict the behavioral patterns we have found. In particular, such a model must predict bilateral reciprocity between the three countries, mixed with routine behavior in each country and triangular asymmetry with respect to Sino-Soviet relations. In general, our results suggest we should be studying three-person games with stylized asymmetries in payoffs along with elements of prisoner's dilemma-like incentives conducive to strategies of reciprocity (see Goldstein and Freeman 1990, 137-41).

For psychological theorists of international cooperation (e.g., Jervis 1976), our research validates the "spiral model" of reciprocal response rather than the "deterrence model" of inverse response for the Cold War era. Our finding of strong bureaucratic routine in all three countries supports psychological theorists' claims about needs for sustained series of cooperative initiatives to overcome inertia (Osgood's [1962] "GRIT" proposal) and effective communication of one's willingness to cooperate (Larson 1988). Also, our result about the consistency of reciprocity and triangularity over four decades implies that longstanding norms of reciprocity can lead to a great power security regime (Jervis 1981). At the same time, our results call for the incorporation of new research on the effects of triangular asymmetry—more specifically, on the conditions under which subjects will modify behavior toward a second subject based on the latter's relations with a third subject. Our results also call for an account of the behavioral changes that occurred at the historical "break points" we have identified.

In these ways, then, our investigation provides a solid empirical foundation for the study of great power politics. It contributes to the development of more realistic and practical theories of international cooperation, and delineates the conditions under which such cooperation must be sought. While great power behavior is a complex and difficult subject, we have moved a step closer to understanding that phenomenon and thus strengthening both theory and policy.

Notes

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 1988 American Political Science Association and 1989 International Studies Association meetings. We thank Tse-min Lin for research assistance. For sharing data collections we thank Charles McClelland and Richard Ashley. For their helpful comments and criticisms we thank Christopher Achen, Gary King, Deborah Larson, Jack Levy, Michael McGinnis, Bruce Russett, Duncan Snidal, Michael Ward, John Williams, and Dina Zinnes. For research support we thank the University of Southern California School of International Relations and the University of Minnesota Department of Political Science.

1. Under Williams and McGinnis' (1988) simple linear additive form, $FP_t = C_t + T_t$, from which it follows that $FP_{t-1} = C_{t-1} + T_{t-1}$. Substituting the identities for cost and threat into the first of these equations, we have $FP_t = C_{t-1} + u_t + T_{t-1} + v_t = (C_{t-1} + T_{t-1}) + (u_t + v_t) = FP_{t-1} + e_t$, where $e_t = (u_t + v_t)$. The rational expectations hypothesis is embodied in the idea that were it not for the *shocks* (surprises) in cost and threat, u_t and v_t, each superpower would be able (perfectly) to anticipate the other's behavior, so that when that behavior actually occurred, it would have no impact on the first superpower's behavior. In other words, if u_t

and v_t were both zero, the expected cost and threat estimates would remain the same ($C_t = C_{t-1}$ and $T_t = T_{t-1}$), so that current behavior would be the same as past behavior ($FP_t = FP_{t-1}$). See also McGinnis and Williams (1989a, esp. 1105–6). This approach builds on economic theories of rational expectations. See Sargent 1984, Hansen and Sargent 1980, and Jordan and Radner 1982.

2. Ward does not study the effects of a cooperative initiative per se. Presumably, he would interpret this as a unit change in the corresponding right-hand-side variable in his equations. Under this interpretation Ward's results would predict that a cooperative initiative by either superpower would elicit some cooperation, at least over the short term. In view of Ward's conclusions about the inherent instability of his models (1982, 122–23), such an effect would presumably be purely short-term.

3. McGinnis and Williams's (1986) results are similar to Ward's in terms of the effects of cooperative initiatives. McGinnis and Williams find that an unexpected surge of hostility by the United States toward the Soviets produces decreases in both U.S. and Soviet defense spending, while an unexpected act of hostility by the Soviets toward the United States again elicits an increase in U.S. spending. In their follow-up study (McGinnis and Williams 1989b), which employs Bayesian quasi-structural models rather than unrestricted VAR models, these authors do find mutually reciprocal responses to hostile initiatives. Note that a random walk prior is used in the Bayesian part of this analysis.

4. In addition to the criticisms given, familiar problems include failure to adjust for autocorrelation and idiosyncratic design decisions regarding measures and statistical models (see King 1989; Rajmaira and Ward 1988; Zinnes 1980).

5. Freeman (1990) and Rajmaira and Ward (1988) both show that the original Ward (1982) model in all likelihood omits relevant lags of right-hand-side variables. Below we show that Starr's (1982) models of the strategic triangle also omit relevant lags of the three countries' behaviors. King's (1989) Poisson regression models may be plagued by this problem as well. King's λ_3 parameter also may represent some of the effects of Chinese foreign policy.

6. Freeman (1990) discusses problems associated with systematic sampling and temporal aggregation in international relations research. He shows that the use of annual data led Ward (1982) to derive biased and inconsistent estimates of superpower reciprocity and Williams and McGinnis (1988) to draw inaccurate inferences about the adequacy of their random walk model of U.S. and Soviet behaviors. Goldstein (n.d.) discusses the effects of time aggregation in events data analyses of U.S.-Soviet relations.

7. From a conceptual standpoint, the move to events data is less problematic than one might assume, since researchers like Williams and McGinnis (1988, n. 12) use military expenditures only as an indicator of "superpower actions."

8. Computations used the Regression Analysis of Time Series (RATS 2.01 and 2.11) software package, on IBM or compatible micro- and mainframe computers, at the University of Southern California and the University of Minnesota.

9. In this way our analysis answers George, Farley, and Dallin's charge that to date, most experimental studies of great power cooperation lack external validity (1988, chap. 1). This part of the analysis is a simulation exercise. The VAR model is first transformed into its (recursive) moving average form, which expresses each left-hand-side variable as a sum of orthogonalized shocks in the variables in the system. With this new version of the model we can trace out the effect of a shock or surprise change in the level of any variable. As noted in the text, these shocks are operationalized with magnitudes of one standard deviation of the residual in the respective equation. The recursive moving average model is used to circumvent the fact that the residuals in the original VAR model are usually contemporaneously correlated. For more details of this aspect of the analysis, see Freeman, Williams, and Lin 1989.

10. This one-dimensional approach to measuring national behavior traces back to Richardson (1960, 13, 61). Thompson and Rapkin similarly study "net behavior (cooperation minus conflict)" (1982, 251). COPDAB events were weighted according to Azar's (1980) scale. Ashley's 30-point scale was assigned weights making it roughly comparable with the COPDAB categories while preserving the rank order of the Ashley scale. WEIS events were weighted using Vincent's (1979, 29, 13) scale, which differs little from a simple count of hostile and cooperative events. Our scaling and aggregation procedures are described more fully in Goldstein and Freeman 1990, chap. 2.

11. For example, a leadership transition might result in a change in the way that foreign policy makers form (adaptive) rational expectations. See McGinnis and Williams 1989b.

12. Since all six of our equations have identical lagged right-hand-side terms, ordinary least squares yields consistent, asymptotically efficient estimates of the coefficients in the VAR model. Extra lags of the variables or separate dummies for each time point in the presumed period of instability are placed in each equation. A modified likelihood ratio test is then used to determine if these extra lags or dummies significantly enhance the accuracy of the model. The modified likelihood ratio statistic takes into account the fact that the degrees of freedom in the asymptotic chi-squared distribution for the likelihood ratio statistic is often of roughly the same magnitude as the degrees of freedom left in the data after the vector autoregressive model is estimated. The usual test statistic is $T(\log|D_R| - \log|D_u|)$, where D_R and D_u are the matrices of the cross-products of residuals for

the restricted and unrestricted models, respectively. This is modified to be $(T - k)(\log|D_R| - \log|D_u|)$, where k is the total number of regression coefficients minus the number of equations in the model. See Sims 1980, 17-18.

13. The results for the COPDAB data suggest a temporary period around 1965-70, in which the patterns of response differed from the rest of the 1953-78 period but which led to no permanent change in the following years. (Note, however, that the "noisy" nature of events data may mean that our statistical tests are unable to detect this structural change in the system.) Unfortunately the time ranges covered by our other data sets prevent us from determining whether the other two break points (the early 1950s and the early 1980s) also would appear "temporary" in a longer time frame. The full results for the stability checks and lag length tests are available from us.

14. Note that by not imposing the same lag length and not focusing on the identical time period for all three models, we create an even more stringent test for the propositions. If one of the propositions holds up across all of these models, we can be more confident of its validity than if we had imposed the same lag length and studied the identical subperiod for all three models. Note that the analysis periods of the WEIS and ASHLEY data sets do not even overlap, so that not only the measurement procedures but the actual historical events were different for these two analyses.

15. The results of the simulations with fitted VAR models have been known to change when the order of the variables is changed (see Freeman, Williams, and Lin 1989). However, our results are robust against alternative orderings of the variables. These ancillary results are available from us.

16. Rational expectations theory might be revised to account for our results, for instance, by assuming that great powers process information inefficiently. For example, the direct causal connections between countries' behaviors could be explained in terms of delays in their bureaucracies' processing observations of other countries' behaviors. Such an argument would require more systematic study and modeling of bureaucratic decisionmaking in the United States, the Soviet Union, and China (Majeski 1985, 237-39; Achen 1988). The analytical challenge here is to build a rational expectations model for great power politics that predicts the pattern of bilateral and triangular relationships we have found. Making these improvements in rational expectations theory is no easy task. Note that Williams and McGinnis' model (1988) has difficulty predicting any causal links between countries' foreign policy behaviors because, *if only one or neither country reacts to expected threats, their theory still predicts that both countries behave like a random walk.* Technically minded readers can verify this by replacing the assumption that $FP_t = C_t + T_t$ with the alternative $FP_t = C_t$. Then, with costs defined as before, $C_t = C_{t-1} + v_t$. But now $FP_t = C_t$. So $FP_{t-1} = C_{t-1}$, and the behavioral equation is $FP_t = FP_{t-1} + v_t$; the superpowers still behave according to random walks, and any correlation of respective residuals represents common variation in shocks to cost variables alone.

17. Again, the second of these did not create sufficient instability in COPDAB coefficients to warrant breaking the 1953-78 period into two subperiods for analysis.

References

Achen, Christopher H. 1987. "Statistical Models for Event Data: A Review of Errors in Variable Theory." Paper delivered at the first Data Development for International Research Conference on Event Data, Columbus.

Achen, Christopher H. 1988. "A State with Bureaucratic Politics Is Representable As a Unitary Rational Actor." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.

Ashley, Richard K. 1980. *The Political Economy of War and Peace: The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle and the Modern Security Problematique.* London: Frances Pinter.

Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation.* New York: Basic Books.

Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane. 1985. "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." *World Politics* 38:226-54.

Azar, Edward E. 1980. "The Codebook of the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB)." University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Mimeo.

Bull, Hedley. 1977. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Cusack, Thomas R., and Michael Don Ward. 1981. "Military Spending in the United States, Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25:429-69.

Dittmer, Lowell. 1981. "The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-theoretical Analysis." *World Politics* 33:485-515.

Dittmer, Lowell. 1987. "The Strategic Triangle: A Critical Review." In *The Strategic Triangle: China, the United States, and the Soviet Union,* ed. Ilpyong J. Kim. New York: Paragon House.

Freeman, John R. 1983. "Granger Causality and the Time Series Analysis of Political Relationships." *American Journal of Political Science* 27:327-58.

Freeman, John R. 1990. "Systematic Sampling, Temporal Aggregation, and the Study of Political Relationships." In *Political Analysis,* ed. James

A. Stimson. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Freeman, John R., John T. Williams, and Tse-min Lin. 1989. "Vector Autoregression and the Study of Politics." *American Journal of Political Science* 33:842–77.

Friedberg, Aaron L. 1983. "The Collapsing Triangle: U.S. and Soviet Policies toward China, 1969–1980." *Comparative Strategy* 4:113–46.

Garthoff, Raymond. 1985. *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan.* Washington: Brookings.

George, Alexander L., Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds. 1988. *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Goldstein, Joshua S. N.d. "Reciprocity in Superpower Relations: An Empirical Analysis." *International Studies Quarterly.* Forthcoming.

Goldstein, Joshua S., and John R. Freeman. 1990. *Three-Way Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gowa, Joanne. 1986. "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations." *International Organization* 40:167–86.

Hansen, Lars R., and Thomas J. Sargent. 1980. "Formulating and Estimating Dynamic Linear Rational Expectations Models." *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* 2:7–46.

Huth, Paul K. 1988. *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Jensen, L. 1984. "Negotiating Strategic Arms Control, 1969–1979." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28:535–59.

Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Jervis, Robert. 1981. "Security Regimes." *International Organization* 36:357–78.

Jordan, J. S., and R. Radner. 1982. "Rational Expectations in Macroeconomic Models: An Overview." *Journal of Economic Theory* 26:201–23.

Keohane, Robert O. 1986. "Reciprocity in International Relations." *International Organization* 40:1–27.

Kim, Ilpyong J., ed. 1987. *The Strategic Triangle: China, the United States, and the Soviet Union.* New York: Paragon House.

King, Gary. 1989. "Event Count Models in International Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 33:123–48.

Larson, Deborah Welch. 1988. "The Psychology of Reciprocity in International Relations." *Negotiation Journal* 4:281–301.

Leng, Russell J., and Hugh G. Wheeler. 1979. "Influences, Strategies, Success, and War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23:655–84.

Lynch, Allen. 1987. *The Soviet Study of International Relations.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McClelland, Charles A. 1971. "The Management and Analysis of International Event Data." University of Southern California, Los Angeles. Typescript.

McGinnis, Michael D., and John T. Williams. 1986. "Constrained Competition between the Superpowers: A Model of Military Expenditures and Hostility Levels." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.

McGinnis, Michael D., and John T. Williams. 1989a. "Stability and Change in Superpower Rivalry." *American Political Science Review* 83:1101–24.

McGinnis, Michael D., and John T. Williams. 1989b. "Bayesian Rationality and Superpower Rivalry: A Game-theoretic Model." Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

Majeski, Stephen J. 1985. "Expectations and Arms Races." *American Journal of Political Science* 29: 217–45.

Majeski, Stephen J., and David Jones. 1981. "Arms Race Modeling: Causality Analysis and Model Specification." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25: 259–88.

Makins, Christopher J. 1985. "The Super-Power's Dilemma: Negotiating in the Nuclear Age." *Survival* 27:169–78.

Most, Benjamin A., and Harvey Starr. 1984. "International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Substitutability and 'Nice Laws'." *World Politics* 36: 383–406.

Osgood, Charles E. 1962. *An Alternative to War or Surrender.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Ostrom, Charles W., and Robin F. Marra. 1986. "U.S. Defense Spending and the Soviet Estimate." *American Political Science Review* 80: 819–42.

Oye, Kenneth A. 1986. "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies." In *Cooperation under Anarchy,* ed. Kenneth A. Oye. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rajmaira, Sheen, and Michael D. Ward. 1988. "Reciprocity and Equilibria in the Superpower Triad, 1950–1978." University of Colorado, Boulder. Typescript.

Richardson, Lewis F. 1960. *Arms and Insecurity.* Pittsburgh: Boxwood.

Robinson, Thomas W. 1987. "On the Further Evolution of the Strategic Triangle." In *The Strategic Triangle: China, the United States, and the Soviet Union,* ed. Ilpyong J. Kim. New York: Paragon House.

Rostow, W. W. 1987. "On Ending the Cold War." *Foreign Affairs* 65:831–51.

Sargent, Thomas J. 1984. "Autoregressions, Expectations, and Advice." *American Economic Review* 74:408–15.

Segal, Gerald. 1982. *The Great Power Triangle.* New York: St. Martin's.

Sims, Christopher. 1980. "Macroeconomics and Reality." *Econometrica* 48:1–48.

Snidal, Duncan. 1985. "Coordination Vs. Prisoner's Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes." *American Political Science Review* 79:923–42.

Starr, Harvey. 1982. " 'Détente' or 'Two against One'? The China Factor." In *Foreign Policy: USA/USSR,* ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Pat McGowan. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Stoll, Richard J., and William McAndrew. 1986. "Negotiating Strategic Arms Control, 1969–1979: Modeling the Bargaining Process." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 30:315–26.

Talbott, Strobe. 1981. "The Strategic Dimension of the Sino-American Relationship." In *The China Factor,* ed. Richard H. Solomon. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Thompson, William R., and David P. Rapkin. 1982. "Conflict, Inertia, and Reciprocity: Coping with the Western Bloc." In *Foreign Policy: USA/USSR,* ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Pat McGowan. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Vincent, Jack E. 1979. *Project Theory.* Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Wagner, R. Harrison. 1983. "The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation." *American Political Science Review* 77:330–46.

Ward, Michael Don. 1982. "Cooperation and Conflict in Foreign Policy Behavior." *International Studies Quarterly* 26:87–126.

Ward, Michael Don. 1984. "Differential Paths to Parity: A Study of the Contemporary Arms Race." *American Political Science Review* 78:297–317.

Williams, John T., and Michael D. McGinnis. 1988. "Reaction in a Rational Expectations Arms Race Model of U.S.-Soviet Rivalry." *American Journal of Political Science* 32:968–95.

Zinnes, Dina A. 1980. "Three Puzzles in Search of a Researcher." *International Studies Quarterly* 24:315–42.

Joshua S. Goldstein is Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089.

John R. Freeman is Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455.

LESSONS IN LOBBYING FOR FREE TRADE IN 19TH-CENTURY BRITAIN: TO CONCENTRATE OR NOT

CHERYL SCHONHARDT-BAILEY
University of California
Los Angeles
London School of Economics
and Political Science

I present a modified version of the public choice interest group model that integrates concentrated and deconcentrated interests with successful lobbying. It is argued that effective free trade lobbying required the political fusion of the economic interests representing two fundamental changes in nineteenth-century Britain's economy: (1) geographic concentration of the core export industry (cotton textiles) and (2) deconcentration of the broader export sector both geographically and in terms of industrial structure. Empirical evidence from both national and individual levels firmly supports the contention that the timing and political success of Britain's nineteenth-century free trade lobby required the combined forces of core export interests and the more diverse and geographically more evenly distributed interests of the export sector as a whole.

Public choice has been defined as "the economic study of non-market decision making, or simply the application of economics to political science" (Mueller 1986, 1). Political scientists and economists who have adopted the public choice approach to explain tariff legislation have benefited considerably from the extensive nature and relative ease with which contemporary U.S. economic data is available to test various extensions of the approach. Consequently empirical applications of public choice models to tariff legislation are based primarily on the twentieth-century United States (e.g., Robert Baldwin 1985; Lavergne 1983; Magee 1986; Ray 1981). This is not to suggest that more historical applications do not exist—they do, although once again, the analysis is of U.S. tariff legislation (e.g., Baack and Ray 1973, 1983; Pincus 1975).

I shall apply the public choice approach to a case of pressure group activity in nineteenth-century Great Britain. Such pre-twentieth-century applications of the public choice approach to countries other than the United States are conspicuously rare—an understandable paucity, given that appropriate data is generally either unavailable or of very poor quality. Moreover, the public choice approach itself assumes conditions approximating a modern representative democracy; thus, the approach is not always readily adaptable to cases of limited suffrage, quasi political parties, and little if any "modern" pressure group activity.

Although nineteenth-century British trade policy has received much attention in recent years from scholars concerned primarily with systemic-level analysis (e.g., Gilpin 1977; Krasner 1976; Lake 1988; Snidal 1985; Stein 1984), little microlevel analysis has yet been undertaken that focuses on this historically critical case of trade policy liberalization—let alone any such analysis that attempts to gauge the significance of pressure group activity empirically. In spite of limited data and a polity only beginning to resemble a modern representative democracy, I examine the emergence and operational strategy of the Anti-Corn Law League (1838–46). I assess the role of the league in obtaining the removal of protective legislation for British agriculture in the form of repeal of the Corn Laws, while exploring both the league's rise to the political forefront[1] and its effectiveness as a modern political pressure group.

Moreover, within the public choice literature conflicting interpretations exist among theorists regarding the importance of concentrated versus deconcentrated interests in successful lobbying. I shall present an extension of the interest group model (as the model is understood in the public choice literature) that integrates these seemingly conflicting interpretations. In so doing, two general types of (de)concentration are discussed: industry (de)concentration (measured in terms of capital, labor or output) and geographic (de)concentration (i.e., of industries or industry "interests" across or within a geographic area). I argue that effective free trade lobbying was the political outcome of the fusion of these two types of concentration, in two contrasting forms: (1) industrial and geographic concentration of the core export industry (cotton textiles) and (2) deconcentration of the broader export sector, both geographically and (in terms of industrial structure) into a larger number and broader array of composite industries. Empirical evidence from both the national and individual levels firmly supports the contention that core export interests were necessary to engage the political machinery of the free trade lobby but were not sufficient to replicate this political influence at the national level—something that required political pressure spread across a larger number of parliamentary constituencies. The success of this lobby required the combined forces of core export interests and the more diverse and geographically more evenly distributed interests of the export sector as a whole. It was the growing concentration of the former and the increasing deconcentration of the latter that explain the timing and the political success of the Anti-Corn Law League free trade lobby.

Interest Group Theory

Contemporary interest group theory maintains that the propensity to organize for collective action can be measured by characteristics of a particular industry (e.g., Robert Baldwin 1985; Lavergne 1983; Olson 1965). It is argued that the greater the share of production by the industry's top firms (i.e., the greater the industry concentration), the more likely they are to organize, since the largest firms will accrue a larger share of the total gains and therefore be willing to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of organizing. Moreover, industries with a large number of firms usually experience the free-rider problem, making organization more difficult. The probability of organizing, ceteris paribus, is therefore inversely related to the number of firms in the industry. Proponents of the theory also maintain that because geographic concentration reduces transportation, information, and other costs that inhibit organization, the more geographically concentrated the industry, the greater the probability that its firms will organize.

Public choice theorists generally consider both industry and geographic concentration as key indicators of potential political leverage, although they remain divided on the combined effects of the two forms of concentration. The theoretic logic underpinning industry concentration (traditionally based on the four-firm concentration ratio) relies on Mancur

Olson's argument that concentrated industries are better positioned to overcome the free-rider problem, given the (usually) small numbers of firms and their unequal size. According to Olson, where the number of actors in a group is small, each actor's contribution to provision of the good makes a perceptible difference in the quantity of the good provided; and large firms in industries with unequal distributions of firm sizes will tend to receive a proportionately larger share of the good and therefore may contribute to its provision despite the existence of free riders (1965).

Concentrated industries, according to Olson, may experience fewer difficulties in organizing for collective action. However, other theorists argue that geographically deconcentrated industries are more successful in obtaining their political objectives. Jonathan Pincus (1975), for example, finds that industries that are geographically more evenly distributed (and thus possess constituents in a larger number of electoral districts) lower the bargaining costs among legislators. Lower bargaining costs imply that fewer compromises are required—hence an easier passage into protective legislation. Pincus explains that, "In a system of geographical representation . . . transfer costs arose and it was costly for a senator to vote other than in his constituents' direct interests. The more even the distribution of pressure on the single issue, the less wastage there was in the course of transfers of pressure, one senator to another. From a given total of pressure, the highest possible duty would have resulted when the pressure was evenly distributed over the senators" (p. 769). Moreover, he combines industry concentration with geographic deconcentration to form a revised model of interest group activity. In his study Pincus finds that "the ideal industry pressure groups had low proprietorial income shares and geographically concentrated production units, but . . . political effectiveness required the group to speak for many establishments with output spread fairly evenly across states" (p. 757). Industries that are large and geographically deconcentrated, in Pincus' view, are more likely to obtain favorable legislation.

Empirical tests of the effects of industry (de)concentration and geographic (de)concentration on tariff structure have produced mixed findings. For instance, Robert E. Baldwin (1985) and Real Lavergne (1983) reject both measures of concentration as poor predictors of tariff legislation (and indeed cast an unfavorable light on the interest group model as a whole). Richard Caves finds only qualified support for industry concentration, although when he includes other measures, he concludes that the interest group model performs quite well overall (1976). In comparison, Pincus's (1975) positive empirical findings for industry concentration as well as geographic deconcentration diverge quite markedly from those of his contemporaries.[2]

The critical point of contention among public choice theorists hinges not on industry concentration but on geographic concentration. Olson argues that industry concentration combined with geographic *concentration* leads to successful lobbies, since the latter makes organizational efforts less onerous. Pincus argues that industry concentration plus geographic *deconcentration* leads to successful lobbies. He is less concerned about the difficulties that geographically deconcentrated groups incur in organizing and more concerned with degrees of political effectiveness once organized. Alternatively, if organization is initially achieved by the fusion of two groups—a leading export industry exhibiting both geographic and capital concentration and a broader export sector more deconcentrated in terms of the number of composite industries and the geographic spread of those industries (incorporating the leader as one of its constituent industries)—we may accept Pincus's argument without seeming to contradict Olson's. The fusion of industry and sector is critical to overcoming the problem of organization created by Pincus's model of geographic deconcentration. I shall address the problem of how deconcentration enhances organizational ability (and hence political strength) by examining the coexistence of geographic and capital concentration in the leading export industry and deconcentration (both geographically and by number of industries) in the broader export sector.

An Extension of Interest Group Theory

My analysis is firmly rooted in the public choice approach to interest group theory. However, I relax conventional assumptions in order to explore interesting features of nineteenth-century British pressure group activity. First, as this paper is but one component of a larger model of trade policy *liberalization*—in which interest group pressure is one of a number of key variables leading to trade liberalization (Schonhardt-Bailey 1991)—free trade, rather than protection, is identified as the quasi public good. Unlike models that link collective action with the provision of trade protection, models concerned with the effects of collective action on trade liberalization may include not only the static gains from policy change but also the gains accruing from external scale economies; that is, rather than assuming (as neoclassical growth theory does) constant returns to scale, economists have recently argued that the most important benefits of trade liberalization result from increasing returns to scale to productive factors at the industry level. Drawing upon recent "new growth" literature (Richard Baldwin 1989; Grossman and Helpman 1988; Krugman 1988) stressing increasing returns to scale and therefore the dynamic gains resulting from trade liberalization, I posit that the dynamic gains from liberalization should correlate with industry size and capital concentration. With increasing returns to scale, the standard argument that protective forces enjoy an inherent advantage over free trade forces (given the concentrated benefits and dispersed costs associated with protective legislation [e.g., Lavergne 1983, 19-20]) is turned on its head. Increasing returns to scale from trade liberalization suggest that manufacturers for export would benefit not only from the one-time (static) upward shift in sales accruing from trade liberalization, but they (and especially the largest exporters) would benefit even more from the externalities accruing from their ability to exploit a larger share of the world market—that is, from the dynamic dimension of liberalization. Pincus's argument may therefore be amended as follows: the ideal free trade pressure group should consist of a key export industry that exhibits both capital and geographic concentration, combined with deconcentration at the export sector level, both geographically and by number of composite industries. Increasing returns to scale mean that individuals with interests at the key export industry level benefit disproportionately but that nevertheless the small, less capital-concentrated exporters also reap the rewards of larger absolute sales, plus some of the externalities associated with a (marginally) larger market share.

A second dimension that differs from standard interest group theory is the focus here on the timing of pressure group activity. Why is it that the league emerged in the late 1830s, rather than decades earlier when manufacturing had already surpassed agriculture as the dominant sector in the British economy?[3] Rather than adopting a static view in determining which industry characteristics contribute to or detract from organizational efforts, I trace the progression of organization in order to discern the factors that act to catalyze organization.[4] Some authors, admittedly, have attempted to measure the dynamic determinants of tariff legislation (Baack and Ray 1983). Nevertheless, virtually nonexistent are any attempts to analyze the effects of *changes* in industry and geographic concentration on organization—that is, the dynamic elements of organization, especially of free trade forces.

In brief, I construct an extension to the model of interest group activity that emphasizes the mix between industry—here, specifically capital—concentration and geographic deconcentration of the broader export sector. It differs from Pincus's model in that (1) by examining a free trade instead of a protection lobby, it adds the dimension of increasing returns to scale from liberalization and therefore broadens the analysis to include the effects that potential dynamic gains may have had on exporters' incentive to lobby, and (2) it examines the effects of changes over time in industry and sectoral structure on organizational ability. It seeks to extend Pincus's model to include the issue of organizational ability within a context of geographic deconcentration.

Concentration and Deconcentration in Nineteenth-Century Britain

Industry concentration in the public choice literature is usually derived from the concentration ratio of the top four firms in a given industry. Unfortunately firm-level data for British industries in the early to mid-nineteenth century is sparse at best and simply unavailable for most industries. Studies in economic history have, in part, explored the question of industry concentration; but even these remain limited primarily to the cotton textile industry.

However, inferring from equipment type and employment figures, a tentative consensus has emerged within this literature on the increasing geographic concentration of cotton textile industry activity into Lancashire during the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Evidence from the economic history literature is piecemeal but illustrative. For instance, while the total number of cotton power looms in England more than doubled between 1835 and 1850, Lancashire's share of this total increased from 67.5% to 79.1% (Fang [1930] 1978, 37–38). Moreover, Von Tunzelmann (1978, 236–39) finds that for the period from 1835 to 1846, Lancashire increased its share of the nation's total employment in cotton mills from 66.7% to 72.3%. During the same period, Lancashire also expanded its share of the nation's total horsepower in the cotton industry from 64.4% to 69.3%, expanding further to 74.8% in 1856.

Even Gatrell (1977), who claims that the cotton textile industry remained broadly capital-deconcentrated during the early nineteenth century, acknowledges a trend toward *geographic* concentration into Lancashire (and particularly Manchester) from the mid to late 1830s onward. From the Factory Inspector's Reports of 1835 and 1841, Gatrell finds that a "trend towards the more intensified use of capital [in Lancashire] may be inferred from the fact that labour increased by some 53 per cent and horsepower by some 64 per cent between 1835 and 1841. Something like two-thirds of power and two-fifths of labour were added before the end of 1838" (p. 101n).

Taylor (1949) more fully endorsed the trend toward geographic concentration in his study of cotton manufactures in Lancashire, Cheshire, Derbyshire, and Yorkshire from 1825 to 1850. Taylor found that the industry had become largely concentrated in the Lancashire coalfield (or "districts easily served by it") as a result of the growing replacement both of waterpower by steam engines and of hand looms by power looms. The greater availability of capital and improved transport facilities, in turn, helped to explain the emergence of steam engines and power looms in Lancashire.

In contrast, evidence of industry concentration in cotton textiles is less conclusive, in large part the result of limited surviving data. Cottrell (1980), however, provides some evidence of industry concentration and attributes it to rapid changes in technology. "From the 1830s weaving began to be a mechanized process. This led to the demise of the hand loom and the water-powered rural spinning mill. . . . As a result of these developments, fixed capital invested in the manufacturing branches of the Lancashire cotton increased from approximately £14.8 m. in 1834 to £31 m. in 1856. An investment in a 'typical' mill of the 1830s amounted to between £20,000 and £50,000, and at the beginning of the decade Manchester mills were employing on average 400 hands as opposed to half that number two decades before" (p. 23).

Lloyd-Jones and LeRoux (1980, 1982) examine more explicitly the changing industrial structure in Manchester, using labor as a proxy for capital. They argue that the structure of the city's cotton industry from 1815 to 1841 was shaped by the demise of small firms (150 and fewer employees) and the entry of medium-to-large firms (151–500 and over 500 employees, respectively). These authors find that the median size of the labor force per firm rose from 54 employees to 174 and that the number of small firms decreased from 28% to 12%, while medium-size firms increased from 27% to 56%. While recalculations of the authors' data cast doubt on the relevance of their division between medium and large firms,[5] not to mention the list of further methodological and theoretical problems noted by at least one economic historian (Bailey 1984), they do not call into question the sharp increase in average firm size. Moreover, Anthony Howe (1984) supports Lloyd-Jones and LeRoux's observation of the growing dominance of medium and large firm size. While his study of the structure of the cotton industry in the 1840s is not primarily concerned with industry concentration, Howe essentially extends Lloyd-Jones and LeRoux's premise to other textiles (calico printing, bleaching) and noncotton textiles (flax, silk, worsted). Defining small firms as those employing capital near £10,000, medium-to-large from £50,000 to £20,000, and giants at £500,000, Howe finds that "only in woollens did the 'democratic' structure of numerous small units survive" (p. 5).

Although it is difficult to translate these studies into a single framework for understanding industry concentration, the important conclusion is the agreement on the increasing geographic concentration of the cotton industry in Lancashire. Accordingly, I do not contribute "new" data on capital concentration in Lancashire; rather, I accept the general consensus and test the impact of capital concentration on lobbying efforts, using proxy variables. In contrast to the emphasis on the cotton textile industry, economic historians have tended to ignore the development of Britain's other export industries and therefore cannot provide us with comparable evidence on the export sector as a whole.[6] Because much of the firm-level data necessary for such analysis does not exist, I develop alternative means for exploring the structure of Britain's export sector and present "new" data in this capacity. I seek, in brief, to establish something closer to a national picture of the export sector's geographic and industry (interest) (de)concentration and thus achieve a better understanding of the relationship between export interests and pressure group activity.

Concentration, Deconcentration, and the Anti-Corn Law League

The Effects of Export Industry Concentration on the Anti-Corn Law League

Geographic and industry concentration of the textile industry *by itself* does not contribute to an explanation of the emergence of the Anti-Corn Law League. A deliberate link must be made between this concentration and free trade pressure group activity by the league. To do so, I shall examine (1) the league's organizational management, and (2) the geographic distribution of subscriptions to the league.

Historians have often described the league as the first modern pressure group to emerge in Britain. Howe describes it as "the most impressive of nineteenth-century pressure groups, which exercised a distinct influence on the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846" (1984, 208). McCord refers to it as the *league machine*, whose organization "presents one of the first examples of a recurring feature of modern political life, the highly organized political pressure group with its centralized administration and its formidable propaganda apparatus" (1958, 187).

Most relevant is the force that propelled the league machine—a central administrative structure supported and operated by a concentrated core of export-oriented free trade supporters. This centralized administration—the financial core of the league—was situated in Manchester and operated by a nexus of that city's manufacturing and professional elite. McCord notes that the league's efficiency may indeed "be traced in great part to the business-like character" of this commercially minded group of individuals (1958, 172–73).[7] Of critical importance is that the businesslike characters of the league council were also its chief financial supporters. According to Howe: "The initial membership of the Manchester Association and of the League were both heavily recruited from the textile masters, together with merchants and professional men. . . . [Their] greatest contribution to the success of the League was financial. In its ability to call on vast funds over short periods, the League exceeded all other nineteenth-century pressure groups" (1984, 209–10). Howe notes that 56% of the subscriptions over £100 came from Lancashire in 1844, 70% in 1846 (p. 212). Table A-1 in the Appendix illustrates more graphically the distribution of subscriptions to the league by city, county, and region. Although the list in Table A-1 is by no means comprehensive, it does clearly depict Lancashire as the dominant county contributor and (in subscriptions per person) Manchester as the leading city contributor.[8]

Considering the general consensus in the economic history literature on geographic concentration of the leading export industry in Lancashire (more specifically, Manchester), one can easily surmise that this concentration of capital undoubtedly enhanced that geographic area's ability to function as the financial and operational core of league activities. Manufacturers, merchants, and professionals in Manchester were able to draw upon this concentrated core of potential free trade beneficiaries to initiate and propel league efforts at gaining repeal. In public choice terminology, increased geographic concentration of industry capital acted as a barrier to entry and thus meant greater benefits accruing from free trade to key actors in this region—hence a stronger incentive for these actors to lobby for free trade. Moreover, if we add the dynamic dimension of trade liberalization, the incentive to lobby increases substantially since these key actors stood to gain even more from the permanent increase in the long-run growth rate of output resulting from trade liberalization.

Export Sector Deconcentration

At the same time that capital investment in the cotton textile industry was becoming concentrated geographically into Lancashire, Britain's overall export sector was becoming less concentrated, both geographically and in terms of the share accounted for by the various export industries. Ralph Davis, in an examination of Britain's exports by commodity type (a proxy for the industries themselves), argues that the Industrial Revolution temporarily disrupted Britain's trend toward export deconcentration. Consequently, exports were highly concentrated in one industry—textiles. By the mid nineteenth century, as Europeans developed their own cotton mills and large ironworks, Britain's comparative advantage vis-a-vis Europe had shifted from the export of finished manufactures (especially textiles) into the export of semifinished goods. Thus, Britain's exports to Europe increasingly consisted of such items as yarns, iron billets, bars and girders, and spin-offs from raw materials like wool, cotton, and hides (Davis 1979, 34).

Figure 1 clearly illustrates the growth in exports of semifinished products (e.g., iron and steel; cotton, woollen, and linen yarns; copper products). Moreover, a comparison of 1846 with 1825 British Customs records reveals 154 new categories of export (excluding new classifications of textiles) and only 14 discontinued categories. Of the 154 new additions to Britain's export trades, semifinished products feature quite prominently. Figure 2 presents concentration indices calculated for the export sector from 1815 to 1880. Most striking is the abrupt reversal in trend beginning in 1830: whereas from 1815 to 1830, Britain's export concentration index decreased from 64.5 to 54.1 (i.e., became more concentrated), by 1845 it had climbed to 68.5 (i.e., became less concentrated), and continued increasing for several more decades. Further, an examination of Britain's export concentration indices for the next 100 years (to 1980, in five-year increments) provides added significance to the 1830–45 shift. First, while exports clearly became less concentrated from 1830 to 1890, no subsequent trend is evident, as the index fluctuates within a narrow band ranging from the high 80s to low 90s. Second, a comparison of the 1830–45 shift in index against every 15-year period from 1815 to 1980 (again in 5-year increments) found the change from 1830–45 to be statistically significant at the .0001 level (second only to the shift between 1840–55).

Figures 1 and 2 indicate that at the aggregate level, Britain's export sector most definitely had resumed its pre-Industrial Revolution trend toward diversification. These figures do not, however, provide us with any evidence of a parallel trend toward geographic deconcentration of export sector interests, especially relative to an increasing geographic concentration of the traditionally dominant import-competing interests—the landed aristocracy and gentry. For some gauge of these interests we require data at the micro level and by geographic location.

City directories offer one means of studying the economic interests of nineteenth-century Britain's populace, at least insofar as these interests may be assumed to correspond with each individual's occupational categorization. In spite of their incompleteness and inevitable inaccuracies,[9] these directories provide us with as near an approximation of the economic interest composition of various nineteenth-century cities and towns as is possible. (The Appendix elaborates on the procedure used for sampling from these directories.)

Samples from the city directories demonstrate the trend toward geographic deconcentration of export sector interests, both absolutely and relative to the import-competing interests—the landed aristocracy and gentry. Geographic con-

Figure 1. Change in Export Market Share of Leading British Industries between 1825 and 1846



Source: Great Britain, Public Record Office, *Exports, Product and Manufacturers of the United Kingdom,* Cust. 9 (1825–1846).

Note: Declared values are used instead of official values (i.e., values fixed in the early eighteenth century) because rapidly falling prices for cotton goods during this period seriously distort the comparison among export commodities. For further discussion of declared versus official values see Davis 1979.

Figure 2. Concentration of the British Export Sector between 1815 and 1880



Source: Derived from Mitchell 1988, 481–85.

Note: Mitchell's classifications within the export sector include coal, iron and steel, machinery, ships and boats, nonferrous metals, cotton goods, wool goods, and chemicals.

[a] Concentration indices calculated from the index of qualitative variation (IQV). IQV = $[k(N^2 - \Sigma f^2)]/[N^2(k - 1)]$, where k = number of categories (here, number of categories of exports $[y]$), N = number of cases (here 100%), and Σf^2 = sum of the squared frequencies (here $\Sigma[((y/\Sigma y)^*100)^2]$. IQV is defined as the ratio of the amount of variation actually observed in a distribution of scores to the maximum variation that could exist in that distribution. The index varies from zero (no variation) to one (maximum variation) (Healey 1984, 66–69).

centration indices for the occupational categories given in the Appendix clearly indicate that the interests of all occupations became less concentrated except for one category—the landed aristocracy (see Schonhardt-Bailey 1991). In the 1820s the landed elite were by far the most concentrated group, and by the 1840s they had become geographically even more concentrated. In contrast, all other categories of occupations had become less concentrated; in particular, professionals aligned with manufacturing and the retail-specialty-trades-service sector were the two leading categories of geographic deconcentration.

It should be emphasized that concentration measures used here refer only to towns and cities, and not to rural areas. Consequently this urban sample allows us to conclude that declining numbers of landowners (relative to other occupations) were concentrating into fewer towns, and therefore would very likely have been less able to exert political pressure.[10] In contrast, increasing numbers of export-oriented interests were present in a larger number of towns and were likely to have demonstrated a commensurate increase in political influence. A minor caveat to this is that under the unreformed (pre-1832) Parliament, a landowner's political influence was not necessarily limited to residence in the borough—although with the elimination of many pocket boroughs in the 1832 reform, such influence would have become less common.

Two distinct trends toward deconcentration in the British economy between the mid-1820s and the mid-1840s are thus observed: (1) national-level export sector diversification into a broader range of export trades and (2) geographic deconcentration of industry interests as categories of occupations spread more evenly throughout the country. Simply put, industry interests extended to new trades for export and simultaneously became geographically more dispersed. Additionally, an examination of the total occupational distribution (see Schonhardt-Bailey 1991) illustrates the expansion of (potential) export interests into the professions and retail-specialty trades. Meanwhile, however, the import-competing interests of the landed elite became geographically more concentrated than they already were, and they declined in their share of the total occupational distribution.

Deconcentration and the Anti-Corn Law League

Earlier I outlined the concentrated organizational core of the league but did not elaborate upon the second important aspect of the league's operational strategy—its nationwide propaganda and electoral registration campaign. After electoral losses in 1841–42, the league focused its energy and resources on returning a free trade majority in the anticipated general parliamentary election of 1848. Its leaders' tactical strategy included manipulating the voter registers and employing propaganda devices on existing voters. Looking toward the 1848 election, the league sought to add as many free traders and delete as many protectionists from these registers as possible. The latter they accomplished by making objections against thousands of protectionists at the annual revisions of the registers. The former required a different tactic—exploiting the forty-shilling county property qualification.[11]

On a broader scale, the league based its national network on an organizational strategy that joined the voter registration campaign with the league propaganda scheme. As league agents distributed propaganda tracts to every elector in 24 county divisions and 187 boroughs, these agents submitted to the league headquarters consistent and complete reports on the electorate in their districts. These reports provided the league with an exhaustive and comprehensive picture of the electoral scene throughout England, thereby allowing it much greater knowledge of, and control over, electoral districts than either the Conservatives or Liberals possessed "with their more limited and local organization" (McCord 1958, 147–50). The earlier distribution of propaganda tracts thus provided the league with an extensive data base from which they could inflict political pressure on MPs, who, of course, were concerned with their bids for reelection in the anticipated 1848 general election.

It would be difficult to offer direct evidence to bridge the massive national propaganda and voter registration campaigns to the deconcentrated interests of the export sector. However, one might surmise that this national network, emanating from Manchester, was directed toward a more receptive audience than it would have enjoyed in the 1820s. Scores of new export trades had, by the 1840s, created countless new interests in trade expansion as well as interests in, if not across-the-board liberalization, certainly in strongly opposing the continued protection of British agriculture. Geographically, these interests were spread far more evenly, therefore creating more constituencies to which the league could propagandize and influence voter registration lists. A wider constituency base, moreover, also allowed the league to present itself to Parliamentary members as a national lobby with widespread electoral support. At the same time, the landed elite's core of support had both declined relative to other occupations and become more concentrated geographically. In brief, the league had the best of both worlds—a concentrated core of financial and organizational support combined with a national network scheme addressing itself to newly awakened interests in the repeal of protection for agriculture.

Testing the Hypothesis

Finally, I shall attempt to link both the diversification of export interests and concentration of the core export industry in Lancashire empirically to the Anti-Corn Law League. Beginning with diversification, I examine (1) the relationship between export interests in the 1840s and league subscriptions and (2) the relationship between the *growth* in export interests (occurring between the mid-1820s and the mid-1840s) and league subscriptions. The former may be considered the static dimension, the latter a more dynamic dimension.

Both the static and dynamic dimensions are tested using four distinct, but overlapping, groups of occupational interests. (See the Appendix for descriptions of occupational interests.) The two dimensions differ in that the static interest groups draw only from the 1840s directories, whereas the dynamic groups measure the *difference* in occupational structure between the 1820s and 1840s. Interest group A constitutes the most narrowly defined export industry interest group and is defined as export-oriented manufacturers plus professionals engaged directly in the export trade. The group is given as a percentage of the sum of all the occupational groupings (as listed in the Appendix). Interest group B broadens group A to include professionals not explicitly linked to export trades (agents, brokers, merchants) as well as retailers, specialty trades, and service sector occupations. Group B attempts to measure the combined strength of actual and highly probable export-oriented interests, that is, individuals likely to have been closely linked to the export sector. Interest group C adds to group B manufacturers whose activities were directed primarily toward the domestic market. Interest group D combines all manufacturing interests together. Groups A, B, C, and D are each given as a proportion of the sum of all occupations.

The dynamic interest groups measure changes over time in the percentages of the population falling into each of the four groupings. For instance, by subtracting group A's percentage of the total occupations in the 1820s from its percentage of the total occupations in the 1840s, the dynamic measure of interest group A indicates the change in strictly export-oriented interests from the mid-1820s to the mid-1840s, measured as a percentage of the total employed population.

Tables 1 and 2 give the results of linear regressions of each interest group and change in interest group, respectively, on league subscriptions. Unfortunately the geographical concentration of capital offers no empirical data that is suitable for statistical analysis and therefore has to be proxied. Considering the earlier discussion of concentration of the textile industry into Lancashire, the proxy is constructed as a dichotomous variable with the dummy assigned to all towns inside Lancashire. Hence, I shall not demon-

Table 1. Coefficient Estimates for the Relationship between Export Sector Interest Groups in the mid-1840s and Subscriptions to the Anti-Corn Law League

	Interest Group A		Interest Group B		Interest Group C		Interest Group D	
Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
Subscription/100 pop.								
Constant	-.19	—	-2.55	—	-6.89	—	-1.19	—
Interest Group[a]	5.70	8.15	6.20	11.99	11.22	12.78	6.89	7.86
Dummy Variable[b]	7.77*	2.32	7.53*	2.31	7.15*	2.34	7.58*	2.92
R^2	.243		.238		.249		.249	
Subscription/100 in commercial directory								
Constant	12.07	—	-78.87	—	-135.51	—	4.86	—
Interest Group[a]	34.36	123.26	154.84	179.23	211.03	191.15	44.55	119.29
Dummy Variable[b]	141.11*	35.14	139.43*	34.49	132.22*	34.95	140.0*	34.79
R^2	.316		.329		.338		.318	

Source: Commercial directories from the 1840s.

Note: N = 38. Interest Group A = export-oriented manufacturers and professionals aligned with manufacturing, B = A + nonaligned professional and retail trades, C − B + manufacturers supplying domestic markets, D = A + manufacturers supplying domestic markets.

[a] Each interest group is expressed as a proportion of the sum of all occupations as listed in the Appendix.

[b] A proxy for export sector capital concentration in Lancashire.

*Statistically significant at $p < .01$.

Table 2. Coefficient Estimates for the Relationship between the Growth in Export Sector Interest Groups between the mid-1820s and the mid-1840s and Subscriptions to the Anti-Corn Law League

	Group Change A		Group Change B		Group Change C		Group Change D	
Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
Subscription/100 pop.								
Constant	2.44	—	1.86	—	1.81	—	2.13	—
Interest Group[a]	7.19	8.35	4.80	8.47	1.39	10.46	3.75	8.90
Dummy Variable[b]	7.01*	2.56	7.27*	2.56	7.22*	2.58	7.04*	2.62
R^2	.228		.218		.210		.214	
Subscription/100 in commercial directory								
Constant	39.36	—	27.49	—	27.12	—	34.96	—
Interest group[a]	151.99	124.16	116.62	126.34	81.74	156.71	100.76	133.04
Dummy Variable[b]	131.26*	38.04	136.75*	38.21	134.66*	38.71	130.55*	39.14
R^2	.326		.312		.299		.306	

Source: Commercial directories from the 1820s and 1840s.

Note: N = 33. Groups are as in Table 1.

[a] Each interest group is defined as in Table 1, but here the variable measures the change in the strength of the group between the 1820s and 1840s.

[b] A proxy for export sector capital concentration in Lancashire.

*Statistically significant at $p < .01$.

strate the *direct* statistical link between geographic concentration and league contributions.

The emphasis of the analysis is on the relative strengths of the interest groups, as derived from slope estimates. While the overall explanatory performance of the equations is remarkably good for historical data such as these (with regression coefficients ranging from .21 to .34), estimations of fit are not sufficiently different among the regressions to offer insight into the validity of the competing hypotheses. Moreover, while it may be useful to note that the dummy is consistently significant at the .01 level and the interest groups consistently statistically insignificant, note also that (1) I could have predicted a strong statistical performance for dummy, given evidence that the textile manufacturers in Lancashire as individuals contributed most to the league, and (2) historical data such as were used to construct the interest group variables are rarely (as economic historians will attest) in a form likely to produce statistical significance in regression analysis. Hence, I shall provide a tentative analysis of the relative strengths of the interest groups by exploring the variations both among the interest group slope coefficients and between these coefficients and the Lancashire dummy slope coefficients.

The Lancashire dummy slope coefficient in both the static and dynamic regressions provides statistical confirmation that Lancashire residents contributed substantially more to the league than non-Lancashire residents. Interpreting this variable as a proxy for capital concentration, the slope coefficient suggests that this extra capital translated into contributions to the league inside Lancashire amounting to, ceteris paribus, over seven pounds per person—or 135 pounds per working person—*more than* those outside Lancashire (see Table 1). More revealing, however, are the contrasts among the various groups of occupations in Table 1. For both the static 1840s set of regressions, the largest contributions came from towns with a high proportion of interest group C, that is, exporters, marginal exporters, and domestic market manufacturers. Indeed the largest contributors were towns situated in Lancashire with exporters, marginal exporters, and domestic market manufacturers constituting a high percentage of the population. Nonetheless, the strength of the coefficient for group C illustrates the importance of diversification of export interests *at the national level* so that even the towns *outside* Lancashire with populations of diversified export interests were important contributors to the league. (For example, for each 10% increase in diversified export interests in the country's working population, a town would, ceteris paribus, contribute about £21 more to the league.)

In the dynamic regressions (Table 2), the extension of export interests to a greater number of occupations from the 1820s to 1840s (Group Change B, C and D) appeared far less important than the increase in occupations most directly tied to exports (Group Change A). Clearly the growth of the narrowest group of export interests (group A) had the greatest influence on league contributions, although the growth of the actual and highly probable export-oriented interest group (Group Change B) also demonstrated a substantial influence on league contributions. The broadest group (i.e., Group Change C, derived from group C) showed the least impact on league contributions—a finding that initially might seem *not* to support the deconcentrated export interests hypothesis. However, considering that the interest groups were constructed as percentages of the total population, the group of occupations that was most directly associated with exports (group A) constituted a smaller percentage of the population and thus allowed a greater margin for growth than did the larger initial percentages of the remaining groups (all of which included occupations given in interest group A plus other occupations less directly tied to exports). We may conclude, then, that the strong performance of the narrower group of export interests emphasizes the importance of the *growth* in those interests closely associated with the export trade (Group Change A), as well as interests with a highly probable link to the export trade (Group Change B). Growth of the most broadly defined group (Group Change C)—which already included the largest percentage of the population—was, not surprisingly, the weakest performer. However, the impressive performance of this group in the static measures suggests that while the *level* of export interest geographic deconcentration certainly contributed to support for the league, the effect of the *growth* of this deconcentration was either less important than its actual level, or was important but requires a measure other than change in percent of the population to capture its effect (for example, one that could capture the effect of individuals falling within group C who over time moved into the narrower group A).

Briefly stated, the regression results illustrate the impact of both diversified export interests, and of geographic concentration of capital in Lancashire on the Anti-Corn Law League. It was not the core export industry alone that best accounts for league financial support but rather the combined clout of interests within this industry plus the more geographically diversified export sector, including the groups newly created and less directly associated with the export interests.[12]

Concluding Remarks

The emergence of the Anti-Corn Law League as a free trade pressure group is best explained not by the standard Olson interest group model but rather as the combination of two concurrent changes in the nineteenth-century British economy. First, geographic concentration of the textile industry into Lancashire acted both to concentrate resources available for launching the free trade campaign and to concentrate the expected benefits accruing from free trade, hence motivating this core of industrialists to bear a disproportionate burden in supplying the free trade public good. Second, an increase in the number of industries comprising the export sector, combined with geographic deconcentration of export-oriented interests, enhanced the political leverage of the league by broadening its base of support. Its propaganda and voter registration campaigns thereby enjoyed a geographically broader base of support; and, equally important, the free trade message of the league would certainly have appealed to the recently expanded number of occupations (interests) connnected to the export trade.

Much of the current interest group literature juxtaposes concentrated groups against diffused groups—all of which are seeking protective legislation—and then analyzes their relative abilities to overcome the free rider problem, their relative political success, and so on. In contrast, this extension to the interest group model explains the emergence of a free trade pressure group as the united force of concentrated and deconcentrated interests. Whereas concentrated industry interests willing to bear a disproportionate share of the burden easily overcame the free rider problem through their smaller numbers and concentrated benefits from liberalization (both static and dynamic), their narrow political base of support required a broader constituency to lobby effectively for liberalization. This emerged as the economy diversified its exports and as export interests became more geographically widespread. Succinctly put, to explain the rise of free trade pressure group activity—contemporary or historic—we must pay closer attention to organizational strategy and economic changes. For the Anti-Corn Law League, these elements were joined in the geographic concentration of the textile industry and the concurrent diversification of Britain's export sector and geographic deconcentration of export-oriented interests.

Appendix

Publishers issued two common types of directories for nineteenth-century cities and towns—commercial directories and trade directories. Commercial directories may be likened to modern-day "white pages," since they list individual names, addresses, and occupations (or titles). Trade directories, similarly, correspond to our "yellow pages," as they list beneath each trade the names and addresses of the tradesmen. A third type of directory, the court directory (which was only occasionally available) listed the local aristocracy, gentry, and clergy. For purposes of this paper, a city's court directory was subsumed under the trade directory classifications, with the total number of aristocracy and gentry coded as a separate category under the particular city's trade directory. While elsewhere I use the combined data from both sets of directories (Schonhardt-Bailey 1991), for simplification the regression results are given here only for the commercial directories.

A sample size of 5% was drawn from the commercial directories (white pages) for each city; however, for cities with over ten thousand listings, I drew a sample of 2.5% and then doubled the numbers under each occupational category. (For a few small villages, I drew at least 35 individuals or the standard 5%—whichever was larger.) Actual total numbers of individuals were counted under each category of the trade directories (yellow pages). Samples were drawn from all cities publishing directories for both the mid-1820s and the mid-1840s. The key reference listing all available city directories before the 1850s was Norton 1950. I also consulted the London Guildhall Library's current listings for additional directories.

In Schonhardt-Bailey 1991, I give the county and regional breakdown of the city directory samples, as well as a map of the distribution. Not surprisingly, the industrial areas were overrepresented and the agricultural areas underrepresented. For purposes of this study, however, underrepresentation of agricultural regions is of little concern, since their absence only biases the sample against the geographic deconcentration hypothesis, rather than in favor of it; that is, if we think of the country as divided into two types of regions—agricultural and industrial-commercial—then, regardless of whether or not geographic deconcentration were to extend to the agricultural regions, it would not diminish findings demonstrating that deconcentration occurred within the more industrial and commercial portions of the country.

The hundreds of various occupation types were grouped into fifteen categories, as follows:

Export-oriented Manufacturers

1. *Manufacturing, export of light goods.* Bleachers, bobbinmakers, canvas manufacturers, cloth dressers, cotton manufacturers, cotton dealers, dyers, hat manufacturers, linen drapers, milliners and dressmakers, needle and pin makers, thread manufacturers, woollen cloth manufacturers, and so on.

2. *Manufacturing, export of heavy goods.* Brass founders, braziers, coppersmiths, tinplate workers, iron founders, tool manufacturers, and so on.

3. *Manufacturing, semiexport (serving home market as well as foreign markets).*

Brush manufacturers, cabinetmakers, coal dealers, leather cutters and manufacturers, earthenware dealers and manufacturers, glass manufacturers, gunmakers, hardware dealers, hosiers and glovers, lead merchants, rope and twine manufacturers, watch and clock manufacturers, and so on.

Professionals

4. *Professional, nonaligned.* Academy owners, accountants, agents, architects, attorneys-solicitors, auctioneers, bankers, barristers, brokers, commissioners, consuls, clergy, insurance agents, merchants, publishers, pawnbrokers, surgeons, and so on.

5. *Professional, aligned with manufacturing.* Warehouse owners, clothing brokers, cotton brokers, engineers, stock and share brokers, and so on.

6. *Professional, aligned with land.* Surveyors, land agents, and so on.

Agricultural

7. *Agriculture, farming.*

8. *Agriculture, semiexport (serving domestic market as well as foreign markets).* Bacon, ham, and cheese factors, gardeners and seedsmen, oil merchants, seed merchants, and so on.

9. *Agriculture, serving domestic market.* Bakers, butchers, cattle dealers, wheat and flour merchants, corn millers, fruiterers, grocers, poulterers, and so on.

Miscellaneous

10. *Manufacturing, serving domestic market.* Basketmakers, blacksmiths, boot and shoe makers, bricklayers and builders, confectioners, engravers, gas light makers, whitesmiths and bellhangers, and so on.

11. *Other retail, specialty trades, service sector.* Artificial limb makers, animal preservers, booksellers and stationers, tea and coffee dealers, druggists, eatinghouse keepers, haberdashers, news vendors, shopkeepers, victuallers, and so on.

12. *Fishing and shipping.* Fishing gear makers, fishmongers, boat builders and owners, ship builders and owners, and so on.

13. *Widows and spinsters.*

14. *Aristocracy, landowners, gentry, titled men of independent means.*

15. *Military.*

These categorizations clearly are problematic, as room for subjective estimation was quite broad. Moreover, the problems in trying to ascertain from national-level export totals the export interests of individuals in particular cities are obvious. My estimates of the interests of individuals' occupations were based upon 1825, 1830, 1835, 1840, and 1846 export records (Great Britain, Public Record Office) and lengthy consultations with Andrew Bailey, a British economic historian familiar with this period in British history.

The list of league subscriptions was obtained from two sources: Prentice 1853 and McCord 1958. My sample is limited to cities publishing commercial and/or trade directories for years circa 1825 and 1846. These cities, with the counties and regions in which they fall and their per capita subscriptions to the league are given in Table A-1.

Table A-1. Subscriptions to the Anti-Corn Law League

City (in order of increasing subscription/ 100 pop.)	A	B
Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Northumberland, NE	0	0
Rotherham, Yorkshire, NE	0	0
Wednesfield, Staffordshire, M[a]	0	0
Willenhall, Staffordshire, M	0	0
S. Shields, Durham, NE	0	0
N. Shields, Northumberland, NE	0	0
Durham, Durham, NE	0	0
Wednesbury, Staffordshire, M	0	0
Kingston-upon-Hull, Yorkshire, NE	0	0
Brighton, Sussex, SE	0	0
Gateshead, Durham, NE	0	0
Stoke-on-Trent, Staffordshire, M	0	0
Shelton, Nottinghamshire, M	0	0
Saddleworth, Yorkshire, NE	0	0
Hanley, Staffordshire, M	0	0
Barton, Lincolnshire, EA[a]	0	0
Great Grimsby, Lincolnshire, EA	0	0
Selby, Yorkshire, NE	0	0
Gainsborough, Lincolnshire, EA	0	0
Thorne, Lincolnshire, EA	0	0
Oughtibridge, Yorkshire, NE	0	0
Exeter, Devon, SW	.01	.18
Bath, Somerset, SW	.09	.81
Beverley, Yorkshire, NE	.10	—[b]
Dudley, Staffordshire, M	.19	2.88
Leigh, Lancashire, NW	.22	8.74
West Bromwich, Staffordshire, M	.25	.88
Birmingham, Warwickshire, M	.28	3.88
Burslem, Staffordshire, M	.31	8.47
Ross-on-Wye, Herefordshire, M	.37	—[b]
Wolverhampton, Staffordshire, M	.41	10.59
Newcastle-under-Line, Staffordshire, M	.51	10.99
Bilston, Staffordshire, M	.55	31.98
Macclesfield, Cheshire, NW	.66	9.54
Sheffield, Yorkshire, NE	.90	11.20
Wigan, Lancashire, NW	1.51	82.70
Bristol, Somerset, SW	1.56	14.11
Stockport, Cheshire, NW	1.79	22.48
Nottingham, Nottinghamshire, M	2.70	19.92
Otley, Yorkshire, NE	2.73	—[b]
London, Middlesex, SE	2.98	44.53
Oldham, Lancashire, NW	3.19	65.83
Warrington, Cheshire, NW	3.79	93.68
Preston, Lancashire, NW	5.88	169.05
Bolton, Lancashire, NW	6.67	84.63
Blackburn, Lancashire, NW	7.19	209.17
Bury, Lancashire, NW	8.27	147.66
Liverpool, Lancashire, NW	8.73	74.08
Rochdale, Lancashire, NW	12.76	475.40
Ashton-under Lyne, Lancashire, NW	19.98	341.43
Leeds, Yorkshire, NE	26.07	368.38
Manchester, Lancashire, NW	30.60	178.70

Note: Column A gives subscriptions to the league for 1843–46 in pounds per 100 of total population for each town. Column B gives the same subscriptions in pounds per 100 individuals listed in the town's commercial directory as having an occupation.

[a] M = Midlands, EA = East Anglia.

[b] No occupational totals could be obtained to compute figures for Beverley, Ross-on-Wye, or Otley.

Notes

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1989 American Political Science Association annual meeting in Atlanta. Comments from Jeff Frieden, Barbara Geddes, Anthony Howe, Kevin James, David Lake, Bob Pahre, Daniel Verdier, and David Yoffie were very helpful. My appreciation to Andrew Bailey for painstaking editorial assistance, to Lance Davis for suggesting usage of the city directories, to John Petrocik for recommending the index of qualitative variation to estimate measures of concentration, and to Craig Schonhardt for providing assistance in the graphics work. Research support from the University of California, Los Angeles Center for International and Strategic Affairs and the Department of Political Science is also gratefully acknowledged.

1. Some historians might dispute the political importance and effectiveness of the Anti-Corn Law League, arguing that MPs were unwilling to respond to the pressure exerted by the league, that the league was only marginal in terms of effecting repeal of the Corn Laws, or that the League was counterproductive in that it sparked the emergence of the anti-league, that is, the protectionist lobby. However, a close examination of MP speeches (many of which respond directly to league pressure) in critical parliamentary debates in 1846, as well as a comparison of league versus anti-league resource bases (Chaloner 1970; Crosby 1976; McCord 1958; Wootton 1975), clearly illustrates the political importance and economic clout of the Anti-Corn Law League. For elaboration of this evidence, see Schonhardt-Bailey 1991.

2. Paul Godek (1985) gives evidence of a positive relationship between geographic and industrial concentration and trade restrictions—but within a framework more directly concerned with exploring the effects of industry structure on tariffs versus quotas. Specifically, Godek finds positive relationships between (1) geographic concentration-industry size and quota levels and (2) higher levels of industry concentration (i.e., fewer firms) and tariff levels.

3. By 1821 industry had already outdistanced agriculture in proportion of national income by 32% to 26%, and by 1831 the gap widened even further to 34.4% and 23.4%. Additionally, the proportion of national income derived from trade and transport rose from 15.9% in 1821 to 17.4% in 1831, and 18.4% in 1841 (Mitchell and Deane 1971).

4. The evidence is clear that industry and manufacturing interests had organized themselves into business associations and chambers of commerce in the late eighteenth century—long before the Anti-Corn Law League was born in 1838 (see, e.g., Bowden 1925, 172–73; Howe 1984, 162–63; Mantoux 1948, 398–403). The obvious question then becomes, Why was the league successful in pressuring Parliament for free trade when previous organizations were not? Any conclusive answer to this question would require a more extensive study, including a control group of manufacturers who were not subject to the historical circumstances that the rest of British society experienced. Obviously, this is impossible. However, for a more detailed investigation of this query, see Schonhardt-Bailey 1991.

5. In the 1980 article, the authors list 15 Manchester cotton firms by name, number of employees, and the poor-rate assessment (which corresponds with number of employees). Based upon poor-rate assessment figures (also listed) for 75 other cotton firms in Manchester, the authors then calculate the number of employees for these firms. Some recalculations of their data show the division between medium- and large-size firms to be sensitive to slight changes. In all cases, the proportion of medium-size firms increases dramatically; and in many instances (depending upon where the division is made between medium and large) so does the proportion of large-size firms. Nonetheless, in all cases, the proportion of small-size firms decreases substantially.

6. Discussion of concentration outside the cotton industry in the current literature is meager at best. Two articles, however, have recently addressed the topic: Timmins 1982, and Dutton and Jones 1983. Both argue that output increasingly became concentrated in a small number of integrated firms.

7. Similar to business organizations, league staff were compensated with salaries and wages for their efforts. However, it should be noted that the broader membership received no clear "selective incentives" other than engraved membership cards indicating by color the subscription amount (McCord 1958, 134, 174).

8. Even the so-called transfer of league headquarters to London in 1843 was effectively nullified by the political necessity of maintaining a central core of staunch free trade advocates (who, coincidentally, were also key beneficiaries of liberalization). The official move to London was more a strategic propaganda ploy than an actual shift in administrative operations, as McCord explains: "A pressing reason for the move was a desire to break the close identification between the League and Manchester in the public mind, which made the League appear as a sectional movement instead of the nation-wide crusade its leaders conceived it to be. For this reason the move to London in . . . 1843 was made with great parade and emphasis. . . . Nevertheless, this ostentatious move did not indicate a genuine shift of centre . . . and the control of the League was not materially affected by the change" (1958, 139–40).

9. For elaboration on the usage of nineteenth-century city directories, see Duggan 1975; Page 1974; Shaw 1978; Timmins 1979; and Wilde 1976.

10. I do not call into question the concentrated political influence of landowners in *rural* constituencies. Indeed, constituency economic composition

(rural versus urban) played a critical role in determining which MPs voted for repeal of the Corn Laws (Schonhardt-Bailey 1988), even though it is also true that landowner economic interests were not monolithic (Schonhardt-Bailey 1989). Nevertheless, my primary concern here is the *urban* constituencies that in the wake of the 1832 electoral reform were strongly influenced by the growing and more widely dispersed export sector interests.

11. For an excellent description of the voter registration campaign, changes in the registration lists and the 40-shilling loophole, see McCord 1958, 150–62.

12. A related and important question remains: To what extent did export interests, both independently and channeled through the league, influence MP voting behavior? Elsewhere, I found strong empirical evidence of the political link between constituency economic interest and MP voting behavior on the Corn Laws. For a rigorous test of the electoral connection between the interests of constituents—as derived from district (both county and borough) economic composition—and parliamentary voting behavior on Corn Law divisions dating from 1826 through 1846, see Schonhardt-Bailey 1988.

References

Baack, Bennett D., and Edward John Ray. 1973. "Tariff Policy and Comparative Advantages in the Iron and Steel Industry: 1870–1929." *Explorations in Economic History* 11:3–23.

Baack, Bennett D., and Edward John Ray. 1983. "The Political Economy of Tariff Policy: A Case Study of the United States." *Explorations in Economic History* 20:73–93.

Bailey, Andrew J. 1984. "The Impact of the Napoleonic Wars on the Development of the Cotton Industry in Lancashire: A Study of the Structure and Behaviour of Firms during the Industrial Revolution." Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University.

Baldwin, Richard. 1989. "Measurable Dynamic Gains from Trade." Working Paper No. 3147. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.

Baldwin, Robert E. 1985. *The Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Bowden, Witt. 1925. *Industrial Society in England towards the End of the Eighteenth Century.* New York: Macmillan.

Caves, Richard E. 1976. "Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada's Tariff Structure." *Canadian Journal of Economics* 9:278–300.

Chaloner, W. H. 1970. "The Agitation against the Corn Laws." In *Popular Movements c. 1830–1850,* ed. John T. Ward. London: Macmillan.

Cottrell, P. L. 1980. *Industrial Finance 1830–1914: The Finance and Organization of English Manufacturing Industry.* London: Methuen.

Crosby, Travis L. 1976. *Sir Robert Peel's Administration, 1841–1846.* Devon, England: David & Charles.

Davis, Ralph. 1979. *The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade.* Leicester: Leicester University Press.

Duggan, Edward P. 1975. "Industrialization and the Development of Urban Business Communities: Research Problems, Sources, and Techniques." *Local Historian* 11:457–65.

Dutton, H. I., and S. R. H. Jones. 1983. "Invention and Innovation in the British Pin Industry, 1790–1850." *Business History Review* 57:175–93.

Fang, Hsien-t'ing. [1930] 1978. *The Triumph of the Factory System in England.* Reprint. Philadelphia: Porcupine.

Gatrell, V. A. C. 1977. "Labour, Power, and the Size of Firms in Lancashire Cotton in the Second Quarter of the Nineteenth Century." *Economic History Review,* 2d ser., 30:95–139.

Gilpin, Robert. 1977. "Economic Interdependence and National Security in Historical Perspective." In *Economic Issues and National Security,* ed. Klaus Knorr and Frank Trager. Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas.

Godek, Paul E. 1985. "Industry Structure and Redistribution through Trade Restrictions." *Journal of Law and Economics* 28:687–703.

Great Britain. Parliament. [1842] 1970. *Parliamentary Papers* (Commons), *1841 Census Great Britain, Occupational Abstract with Preface (Popul. 5).* Shannon: Irish University Press.

Great Britain. Public Record Office. 1825–1846. *Exports, Produce and Manufactures of the United Kingdom.* Cust. 9.

Grossman, Gene, and Elhanan Helpman. 1988. "Product Development and International Trade." Princeton University. Typescript.

Healey, Joseph F. 1984. *Statistics: A Tool for Social Research.* Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Howe, Anthony. 1984. *The Cotton Masters, 1830–1860.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Krasner, Stephen. 1976. "State Power and the Structure of International Trade." *World Politics* 29:317–47.

Krugman, Paul. 1988. "Endogenous Innovations, International Trade, and Growth." Presented at the State University of New York, Problem of Development Conference, Buffalo.

Lake, David A. 1988. *Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887–1939.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Lavergne, Real P. 1983. *The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs.* Toronto: Academic.

Lloyd-Jones, R., and A. A. LeRoux. 1980. "The Size of Firms in the Cotton Industry: Manchester 1815–1841." *Economic History Review,* 2d ser., 33:72–82.

Lloyd-Jones, R., and A. A. LeRoux. 1982. "Marshall and the Birth of Firms in the Early Nineteenth-Century Cotton Industry." *Business History* 24:141–55.

McCord, Norman. 1958. *The Anti-Corn Law League, 1838–1846.* London: George Allan & Unwin.

Magee, Stephen P. 1986. "Endogenous Policy Theory: The Political Economy of U.S. Protection." Presented at the Conference on Free Trade in the World Economy, Kiel, West Germany.

Mantoux, Paul. 1948. *The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century.* London: Johnathan Cape.

Mitchell, Brian R. 1988. *British Historical Statistics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mitchell, Brian R., and Phyllis Deane. 1971. *Abstract of British Historical Statistics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mueller, Dennis C. 1986. *Public Choice.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Norton, Jane E. 1950. *Guide to the National and Provincial Directories of England and Wales, Excluding London, Published before 1856.* London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society.

Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Page, David. 1974. "Commercial Directories and Market Towns." *Local Historian* 11:85–88.

Pincus, Jonathan J. 1975. "Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs." *Journal of Political Economy* 83:757–78.

Prentice, Archibald. 1853. *History of the Anti-Corn Law League.* 2 vols. London: W. & F. G. Cash.

Ray, Edward J. 1981. "The Determinants of Tariff and Nontariff Trade Restrictions in the United States." *Journal of Political Economy* 89:105–21.

Schonhardt-Bailey, Cheryl. 1988. "Linking Constituency Interests to Legislative Voting Behavior: The Role of District Economic and Electoral Composition in the Repeal of the Corn Laws." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington.

Schonhardt-Bailey, Cheryl. 1989. "Specific Factors, Capital Markets, Portfolio Diversification, and Free Trade: Domestic Determinants of the Repeal of the Corn Laws." Presented at the joint convention of the British International Studies Association and the International Studies Association, London.

Schonhardt-Bailey, Cheryl. 1991. "An Equilibrium Model of Trade Policy Liberalization: Looking Inside the British 'Hegemon' of the Nineteenth Century." Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles.

Shaw, Gareth. 1978. "The Content and Reliability of Nineteenth-Century Trade Directories." *Local Historian* 13:205–7.

Snidal, Duncan. 1985. "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory." *International Organization* 39:579–614.

Stein, Arthur. 1984. "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order." *International Organization* 38:355–86.

Taylor, A. J. 1949. "Concentration and Specialization in the Lancashire Cotton Industry, 1825–1850." *Economic History Review,* 2d ser., 1–3:114–21.

Timmins, Geoffrey. 1979. "Measuring Industrial Growth from Trade Directories." *Local Historian* 13:349–51.

Timmins, J. G. 1982. "Concentration and Integration in the Sheffield Crucible Steel Industry." *Business History* 24:61–78.

Von Tunzelmann, G. N. 1978. *Steam Power and British Industrialization to 1860.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wilde, Peter. 1976. "The Use of Business Directories in Comparing the Industrial Structure of Towns." *Local Historian* 12:152–56.

Wootton, Graham. 1975. *Pressure Groups in Britain 1720–1970.* London: Allen Lane Penguin Books.

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey recently completed her Ph.D. degree at the University of California, Los Angeles, and is currently affiliated with the London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom WC2A 2AE.

THE NEW HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY

WILLIAM JAMES BOOTH
McGill University

In the revival of scholarly interest in Marx's relationship to one of the greatest of his teachers, Aristotle, a crucial aspect has been undervalued: Marx's indebtedness to ancient political economy. While Marx employed the methods and key concepts of the economic science of his day in analyzing capitalism, he embedded that explanation in a higher-order theory of the economy. This theory, derived from the Aristotelian account of the household economy, seeks to situate the economy in an overarching account of the community, its purposiveness, and the place within it of activity, time, and domination. Marx sought thereby to illuminate the historical uniqueness of capitalism and, relatedly, to show the bounded character of the economic science (including his own) appropriate to the understanding of it. Central elements of the Aristotelian critique of an economy given over to Midas-like acquisition also find their way into Marx's evaluation of capitalism, and the ideal of the ancient oikos *forms one of the core parts of Marx's theory of communism as the new household economy.*

It is perhaps tempting to imagine that there could be no greater distance than that separating Aristotle, character reader of ancient Athens and proponent of slavery, from Marx, analyst and critic of capitalism. This misapprehension has been in some measure corrected by a substantial body of recent scholarship that has sought to restore Aristotle to his rightful place at the center of those who taught Marx. One part of this literature has developed the argument that Marx's thought contains an ideal of self-realization that stands in greater or lesser proximity to the Aristotelian conception of the good life (Elster 1985, 77, 82–83, 219, 515; Elster 1986; Gilbert 1984; Whelan 1983). We have also been told of the influence of Aristotle's discussions of class (to speak, as I shall argue, more than somewhat anachronistically) and regime forms on Marx's conception of politics and class struggle (Ste. Croix 1981). Relatively little attention has been devoted, however, to what Marx learned from Aristotle in those matters that were the heart of his life's project, the critique of political economy, that area indeed in which Aristotle's name is most often to be found in Marx's writings. (For exceptions, see Castoriadis 1978; Mansfield 1980; Meikle 1979; Nussbaum n.d., 49n.; Welskopf 1962).

Marx wrote that modern revolutions could draw their poetry only from the future (Marx 1978, 106). His own political economy, however, demonstrated the indebtedness of his analysis and critique of capitalist society to the most ancient works in economic thought, and above all to Book 1 of Aristotle's *Politics.* That Marx would turn to Aristotle for guidance in the study of the economy is less surprising than it might at first blush appear to be. The Stagirite had, after all, analyzed the emergence and nature of markets in the ancient Greek world and had developed a critique of the life given over to the ceaseless pursuit of unlimited wealth. Marx's barely concealed awe and revulsion at the pervasive market society that he saw flowering before him mirror Aristotle's observations on the acquisitive life. The relationship between Aristotle and Marx in matters economic is, however, more than one of a conceptual family resemblance. I shall explore the depth of that debt. At the same time, I shall insist on the newness of Marx's appropriation of the idea of the household economy, a transfiguration that rested on the importance that Marx attached to autonomy and, correspondingly, on his profound hostility to the absence of freedom and the hierarchy that he associated with the despotic nature of the ancient household economy.

My approach to understanding Marx's debt to Aristotle begins from a set of passages in which Marx tries to capture the *differentia specifica* of capitalism, its determining final purpose, that is, the creation of surplus value without end rather than the provision of (finite) use values. This distinction between an economic formation driven, Midas-like, to transform everything before it into moments of economic value in pursuit of the unlimited valorization of things and an economy centered around need satisfaction (material and radical or supra-economic)—in Marx's formulae money leads to commodity (something exchanged) leads to valorized money (M-C-M') and commodity leads to money leads to commodity (C-M-C)—is drawn directly and explicitly from Aristotle's *Politics* (1970, 137n.; 1976c, 15-16; 1977-81, 1:253n., 1041n.). Indeed, that most fundamental of Marx's conceptual portraits of capitalism is nothing other than an extended commentary on, and modernization of, book 1, chapter 9 of the *Politics*, in which Aristotle distinguishes *oikonomikē* from one type of *chrēmatistikē*—the art of household management from that of unfettered acquisition—according to their respective ends.

When one considers the many theoretical tributaries that flow from this basic characterization of capitalism, for example, the historical watershed it represents, its technological innovativeness and solventlike action on all traditional social institutions, the theory of crises of overproduction, and capitalism's emancipatory material results systematically turned into their opposites, its centrality becomes evident. So, too, does the profound and direct influence of Aristotle on this most important part of Marx's project. This indebtedness to Aristotle is to be found at a high-level order of reflection upon the economy, in Marx's theorizing about the character of a pervasive market society, his understanding of the science needed to comprehend that society, and his critique of the capitalist economy. In bringing to light the Aristotelian foundations of Marx's "general formula" of capitalism and the resonances of that intellectual lineage throughout Marx's core arguments, we come to a better understanding of Marx and his theoretical ancestry. More than that, however, is at issue here; for in thinking about these two greatest critics of market society, about the profundity of their questions as well as the questionableness of their alternatives to it, we are led to consider with more depth and clarity our own economy and its moral foundations.

The Household Economy

Ancient political economy and, following it, much economic thought until the early modern period (see Brunner 1956; Tribe 1978) took its bearing from the study of the *oikos*, or household.[1] The ancient household was understood as being above all a community of persons, a set of (hierarchical) relations between them, and a purpose around which they are united in that community. The ideal of the *oikos* was that of a community the economic activity of which was seen as subordinated to the (noneconomic) purposes of the household's dominant members, though indirectly and secondarily benefiting its servile members.[2] What we would now commonly call the economic sphere, "the allocation of material goods to satisfy material wants" (Becker 1976, 3) was thus submerged in, or judged in the light of, the idea of the household economy. The reasons for this embedded quality of the economic domain will become clearer as the analysis of the household proceeds. The path to that conclusion must take us to the questions, What is a community?, What sort of community is the household?, and How are its various moments and activities, especially its economic functions, articulated?

Aristotle discusses three principal forms of association: friendship, the polis, and the household. He appears to distinguish the *oikos* from the other two communities (i.e., friends and citizens) in arguing that it is an association directed to the satisfaction of daily recurrent wants (*Politics* 1252b10–11). Yet this definition, which suggests an inferior community wholly bound by necessity and aiming at nothing very elevated, does not seem adequate. For among the free members of the household, there is a range of relationships resembling those to be found among both friends and citizens (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1160b20–21). The household is also, Aristotle adds, like the polis in that it is an association in justice (*Politics* 1253a15–16). Conversely, the city, too, is concerned with the provisioning of its citizens: it is, he writes, as concerned with revenues as is the household, only more so (*Politics* 1259a35–36). Aristotle elsewhere remarks that one of the main tasks awaiting the citizen deliberating in the *ekklēsia* is the setting of food policy and revenue acquisition, suggesting thereby that the city might be viewed, at least in one of its vital functions, as a "vast *oikos*" (*Rhetoric* 1359a23–24), 1360a12–13; Humphreys 1978, 143–44, 155). For this essay, however, the most important among the shared traits uniting the household with other associations is that the household too has a sovereign purpose that is something more than the satisfaction of material want. That purpose is the well-being—the good life—of its free members, particularly its master.

The sovereign purpose of the household is embodied in, and emanates from, that community's ruler. Accordingly, the economy of this despotic household community can be understood as one in which "its dominant motive is . . . the lord's organized want satisfaction" (Weber 1978, 381). (See also Sen's valuable formulation [1984, 373] of the theory of the household as a despotic organization: "Family behaviour would . . . be just a reflection of the head's choice function, and family welfare—in terms of revealed preference—would then have to be seen as the maximand implicit in the head's choice function"). It is the *oikos* master's welfare, properly understood (not just any choice would do), and to a lesser extent that of his wife and children, that constitutes the end and binding cement of that community. This welfare is both material (to be provided with the things required for sustenance) and something more (the possibility of the good life in praxis, of free activity), whether he may choose to spend his hours acting in the role of citizen, philosopher, or something else. With that thought, we are better able to interpret Aristotle's argument that the household exists for the satisfaction of daily recurrent needs. The household community does indeed provide for those wants, but it does so in order to allow room for the activity of the household's free members, especially its master. This is the sense of Aristotle's observation that the slave is an instrument not of *poiēsis*, or production, but of praxis; that is, the slave produces but not for the sake of production itself. Rather, he provides for the material needs of the household so that its free members will not have to occupy themselves in production. The household economy is thus subordinated to the choice function of its dominant member (hence a despotic economy); more importantly it is a tool, something useful for the pursuit of the good life, which is, or ought to be, the content of the master's choice.

The idea of praxis as one of the principal ends of this mode of economic organization brings into sharp relief the centrality in Aristotelian economic thought of *leisure,* or time free for activity.[3] Leisure, unbound (but not empty) time is one of the crucial preconditions that the economy can provide for the good life of the community and the individual. It is the room in which excellence develops. This is so because, for Aristotle, noble and good actions are chosen for their own sake and not out of necessity or in the pursuit of another, remote end. Only time unbound by external constraints permits this free choosing of actions for their own sake, and it is therefore a necessary condition of the good life. In relation to leisure, then, labor (and other economic activities, including the life of the trader) appears as a means—something to be limited as far as possible or transferred onto the shoulders of the servile.

The household thus has a ruling or defining purpose: the freedom and excellence of its master and, secondarily, the well-being of its other members. The *oikos* economy serves that purpose largely through the release of the free persons within it from the necessity of toil. That is one sense in which we can describe Aristotle's analysis of the *oikos* as an account of an embedded economy. *Embedded* here suggests that economic activity—production for the meeting of life's recurrent material needs—is to be grasped within an overarching analysis of the community and its purpose. In Aristotle's argument that purpose stands apart from—and (he would add) is superior to—economic activity itself. At the heart of this view is the idea that economic activity is something necessitous and therefore unfree regardless of whether that unfreedom takes the form of servile labor or of the slavish pursuit of wealth for its own sake. It is thus sharply distinct from virtue and the good life (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1096a6-7). Economic life in a community should then fittingly be a means to the realization of its higher (noneconomic) purpose. The embedded economy is, accordingly, a contained sphere. This restriction of bound or economic time and activity within the smallest possible circumference is a necessary corollary to the ideal of maximizing leisure, or time free for the pursuit of the good life.

I have spoken so far in the Aristotelian manner, that is, only about the sovereign moment of the household and its relation to the economy, about those who are served by it and those who legislate over it. Their pursuit of excellence in leisure, the degree of their detachment from the world of necessity, is possible only because there are those for whom the economy is not contained. These servile persons are indeed part of that community but in a special sense. Their peculiar standing arises from the fact that they enter the *oikos* by compulsion and do not share at all in its governing purpose, except in the sense of being its instruments. Servile labor generally, including slavery as one of its instances, has the other related properties that it is activity performed under compulsion (whether the direct coercion of the master or the dictates of need) and that it is leisureless (*Politics* 1291a8-9, 1334a20-21). The first of these characteristics points to the involuntary nature of this labor, which in turn indicates its remoteness from the activities of excellence to be found among friends or citizens and from the purposes that bind the communities of friends, citizens, and free household members. The purpose governing servile labor is external to it in a twofold sense: (1) it does not originate with the person but with the master or the objective compulsion of need; and (2) the substance of that purpose (as opposed to its origins) is not in the activity itself but in some external end to be served by it (e.g., the welfare of the free household members).

The sort of purpose ruling over labor also gives that activity its special cast. Work in the ancient economy was not considered the organized expenditure of time and effort in the pursuit of ever greater productivity. Rather, it was seen either as some specific activity (a just way of life, as in the case of farming) or as something that aimed at the creation of the beautiful or useful.[4] Time, indeed, appears in antique accounts of servile labor, not as the measure of its expenditure but as something lacking in bound labor, a want (Xenophon *Oeconomicus* 4.3 and Marx's excerpts from this passage [1981, 391]; see also Aristotle *Politics* 1134a19). The servile person is without leisure. Leisure presupposes self-mastery, the freedom to use one's powers and time as one wishes. That freedom is just what those who labor under compulsion lack. Their time belongs to the master, whether that master is the household despot or the community. If, as Aelian wrote *(Varia historia* 10.14), "leisure is the sister of freedom,"[5] the servile are unfree; to the extent that leisure is the space for the cultivation of excellence, they are also denied the possibility of virtue and so too of full membership in communities bound together by virtue.

It will be observed that I have discussed Aristotle's theory of slavery and servitude as a part of his analysis of the relationship between economy and the good life under a specific condition of scarcity, namely, that of a world into which Pandora had released the evil of toil and poverty (Hesiod *Works and Days* 80-81). This reading runs counter to the dominant understanding of Aristotle, which tends to focus almost exclusively on his psychology of the naturally inferior slave and to see in those passages the outermost limits of his idea of freedom (see Ritter 1969, 82). It is undeniable that this is an important element of his remarks on slavery in book 1 of the *Politics*, in that it seeks to provide a justification of that institution independent of the economic and social functions of slavery. I would argue, however, that there is a second and more interesting strand of analysis in his writings, one that in its interweaving of ideas of scarcity, hierarchy and the good life places Aristotle's argument in a longstanding current in ancient Greek thought. This interpretation is supported by two indirect but important pieces of evidence. One is Aristotle's statement, "If every tool could perform its own work when ordered . . . like the statues of Daedalus in the story or the tripods of Hephaestus which the poet says 'enter self-moved the company of the divine'—if thus shuttles wove and quills played harps of themselves, mastercraftsmen would have no need of assistants and masters no need of slaves" *(Politics* 1253b33–1254a1). This passage, which grounds slavery (unashamedly and without the slightest suggestion of its being a necessary evil) in the scarcity of the human condition and in the requirements of the good life, reflects a tradition going back to Hesiod that envisioned an age in which there had been no slavery because humans were provisioned by bountiful nature or by marvelous, self-moving machines and without the need for toil. (For an analysis of this, see Baldry 1953.) However fanciful such speculation may have been, it points to a nonpsychological, economic theory of slavery. A second piece of evidence is that after book 1 of the *Politics*, Aristotle's discussions of slavery and the mechanical occupations (the two are usually equated) rest not on a portrait of the soul but on observations about politics, the good life, and the economy, specifically on the inaccessibility of the good life and the best forms of citizenship to those whose time is consumed in the mechanical occupations. This suggests that the slave psychology of book 1 has some other role in Aristotle's argument than the understanding of slavery as an institution. Indeed, Aristotle as much as acknowledges this in commenting on the niggardliness of nature in not distinguishing in a visible and publicly discernible manner between those with slavish and free souls—an acknowledgment that amounts to stripping the discussion of the inferiority of the slave's soul of any bearing on the analysis of the social phenomenon of slavery.

If concentrating strictly on the slave psychology of book 1 of the *Politics* threatens one sort of misreading of Aristotle, the economic reading just presented risks another—that of understanding Aristotle as offering a type of class analysis, a risk magnified by the importance he attaches to the roles of the wealthy and the poor in the debate in book 3 of the *Politics* between oligarchy and democracy. In neither his analysis of the *oikos* nor his analysis of the city does class in the Marxist sense, a concept appropriate only to a society of a capitalist type, play a role. Like all great observers of the ancient world, Aristotle was not, as some of his more romantic modern readers would have it, oblivious of the desire to acquire and preserve wealth or of how political power could be helpful in securing those ends. Nor, as Aristotle makes clear in book 3, was he unaware of how economic interests could converge handsomely with theories of justice and claims to rule based on those theories. What distinguishes Aristotle's analysis of servitude and mastery—whether in the domestic economy or in the political community—from the one that flows from a theory of classes are the presence of the community, its *philia* and sense of justice, and its sovereign moment as the irreducible starting points of his investigation. Economic moments (e.g., relations of effective control over the means of production and principles of distributive justice) are the efflux of the (prior) ordering of that community, not its determinants. This was, in Maurice Godelier's phrase, a profoundly "political" economy (Godelier 1986, 212).

To resume the thread of our discussion, the central elements of ancient reflection on the economy tell us much about that one conception of the economic sphere, so very different from our own. The realm of production, according to this view, cannot be properly understood to have laws of its own. Rather, it is subordinated to the purposes of the household—more precisely, the requirements of the master or of the dominant members of the larger community. It is also a contained, or suppressed, economy—a sphere kept as remote as possible from the lives of the community's free persons in order that it not interfere with their praxis but rather serve as the material foundation for that activity. It follows from this that since the economy is not an autonomous, self-regulating set of phenomena, it does not constitute a distinct object of investigation. There can, then, be no independent science of the economy, precisely because the object of such an enquiry lacks a distinct, law-governed character. Just as the phenomena being analyzed are embedded, so must political (household) economy form a moment in another overarching story, that of the determining community. Accordingly, this political economy proceeds from a study of the sovereign element within the household because it is there that the purpose governing the economy originates. The legislative community is its proper starting point, not the autonomous economy.

The New Household Economy

The Autonomy of Capital and the Political Economy of Capitalism

For a new world, a new political economy was needed; and it was precisely from the modern science of economics that Marx drew most of the concepts that he used to analyze capitalism. (I examine related aspects of the method of Marx's political economy in Booth 1989b.) Yet the recognition of the novelty of capitalism was possible only against a theoretical background that permitted this newness to be recognized as such. That background was Aristotle's theory of the household economy and of its fundamental distinction between the provisioning of humans in the things needed for life and for the good life and the restless search after wealth, oblivious of the proper use that wealth ought to serve. As we shall see presently, Marx sought to use that Aristotelian distinction, expressed now in the formulas M-C-M′ and C-M-C, in order both to capture the singular properties of capitalism and its economic science and to set the groundwork for a critique of capitalism and a vision of a new household economy.

Let us begin this inquiry into the Aristotelian foundations of Marx's political economy by reversing the order of the preceding discussion. I shall thus start with a short sketch of Marx's thoughts on political economy (including his own) as a science. Marx claims as one of the central discoveries of his economic analysis the explanation of the *value form*, a concept that, he writes, did not appear in the ancient world and that indeed is "entirely peculiar" to the modern economy (1973, 776; 1977–81, 1:90). Marx, then, places his core insight squarely in the modern tradition of political economy, a body of thought that he argues first attained the rank of a science with the Physiocrats (Marx and Engels 1976, 412). What does Marx mean when he says that only in modernity did economics become a science? Consider this comment on the Physiocrats: "It was their great merit that they conceived these forms [of production] as physiological forms of society: as forms arising from the natural necessity of production itself, forms that are independent of anyone's will or of politics, etc." (1963–71, 1:44). In other words, economics for the first time becomes a science independent of politics, the study of the objective and autonomous laws of production and exchange and of that force determining all human relations. The needs of the dominant community are no longer understood as the determining purpose of wealth-creating activity. Only in modernity does (and can) economics emerge as the independent master science of the social world (Marx 1973, 104; Marx and Engels 1976, 409, 412, 414).

Modern political economy remakes the central ideas of ancient economics—community, labor, and time—in its own image. It conceives the community as a network of persons exchanging commodities (Marx 1975b, 217). The solventlike quality of capitalism, mirrored in its economic science, replaces the many-tiered world that preceded capitalism with a dotlike society of persons who engage each other only as the producers, purchasers, and sellers of commodities. Economic science reconstitutes the idea of community as one whose binding cement is not the purposes of its dominant or other members but rather the cash nexus—more broadly, the valorization process of capital (Marx 1973, 488; Marx 1976a, 487). The collective laborer replaces the craftsman, homogeneous labor takes the place of skilled work, and surplus value emerges as the purpose of labor rather than the satisfaction of need (see Marx 1975a, 241, 244; Marx 1977–81, 1:468–69). Lastly, time—far from being conceived of as leisure, as room for the development of the excellences of man or citizen and as the object and desideratum of economic activity—becomes itself subordinated to the economic process and conceptualized as the substance and measure of wealth, in short, as labor time embodied in commodities (Marx 1973, 794; for further analysis of Marx's concept of the economy of time, see Booth 1991, Cohen 1977, and Welskopf 1962).

Marx's political economy is solidly anchored in that modern tradition. This is to be explained by the fact that he held that in the bourgeois world all relations are indeed subordinated to, and transformed into, economic ones. The science of political economy, he wrote, is just the theory of that underlying condition. Accordingly, the categories of bourgeois economics are "forms of thought which are socially valid, and therefore objective, for the relations of production belonging to this [capitalist] historically determined mode of social production" (1973, 106; 1977–81, 1:169; Marx and Engels 1976, 409–11). This suggests that we must bracket Marx's use of the fundamental tenets of the new economic science with critical qualifiers or at least keep open the possibility that their employment in analyzing bourgeois society was understood by Marx against the background of another sort of political economy, one that had in the past, and would again, reflect an essentially different order of things. I shall return to that topic later. For the present, I wish to set out in more detail why Marx believed that an autonomous and dominant economic science was the most appropriate vehicle for understanding capitalism.

Recall Marx's broad-brush description, in volume 1 of *Capital*, of capitalism as an economic system, a description freely adapted from the *Politics* (1.9). There Marx states the "general formula" of capital: M–C–M′. Despite its limitations (1977–81, 1:266, 2:109–43), what this formula is meant to capture is the core of capitalist production. M–C–M′ expresses above all the governing purpose and automatic character of economic activity under capitalism. This determining purpose, which is a structural property of that sort of economic formation, enforced and translated into the subjective motivation of the system's actors through the mechanism of competition, has at its center an autonomous expansionary momentum. Unlike earlier economic formations (C–M–C or its variants) in which the need satisfaction of the dominant class set a threshold beyond which there was no incentive to increase production, M′, surplus value is, in principle, limitless and self-renewing. At every achieved level of surplus, economic actors are driven to seek a still higher level.

Such an economic process takes on, Marx argues, a life of its own: value becomes its "automatic subject" (1977–81, 1:255), the governing purpose of the system in relation to which the human subjects engaged in its various moments appear only as its functionaries or bearers. The despotic (*oikos* model) economy is stripped of its overdetermining master, economic decisions are transferred indiscriminately to individuals, and their anarchic interactions generate lawlike forces that succeed the household master as the hand governing the economy. This fundamental picture of capitalism as a system that, independent of the intentions of persons, gives birth to economic laws is key to understanding Marx's assumptions about the revolutionary dynamism of technological innovation under capitalism as well as those about its solventlike action upon all social and national barriers to increased surpluses. It is also, as we shall see, central to his explanation of the perverse effects that are unique to capitalism.

The valorization process of capital (M–C–M′) constitutes that all-embracing force that transforms all human relations into economic ones. But that is only the starting point for Marx. The detailed project of his political economy seeks to show how the valorization process comes to absorb everything standing before it and thereby to provide a "general illumination" in which all phenomena are bathed (1973, 106–7). In the first place, labor is transformed into the expenditure of units of labor time in the production of commodities that embody those value-hours. It is rendered homogeneous through the leveling of skills that accompanies the introduction of technology and of the factory system of production (1976b, 127; 1977–81, 1:545–46; 1982, 2018, 2020). Moreover, it becomes homogeneous in that it is both itself measured by, and productive of, value denominated in quantitative units of time (1976c, 48; 1977–81, 1:352–53). The theoretical expression of this set of phenomena, uniquely appropriate to the analysis of labor under capitalism, is the labor theory of value.

Secondly, in an economic system driven by the production of surplus value measured in hours (surplus and necessary) and in which surplus labor time is the presupposition of the value circuit's continuance, there will arise, according to Marx, two seemingly contradictory, but in fact necessarily related, consequences for the use of time. No past economic formation has been as concerned with the creation of surplus time as is capitalism, which must constantly seek out labor-saving technology and techniques. Conversely, capitalism is driven toward the appropriation of labor twenty-four hours a day. In short, no earlier economic process has been so dedicated to reducing necessary labor time or generated greater pressures to absorb the time thereby saved into the production circuit (1973, 397, 399, 613, 634; 1977–81, 1:367, 375).

Finally, the character of the community is decisively shaped by the capital circuit.[6] The "interconnections" of capital bind social intercourse (1973, 639). This binding of persons and their interactions assumes two forms, corresponding to the two principal phases of the valorization circuit: circulation (the market) and production. The shape of buyers' and sellers' social intercourse is compelled and flows from their positions in the exchange act; and the exchange in turn flows from the organization of the economy—in other words, from the value process (1976b, 118). Just as the unity of persons in the market is derived from the dominant valorization process, so in the production sphere the community of workers finds its animating unity elsewhere. Capital is the "predominant subject" of their community, the source of its forced origins, and the power that shapes the character of their cooperation. This cooperation, Marx writes, is a *daseinsweise*, a "form of existence," of capital—in short an alien community imposed upon them, drawing both its purpose and its specific forms from the requirements of capital (1976c, 244–45; 1977–81, 1:451, 3:178–79). To give an account of such a world, what is needed is the language of *collective workers*, of *functionaries* and *bearers* interacting with one another as the agents of the individual moments of the determining economic process, M–C–M′.

In more conventional Marxist terms, what is needed is a theory of classes as groups generated by the economic process alone. For only in capitalism have all other distinctions between persons—those based on status, political position, and so forth—been removed and economic forces made supreme over noneconomic ones. It is, of course, true that in discussing the ancient world Marx sometimes employs the language of classes and class struggle and that some contemporary Marxist historians have argued that the idea of class was intended by Marx to have (and does in fact have) transhistorical applicability (see Ste. Croix 1975, 18, 27; Ste. Croix 1985, 165). Detailed comment on the debate between those who deny the value of the idea of class in analyzing precapitalist societies—often adopting in its place some variant of the category of estate or order (see Finley 1973, 1983; Vidal-Naquet 1983)—and Marxist historians such as G. E. M. de Ste. Croix would take me far beyond my concerns here. The best available resolution of the debate within the Marxist tradition—that offered by Maurice Godelier—does, however, mesh well with my thesis. He maintains that Marx employed two conceptions of class: a loose generic notion designed to demystify precapitalist estates by showing the centrality of exploitation to them and a more restricted idea of class applicable only in a capitalist society (here relations of exploitation and domination rest solely upon the place of persons in the production process and the labor market) (Godelier 1986, 231–32, 245–46). Classes such as these are conceivable only where there are no juridically expressed status distinctions between persons (Finley 1973, 45, 48; Godelier 1986, 232–33). Characteristic of ancient Greek society, on the other hand, was the fact that relations of economic exploitation were internal to political relations. The Athens of Aristotle had, in Godelier's words, a truly *political* economy. What is particularly of interest in these observations is the notion that the community, its cleavages, and the place of individuals within the various groups arrayed along those cleavages are, under capitalism, shaped by the workings of the economy (e.g., by initial endowments in economic goods and the competitive market). The contrast to the antique world, in which status within the community was prior to any other distinction between persons, suggests the profoundly altered place of the economy that Marx believed he had discerned in capitalism.

We can recast this as a distinction between ancient and modern political economy. The ancient economists had little or no concept of value (other than use value), an idea central only to a pervasive-market, commodity-producing, and surplus-oriented economy, that is, one of the capitalist type (Marx 1973, 776; Marx 1977–81, 151). The idea of an economic science whose driving question was the increase of surpluses was, Marx writes, not thought of in the antique world; the issue there was rather that of how to produce good citizens (1973, 487). The political economy that expresses the laws of a C–M–C economy will have as its object of investigation the sovereign element in the community—the household masters or the dominant class—since it is they who rule over the embedded economy. In such a world, a purely economic science could hardly exist. At most, a narrowly economic science would be a body of the rules of *technē*, the skills of acquisition; in other words, of an art subordinate to that involved in ruling over the household or city.

This, together with the preceding remarks on class and estate, show just how inaccurate is the charge against Marx's "transhistorical" economic science, that is, that he wrote about Aristotle and the ancient Greek world as if Athens was a capitalist-economy-in-embryo, amenable to the categories of analysis developed within a full-blown market society, with Aristotle as its rather perplexed observer.[7] The C–M–C/M–C–M′ distinction leads directly (and so it led Marx) to the conclusion that different theories of the economy would be needed to explain the workings of such different social and economic formations. Marx fully understood that the community and its sovereign moment played a central role in ancient accounts of the economy for good reason (and most certainly not because of their authors' blindness) and that they were absent from modern theories of the economy for equally good reason. The same distinction that precluded Marx from understanding the ancient world as an embryonic capitalist economy nevertheless enabled him to put forward one way of grasping the uniqueness of capitalism. In the most general terms, this uniqueness resided in the terminus peculiar to capitalism—M′, or unlimited surplus. Flowing from that determining end is a set of more specific consequences that can be described as the transformation of community, activity, and time into derivative moments of the valorization process. In sum, the Aristotelian contrast between the limited, needs-driven economy of the *oikos* and the all-absorbing, Midas-like economy of acquisition beyond limit allowed Marx to situate in theory the society that he saw before him.

The New Household Economy

The central project of Marx's life's work consisted of more than the analysis of the historical location and specificity of capitalism or the study of the laws of its motion. Another crucial element of Marx's work was the critique of political economy. That critique took a variety of forms, some quite technical and directed at what Marx thought to be the errors of his modern predecessors. There is, however, a second facet to Marx's critique of political economy, one intimately related to his criticism of the economic process that it expressed and drawing yet again on Aristotle's normative economics. This aspect of Marx's new household economy draws on two related ideas. First, capitalism, with its economic process independent of, and ruling over, the community, is understood against the background of the ancient household economy as historically sui generis and perverse from the point of view of the human good. It is seen as perverse for reasons not far removed from one source of the ancient contempt for *pleonexia,* i.e., the constrained, unfree, and almost slavish life of a person consumed by the endless search for wealth *(Nicomachean Ethics* 1096a6). There is, though, this one crucial difference: *pleonexia* in the classical world was an individual failing, whereas in modernity it is, according to Marx, an essential property of the economic system itself. Second, since this perversity resides above all in the unique properties of capitalist production—in the autonomy and dominance of its surplus-directed process and the distortions of community, individuals, and their activities that are the direct consequences of that all-encompassing M–C–M′ circuit—the solution is something like the emergence of a *transformed household economy writ large,* namely, communism.

Communist society, Marx thought, would be a free association of persons consciously regulating their production. So far as is possible, the division of labor and the determination of activity by the economy would no longer significantly shape a person's life. Time will once again become the "room for man's development," time free from necessary production (1963–71, 3:256; 1977–81, 3:959; 1982, 2027). The particulars of this vision are not as important for us as is the foundation of Marx's picture of communism. That foundation consists of two elements: the implied critique of capitalism as an economic formation in which the production and circulation of value are independent of, and dominant over, society and the righting of that condition by establishing social control over the economy (see Booth 1989a). Viewed in that light, communism represents the restoration of a needs-driven (household-type) economy over the surplus-directed model of capitalism,[8] where needs are not those of a dominant class and their satisfaction does not entail a corresponding denial of that same satisfaction to a servile population. It is a vision of a society that would allow for the satisfaction of what we might term, with Agnes Heller (1976; see also Przeworski 1986), *radical needs*—for the autonomy of individuals and their community. This is a portrait of a society in which the economy, just as in the Aristotelian *oikos*, is subject to the governance of the community and in which the economy is governed in order to contain it, to diminish the degree to which its operations determine the lives of persons.

This does not mean that Marx was, like so many others of his day, a naive admirer of the ancient world, blind to the conditions that made the *oikos* economy possible and defined its limits. Marx well understood that the embedded economy of antiquity was necessarily despotic in the sense discussed earlier (1973, 245; 1977–81, 1:509). In addition, these economies were essentially conservative in that their governing end or goal generated no pressure for expansion once their restricted need satisfaction threshold had been met. For Marx, the most important negative consequence of this stagnant type of economy was that it made unnecessary the further growth of material productive forces, a growth required for the emancipation of human beings from domination by their fellows and from the constraints of scarcity. While the Greeks knew of the liberating potential of technology, their specific type of consumption economy created no drive to realize that potential (1976a, 487; 1977–81, 1:532).[9] Capitalism, an economic process propelling production and innovation beyond any set of needs (even those of the dominant class) was required in order to whip forward the growth of productive forces so that machines, not humans, would be the serfs opening up the realm of freedom (1973, 25; 1975a, 243; 1977–81, 3:957–58).

Communism, then, must recreate that embedded and contained economy in a radically new way. This new household economy differs from its Aristotelian predecessor in two principal and related respects: the end to which it is subordinate is freedom rather than virtue, and it is nondespotic. The first of these two distinguishing features is the most difficult to establish, given the scarcity and thinness of Marx's texts on the subject of communism; and, as well, it runs counter to a widely accepted and formidably argued reading of Marx that discerns in his writings a quasi-Aristotelian concern with the good life (Elster 1986; Gilbert 1984; Miller 1984; Whelan 1983). I would suggest that on the contrary, what is striking in Marx's works is precisely the absence of a discussion of the good life. Still more remarkable is the fact that he hardly seems to have thought it necessary so much as to raise the question. For Aristotle, on the other hand, once the proper place of the economy in the order of human ends has been determined, the central question remains to be answered: How ought one to spend the greatest good provided by the *oikos* economy—leisure, the freedom from constraining toil? What is the fitting hierarchy of activities thereby made available to human beings? Marx does, to be sure, occasionally write in a manner that is suggestive of a background theory of the good life. But overwhelmingly, his emphasis is upon what we might (paraphrasing Sen) call *liberty as control.*

The normative perplexity standing behind the idea of liberty as control is captured in this question from Marx's notes to *The German Ideology:* "How does it happen that their relations assume an independent existence over against them? and that the forces of their own life become superior to them?" (Marx and Engels 1976, 93). Communism, Marx thought, would be the righting of this loss of self-legislation: "Men once more gain control of exchange, production and the way they behave to one another" (p. 48). The desideratum that Marx here envisions is not that of excellence in the best of activities but an extension of autonomy, or self-rule, beyond the limits set by the liberal agenda of freedom from coercion to freedom from the laws of the economy and, insofar as this is possible, freedom from scarcity.[10]

There is little compelling evidence that liberty as control was meant to be but a prelude to the possibility of a good higher still than freedom. Marx, in the famous banderole from *The German Ideology,* writes, "In communist society . . . society regulates production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind [to]" (Marx and Engels 1976, 47). That sentence reads almost as if it were a play on Aristotle's account of friendship and leisure: "Some friends drink or throw dice together, others practice gymnastics and hunt or philosophize together; each sort spending their time together in the activity they love best of everything in life" *(Nicomachean Ethics* 1172a3–5). There is, however, this one profound and telling difference: unlike Aristotle, who embeds his examination of friendship in a work devoted to the good life, Marx does not raise the issue of whether, for example, hunting is to be preferred to philosophy or in general of what the good life is. It is sufficient, for Marx, that one can do what one "has a mind to," that the individual be free of constraint. Serge-Christophe Kolm has accurately (and provocatively) identified this core concern: "The fundamental Marxist reference point [is] . . . the ethic of liberty. . . . Exactly as in liberalism . . . [it] is the hypothesis that the person has the right to the free disposition of herself" (Kolm 1984, 92).

Marx places his emphasis upon freedom rather than upon the idea of a hierarchy of ways of living; correspondingly, he rejects the notion of the despotic organization of the household, the latter being a reflection of, and a means for, the preservation of that hierarchy. For Aristotle, so long as material production was not self-operating, that is, as long as the shuttle was not able to weave on its own, there would be need of slaves. Domination and servitude were, as we have seen, the preconditions of the ancient embedded economy. Marx, in criticizing the nonmarket economy of the patriarchal household and in attacking the "despotic" nonmarket economy of the modern firm and industrial enterprise (1977–81, 1:549–50, 619–21), suggested that the nonmarket organization of the postcapitalist economy must not be despotic or a command economy of any sort.[11] The possibility of this new household economy rests on a foundation that for Aristotle was utopain fantasy: an infrastructure of material production endowed with the capacity to reduce necessary labor time to a minimum consistent with the satisfaction of consumption needs, in which that reduction is secured not through the creation of surplus labor on the one side as the precondition of free time on the other but by labor-saving technology (see Cohen 1978, 23 and chap. 11). Just that growth of technology, with its accompanying potential for liberation, was for Marx the "historical justification" of capitalism (1963-71, 2:405; 1973, 325; 1976c, 327).

These differences, important as they are, should not obscure from us the indebtedness of the last great critic of markets to his ancient ancestor. Marx owes his ideas of the subordination of the economy to the community's purposes, of the containment of the economy, and of leisure as freedom from those necessary tasks to Aristotle's theory of the art of household management. His arguments about the perverse character of the drive to unlimited acquisition, of the slavishness of a life given over to that pursuit, and to the labor required to produce wealth find their origins in Aristotle's critique of the acquisitive life. But Marx's new household economy is more than a part of his vision of communism or his critique of capitalism. It stands also at the center of his higher-order theory of human economies, a theory with which he sought to explain the uniqueness and historical specificity of capitalism. The ideal of the pre- and postcapitalist household economies is meant, among other things, to reveal the watershed represented by capitalism, a transformation that consists above all in the autonomy and dominance of the economy over all other aspects of society. The new household economy also brings to light the science appropriate to such a condition, one that reflects (in its independence from the other human sciences) both the autonomy of the laws that are its proper object and (in its status as the master science of society) the dominance of those laws over the community. The uniqueness of the capitalist economy thus finds expression in its economic science. That this science hardly could be said to have existed prior to capitalism and that in its present form it likely shall not exist after the passing of that economic formation tells us something crucial, according to Marx, about the bounded character of the economic science that he himself employed in his portrait of capitalism. To understand that finite, bounded quality of both capitalism and its master science, to secure a higher vantage point from which to develop a critique of the bourgeois world and its political economy, Marx turned to his teacher in so many things, Aristotle, and to the idea of the household economy that he had with the greatest lucidity set out.

Notes

I first presented some of the arguments of this essay in an informal faculty seminar on political economy at Duke University. I am grateful to the members of that seminar for their criticisms, especially Robert Bates, Joseph Grieco, Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, and George Tsebelis.

1. There is an extensive literature on ancient economic thought. Some particularly useful works include Finley 1973, Polanyi 1957, Vidal-Naquet and Austin 1977, and relevant chapters in Will 1972. A different approach to the ancient economy and to ancient economic thought can be found in the writings of the "new economic historians": North (1977, 1981) and Gunderson (1982). Frederiksen (1975) presents another type of challenge to the Finley interpretation.

2. The essential principles of this view of the household economy governed by the community could be and were (*Nicomachean Ethics* book 5) extended to a vision of the good economy at the level of the city, characterized by an extensive division of labor and so by exchange. This suggests that Aristotle's core concern was not with the presence or absence of exchange as such but with the directing purpose of economic activity including trade: unlimited gain or the provisioning of humans in the things necessary for life and for the good life. In this paper I confine myself to a discussion of the basic theory, that is, the *oikos* rather than the city economy.

3. Leisure (*scholē*) is described by Aristotle as the "beginning point of everything" (*Politics* 1337b33-34). The most extended classical discussion is to be found in books 7 and 8 of the *Politics*; intriguing for its portrait of a fanciful literary world of leisure is Athenaeus, *The Deipnosophists* 3.6.267e-f. Valuable modern commentaries include Welskopf 1962 and 1976 and Stocks 1936.

4. See Xenophon *Oeconomicus* 5.1-17 and *Cyropaedia* 8.2.5-6; for further discussion, see Finley 1982, 186-87; Vernant 1969, 215, 220; Vidal-Naquet and Austin 1977, 14-15; Will 1972, 646.

5. Aelian uses the term *argia* (literally, "without a function or job") rather than *scholē*, the word more usually translated as "leisure." The distinction between the empty free time of *argia* and the virtue-filled time of *scholē* is crucial to Aristotle's argument. I pass over this distinction here only because in discussing the servile, who lack free time altogether, one is speaking about a group for whom the question of the fitting use of time cannot even arise.

6. This distinction between communities ancient and modern has a clear Hegelian dimension; and it is also to be found, *mutatis mutandis*, in the writings of Sir Henry Maine, Tönnies, and Weber. Shklar (1976, 74-75) and Smith (1989, 12-13) contain valuable discussions of Hegel's contribution to the understanding of this distinction. I have avoided the temptation to introduce Hegel as a mediating term between Marx and Aristotle primarily because I am certain that Marx was a close and for the most part independent reader of Aristotle but also because the small compass of an article can only do justice to so many greats.

7. A striking example of this sort of critique is Castoriadis 1978, the weakness of which is its reliance on a single passage and theme from volume 1 of *Capital*, the one about value and rendering goods-in-exchange comparable (Marx 1977-81, 1: 151-52). A good counter to this view is Lukács 1971, which maintains that Marx's historical materialism

was intended to be the "self-knowledge" of capitalist society.

8. An early intimation of the attractiveness of the theory of the *oikos* economy for Marx's vision of communism can be seen by comparing to the *German Ideology* passage (Marx and Engels 1976, 48 describing conscious control of the economy and, by implication, a use-value orientation as the core of communism) the following excerpt that Marx took from Xenophon: "*The art of household management* . . . [is] the science through which humans are capable of increasing the things of their household. . . . *The things of the household* [are] its totality of goods, goods [are] what is useful to each and all, useful [is] everything that one knows how to use" *(Oeconomicus* 4.4; 1981, 391; emphasis Marx's).

9. It is important that the two elements of this sentence be kept in balance. I remarked earlier that the Greeks from Hesiod's *Works and Days* to the classical period conceived, if only in their utopian literature, of a leisured world (without master or servant) made possible by self-moving machines (or by generous nature). But such technical innovation as there was in that society was not directed toward the mastering of a nature-imposed scarcity with a view to human emancipation. Rather, it was most often bound up with aesthetic considerations, religious display, or military purposes (see Finley 1982, 178, and Hodges 1970, 216). That thought lies behind Marx's proposition that the ancient world's "dominant way of looking [at production and the division of labor] was what was *better:* quality. [Only rarely is *pleiō,* more mentioned]; otherwise always *kallion*" (1976c, 257).

10. Though Marx was savagely critical of Kant (see Marx and Engels 1976, 193, 195), there is a Kantian resonance in his idea of autonomy. Contrasting analyses (Kantian and Marxian) of this aspect of Marx's thought are to be found in Booth 1986, ix-x-iii, 58-61; and Booth N.d.

11. Ugo Pagano's analyses (1985a, 1985b) of Marx's critique of the single-firm model of economic organization provide a foundation for understanding Marx's rejection of command or despotic economies as an alternative to markets. Much more difficult to comprehend is what form an economy at once complex, nonmarket, and noncommand would take. See Booth 1990 for further analysis.

References

Aelian. 1974. *Varia Historia,* ed. M. R. Dilts. Leipzig: BSB B. G. Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft.

Aristotle. 1932. *The Politics.* Trans. H. Rackham. London: William Heinemann.

Aristotle. 1934. *Nicomachean Ethics.* Trans. H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Aristotle. 1984. *Rhetoric.* In *The Complete Works of Aristotle,* ed. Jonathan Barnes. 2 vols. (vol. 2). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Athenaeus. 1929. *The Deipnosophists.* Trans. C. B. Gulick. 7 vols. (vol. 3). London: William Heinemann.

Baldry, H. C. 1953. "The Idler's Paradise in Attic Comedy." *Greece and Rome* 22:49-60.

Becker, Gary. 1976. *The Economic Approach to Human Behavior.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Booth, William James. 1986. *Interpreting the World: Kant's Philosophy of History and Politics.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Booth, William James. 1989a. "Gone Fishing: Making Sense of Marx's Concept of Communism." *Political Theory* 17:205-22.

Booth, William James. 1989b. "Explaining Capitalism: The Method of Marx's Political Economy." *Political Studies* 37:612-25.

Booth, William James. 1990. "Households, Markets, and Firms." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco.

Booth, WIlliam James. 1991. "Economies of Time: On the Idea of Time in Marx's Political Economy." *Political Theory* 19:7-27.

Booth, William James. N.d. "The Limits of Autonomy: Karl Marx's Kant Critique." In *The Starry Heavens and the Moral Law,* ed. Ronald S. Beiner and William J. Booth. Forthcoming.

Brunner, Otto. 1956. *Neue Weg der Sozialgeschichte.* Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Castoriadis, Cornelius. 1978. "From Marx to Aristotle, from Aristotle to Us." *Social Research* 45:667-738.

Cohen, Gerald A. 1977. "Labor, Leisure, and a Distinctive Contradiction of Advanced Capitalism." In *Markets and Morals,* ed. Gerald Dworkin. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Cohen, Gerald A. 1978. *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Elster, Jon. 1985. *Making Sense of Marx.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Elster, Jon. 1986. "Self-realization in Work and Politics: The Marxist Conception of the Good Life." *Social Philosophy & Policy* 3:97-126.

Finley, Moses I. 1973. *The Ancient Economy.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Finley, Moses I. 1982. *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece.* New York: Viking.

Finley, Moses I. 1983. *Politics in the Ancient World.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Frederiksen, M. W. 1975. "Theory, Evidence, and the Ancient Economy." *Journal of Roman Studies* 65:164-71.

Gilbert, Alan. 1984. "Marx's Moral Realism." In *After Marx,* ed. Terence Ball and James Farr.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Godelier, Maurice. 1986. *The Mental and the Material: Thought, Economy, and Society.* Trans. Martin Thom. London: Verso.

Gunderson, Gerald A. 1982. "Economic Behavior in the Ancient World." In *Explorations in the New Economic History,* ed. Roger L. Ransom, Richard Sutch, and Gary W. Walton. New York: Academic.

Heller, Agnes. 1976. *The Theory of Need in Marx.* New York: St. Martin's.

Hodges, Henry. 1970. *Technology in the Ancient World.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Humphreys, S. C. 1978. *Anthropology and the Greeks.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Kolm, Serge-Christophe. 1984. *Le libéralisme moderne: Analyse d'une raison économique.* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Lukács, Georg. 1971. *History and Class Consciousness.* Trans. Rodney Livingstone. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Mansfield, Harvey C., Jr. 1980. "Marx on Aristotle: Freedom, Money, and Politics." *Review of Metaphysics* 34:351-67.

Marx, Karl. 1963-71. *Theories of Surplus Value.* 3 vols. Moscow: Progress.

Marx, Karl. 1970. *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.* Moscow: Progress.

Marx, Karl. 1973. *Grundrisse.* Trans. Martin Nicolaus. New York: Vintage Books.

Marx, Karl. 1975a. *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts.* Vol. 3 of *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works.* New York: International.

Marx, Karl. 1975b. *Comments on James Mill.* Vol. 3 of *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works.* New York: International.

Marx, Karl. 1976a. *Manifesto of the Communist Party.* Vol. 6 of *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works.* New York: International.

Marx, Karl. 1976b. *The Poverty of Philosophy.* Vol. 6 of *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works.* New York: International.

Marx, Karl. 1976c. *Zur Kritik der politischen* Ökonomie (Manuskript 1861-1863). Vol. 2.3.1 of *Karl Marx: Friedrich Engels Gesamtausgabe.* Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

Marx, Karl. 1977-81. *Capital.* 3 vols. Trans. Ben Fowkes and David Fernbach. New York: Vintage Books.

Marx, Karl. 1978. *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.* Vol. 11 of *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works.* New York: International.

Marx, Karl. 1981. "Xenophon: Von der Haushaltungskunst." In *Exzerpte und Notizen: 1843 bis Januar 1845.* Vol. 4.2 of *Karl Marx. Friedrich Engels Gesamtausgabe.* Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

Marx, Karl. 1982. *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Manuskript 1861-1863).* Vol. 2.3.6 of *Karl Marx. Friedrich Engels Gesamtausgabe.* Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. 1976. *The German Ideology.* Vol. 5 of *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works.* New York: International.

Meikle, Scott. 1979. "Aristotle and the Political Economy of the Polis." *Journal of Hellenistic Studies* 99:57-73.

Miller, Richard W. 1984. *Analyzing Marx: Morality, Power, and History.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

North, Douglass C. 1977. "Markets and Other Allocation Systems in History: The Challenge of Karl Polanyi." *Journal of European Economic History* 6:703-16.

North, Douglass C. 1981. *Structure and Change in Economic History.* New York: W. W. Norton.

Nussbaum, Martha C. N.d. "Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution." In *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. Forthcoming.

Pagano, Ugo. 1985a. "Single-Firm and Anti-Firm Communism: Contradictions and Evolution in the Marxian Alternatives to Capitalism." In *Marx en perspective,* ed. Bernard Chavance. Paris: Éditions de l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales.

Pagano, Ugo. 1985b. *Work and Welfare in Economic Theory.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Polanyi, Karl. 1957. "Aristotle Discovers the Economy." In *Trade and Market in the Early Empires,* ed. Conrad M. Arensberg, Harry W. Pearson, and Karl Polanyi. New York: Free Press.

Przeworski, Adam. 1986. "Material Interests, Class Compromise, and the Transition to Socialism." In *Analytical Marxism,* ed. John Roemer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ritter, Joachim. 1969. *Metaphysik und Politik: Studien zu Aristoteles und Hegel.* Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Ste. Croix, G. E. M. de 1975. "Karl Marx and the History of Classical Antiquity." *Arethusa* 8:7-41.

Ste. Croix, G. E. M. de 1981. *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Ste. Croix, G. E. M. de 1985. "Karl Marx and the Interpretation of Ancient and Modern History." In *Marx en perspective,* ed. Bernard Chavance. Paris: Éditions de l'Écoles des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales.

Sen, Amartya. 1984. *Resources, Values, and Development.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Shklar, Judith N. 1976. *Freedom and Independence: A Study of the Political Ideas of Hegel's Phenomenology of the Mind.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, Steven B. 1989. "What Is 'Right' in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right?" American Political Science Review* 83:3–18.

Stocks, J. L. 1936. "Scholē." *Classical Quarterly* 30:177–87.

Tribe, Keith. 1978. *Land, Labour, and Economic Discourse.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Vernant, Jean Pierre. 1969. *Myth et pensée chez les Grecs.* Paris: Maspero.

Vidal-Naquet, Pierre. 1983. *Le chasseur noir: Formes de pensée et formes de société dans le monde grec.* Paris: Maspero.

Vidal-Naquet, Pierre, and Michael M. Austin. 1977. *Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Weber, Max. 1978. *Economy and Society.* Vol. 1. Ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Trans. Ephraim Fischoff et al. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Welskopf, Elisabeth Charlotte. 1962. *Probleme der Musse im alten Hellas.* Berlin: Ruetten & Loening.

Welskopf, Elisabeth Charlotte. 1976. "Loisir et esclavage dans la Grèce antique." In *Actes du Colloque 1973 sur L'Esclavage.* Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

Whelen, Frederick G. 1983. "Marx and Revolutionary Virtue." In *Marxism, Nomos XXVI,* ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman. New York: New York University Press.

Will, Édouard. 1972. *Le monde grec et l'orient.* Vol. 1. Paris: Presses Universitaires de france.

Xenophon. 1914. *Cyropaedia.* Trans. Walter Miller. Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library.

Xenophon. 1968. *Oeconomicus* in *Xenophon in Seven Volumes* (vol. 4). Trans. E. C. Marchant. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

William James Booth is Associate Professor of Political Science, McGill University, Montréal, Québec, Canada H3A 2T7.

THE LIMITS OF THE STATE: BEYOND STATIST APPROACHES AND THEIR CRITICS

TIMOTHY MITCHELL
New York University

The state *has always been difficult to define. Its boundary with society appears elusive, porous, and mobile. I argue that this elusiveness should not be overcome by sharper definitions, but explored as a clue to the state's nature. Analysis of the literature shows that neither rejecting the state in favor of such concepts as the political system, nor "bringing it back in," has dealt with this boundary problem. The former approach founders on it, the latter avoids it by a narrow idealism that construes the state–society distinction as an external relation between subjective and objective entities. A third approach, presented here, can account for both the salience of the state and its elusiveness. Reanalyzing evidence presented by recent theorists, state–society boundaries are shown to be distinctions erected internally, as an aspect of more complex power relations. Their appearance can be historically traced to technical innovations of the modern social order, whereby methods of organization and control internal to the social processes they govern create the* effect *of a state structure external to those processes.*

Despite the recent proliferation of literature on the subject, it remains difficult to explain exactly what is meant by the concept of the state. There is no shortage of competing definitions. But a definition of the state always depends on distinguishing it from society, and the line between the two is difficult to draw in practice. The modern state, Philippe Schmitter (1985, 33) points out, seems to be "an amorphous complex of agencies with ill-defined boundaries, performing a great variety of not very distinctive functions."

In the postwar period, American political science has offered two alternative responses to this difficulty in drawing the boundaries of the state. The first was to abandon the state as a concept too vague and too narrow to be the basis of a general science of politics, replacing it most frequently with the concept of political system. But the change in vocabulary failed to solve the problem. The boundaries of the political system, where its edges meet those of the social or other systems, proved, if anything, even more elusive than the boundary of the state. In addition, the state itself refused to disappear. It seemed to retain what Nettl (1968, 565–66) called a "conceptual existence" as a "sociocultural phenomenon" whose salience could not be ignored.

The second response, since the late 1970s, has been to "bring the state back in" (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985). The new work on the state has defined the term in a variety of ways, most of which take it to be not just distinguishable from society, but partially or wholly autonomous from it. Rather than addressing the difficulty of drawing the elusive line between the two, however, the literature has largely evaded the problem. It has done so by reducing the state to a subjective system of decision making, a conception that is both exceedingly narrow and, it can be shown, essentially idealist. This conception, moreover, fails to fit even the evidence presented by statist authors.

I present a third possible approach beginning with the assumption that the elusiveness of the state–society boundary needs to be taken seriously, not as a problem of conceptual precision but as a clue to the nature of the phenomenon. Rather than searching for a definition that will fix the boundary, we need to examine the detailed political processes through which the uncertain yet powerful distinction between state and society is produced.

The distinction must be taken not as the boundary between two discrete entities, but as a line drawn internally within the network of institutional mechanisms through which a social and political order is maintained. The ability to have an internal distinction appear as though it were the external boundary between separate objects is the distinctive technique of the modern political order. The technique must be examined from a historical perspective (something prevailing approaches fail to do), as the consequence of certain novel practices of the modern age. This approach can account for the salience of the state phenomenon, but avoids attributing to it the coherence, unity, and absolute autonomy that result from existing theoretical approaches. I will conclude by offering five propositions on the study of the state.

Why the State Was Abandoned: Seeking a "Total Science"

There has been sharp disagreement between advocates of the two successive approaches to the problem of the state about the nature of the difference between them. Those advocating a return to the concept of the state distinguish their work from the political systems approach by characterizing the latter as society centered (Skocpol 1985, 4). Responding to such characterizations, Gabriel Almond (1988) argues that the earlier work did not locate explanations solely in society but examined a complex interaction between society and governmental institutions, and therefore the new writings on the state at best offer nothing conceptually new. At worst, Almond warns, with their unfounded talk of "paradigmatic shifts" they have encouraged "a generation of graduate students to reject their professional history" (853). They now "threaten us with a return," in the words of David Easton (1981, 322), ". . . to a conceptual morass from which we thought we had but recently escaped."

For the advocates of the statist approach the dispute concerns where to center political explanation, in the action of the state or in society; for their opponents it concerns the feasibility and usefulness of this distinction. As we will see, their opponents are correct in pointing to the difficulty state theorists encounter in defining the state–society boundary. Yet it can be shown that the same boundary problem is present, in a different way, in their own approach. In fact for systems theorists the boundary itself expanded without limit to fill the entire space of society. To see how this occurred we will have to look more closely at the systems theorists' own now-neglected professional history and recall why the language of state versus society was first abandoned.

When Easton, Almond, and other scholars eliminated the term "state" from their political vocabulary in the 1950s, it was not on the grounds that the focus of political analysis should be moved from state to society but that the word itself suffered from two related weaknesses: its meaning was vague, producing disagreement about exactly what it referred to;

and even if agreement might be reached, the term excluded important aspects of the political process (Easton 1953, 106–15). Almond recently reiterated this view. "The tendency to abandon the state concept and replace it by other concepts," he argues, "was attributable to the enormous political mobilization that took place in the Western world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries" and to the proliferation of parastatal and extrastatal political institutions such as parties, interest groups, and mass media, located on the uncertain boundary between society and state and thus not clearly covered by the latter term (Almond 1988, 855).

Yet these factors alone do not account for the demise of the state concept, or explain why boundaries were to expand without limit. The transformations in the state had occurred well before the 1950s, as Almond himself once admitted (1960, 3), and the corresponding weaknesses of the concept had long been recognized (Sabine 1934). It can be argued that the reasons for abandoning the concept lay not in changes in states themselves but in the changed postwar relationship between American political science and American political power. This can be identified from rereading what was written at the time, particularly in documents describing the mission of the discipline. Postwar comparative politics, according to Loewenstein, would have to relinquish its narrow concern with the study of the state in order to become "a conscious instrument of social engineering" (1944, 541). This instrument would be used for "imparting our experience to other nations and . . . integrating scientifically their institutions into a universal pattern of government" (p. 547). To achieve these ends, the discipline had to expand its geographical and theoretical territory and become what Loewenstein's report called a *total science.* "We can no longer permit the existence of white spots on our map of the world," the report said, employing metaphors reflecting the imperial climate of postwar American politics. "The frontier posts of comparative government must be moved boldly," both to encompass the globe and, by expanding into the territory of other disciplines (anthropology, psychology, economics, and statistics), to open up each country to far more detailed methods of observation and questioning and thereby "gain access to the true *Gestalt* of foreign political civilizations" (p. 541–43).

The opening up of this new territory to scientific investigation seemed even more urgent by the 1950s, when postwar American optimism had turned into political uncertainty. It was what Easton (1953, 3) gravely called "our present social crisis"—the global unfolding of the cold war and the accompanying domestic struggle against subversion—that made suddenly imperative the elimination of ambiguity from political vocabulary and the construction of general social scientific laws broad enough to include all significant political phenomena and "pass beyond the experience . . . of any one culture" (p. 319).

The "Research Strategy" for Western Europe proposed in 1955 by the new Comparative Politics Committee of the SSRC, chaired by Gabriel Almond, criticized once again the "too great an emphasis on the formal aspects of institutions and processes," but now spoke of the need for a change in terms of "urgent and practical considerations." In the major Western European countries, the committee reported, "Large bodies of opinion appear to be alienated from the West, politically apathetic, or actively recruited to Communism." The state was too narrow a focus for research, because "the basic problems of civic loyalty and political cohesion lie in large part outside of the formal government framework." Research was needed that would trace the degree of political cohesion and loyalty to the West beyond this formal framework, "into the networks of social groupings, and the attitudes of the general population." Such close examination could confirm the committee's expectation that, in cases such as France, "there is at least the possibility of breaking the hold of the Communist party on a large part of its following" (Almond, Cole, and Macridis, 1955, 1045).

In response to the political crisis the discipline also expanded its geographical territory. The foreword to Gabriel Almond's *Appeals of Communism* (1954) noted that Communism had now begun to spread to non-Western areas, and warned that this was "so menacing a development that it is deserving of special attention" (Almond 1954, vii). The attention was provided by a number of individual studies, such as Lucian Pye's (1956) analysis of the communist threat in Southeast Asia, and by Almond and Coleman's *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (1960), in which the proposed extension of political science to include in it what were called "the 'uncouth' and exotic systems outside Western Europe" was attributed to these "practical policy motives" (p. 10). The same global concerns were the stimulus to the research undertaken in the late 1950s and subsequently published as *The Civic Culture.* The book's introduction addressed itself to the pressing need to export to the colonized areas of the world, now seeking independence, the principles of the Anglo-American political process. To this end it sought to "codify" not just the formal institutional rules of the state but the "subtler components" that formed its "social psychological preconditions"—that combination of democratic spirit and proper deference toward authority that was celebrated as "the civic culture" (Almond and Verba 1963, 5).

The scientific tone of this literature promised to overcome the ambiguity of the state and its boundaries. Far from solving the problem, however, its totalizing ambition presented the possibility of a science whose object, the political system, had no discernible limits. The ever-expanding empirical and theoretical knowledge that would have to be mastered by the future scientist of comparative politics, Almond warned in 1960, "staggers the imagination and lames the will." Despite the tendency "to blink and withdraw in pain," he wrote, there could be no hesitation in the effort to accumulate the knowledge that will "enable us to take our place in the order of the sciences with the dignity which is reserved for those who follow a calling without limit or condition" (1960, 64).

Advocates of the shift from the formal study of the state to the meticulous examination of political systems realized that they were embarking on a scientific enterprise without limit. They assumed, however, that the very notion of system would somehow solve the question of boundaries. "Once we begin to speak of political life as a system of activity," wrote Easton, "certain consequences follow . . . The very idea of a system suggests that we can separate political life from the rest of social activity, at least for analytical purposes, and examine it as though for the moment it were a self contained entity surrounded by, but clearly distinguishable from, the environment or setting in which it operates" (1957, 384). Easton's language here already indicates the problems. Like the statist approach, systems theory depends on the political being clearly distinguishable from its social environment. Rather than an actual distinction, however, we are told that it is only as though the distinction exists, for the moment, and merely as a *consequence* of speaking of politics as a system. The basic tenet of systems theory, that the political realm is discrete and thus identifiable as a system, reflects a temporary phenomenon arising only from "the very idea of a system."

The boundary question created even

more difficulties for Almond. The concept of political system, he said, was intended to "separate out analytically the structures that perform political functions in all societies," and therefore implied the "existence of boundaries"—the points "where other systems end and the political system begins." The boundary required a "sharp definition," otherwise "we will find ourselves including in the political system churches, economies, schools, kinship and lineage groups, age sets, and the like" (1960, 5, 7–8). Yet this is precisely what happened. The edge of the system turned out to consist not of a sharp line but of numerous, shifting associations that "man the boundaries of the political system" (p. 9). These "interest articulation" structures, as Almond called them, were virtually limitless, for they were said to include every conceivable form of collective expression of demand, from "institutional" groups such as legislatures, churches and armies, to "associated" groups such as labor or business organizations, "nonassociated" groups such as kinship or ethnic communities, and "anomic" groups such as riots and demonstrations (p. 33).

Far from solving the problem of the uncertain boundary between state and society by substituting the enlarged but sharply defined edges of a self-contained system, the systems approach unfolded the very space of the boundary into a limitless and undetermined terrain.

The Return of the State

Even if the boundaries of the political system proved as elusive as those of the state, the latter concept suffered from one more weakness in the opinion of systems theorists. The state seemed to Easton (1953, 111–12) "less an analytic tool than a symbol for unity, . . . a myth." It represented something "transcendental" that "symbolizes the inescapable unity of one people on one soil." The imprecision that made the term unsuitable as an analytic tool was the source of its political strength as a mythic or ideological construct.

Yet for this very reason, despite its unsuitability for constructing a universal science of politics, the concept of the state refused to disappear. By 1968, Nettl was remarking that although the concept was out of fashion in the social sciences, "it retains a skeletal, ghostly existence," which "no amount of conceptual restructuring can dissolve" (1968, 559). The state, Nettl wrote, is "essentially a sociocultural phenomenon," which occurs due to the "cultural disposition" among a people to recognize the state's "conceptual existence" (pp. 565–66). Notions of the state "become incorporated in the thinking and actions of individual citizens" (p. 577), he argued, and the extent of this conceptual variable could be shown to correspond to empirical differences between societies, such as differences in legal structure or party system (pp. 579–92).

The importance of the state as a common ideological and cultural construct, I argue, should be grounds not for dismissing the phenomenon in favor of some supposedly more neutral and accurate concept (such as political system), but for taking it seriously. Politics, after all, is a process built out of such shared constructs. Yet Nettl's presentation of this construct as a subjective disposition that can be correlated with more objective, empirical phenomena is misleading. A construct like the state occurs not merely as a subjective belief, incorporated in the *thinking and action of individuals.* It is represented and reproduced in visible, everyday forms, such as the language of legal practice, the architecture of public buildings, the wearing of military uniforms, or the marking out and policing of frontiers. The cultural forms of the state *are* an empirical phenomenon, as solid and discernible as a legal structure or a party system. Or rather, I argue, the distinction made between a conceptual realm and an empirical one needs to be placed in question if we are to understand the nature of a phenomenon like the state.

Unfortunately, such questions have not been posed. In fact the conceptual-empirical distinction has become the unexamined basis of a new literature. A decade after the publication of Nettl's article, the state began to reemerge as a central analytic concern of American political science. "The lines between state and society have become blurred," warned Stephen Krasner, whose book, *Defending the National Interest* (1978, xi), was one of the important early contributions to this reemergence. "The basic analytic assumption" of the new approach it advocated, "is that there is a distinction between state and society" (p. 5). The statist approach has presented this fundamental but problematic distinction, as in Nettl's article, in terms of an underlying distinction between a conceptual realm (the state) and an empirical realm (society). Such an approach appears to overcome the problem the systems theorists complained about and reencountered, of how to discern the boundary between state and society: it will be assimilated to the apparently obvious distinction between conceptual and empirical, between a subjective order and an objective order. As we will see, however, this depends on both an enormous narrowing of the phenomenon of the state and an uncritical acceptance of this distinction.

Statist approaches to political explanation present the state as an autonomous entity whose actions are not reducible to or determined by forces in society. To present the state in this way requires not so much a shift in focus, from society back to the state, but some way of establishing a clear boundary between the two. How are the porous edges where official practice mixes with the semiofficial and the semiofficial with the unofficial to be turned into lines of separation, so that the state can stand apart as a discrete, self-directing object? The customary Weberian definition of the state, as an organization that claims a monopoly within a fixed territory over the legitimate use of violence, is only a residual characterization. It does not tell us how the actual contours of this amorphous organization are to be drawn.

The new advocates of the statist approach have not filled in the organizational contours. They have retreated to narrower definitions, which typically grasp the state as a system of decision making. The narrower focus locates the essence of the state not in the monopolistic organization of coercion, nor, for example, in the structures of a legal and ideological order, nor in the mechanisms by which social interests find political representation, nor in the arrangements that maintain a given relationship between the producers of capital and its owners, but in the formation and expression of authoritative *intentions*. Construed as a machinery of intentions—usually termed "rule making," "decision making," or "policy making"—the state becomes essentially a subjective realm of plans, programs, or ideas. This subjective construction maps the problematic state–society distinction on to the seemingly more obvious distinctions we make between the subjective and the objective, or even that between meaning and reality. The state appears to stand apart from society in the unproblematic way in which intentions or ideas are thought to stand apart from the external world to which they refer.

Beginning at the Subjective Level

The logic of the statist approach can be illustrated from the writings of almost any of its major advocates. I use three examples as evidence: the work of Eric Nordlinger, Stephen Krasner, and Theda Skocpol. I begin with Nordlinger and

Krasner, and afterward consider Skocpol's somewhat different approach.

The core of the statist perspective, according to Nordlinger (1988, 881), is to begin with "public officials forming their own policy preferences." Starting with these individual mental acts, the first question asked should be: "Is the state—that is, public officials writ large—acting on its own policy preferences, translating them into public policy. . . ?" (Nordlinger 1987, 353). The "emphasis on individuals" (p. 362) rather than institutionalized structures in the study of the state is defended on the grounds that institutions themselves do not have preferences or act on them, but merely influence the way individual officials do so; moreover, since the extent of this influence in different states varies, we are told it cannot be included in a definition of the state (1981, 9; 1987, 362–63). Even if one accepts these points, they all depend on the initial decision to take preferences as the core of the state.

Nordlinger's decision to "begin at the subjective level" is not explained on theoretical grounds. We are simply told that an "analysis of state autonomy may profitably begin" there (1987, 371). Yet it is the choice of this starting point that creates the effect of an autonomous state. The starting point determines the nature of the state as an originally subjective entity composed of individual preferences, thoughts, decisions, and other ideational phenomena—a person writ large. In our ordinary understanding of personhood, it is the possession of ideas and preferences that makes the human individual appear to be a self-formed and separate unit. Such subjectivity is the basis of the fundamental separation we experience between the person and the social world. In the modern political thought of the Enlightenment, this separation constitutes personhood as a condition of freedom or autonomy, opposed to and originally undetermined by external social forces. Nordlinger's subjective starting point automatically attributes this same originality, separateness and autonomy to the state.

The dependence of this kind of state autonomy on the subjectivist starting point is confirmed by the way it collapses as soon as one moves away from that point. Nordlinger postpones the collapse by insisting that societal factors first be represented as far as possible as subjective variables in the minds of state officials. Thus state autonomy is said to be affected by such factors as "the degree to which public officials are susceptible to expressions of societal interests" and the "importance that they attribute to active societal support" (1987, 372). With this sort of phrasing, social pressures that partly determine state action are transformed into autonomous features of the state, by substituting for the pressures themselves their perception in the minds of state officials. The substitution is justified with the argument that "societal explanations . . . should not be introduced until it is evident that statist ones are insufficient" (1987, 360), however compelling the societal factors may be—an indication of the threat they pose to the evidence for autonomy.

Nordlinger acknowledges that this sort of explanation does not amount to a very deep account of state autonomy. He turns next to various "structural features of the state"—features he had originally rejected as aspects of the state's definition—that may impinge upon how officials make decisions (1987, 372). These are categorized as the malleability, insulation, resilience, and vulnerability of state organizations. Even at this level the argument is phrased not in terms of how the strengths and weaknesses of an organization depend on its relations with wider social forces but in terms of its subjective perceptions. A vulnerable state, for example, is one that "dissuades itself" from acting on its preferences because it fears they "will probably not be realized," usually because the means of implementation are "seen as" unwieldy or "tainted with a poor track record" (p. 383).

Finally Nordlinger admits the need to go deeper still and ask how the structural features of the state are determined, by looking at society-centered explanations. At this point, he says, "the entire question of statism's distinctiveness will have been left behind." The statist perspective is abandoned as no more than a "beachhead from which to reconnoiter and then move into the societal interior" (pp. 385–87) although we still have no way of knowing where the beachhead of the state ends and the societal interior begins.

Nordlinger's statist approach does not, it turns out, locate explanations in the state rather than society. Still less does it establish a clear boundary between the two. It simply begins with the intentions of the state, thereby attributing to it an apparent separateness and autonomy that subsequently go unquestioned. Although this starting point is justified by its usefulness, it has in fact a more specific outcome. The statist approach creates a state not simply autonomous from society, but one that acts in the "national interest." Nordlinger complains of the "sledgehammer attacks to which this concept has been subjected" in recent years. He defends the idea of the national interest as something real, on the grounds that the autonomous vantage point of officials and their desire to retain a respected self-image leads them to "articulate public interest pronouncements so as to gain popular support and ward off private pressures." They therefore adopt "long term, broad gauged policies" aimed at such goals as "the maintenance of the political and economic order" (1988, 882). It is a measure of the bias of the analysis that maintaining the political and economic status quo is regarded as unquestioned evidence of a genuine national interest.

The dependence of the statist approach on a subjectivist starting point can be further demonstrated by turning to my second case, the work of Stephen Krasner (1978). Like Nordlinger, Krasner starts from the premise that the state should be understood essentially as a subjective process of policy making. His study of the relationship between corporate overseas investment in raw materials and U.S. foreign policy "is premised on the intellectual vision that sees the state autonomously formulating goals that it then attempts to implement against resistance from international and domestic actors" (p. 10). This autonomous state is construed even more narrowly than Nordlinger's "public officials writ large," for its meaning is limited principally to just two executive offices, the presidency and the Department of State, which are said to enjoy a "high degree of insulation from specific societal pressures" (p. 11). Krasner considers the possibility that other offices, such as the Pentagon, the Treasury, the Commerce Department, or the CIA, might "be thought of as part of the state," but decides to discount them on the grounds that "their behavior has varied. At some times they have acted to promote collective goals, at others to further specific societal and bureaucratic interests" (p. 11). Thus the author sustains his intellectual vision of the state as an autonomous promoter of collective goals by excluding from consideration state organs that sometimes fail to live up to this vision.

The book analyzes U.S. government policy toward the control of foreign raw materials by American multinational corporations. It seeks to show that the state is autonomous from these societal interests, by proving that U.S. policy has been shaped by neither strategic nor economic interests (which would indicate some degree of corporate influence) but by a consistent ideology. Strategic interests are eliminated as an explanation for U.S. policy by simply defining *strategic* to mean only cases where the territorial or political integrity of the U.S. is directly threatened (pp. 313-14). Under this definition, American efforts to protect oil interests in the Persian Gulf, for example, are said not to have been strategically motivated because the physical survival of the United States or its political system was not at stake.

Economic interests are eliminated as an explanation largely on the ground that an explanation in economic terms "does not account for the relatively passive American response to the dangers posed by economic nationalism" (p. 316). Krasner's most important evidence for this alleged passivity is the United States' reaction to Muhammed Musaddeq's nationalization of the Anglo Iranian Oil Company in 1951-53. Yet when examined carefully, this case (whose victim was a British—not an American—corporation) offers no support for his thesis. It is true that the United States was initially less hostile than Great Britain toward a conservative Middle Eastern nationalist like Musaddeq, especially in a case where support for such nationalism enabled the U.S. to challenge Britain's dominant position in the region. Yet the passive American response consisted of first helping to enforce the British-led embargo on Iranian oil and then, when the resulting collapse of Iran's economy failed to change Musaddeq's policies and radicalized his support, organizing a coup to remove the elected government and restore the authoritarian power of the shah (Gasiorowski 1987).

Krasner bases his argument that U.S. policy "cannot easily be explained in terms of corporate interests" on the fact that the U.S. did not initially pressure Musaddeq to allow U.S. multinationals access to Iranian oil (1987, 127). But the interests of the oil companies did not lie in acquiring access to Iranian oil. They lay first in preventing the Iranians from marketing their oil themselves through independent dealers, which would break the oil majors' global monopoly and the illegal system of price fixing dependent on it, and second in halting the U.S. Justice Department's criminal investigation of this price fixing. The U.S. government complied with both these wishes—and as a bonus forced the Iranians to let U.S. companies share in the control of their oil.

Having appeared to refute economic and strategic explanations for U.S. policy toward foreign raw materials investments, Krasner presents the case for ideology as the explanatory motive. His decisive evidence here does not consist of any of the raw materials cases analyzed in the book, but rather the Vietnam War. He admits that America's ideological justifications for its involvement in Vietnam were neither logical nor consistent (pp. 321-22). This might suggest that ideological justifications were adapted according to political need, or reflected conflicts within the administration, or were simply a confused attempt to defend a war in which even those responsible no longer believed. Krasner considers none of these possibilities, but declares instead that lack of consistency and rationality is the "hallmark of an ideological foreign policy."

The possibility that economic interests might have played some role alongside ideological motives in prolonging the war, given the large profits of arms corporations, is dismissed with the remark that it would have been easier to sustain high military spending "by picturing the Soviet Union and China as implacable enemies than by engaging in a land war in Southeast Asia" (p. 324). Even if one were to agree with this unproven claim it would not demonstrate that corporate interests played no role in sustaining the war; yet the book's entire argument for state autonomy rests on this single assertion. It enables Krasner to conclude that a "revulsion towards Communism," attributable to "the exclusive dominance of

Lockean liberalism within the United States" determines U.S. policy toward the control of foreign raw materials, and hence that state policy cannot be explained by reference to societal interests.

For both Krasner and Nordlinger, the alleged autonomy of the state is in large part produced definitionally. The amorphous object of analysis is reduced to something called *policy*, meaning the intentions and desires of certain state officials. The state becomes this disembodied ideality, which is characterized as the *national interest* and examined not as a rhetorical effect but as a self-generated and governing idealism. Writing of this sort should not be considered according to its own scientific claims. As the examples from Krasner show, the case studies supporting the claim of state autonomy are brief and unconvincing readings of complex political episodes. Nordlinger's recent essays avoid this problem by offering no case studies at all. Almond (1987, 476) has suggested that the result of much of this literature is "to remystify the state concept." If so, then such writing should be seen as part of the much larger social process of generating the mysterious effect of the state, as a separate, self-willed entity.

The State as an "Actual Organization"

The contributions of Theda Skocpol to the statist approach appear to offer something very different from the work of Krasner and Nordlinger. Both her work on the politics of the New Deal and her earlier comparative study of social revolutions are based on detailed readings of carefully constructed case studies. Moreover, she explicitly rejects a "voluntarist" approach to the study of the state. In *States and Social Revolutions* (1979), she argues that neither the occurrence nor the outcome of major social revolutions can be explained by the ideological visions of revolutionary or state leaders. The book proposes instead an "organizational" approach, in which revolutionary collapse and the building of new states are explained by the structural vulnerabilities and potentials of states themselves.

Despite these differences, however, it can be shown that Skocpol's argument for state autonomy remains a voluntarist, ideological explanation. Once again, the clear boundary between state and society, on which the argument for autonomy depends, relies on an essential subjectivity as the basis of the state's distinctiveness. Skocpol later moves beyond this subjectivity. But as soon as she does, the boundary between state and society—and the evidence for autonomy—disappears.

Skocpol's explanation of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions focuses on the collapse of autonomous states, whose autonomy is to be demonstrated by showing that the collapse comes as a consequence of the state's own flawed policies and institutional ties with society rather than any larger conflict between dominant social classes (p. 48). As with other state theorists, the first step in the argument is to narrow the definition of the state to ensure that apparatuses into which "nonstate" elements may penetrate are excluded. To this end, Skocpol distinguishes "fundamental" state organizations from the broader "political system." "The state properly conceived," she writes, consists of "a set of administrative, policing, and military organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority." Such organizations represent only a part of "overall political systems," which may also include "institutions through which social interests are represented in state policymaking as well as institutions through which nonstate actors are mobilized to participate in policy implementation" (p. 29). This distinction between the *state properly conceived* and the *political system* is clearly vital to the argument for state autonomy, yet it is made only in passing and we are given no actual means of knowing whether a given institution belongs merely to the political system or to the state proper. In practice the difficulty is overcome by substituting for the latter phrase even narrower terms, in most cases simply *the monarchy.*

Having narrowed the meaning of the state in this way, the next stage in the explanation is to present an interest or policy of the state that brings on the revolutionary crisis. In all three prerevolutionary societies, Skocpol argues, "monarchs were interested in appropriating increased resources from society and channeling them efficiently into military aggrandizement or state sponsored and centrally controlled economic development" (p. 49). As in Krasner and Nordlinger, this interest of the state is to be the basis of its autonomy. It must be construed not in relation to any broader commercial or political interests, but as the state's independent desire.

In France, for example, revolutionary collapse was brought on by the state's costly involvement in foreign wars, as it competed for markets, trade routes, and colonies. Skocpol explains this involvement in ideological terms, as something "necessary for the vindication of French honor on the international scene," adding, almost as an afterthought, "not to mention the protection of seaborne commerce" (p. 60). France is called a "commercial power" but we are told nothing about the nature of this commerce or the broader kinds of political or economic interests involved (the trading companies, the commodities traded and their producers, the industries served, or the role of finance houses, the shipping industry, and colonization corporations). The possibility that interests of this sort might be at least as significant a factor in state policy as the ideology of French honor is dismissed, it seems, for on the following page the state's involvement in "protracted and repeated general welfare" is attributed simply to the monarchy's unwillingness to abandon its "martial ambitions," and three pages later we are told that what "carried the eighteenth-century Bourbon monarchy into an acute financial crisis" was "its unquenchable penchant for war" (pp. 61–64). The initial crisis of the state is thus reduced to a question of ideology—an interest in "the vindication of French honor," the pursuit of "martial ambitions," or an irreducible "penchant for war." A seemingly self-formed monarchical interest becomes the irreducible element in the explanation of state behavior.

This narrow, subjectivist image of the state, however, is contradicted in Skocpol's case by her own further explanation of revolution. In responding to the crisis brought on by defeats in war or other external threats, she explains, the state is constrained by its institutional relationships with the landed upper classes. Skocpol provides detailed accounts of these relationships for each of her case studies, from which it becomes clear that the prerevolutionary state is something much larger and more amorphous than a monarch. Although the "organizational" approach to the state insists that states are "actual organizations" whose boundaries are distinct from society (p. 31), Skocpol's illuminating account of these organizations in France, Russia, and China shows that the boundaries are impossible to draw in practice. In all three cases, the provincial and local power of the state is inseparable from the political power of the landed classes.

In France the state structure is described not as an actual organization but as an "extraordinary complex . . . and multiply layered" network of seigneurial domains, municipal corporations and provincial assemblies, maintained through the system of "venality of office" whereby revenues are raised through the sale of state offices, which become individual possessions to be rented, resold or bequeathed (pp. 52–53). Russia and China present analogous pictures, but in the latter case Skocpol drops the increasingly awkward distinction between state and society and introduces the more fluid metaphor of "two 'worlds'," an agrarian economy and society and an apparatus of imperial administration. The interpenetration of the two worlds was so extensive, we are told, that the separation between them exists only for analytic purposes (p. 68). The existence of the state as an actual organization thus disappears altogether. Skocpol eventually acknowledges the impossibility of distinguishing state and society by bringing the two terms together in a single phrase and referring to the three countries as *statist societies* (p. 167).

Similar problems arise in the second half of *States and Social Revolutions,* where the analysis moves from the causes of revolutionary collapse to the reasons for the emergence of strong, centralizing postrevolutionary states. Once again the explanation minimizes socioeconomic factors and stresses ideology—not the specific content of revolutionary ideologies, but the fact that the new leaders were men already "oriented to" state building (pp. 164–68). But again, the case studies of this process in France, Russia, and China reintroduce a broader socioeconomic explanation, accounting for the direction and stages of state building largely in terms of the different social bases of support for each regime.

The arguments advanced by Nordlinger, Krasner, and Skocpol in favor of a statist approach to political analysis face a common problem and respond similarly. The problem, as they each more-or-less admit, is that the edges of the state are uncertain; societal elements seem to penetrate it on all sides, and the resulting boundary between state and society is difficult to determine. They respond by giving the state a narrow definition, personified as a policy-making actor. Like personhood, statehood is conceived in fundamentally idealist terms. The state stands apart from society as a set of original intentions or preferences, just as persons are thought of as units of autonomous consciousness and desire distinct from their material or social world. However uncertain its edges, the state, like the person, is an essential unity.

This image of unity is preserved even in analyses that introduce the element of conflict between different parts of the state apparatus. Such conflict is an important indication of the permeability of state boundaries because it enables one to trace how wider social differences reproduce themselves within the processes of the state. But in the statist literature, such wider connections are not examined. The essential unity of the state is taken as given, and conflicts are treated as secondary phenomena internal to this larger unity. Indeed the impact of such internal conflicts on policy making is turned into part of the evidence for the state's independence from society.

In her work on the New Deal, for example, Skocpol argues that state and party organizations should be treated as "independent determinants" of political outcomes (1981, 156), for they have "their own structures and histories, which in turn have their own impact upon society" (p. 200). Her argument is based on the failure of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and liberal Democrats during the reformist phase of the New Deal (1935–38) to transform the federal government into a fully interventionist, social democratic state (pp. 191–99). The principal reason for this failure was that popular support for FDR's reform program was not reflected in Congress, where conservative interests were powerfully entrenched. This entrenchment was due to the influence of southern Democrats (reflecting, of course, political and economic arrangements in the South that excluded blacks from participation) and in general to the local control of congressional elections by "machines or special agglomerations of organized interests" (p. 195). The conservatives in Congress blocked spending on social programs for the poor, and led the opposition to administrative reforms for fear that they "would disrupt existing symbiotic relationships among Congress, bureaucrats, and organized interest groups in the society at large" (p. 194). Despite the election of a president with a program of popular reform, the power of conservative and other organized interests in society was sufficiently represented within the state to derail the reforms. Skocpol interprets this as evidence for the argument that state institutions are essentially independent determinants of political outcomes. In fact the case offers an excellent example of how conflicts within the state reflect the penetration of wider social forces.

An Alternative Approach

The statist approach always begins from the assumption that the state is a distinct entity, opposed to and set apart from a larger entity called society. Arguments are confined to assessing how much independence one object enjoys from the other. Yet we have seen that in fact the line between the two is often uncertain. Like the systems theorists before them, advocates of a statist approach have been unable to fix the elusive boundary between the political system or state and society. An alternative approach to the state has to begin with this uncertain boundary. In a given area of practice, how is the effect created that certain aspects of what occurs pertain to society, while others stand apart as the state? More importantly, what is the significance of effecting this distinction?

The Aramco Case

To introduce such an alternative approach, one can begin with a case discussed in Krasner's study of U.S. foreign policy: the relationship between the U.S. Government and the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), the consortium of major U.S. oil corporations that possessed exclusive rights to Saudi Arabian oil (1978, 205–12). The case illustrates both the permeability of the state–society boundary and the political significance of maintaining it. After World War II, the Saudis demanded that their royalty payment from Aramco be increased from 12% to 50% of profits. Unwilling either to cut its profits or to raise the price of oil, Aramco arranged for the increase in royalty to be paid not by the company but by U.S. taxpayers. The Department of State, anxious to subsidize the pro-American Saudi monarchy, helped arrange for Aramco to take advantage of a loophole in U.S. tax law whereby the royalty was treated as though it were a direct foreign tax, to be paid not from the company's profits but from the taxes it owed to the U.S. Treasury. This collusion between government and oil companies, obliging U.S. citizens to contribute unaware to the treasury of a repressive Middle Eastern monarchy and the bank balances of some of the world's most profitable multinational corporations, does not offer much support for the image of a neat distinction between state and society.

Krasner copes with this complexity by arguing that the oil companies were an institutional mechanism used by central decision makers to achieve certain foreign policy goals; in this case the secret subsidizing of a conservative Arab regime. Policies that might be opposed by Congress or foreign allies could be pursued through such mechanisms, "in part because private firms were outside of the formal political system" (pp. 212–13). This explanation offers only one side of the picture: the firms themselves also used the U.S. government to further corporate goals, as the Aramco case illustrates and as several studies of the oil industry have demonstrated in detail (I. Anderson 1981, Blair 1976, Miller 1980). Yet despite his failure to portray the complexity of such state-society relations, Krasner inadvertently points to what is crucial about them. The Aramco case illustrates how the institutional mechanisms of a modern political order are never confined within the limits of what is called the state (or in this case, curiously enough, the "formal political system"). This is not to say simply that the state is something surrounded by parastatal or corporatist institutions, which buttress and extend its authority. It is to argue that the boundary of the state (or political system) *never marks a real exterior.* The line between state and society is not the perimeter of an intrinsic entity, which can be thought of as a free-standing object or actor. It is a line drawn internally, *within* the network of institutional mechanisms through which a certain social and political order is maintained.

The point that the state's boundary never marks a real exterior can suggest why it seems so often elusive and unstable. But this does not mean the line is illusory. On the contrary, as the Aramco case shows, producing and maintaining the distinction between state and society is itself a mechanism that generates resources of power. The fact that Aramco can be said to lie outside the formal political system, thereby disguising its role in international politics, is essential to its strength as part of a larger political order.

Many similar examples could be explored, such as the relationship between state and private institutions in the financial sector, in schooling and scientific research, or in health care and medical practice. In each case it could be shown that the state-society divide is not a simple border between two free-standing objects or domains, but a complex distinction *internal* to these realms of practice. Take the example of banking: the relations between major corporate banking groups, semipublic central banks or reserve systems, government treasuries, deposit insurance agencies and export-import banks, and multinational bodies such as the World Bank, represent interlocking networks of financial power and regulation. No simple line could divide this network into a private realm and a public one, or into state and society. At the same time, banks are set up and present themselves as private institutions clearly separate from the state. The appearance that state and society are separate things is part of the way a given financial and economic order is maintained. This is equally true of the wider social and political order. The power to regulate and control is not simply a capacity stored within the state, from where it extends out into society. The apparent boundary of the state does not mark the limit of the processes of regulation. It is itself a product of those processes.

The approach to the state advocated here does not imply an image of the state and private organizations as a single, totalized structure of power. On the contrary, there are always conflicts between them, as there are between different government agencies, between corporate organizations, and within each of them. It means we should not be misled into accepting the idea of the state as a coherent object clearly separate from society any more than we should be misled by the complexity of these phenomena into rejecting the concept of the state altogether.

Conceived in this way, the state is no longer to be taken as essentially an actor, with the coherence, agency, and subjectivity this term presumes. We should not ask "Who is the state?" or "Who dictates its policies?" Such questions presume what their answers pretend to prove: that some political subject, some *who,* preexists and determines those multiple arrangements we call the state. The arrangements that produce the apparent separateness of the state create the abstract effect of agency, with concrete consequences. Yet such agency will always be contingent upon the production of difference—upon those practices that create the apparent boundary between state and society. These arrangements may be so effective, however, as to make things appear the reverse of this. The state comes to seem a subjective starting point, as an actor that intervenes in society. Statist approaches to political analysis take this reversal for reality.

What is proposed here, instead, is an approach to the state that refuses to take for granted this difference, yet can account for why social and political reality appears in this binary form. It is not sufficient simply to criticize the abstract, idealist appearance the state assumes in the writings of the statist approach. Almond (1987, 476), for example, complains that the concept of the state employed in much of the new literature "seems to have metaphysical overtones" and Easton (1981, 316) argues that the state is presented by one writer as "a 'ghost in the machine,' knowable only through its variable manifestations." Such criticisms ignore the fact that this is how the state very often appears in practice. The task of a critique of the state is not just to reject such metaphysics, but to explain how it has been possible to produce this practical yet ghost-like effect. What is it about modern society, as a particular form of social and economic order, that has made possible the apparent autonomy of the state as a free-standing entity? Why is this kind of apparatus, with its typical basis in an abstract system of law and its almost transcendental association with the nation as the fundamental political community (see, for example, B. Anderson 1983), the distinctive political arrangement of the modern age? These practical, historical questions are ignored by systems theorists, who desire to throw out the entire concept of the state and reestablish a more "scientific" vocabulary.

State theorists themselves have also ignored these historical questions. For some authors, such as Nordlinger, this is because, like systems theorists, they seek explanations in the form of generalizable statements, applicable to every political order. By definition this excludes a specific, historically based explanation of the nature of modern states. But even theorists of the state who adopt a historical perspective, such as Skocpol, are unable to offer a historical explanation of the appearance of the modern state. Committed to an approach in which the state is an independent cause, Skocpol cannot explain the ability of the state to appear as an entity standing apart from society in terms of factors external to the state. The state must be an independent cause of events, even when those events, as in a case such as revolutionary France, involve the very birth of a modern, apparently autonomous state.

The Appearance of Structure

To illustrate the kind of explanation that might be possible, one can return to Skocpol's account of the French case. Skocpol describes prerevolutionary France as a *statist society,* meaning a society in which the powers of a landed nobility and the central administration were inextricably bound together. We can now describe this situation another way, as a society in which those modern techniques that make the state appear to be a separate entity that somehow stands outside society had not yet been institutionalized. The revolutionary period marks the consolidation of such novel techniques. Skocpol characterizes the revolutionary transformation of the French state as principally a transformation in the army and the bureaucracy, both of which became permanent, professional organizations whose staffs were for the first time set apart from other commercial and social activities and whose size and effectiveness were vastly extended. For Skocpol, such changes are to be understood as the *consequence* of an autonomous state, whose officials desired to embark on the expansion and consolidation of centralized power. We are therefore given little detail about the methods on which such revolutionary transformations rested.

How was it now possible to assemble a permanent army of up to three-quarters of a million men, transform an entire economy into production for war, maintain authority and discipline on such a scale, and so "separate" this military machine from society that the traditional problem of desertion was largely overcome? By what parallel means were the corruptions and leakages of financial administration brought under control? What was the nature of the "mechanical efficiency and articulation," in a phrase quoted from J.F. Bosher (Skocpol 1979, 200), that in every realm would now enable "the virtues of organization to offset the vices of individual men"? What kind of articulation, in other words, could now seem to separate mechanically an organization from the individual men who composed it? Rather than attributing such transformations to policies of an autonomous state, it would be more accurate to trace in these new techniques of organization and articulation the very possibility of appearing to set apart from society the free-standing apparatus of a state.

An exploration of such questions would have to begin by acknowledging the enormous significance of those modern, microphysical methods of order that Michel Foucault calls *disciplines* (Foucault 1977). The new bureaucratic and military strength of the French state was founded on powers generated out of the meticulous organization of space, movement, sequence, and position. The new power of the army, for example, was based on such measures as the construction of barracks as sites of permanent confinement set apart from the social world, the introduction of daily inspection and drill, repetitive training in maneuvers broken down into precisely timed sequences and combinations, and the elaboration of complex hierarchies of command, spatial arrangement, and surveillance. With such techniques an army could be made into what a contemporary military manual called an "artificial machine," and other armies now seemed like collections of "idle and inactive men" (Fuller 1955, 196).

None of these new methods appeared overnight. The French military reforms of 1791, for example, were developed from earlier reforms in Prussia, which had their own antecedents elsewhere in Europe. Nor were they confined to the army. As Foucault has shown, similar methods of enclosing and partitioning space, systematizing surveillance and inspection, breaking down complex tasks into carefully drilled movements, and coordinating separate functions into larger combinations were developed around the same period in factories, schools, prisons, hospitals, commercial establishments, and government offices. The spread of such methods from field to field in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries represented a new, localized, yet enormously productive technology of power.

Disciplinary methods of power have two important consequences for our understanding of the modern state—only the first of which is analyzed by Foucault. In the first place, we can move beyond the image of power as essentially a system of authoritative commands or policies backed by force. This legalistic approach, as we have seen, is adopted by all the theorists of the state discussed here. It conceives of state power in the form of a person (an individual or collective decision maker), whose decisions form a system of orders and prohibitions that direct and constrain social action. Power is thought of as an exterior constraint: its source is a sovereign authority above and outside society, and it operates by setting external limits to behavior, establishing negative prohibitions and laying down channels of proper conduct.

Disciplinary power, by contrast, works not from the outside but from within, not at the level of an entire society but at the level of detail, and not by constraining individuals and their actions but by producing them. A negative, exterior power gives way to an internal, productive power. Disciplines work within local domains and institutions, entering into particular social processes, breaking them down into separate functions, rearranging the parts, increasing their efficiency and precision, and reassembling them into more productive and powerful combinations. These methods produce the organized power of armies, schools and factories, and other distinctive institutions of modern nation states. They also produce, within such institutions, the modern individual, constructed as an isolated, disciplined, receptive, and industrious political subject. Power relations do not simply confront this individual as a set of external orders and prohibitions. His or her very individuality, formed within such institutions, is already the product of those relations.

One should not overstate the coherence of these technologies, as Foucault sometimes does. Disciplines can break down, counteract one another, or overreach. They offer spaces for maneuver and resistance, and indeed can be turned to counter hegemonic purposes. Resistance movements often derive their organizational forms from the military and their methods of discipline and indoctrination from schooling, and in fact are often generated within the barracks, the campus or other institutions of the state. At the same time it follows that just as we must abandon the image of the state as a free-standing agent issuing orders, we need to question the traditional figure of resistance as a subject who stands *outside* the state and refuses its demands. Political subjects and their modes of resistance are formed as much *within* the organizational terrain we call the state, rather than in some wholly exterior social space (see, for example, Mitchell 1990).

The second consequence of disciplinary power, the one that Foucault does not discuss yet the more important for understanding the peculiarity of the state phenomenon, is that at the same time as power relations become internal in this way, and by the same methods, they now appear to take the novel form of external structures. As I have argued elsewhere (Mitchell 1988; N.d.), the distinctiveness of the modern state, appearing as an apparatus that stands apart from the rest of the social world, must be sought in this novel structural effect. The effect is the counterpart of the production of modern individuality. For example, the new military methods of the late eighteenth century produced the disciplined individual soldier and, simultaneously, the novel effect of an armed unit as an artificial machine. This military apparatus appeared somehow greater than the sum of its parts, as though it were a structure with an existence independent of the men who composed it. In comparison with other armies, which now looked like amorphous gatherings of idle and inactive men, the new army seemed something two dimensional. It appeared to consist on the one hand of individual soldiers, and on the other of the machine they inhabited. Of course this apparatus has no independent existence. It is an effect produced by the organized partitioning of space, the regular distribution of bodies, exact timing, the coordination of movement, the combining of elements, and endless repetition, all of which are particular practices. There was nothing in the new power of the army except this distributing, arranging, and moving. But the order and precision of such processes created the effect of an apparatus apart from the men themselves, whose structure orders, contains, and controls them.

A similar two-dimensional effect can be seen at work in other institutions of the modern nation state. The precise specification of space and function that characterize modern institutions, the coordination of these functions into hierarchical arrangements, the organization of supervision and surveillance, and the marking out of time into schedules and programs all contribute to constructing a world that appears to consist not of a complex of social practices but of a binary order: on the one hand individuals and their activities, on the other an inert structure that somehow stands apart from individuals, precedes them, and contains and gives a framework to their lives. Indeed the very notion of an institution, as an abstract framework separate from the particular practices it frames, can be seen as the product of these techniques. Such techniques have given rise to the peculiar, apparently binary world we inhabit, where reality seems to take the two-dimensional form of individual versus apparatus, practice versus institution, social life and its structure or society versus state.

The State as a Structural Effect

The state needs to be analyzed as such a structural effect. That is to say, it should be examined not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist. In fact the nation state is arguably the paramount structural effect of the modern social world. It includes within itself many of the particular institutions already discussed, such as armies, schools, and bureaucracies. Beyond these, the larger presence of the state in several ways takes the form of a framework that appears to stand apart from the social world and provide an external structure. One characteristic of the modern state, for example, is the frontier. By establishing a territorial boundary and exercising absolute control over movement across it, state practices define and help constitute a national entity. Setting up and policing a frontier involves a variety of fairly modern social practices—continuous barbed-wire fencing, passports, immigration laws, inspections, currency control and so on. These mundane arrangements, most of them unknown two hundred or even one hundred years ago, help manufacture an almost transcendental entity, the nation state. This entity comes to seem something much more than the sum of the everyday activities that constitute it, appearing as a structure containing and giving order and meaning to people's lives. An analogous example is the law. Once again, one could analyze how the mundane details of the legal process, all of which are particular social practices, are so arranged as to produce the effect that "law" exists as a sort of abstract, formal framework, superimposed above social practice. What we call the state, and think of as an intrinsic object existing apart from society, is the sum of these structural effects.

To approach the state as a set of structural effects is very different from a structural approach (Poulantzas 1974; 1978). Structuralism takes for granted the idea of structure—an actual framework that somehow stands apart from physical reality as its dimension of order—and does not ask how this apparently metaphysical separation is brought about. It thus shares the ideal-material dualism of the statist approaches examined in this essay. By approaching the state as an effect, one can both acknowledge the power of the political arrangements that we call the state and at the same time account for their elusiveness. One can examine how it is that the state seems to stand apart from society and yet see this distinction as an internal arrangement. The boundary of the state is merely the effect of such arrangements and does not mark a real edge. It is not the border of an actual object.

To conclude this critique, the argument for a new approach to the state and the question of its boundary can be summarized in a list of five propositions:

1. The state should not be taken as a free-standing entity, whether an agent, instrument, organization or structure, located apart from and opposed to another entity called society.
2. The distinction between state and society should nevertheless be taken seriously, as the defining characteristic of the modern political order. The state cannot be dismissed as an abstraction or ideological construct and passed over in favor of more real, material realities. In fact, this distinction between conceptual and material, between abstract and real, needs placing in historical question if we are to grasp how the modern state has appeared.
3. For the same reason, the prevailing subjectivist view of the state as essentially a phenomenon of decision making or policy is inadequate. Its focus on one disembodied aspect of the state phenomenon assimilates the state–society distinction to the same problematic opposition between conceptual and material.
4. The state should be addressed as an effect of detailed processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and surveillance, which create the appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society. The essence of modern politics is not policies formed on one side of this division being applied to or shaped by the other, but the producing and reproducing of this line of difference.
5. These processes create the effect of the state not only as an entity set apart from society, but as a distinct dimension of structure, framework, codification, planning, and intentionality. The state appears as an abstraction in relation to the concreteness of the social, and as a subjective ideality in relation to the objectness of the material world. The distinctions between abstract and concrete, ideal and material, and subjective and objective, which most political theorizing is built upon, are themselves partly constructed in those mundane social processes we recognize and name as the state.

References

Almond, Gabriel A. 1954. *The Appeals of Communism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Almond, Gabriel A. 1960. "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics." In *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, eds. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Almond, Gabriel A. 1987. "The Development of Political Development." In *Understanding Political Development*, eds. Myron Weiner and Samuel Huntington. Boston: Little Brown.

Almond, Gabriel A. 1988. "The Return to the State." *American Political Science Review* 82:853–74.

Almond, Gabriel A., Taylor Cole, and Roy C. Macridis. 1955. "A Suggested Research Strategy in Western European Government and Politics." *American Political Science Review* 49:1042–44.

Almond, Gabriel A., and James S. Coleman. 1960. *The Politics of the Developing Areas*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Anderson, Benedict. 1983. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

Anderson, Irving H. 1981. *Aramco, the United States, and Saudi Arabia: A Study of the Dynamics of Foreign Oil Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Blair, John M. 1976. *The Control of Oil.* New York: Pantheon.

Easton, David. 1953. *The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science.* New York: Knopf.

Easton, David. 1957."An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems." *World Politics* 9:383–400.

Easton, David. 1981. "The Political System Besieged by the State." *Political Theory* 9:303–25.

Evans, Peter, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. 1985. *Bringing the State Back In.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Foucault, Michel. 1977. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.* New York: Pantheon.

Fuller, J. F. C. 1955. *The Decisive Battles of the Western World and Their Influence Upon History,* 3 vols. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.

Gasiorowski, Mark. 1987. "The 1953 *Coup d'Etat* in Iran." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19:261–79.

Krasner, Stephen D. 1978. *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Loewenstein, Karl. 1944. "Report on the Research Panel on Comparative Government." *American Political Science Review* 38:540–48.

Miller, Aaron David. 1980. *Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy, 1939–1949.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Mitchell, Timothy. 1988. *Colonising Egypt.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mitchell, Timothy. 1990. "Everyday Metaphors of Power." *Theory and Society* 19:545–77.

Mitchell, Timothy. N.d. "The Effect of the State." *Journal of Historical Sociology.* Forthcoming.

Nettl, J. P. 1968. "The State as a Conceptual Variable." *World Politics* 20:559–92.

Nordlinger, Eric. 1981. *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Nordlinger, Eric. 1987. "Taking the State Seriously." In *Understanding Political Development,* eds. Myron Weiner and Samuel Huntington. Boston: Little Brown.

Nordlinger, Eric. 1988. "The Return to the State: Critiques." *American Political Science Review* 82:875–85.

Poulantzas, Nicos. 1974. *Political Power and Social Classes.* London: New Left Books.

Poulantzas, Nicos. 1978. *State, Power, Socialism.* London: New Left Books.

Pye, Lucian. 1956. *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya: Its Social and Political Meaning.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sabine, George. 1934. "The State." *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* New York: Macmillan.

Schmitter, Philippe. 1985. "Neo Corporatism and the State." In *The Political Economy of Corporatism,* ed. Wyn Grant. New York: St. Martin's.

Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Skocpol, Theda. 1981. "Political Response to Capitalist Crisis: Neo Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal." *Politics and Society* 10:155–201.

Skocpol, Theda. 1985. "Bringing the State Back In." In *Bringing the State Back In,* eds. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Timothy Mitchell is Assistant Professor of Political Science, New York University, New York, NY 10003.

DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE: ARENDT AND DERRIDA ON THE PROBLEM OF FOUNDING A REPUBLIC

B. HONIG
Harvard University

Beginning with Hannah Arendt's depiction of the American Revolution and founding, I critically examine Arendt's reading of the Declaration of Independence, comparing it with Jacques Derrida's reading of (a draft of) the same document, in order to show that Arendt is careless in her easy dismissal of the declaration's essentialist moments. Derrida, it seems to me, has a better, more subtle appreciation of the both necessary and impossible role of essentialism in modern political theory and practice. I conclude, however, that Arendt nonetheless succeeds in theorizing a powerful and suggestive practice of political authority for modernity, a practice that is uniquely activist and appropriate for a democratic politics.

> The men who create power make an indispensable contribution to the Nation's greatness, but the men who question power make a contribution just as indispensable, especially when that questioning is disinterested, for they determine whether we use power or power uses us.
>
> —John F. Kennedy

The problem to which the title of this essay refers—that of founding a republic—is the problem of politics in modernity. I shall treat Hannah Arendt as a political theorist interested primarily in responding to this problem. As Arendt conceives of it, the problem is largely attributable to the rise of secularism and to the corresponding dearth in modernity of commonly held and publicly powerful instruments of legitimation, such as political authority. It is tempting to think of Arendt as a nostalgic or essentialist theorist of authority, a theorist for whom political authority is (or was) a uniquely ancient and Roman experience that was lost, irrevocably, along with the modern "loss of tradition and the weakening of religious beliefs" (Arendt 1963, 117–18).[1] In my view, however, Arendt does not simply mourn the disappearance of political authority in modernity; she also celebrates it. Moreover, in the spirit of celebration, she constructs a replacement for it: through her notably fabulist rendering of the American revolution and founding, she offers a powerful account of a practice of authority *for* modernity, an account that has received scant attention from Arendt scholars.

Arendt is ambivalent about the disappearance of authority in modernity. On the one hand, it marks the restoration of the world to humanity, the recovery of human worldliness, and new possibilities of innovative political action. On the other hand, it leaves the modern world bereft of the very things that secured the foundation and longevity of the Roman republic: tradition, religion, and authority. Without the resources of authority, it seems as if the task of founding and maintaining lasting institutions is impossible. Arendt poses the problem, quoting Rousseau:

> "The great problem of politics, which I compare to the problem of squaring the circle in geometry . . . [is]: How to find a form of government which puts the law above man." Theoretically [Arend adds], Rousseau's problem closely resembles Sièyes's vicious circle: Those who get together to constitute a new government are themselves unconstitutional, that is, they have no authority to do what they set out to achieve. The vicious circle in legitimating is present not in ordinary lawmaking, but in laying down the fundamental law. . . . The trouble was—to quote Rousseau once more—that to put the law above man and thus to establish the validity of man-made laws, *il faudrait des dieux*, "one would actually need gods." (1963, 183-84)[2]

For Arendt, then, the problem of politics in modernity is, How do we establish lasting foundations without appealing to gods, a foundationalist ground, or an absolute? Can we conceive of institutions possessed of authority without deriving that authority from some law of laws, from some extrapolitical source? In short, is it possible to have a politics of foundation in a world devoid of traditional (foundational) guarantees of stability, legitimacy, and authority? Arendt answers *yes,* and she turns to the American revolution and founding as a model of this possibility. I take her account of the American experience to be part of a retheorization of authority for a nonfoundational politics.

The American Model

The Quest for Examples

Arendt glorifies the American revolutionaries and founders of the American republic for their great innovations, their courage, their vision. But she faults them for being inadequately conscious of themselves as innovators. Their revolution took them by surprise (1963, 44). Somewhat frightened, they sought to mitigate the radical contingency of the revolution by speaking the language of restoration, which was indeed true to their original intentions in rebellion. Ultimately, though, it became clear to them that restoration was not the whole goal. Their experience of public freedom in the revolutionary process made them value political action and participation, the act of coming together in deliberation, debate, and decision. Free political action is seductive (1963, 33).

Thus, they were moved to complete their revolutionary task, seeking in the end not just liberation but the reconstitution of the political realm in order to enable the citizenry of the new republic to experience the happiness of public freedom and political action. Now conscious that this new goal, which they had not deliberately chosen, was radically new, they both reveled in their good fortune to be a part of this world-historical event and sought comfort from its weightiness. They turned to theory—to the science of politics—for aid in their task, "the creation of new power." And they turned to history, pedantically documenting republican constitutions of all sorts, driven, Arendt argues, not by the need to learn how to "safeguard . . . civil liberties—a subject on which they certainly knew more than any previous republic" but by the need to learn about "the constitution of power" (1963, 149-50).

The Quest for an Absolute

The turn to antiquity, however, constituted not only a search for pedagogic examples; it constituted also a search for a beginning to anchor the newly constituted republic. "Politically speaking," the American revolutionaries were right, Arendt argues, to believe that they had to derive "the stability and authority of any given body politic from its beginning." The problem was that "they could not conceive of a beginning except as something which must have occurred in a distant past" (1963, 198). In this respect then, the turn to antiquity was in quest of reassurance that the innovation of the revolution was not radical but derivative. But the reassurance was false, for their action *was* unprecedented. Hence its greatness.

The quest for reassurance marked a lack of faith on the part of the revolutionaries in their own action. This lack of faith led them also to attempt to ground their reconstitution of the political realm in an absolute, a law of laws that they trusted to serve as "the source of validity of their laws and the fountain of legitimacy for the new government" (1963, 199). The result was a paradox: "It was precisely the revolutions . . . which drove the very 'enlightened' men of the eighteenth century to plead for some religious sanction at the very moment when they were about to emancipate the secular realm from the influences of the churches and to separate politics and religion once and for all" (1963, 185-86).

This quest for an absolute in which to ground and legitimate the reconstitution of the political realm is, according to Arendt, deeply misguided. The positing of an absolute undermines the contingency that is the quintessential feature of the public realm, the feature in virtue of which political freedom and human innovation are possible (1958, 179-240; 1963, 184-85). Moreover, it deprivileges the very human achievement of reconstitution and founding, making it dependent on something external to the human world. And that external something is untenable in the modern era, whether it be god, natural law, or self-evident truth. Natural law needs "divine sanction to become binding for men" and "the authority of self-evident truth . . . still bears clear signs of divine origin," while in modernity "the loss of religious sanction for the political realm is a matter of accomplished fact" (1963, 190, 194, 196).

But there is a more fundamental issue at stake here. Even if appeals to an absolute could still bind us, even if religious sanction was still viable for the political realm, appeals to an absolute as a ground of politics, in Arendt's view, would be illicit. For an absolute is

> a truth that needs no agreement since, because of its self-evidence, it compels without argumentative demonstration or political persuasion. By virtue of being self-evident, these truths are prerational—they inform reason but are not its product—and since their self-evidence puts them beyond disclosure and argument, they are in a sense no less compelling than 'despotic power' and no less absolute than the revealed truths of religion or the axiomatic verities of mathematics. (1963, 192)

In politics, the appeal to an absolute is illicit because of its constative character. The uniquely political action, on Arendt's account, is not the constative but the performative utterance, a speech act that in itself brings "something into being which did not exist before" (1977, 151).[3] Thus, the grandeur of the Declaration of Independence, according to Arendt, consists "[not] so much in its being 'an argument in support of an action' as in its being *the perfect way for an action to appear in words*. . . . And since we deal here with the written, and not the spoken word, we are confronted with one of the rare moments in history when the power of action is great enough to erect its own monument (1963, 130; emphasis mine).[4]

The Ambiguity of the American Revolution

In spite of Arendt's celebratory tone, she is forced to admit that the Declaration of Independence does not consistently maintain the performative posture she so admires. The preamble to the declaration contains two appeals to a "transcendent source of authority for the laws of the new body politic": an appeal to "nature's god" and an appeal to self-evident truths.

What is interesting, though, about the appeal to self-evident truths is that the sentence—"We hold these truths to be self-evident"—is partly performative in character. These famous words, Arendt argues, "combine in a historically unique manner the basis of agreement *[we hold]* between those who have embarked upon revolution, an agreement necessarily relative because related to those who enter it, with an absolute *[self-evident]*" that signals not agreement but compulsion (1963, 192).

The statement's performative quality Arendt attributes to Jefferson's dim awareness that it was a fallacy that irresistible laws were "of the same nature as the laws of a community." Were it not for this dim awareness, Jefferson "would not have indulged in the somewhat incongruous phrase 'We hold these truths to be self-evident' but would have said: These truths are self-evident, namely, they possess a power to compel which is as irresistible as despotic power, they are not held by us, we are held by them; They stand in no need of agreement" (1963, 193). Jefferson's awareness of the fallacy could be no more than dim because he was caught in a period of transition. The new political developments of his time were "nowhere matched by an adequate development of new thought." In particular, "there was no avoiding the problem of the absolute . . . because it proved to be inherent in the traditional concept of law. If the essence of secular law was a command, then a divinity, not nature but 'nature's god,' not reason but a divinely informed reason, was needed to bestow validity on it" (1963, 195).

Fortunately for the American republic, this problem was a theoretical one. This bondage to the "conceptual and intellectual framework of the European tradition" did not, Arendt argues, determine "the actual destinies of the American republic to the same extent as it compelled the minds of the theorists." For if it had, she speculates (somewhat naively), "the authority of this new body politic in actual fact might have crumbled under the onslaught of modernity—where the loss of religious sanction for the political realm is an accomplished fact. . . . What saved the American revolution from this fate was neither 'nature's god' nor self-evident truth, but the act of foundation itself" (1963, 195-96). In short, Arendt believes that in practice, the *We hold*—the performative part of Jefferson's "incongruous phrase"—won out over the constative part, the reference to self-evident truths. This saved the American revolution because the *We hold* constitutes the only sort of power that is "real" and "legitimate," the sort of power that "rest[s] on reciprocity and mutuality" and comes into being only "when men join themselves together for the purpose of action" by binding "themselves through promises, covenants and mutual pledges" (1963, 181, 175).

The appeal to self-evidence stands in opposition to the *We hold.* It expresses not a free coming together but an isolated acquiescence to compulsion and necessity. The appeal, therefore, coerces and disempowers. It violates the integrity of politics and denatures and disables its practice. This is a crucial point for Arendt, who, throughout her work, insists on the autonomy of the political realm and on the sui generis character of politics. In *The Human Condition* she argues that politics should not be held to standards external to it, that it has two precepts of its own—forgiving and promising—precepts that "are not applied to action from the outside [but] arise directly out of the will to live together with others in the mode of acting and speaking" (1958, 245-46). It is now clear that what is unique about these precepts is that they are both performatives; indeed, it is that feature that makes these two practices—ordinarily thought of as the subject of ethics—profoundly political in an Arendtian schema. As performatives, they are marked by all the features characteristic of action as Arendt describes it: they cannot be judged true or false, right or wrong (1958, 205). And they cannot make sense in isolation: performative utterances necessarily take place "in concert" and require for their success the presence of spectators in order to achieve their purpose, which is to bring something into being that did not exist before. In my view, Arendt wants to celebrate the American Declaration of Independence as a purely performative speech act; but in order to do so she must disambiguate it. She dismisses its constative moments and holds up the declaration as an example of a uniquely political act, an act available uniquely to human beings, an authoritative exemplification of human power and worldliness.

The Power of Performatives

The performative *We hold*, on Arendt's account, empowers an existing community inasmuch as it constitutes a free coming together and gives public expression of a shared agreement to abide by certain rules in the community's subsequent being together. The *We hold* is a promise and a declaration; it signals the existence of a singularly human capacity: that of world-building (1963, 175).

The source of power in this world-building act of foundation is the speech act itself, the declaration of the *We hold*. And the act of foundation is the source of its own authority as well. In short, power and authority are interdependent, on Arendt's account (1970, 47). The authority of the world built by power derives from all that is implied by the fact that that world is the product of power, rather than strength or violence. (What is implied, of course, is that it is the product of free action by equals who act in concert, bound together by mutual promises and reciprocity for the sake of bringing something new into being.) Properly understood and performed, the act of foundation requires no appeal to a source of authority beyond itself: "It was the authority which the act of foundation carried within itself, rather than the belief in an immortal Legislator, or the promises of reward and threats of punishment in a 'future state,' or even the doubtful self-evidence of the truths enumerated in the preamble to the Declaration of Independence, that assured stability for the new republic" (1963, 199). Thus, Arendt squares Sièyes's circle by finding the source of authority in the act of foundation, thereby making appeals to an absolute, transcendent source of authority not merely illicit but redundant and unnecessary. Arendt's political performative does not require the blessing of a constative in order to work. Nor, Arendt claims, did the U.S. Constitution: the preamble to the declaration she argues, "provides the sole source of authority from which the Constitution, not as an act of constituting government but as the law of the land, derives its own legitimacy" (1963, 193).

Arendt thereby seems to have found for the new world the new thought it needed, the thought that enables it to conceive of a founding that secures law for a community without appealing to a law of laws and without lapsing into foundationalism, the thought that salvages political authority for an age unable or unwilling to support the authority of tradition and religion. One might say that Arendt's project is to save authority—to find a way to sustain it—because she realizes that without it there can be no politics. In a world devoid of authority, we are denied the opportunity to exercise our "human capacity for building, preserving, and caring for a world that can survive us and remain a place fit to live in for those who come after us" (1977, 95).

This reading of Arendt may appear implausible because of what Richard Flathman calls the essentialist character of her account of authority. Flathman notes that Arendt asserts "a necessary connection between *in* authority and a quite definite and complex constellation of values and beliefs about tradition and religion," meaning that of ancient Rome. According to Flathman, it follows from Arendt's argument that once "this particular constellation of values and beliefs has disappeared, *in* authority has *thereby* disappeared as well" (1980, 71; emphasis original). Furthermore, Flathman argues, given Arendt's insistence that power and authority are interdependent, it is curious that she claims both that authority has disappeared from the modern world and yet insists that power has not (263, n. 6). On my reading, however, the problem disappears, for Arendt is understood to be claiming that a certain kind of authority, the kind that sustained the Roman republic together with tradition and religion, has disappeared in modernity. This is not, as Arendt herself says, "'authority in general,' but rather a very specific form which had been valid throughout the Western World over a long period of time" (1977, 92). And it is this specific form of authority—"authority as we once knew it, which grew out of the Roman experience of foundation and was understood in the light of Greek political philosophy"—that, in Arendt's view, "has nowhere been re-established" (1977, 141).

In *On Revolution,* Arendt gives an account of an alternative form of authority, the authority inherent in the performative Declaration of Independence and in the practice of constitution-making that "preceded, accompanied, and followed [it] in all thirteen colonies." Both, she argues, "revealed all of a sudden to what an extent *an entirely new concept of power and authority,* an entirely novel idea of what was of prime importance in the political realm had already developed in the New World, even though the inhabitants of this world spoke and thought in the terms of the Old World" (1963, 166; emphasis mine). Arendt understands that we cannot recover the lost form of authority that sustained Rome for so long; it is untenable in modernity. But neither can we exercise our world-building capacities in a world without authority. If we love the world, if we are committed to world building—to politics—we must find another form of authority, one that can be sustained in modernity. Only then will we experience the privilege of political action that is not just revolutionary (1963, 171, 238).

Revolutions are frequent in the modern age (and peculiar to it) because of the failure of traditional authority. But most revolutions themselves fail for the same reason. They seek to ground their reconstitution of the political realm in the same sort of traditional authority whose very untenability made their own revolution possible. Arendt tries to get out of this vicious circle by offering an alternative conception of authority, one that inheres not in an untenable absolute, nor in a law of laws, but in the power of reconstitution itself.[5]

Only the modern conception of authority is viable for modernity because it requires for its sustenance not a shared belief in particular deities or myths but a common subscription to the authoritative linguistic practice of promising. Consequently, it assumes a preexisting community but not in the strong sense of "homogeneity of past and origin," which is the "decisive principle of the nation state" (1963, 174). This is a community in a weaker sense, bound together by common linguistic practices, not even necessarily by a single, common, inherited first language. This is a community whose members understand and subscribe to performative practices. Such a community should be able to sustain this new kind of authority, in Arendt's view—assuming, that is, that it can overcome its nihilistic craving for a law of laws, for a source of authority that is transcendent or self-evident, assuming that it can see and be satisfied with the power and authority inherent in its own performatives.

Conversely, one might say not that Arendt seeks to salvage authority for the sake of politics but that she seeks to salvage politics for the sake of authority. To see Arendt's politics as a response to modern nihilism is to make sense of her claim that we need politics for the sake of the world. We cannot live without standards or some stability; yet our traditional sources of stability are no longer viable. Consequently, we are left to the devices of politics and action. Politics is more important than ever because it is the only alternative to violent domination, the only source in modernity of legitimate rules possessed of authority and capable of addressing "the elementary problem of human living-together" (1977, 141).

Arendt's description of the signing of the Mayflower Compact is enlightening in this context. The parties to the compact

> obviously feared the so-called state of nature, the untrod wilderness, unlimited by any boundary, as well as the unlimited initiative of men bound by no law. This fear is not surprising; it is the justified fear of men who have decided to leave civilization behind them and strike out on their own. The really astounding fact in the whole story is that their obvious fear of one another was accompanied by the no less obvious confidence they had in their own power, granted and confirmed by no one and as yet unsupported by any means of violence, to combine themselves together into a 'civil Body Politick' which, held together solely by the strength of mutual promises 'in the Presence of God and one another', supposedly was powerful enough to 'enact, constitute, and frame' all necessary laws and instruments of government (1963, 167).[6]

Like the parties to the compact, the founders of the American republic built small "islands of security" in an "ocean of contingency" (1958, 237) through joint action, promising, and constitution making, all performatives that are not solopsistic because they presuppose a plurality of participants who subscribe to a shared authoritative practice of promising, and not nihilistic because, by virtue of their power, they are the guarantors of their own authority. Arendt can do no better than this; she refuses to, in fact, because of her conviction that the "realm of human affairs" is "relative by definition" (1963, 213). Political action has no anchor: a beginning, it "has, as it were, nothing to hold on to; it is as though it came out of nowhere in either time or space" (1963, 206).[7]

The Postulates of Promising

Arendt's characterization of action as a beginning with nothing to hold on to is somewhat misleading. In Arendt's own account, a beginning does have something to hold on to—the public subscription to an authoritative discursive practice in which performative utterances are understood to possess their own authority as long as they meet the conditions necessary for them to function. Arendt's performative politics presupposes a community of promisers, a preexisting community composed of people who may hold different values and beliefs but who, nonetheless, have shared understandings of what a promise is, what it means to make a promise, and what one must do in order for one's performance to be recognizable as a promise. In short, promising, even on Arendt's account, is a practice.[8]

Yet Arendt gives no account of the conditions of the practice. She only tells us why the practice of promising is of paramount importance to those committed to the activity of politics in modernity. But if the practice of promising is to be the source of legitimacy in an Arendtian politics, the question of the legitimacy of the practice and of its own techniques of self-legitimation must be addressed. Indeed, Friedrich Nietzsche addresses the problem directly: "To breed an animal with the right to make promises—is not this the paradoxical task that nature has set itself in the case of man? Is it not the real problem regarding man?" (1969, pt. 2, sec. 1).

The process by which this problem has been resolved historically is the object of Nietzsche's scathing criticism in the second essay of *On the Genealogy of Morals.* Arendt, however, never addresses these questions, perhaps because she does not share Nietzsche's ambivalence toward the construction of promisers and the practice of promising. Promising is the "highest human faculty." Indeed, Arendt denies Nietzsche's own ambivalence, claiming with approval that "he saw in the faculty of promises . . . the very distinction which marks off human from animal life" (1958, 245), ignoring the fact that in the phrase to which she refers Nietzsche says the problem is how to breed an *animal* with the right to make promises.

Moreover, Arendt's practice of promising, if it is to do the work she expects of it, must be highly sophisticated, even ritualized.[9] As such, it would belie the moment of contingency that, on her account, characterizes the moment of politics. Indeed, there is an apparent paradox here. Action, which for Arendt consists partly in the activity of promising, is terribly risky because it takes place in a contingent world where its meaning and consequences are always underdetermined if not indeterminate. Yet Arendt also claims that promising serves as a "control mechanism," that it "counters the enormous risks of action" by establishing little islands of stability in the radical contingency of the public realm (1958, 245–46). The problem is that if promising is to be a source of reassurance and stability, the operation of the practice of promising and the meaning of particular promises must be relatively unproblematic. In that case action as promising cannot occur ex nihilo and it will not be as risky—as contingent and unpredictable—as Arendt says it is.[10] On the other hand, if action is as contingent as that, promising will not by itself be able to provide the stability Arendt expects it to: the stability is coming from somewhere else, possibly from something external to action's purely performative speech act. And this is precisely the observation made by Jacques Derrida in his own reading of (Jefferson's draft of) the American Declaration of Independence, a reading that, like Arendt's, focuses on the document's curious structural combination of constative and performative utterance.

The Inadequacy of Performatives

Since Arendt dismisses the constative moments of the declaration, and insists that the power of its performative *We hold* is the sole source of authority for the American republic and its Constitution, it seems likely that the *We* of the declaration (and of all political action) is the source of stability in Arendt's account. Yet if we take seriously Arendt's claim that action is a "beginning" that occurs ex nihilo, if we are persuaded by her that the *We* (the people) does not exist as such prior to the declaration,[11] the question emerges, How can the *We* stand as the guarantor of its own performance? How can it function as the sole source of stability for the republic?

The problem is posed by Jacques Derrida in his essay "Declarations of Independence":

> The "we" of the declaration speaks "in the name of the people." But this people does not yet exist. They do *not* exist as an entity, it does *not* exist, *before* this declaration, not *as such.* If it gives birth to itself, as free and independent subject, as possible signer [of the declaration], this can hold only in the act of the signature. The signature invents the signer. This signer can only authorize him- or herself to sign once he or she has come to the end, if one can say this, of his or her own signature, in a sort of fabulous retroactivity. (1986, 10)

On Derrida's account, the signers are stuck in Sièyes's vicious circle. They lack the authority to sign until they have already signed. The American founders' invocation of "the name of the laws of nature and the name of God" manifests this predicament. They appealed to a constative, according to Derrida, not (as Arendt would have it) because of a failure of nerve nor because they underestimated the power of their own performative but because they did not overestimate its power. In order to guarantee that power and secure their innovation, they had to combine their performative with a constative utterance. They needed "another 'subjectivity' . . . to sign, in order to guarantee it, this production of signature"; for "in this process," Derrida argues, "there are only countersignatures."[12]

> It is still "in the name of" that the "good people" of America call *themselves* and declare *themselves* independent, at the instant in which they invent for themselves a signing identity. They sign in the name of the laws of nature and in the name of God. They *pose* or *posit* their institutional laws on the foundation of natural laws and by the same coup (the interpretive coup of force) in the name of God, creator of nature. He comes, in effect, to guarantee the rectitude of popular intentions, the unity and goodness of the people. *He founds natural laws and thus the whole game which tends to present performative utterances as constative utterances.* (1986, 11; emphasis mine)

Founding, promising, or signing, cannot occur ex nihilo: "For this Declaration to have a meaning *and* an effect there must be a last instance. God is the name, the best one, for this last instance and this ultimate signature"; that is, *God* is the name Derrida gives to whatever is used to hold the place of the last instance, the place that is the inevitable *aporia* of founding (or signing or promising) (1986, 12). In short, Derrida, like Rousseau (and yet quite unlike Rousseau), sees that in order to break Sièyes's vicious circle, in order to posit the law of institutional laws, *"il [biensur] faudrait des dieux."*

The moral of Derrida's story is that no act of founding (or signing, or promising) is free of this *aporia*—this gap that needs to be anchored—and this is a structural feature of language. This gap that marks *all* forms of utterance is always filled (whether or not we acknowledge it) by a deus ex machina—if not by God himself, then by nature, the subject, language, or tradition. Arendt sees that this *aporia* is a structural feature of all *performatives.*[13] But she insists that the *aporia,* the gap that marks all performatives, can and should be held open. She understands that there is often a felt human need to fill this gap but she does not see it as a systemic, conceptual, or linguistic need. Quite the contrary. The difference between her position and Derrida's on this point is made clear by their different assessments of the American declaration's combined performative and constative structure.

The Ambiguity of the Declaration, Reconsidered

Unlike Arendt, Derrida does not see the declaration's structural combination of performative and constative utterance as incongruous. It is not a question "of an obscurity or of a difficulty of interpretation, of a problematic on the way to its (re)solution" because "this obscurity, this undecidability between, let's say, a performative and a constative structure, is *required* in order to produce the sought after effect" (1986, 9). The insecure performative is not always and necessarily anchored by another utterance. The *We hold,* on Derrida's account, is capable of anchoring itself not because of its powerful purity as a performative, but because it is in fact *both* a constative and a performative. It is unclear whether "independence is stated or produced by this utterance." And its rhetorical force derives in large measure from this unclarity, from the fact that one cannot decide which sort of utterance it is: constative or performative (1986, 9).[14]

For Derrida, the combined constative and performative structure of the document and its *We hold* illustrate beautifully a structural feature of all language: that no signature, promise, or performative—no act of foundation—possesses resources adequate to guarantee itself, that each and every one necessarily needs some external, systemically illegitimate guarantee to work. This need marks the Declaration of Independence just as it marks utterances that are more quotidian. "This happens every day," Derrida says (indeed, "Every signature finds itself thus affected"), "but it is fabulous" (1986, 10).

For Arendt, however, the declaration's constative moments are marks of impurity, tainting what is really, and ought to have been, a purely performative act. She does not see that her cherished performative *We hold* is *also* a constative utterance. And so there is no undecidability here for her. The other constative moments of the declaration are unfortunate errors or lapses, marring but not obviating modernity's greatest moment, the moment when a new revolution splendidly completed its course in the founding of a republic whose authority rested exclusively in the power of the purely performative *We hold.* The power of this utterance as a performative is sufficient to produce the sought after effect. Acts of founding are not aided, but compromised, by the unnecessary and illicit intrusion of a constative.

As evidence for her claim that the declaration (and its performative *We hold)* is the sole source of authority for the Constitution, Arendt notes that "the Constitution itself, in its preamble as well as in its amendments which form the Bill of Rights, is singularly silent on this question of ultimate authority" (1963, 193–94). But there are two ways to read this silence. The alternative sees this same silence as evidence that the constative structure of the declaration *is* a guarantor of constitutional authority. Recall that Arendt identifies speech with power and characterizes violence as mute (1953, 378). Recall, too, that in her view, constatives are violent, despotic, and disempowering: they are not the products of shared public agreement, they demand an isolated acquiescence to a truth. They are not held by us, we are held by them. In short, they silence us—hence Arendt's insistence that they are illicit in the realm of action, which is the realm of speech. Consequently, the fact that the Constitution is "silent" on this question of ultimate authority is not overwhelming evidence that the authority of the republic inheres in the performative *We hold.* That silence can be read equally well as evidence that the constative moments of the declaration contribute importantly to the establishment of ultimate authority in the new republic. The silence can do no more than confirm the undecidability that Arendt resists.

In my view, Arendt resists this undecidability because she seeks in the American declaration and founding a moment of perfect legitimacy. Insofar as the authority of the founding derives from a constative, it is rooted not in power but in violence. This undecidability, then, delegitimates the republic; and so, for the sake of her moment of pure legitimacy, Arendt must do away with it. What Arendt does not see is that the American declaration and founding are paradigmatic instances of politics (however impure) *because* of this undecidability, not in spite of it. Derrida's point, like Nietzsche's, is that in every system (every practice), whether linguistic, cultural, or political, there is a moment or place that the system cannot account for. Every system is secured by placeholders that are irrevocably, structurally arbitrary and prelegitimate. They enable the system but are illegitimate from its vantage point. The question, then, for Arendt is, What placeholder fills this place, the place of the last instance, in her account?

The Place of Fables

On my reading, Arendt fills the place of the last instance with a fable, her fable of the American revolution and founding. From a Derridian perspective, it is appropriate that she turns to a fable to hold the place; for all placeholders, according to Derrida, including those that are constative in structure, are fables. Recall Derrida's claim that the signer's authorizing himself to sign by signing is a "fabulous retroactivity." By the word *fabulous*, Derrida signals that this retroactivity is enabled by a fable: "There was no signer, by right, before the text of the Declaration which itself remains the producer and guarantor of its own signature. By this fabulous event, by this fable which implies the structure of the trace and is only in truth possible thanks to the inadequation to itself of a present, a signature gives itself a name" (1986, 10). Arendt herself recognizes this "inadequation to itself of a present"; her historical fable is an acknowledgment of it and a response to it. Thus, her criticism of the American founders for their inability to conceive of a beginning that was not rooted in the past must be in the service of her fable; for she, too, proves to be unable to conceive of such a totally present event.

Arendt turns to the declaration in the hope that it will provide her with the resources she needs to fill the gap in her own theorization of a politics of founding. The historical event is the inspiration of the fable, but it does not bind it. Arendt dismisses, among other things, the constative structure of the Declaration of Independence and insists that the pure performative of the declaration was a sufficient guarantor of the authority of the new republic—in order to fill the place with a fabulous faith, the faith that the American founding fathers did not need gods in order to found a legitimate republican politics; hence, neither do we. This fable of founding is meant to inspire us, just as "the classical examples shining through the centuries" emboldened the American revolutionaries "for what then turned out to be an unprecedented action" (1963, 196).

Arendt's fable, like all of her spectators' stories, is meant to define and enable new horizons of possibility. It presents itself as a recovery of the origins and heroes of the republic, as an act of memory and dereification meant to recapture and thereby reenable the revolutionary spirit that is the vitality of republican politics. The fable must take the place of the constative in order for Arendt to theorize a viable politics for modernity, a politics born not of violence but of power, a nonfoundational politics possessed of legitimacy, authority, stability, and durability.

Arendt claims that this fable is the product of her commitment to memory, to the recovery of the American revolutionary spirit; but it invents that spirit. It claims to be a dereification, a recovery of origins; but it erases the violence and the ambiguity that marked the original act of founding. And the effect of Arendt's fable is the same as that of all legitimating fables: to prohibit further inquiry into the origins of the system and protect its center of illegitimacy from the scrutiny of prying eyes.

Arendt seems to recognize this. At the end of *Willing*, she acknowledges that she has come to an impasse. Her account of freedom, natality, and the will "seems to tell us no more than that we are *doomed* to be free by virtue of being born, no matter whether we like freedom or abhor its arbitrariness." The only way out of this impasse, Arendt suggests, is through "an appeal to another mental faculty," that of judgment (1978, 217). Judgment is the faculty used by the spectators who turn actions into stories. It is the faculty used by Arendt as a spectator of the

American Revolution and founding. Her fabulist rendering of those events is meant to bridge the impasse of freedom, the abyss that afflicts all performative utterance, all declarations of independence, all acts of founding.

Intervention, Augmentation, and Resistibility: Arendt's Practice of Political Authority

In spite of their apparent irreconcilability, I believe that it may be possible to bridge—or at least negotiate—the impasse between Derrida and Arendt. If instead of dismissing, as Arendt does, the constative moment of founding, we treat that moment, as Derrida does, as an invitation for intervention, we could respect Arendt's prohibition against anchoring political institutions in an absolute while at the same time acknowledging that *all* acts of founding are (as Derrida claims) necessarily secured by a constative. By this strategy of intervention, we do not deny the constative moment of founding, but neither do we succumb to its claim to irresistibility. We resist it. Our intervention testifies to the resistibility of this (allegedly irresistible) constative anchor; and it posts our opposition to the attempt to "put the law *above* man," to secure the law of laws from all (political) intervention.

This notion of resistibility is at the center of Arendt's new conception of authority for modernity. Recall that for Arendt, an absolute is illicit in politics because it is irresistible. God, self-evident truths, natural law, are all despotic in character because they are irresistible. Because they are irresistible, they do not persuade to agreement, they command acquiescence. Thus, it is in virtue of their irresistibility that they are, for Arendt, antipolitical. In short, resistibility is the sine qua non of Arendt's politics.[15]

On Arendt's account, it is this feature of resistibility that distinguishes secular law from divine command, political authority from religious devotion. The American founders invoked God (and a whole series of constative anchors) because they (mistakenly) believed that the "essence of secular law was a command." Their political development, Arendt argues, "was nowhere matched by an adequate development of new thought"; and this is why "there was no avoiding the problem of the absolute" (1963, 195). It was the New World's failure to distinguish secular law from divine command that left it unable to comprehend the fact that "power under the condition of human plurality can never amount to omnipotence, and laws residing in human power can never be absolute" (1963, 39).

Jacques Derrida recognizes this fact. Indeed, his deconstruction of the American declaration is in the service of this recognition. He exposes "the whole game which tends to present performative utterances as constative utterances." But he knows that this exposure cannot bring the game to an end. The game proceeds; and Derrida, by his very intervention, by his adoption of a posture of intervention, declares himself a player. In so doing, he joins Arendt in proclaiming his commitment to resistibility. Like her, he refuses to allow the law of laws to be put, unproblematically, *above* man; but he recognizes, more deeply than does Arendt, that the law will always resist his resistance (1987). His unwillingness to passively accept that is a commitment to politicization, resistibility, and intervention. And his strategy of intervention is not only consistent with Arendt's own account of the practice of political authority (as I read it); it is required by it.

Arendt's theorization of authority builds on the close connection in Roman thought and practice between the concept of authority and a practice of *augmentation:*

> The very concept of Roman authority suggests that the act of foundation inevitably develops its own stability and permanence, and authority in this context is nothing more or less than a kind of necessary "augmentation" by virtue of which all innovations and changes remained tied back to the foundation which, at the same time, they augment and increase. Thus the amendments to the Constitution augment and increase the original foundations of the American republic; . . . the very authority of the American Constitution resides in its inherent capacity to be amended and augmented. This notion of a coincidence of foundation and preservation by virtue of augmentation . . . was deeply rooted in the Roman spirit. (1963, 202; cf. 1977, 123)[16]

Since republics do not rest on one world-building act of foundation but are manifestly committed to augmentation, to the continual preservation and amendment of their foundation, they are uniquely endowed with political vigor. Not so the American republic, however. In it "there was no space reserved, no room left for the exercise of precisely those qualities which had been instrumental in building it." This was, Arendt argues, no mere oversight; the American founders, intent on "starting something permanent and enduring," succumbed to the charms of the irresistible absolute. As a result, the experience of free political action remained "the privilege of the generation of the founders." That privileging, Jefferson felt, was an injustice. No constitution, in his view, was perfect; and none should be treated with "sanctimonious reverence." Consequently, he greeted the news of Shay's Rebellion with enthusiasm: "God forbid we should ever be twenty years without such a rebellion," he said (1963, 233), expressing a sentiment reminiscent of Machiavelli's advice to princes to reinvigorate their rule with a repetition of the violence of their founding about every 10 years.

Arendt does not endorse this reliance on violence as a way to reinvigorate the republic. But she does admire Jefferson's later idea of a ward system, a system that he came to see as "the only possible nonviolent alternative to his earlier notions about the desirability of recurring revolutions" (1963, 250). The ward system, Arendt says, could correct the fatal flaw of the Constitution (which "had given all power to the citizens, without giving them the opportunity of *being* republican and of *acting* as citizens" [1963, 253; emphasis oridinal]) by subdividing counties into small republics in which every citizen would have an opportunity to participate in the activity of politics.

This republican commitment to political action is important to Arendt for two distinct but related reasons. The first is connected to her motif of self-realization. In Arendt's view, human beings denied the opportunity to exercise their world-building capacities live an impoverished life, a life that is somehow less than human, a life without freedom, without happiness (1963, 255).

The second reason is connected to the character of Arendt's new conception of authority for modernity. Where other theorists of authority, like Rousseau, believe that the problem of authority is how to put the law *above* man, that is, how to *make* the law of laws irresistible, Arendt believes the problem is how to *prevent* the law of laws from becoming irresistible: she rejects the command model of authority as inappropriate for the human condition of living together in a secular and political world. A practice of authority centered on an irresistible law of laws is inappropriate for the post-foundational age for which Arendt theorizes a politics, and it is also deeply antipolitical. It prohibits the practices of augmentation and amendment that she valorizes, and it encourages a withdrawal from active politics; it deactivates politics. Arendt's account (as I see it) is aptly summarized by Hanna Pitkin's description of Machiavelli's view, in which "republican authority must be exercised in a way that further politicizes the people rather than rendering them quiescent. Its function is precisely to keep a political movement or action that the people have initiated . . . from disintegrating into riot, apathy, or privatization" (1984, 88).

Recall Arendt's claim that the American founders correctly perceived that the authority of any body politic derives from its beginning but mistakenly believed that a beginning was "something which must have occurred in a distant past." The great good fortune of the American republic was that this mistaken belief lost out. The success of the revolution "was decided the very moment when the Constitution began to be worshipped"; for that constitution-worship, Arendt argues, evidenced the fact that the republic was built on a beginning that was very present: "If their attitude towards Revolution and Constitution can be called religious at all, then the word 'religion' must be understood in its original Roman sense, and their piety would then consist in *religare*, in binding themselves back to a beginning" (1963, 198). This constitution-worship has always been ambiguous, its object being "at least as much the constituting act as it was the written document itself." Consequently, Arendt can say both that the "American remembrance of the event" of constitution is what keeps the authority of the republic safe and intact and that the "very authority of the American Constitution resides in its inherent capacity to be amended and augmented" (1963, 204, 202). For Arendt, this commitment to augmentation maintains a republic and its revolutionary spirit by, in a curious sense, keeping its beginning always present.

Derrida identifies this same structure of maintenance and calls it *survivance*, by which he, too, means a kind of preservation through augmentation. Here, as with Arendt, survival is not produced by the maintenance of a present into a future in the way that a fixed monument seeks to preserve the presence of what is past. For Derrida, this maintenance is an augmentation that takes place by way of translation, by way of a translation that is called for and heard in the original text. Just as, on Arendt's account, the Constitution calls out to be amended, so Derrida's text calls out to be translated: it is not present *yet*. This is not translation in the ordinary sense: just as Arendt's performative founding could never be content merely to transmit a sense of obligation or produce obedient subjects, neither can Derrida's act of translation be "content merely to transport a content into another language, nor just to communicate or to transmit something," merely to produce comprehension. Translation augments, necessarily. It does not merely copy or reproduce; it is a new linguistic event, it produces "new textual bodies." It does not simply preserve an original in a practice of mere repetition, it dislodges the constative yearnings of the original and finds there the point of departure for a new way of life—hence Derrida's claim that this is *survivance* not "in the sense of posterity . . . but of 'more living'," in the sense of *plus de vie* and *plus que vie* (1985, 24–25). This augmentation, says Derrida, is "what survival is." And this augmentation is, in one sense, arguably like Arendt's practice of authority, which responds to the text or document that seeks to preserve and refer to the past moment of founding by augmenting it with another event, another speech act or, as in this case, by an act of translation.

Finally, Machiavelli, too, explores this structure of maintenance. He sees the importance of maintaining the act of foundation, understands that human institutions need frequent revitalization, and seeks that revitalization in the return to beginnings, a kind of invitation to augmentation. As Pitkin points out, this return to beginnings may be read as a way of frightening the population back into obedience, but there is also another way to think about it. "Perhaps," she suggests, "one should construe the forgetfulness that gradually corrupts a composite body as reification: a coming to take for granted as 'given' and inevitable what in fact is the product of human action." This reification distances citizens from their political institutions. From this perspective, Pitkin argues, the return to origins does not signal the recurrence of violence but a return "to the spirit of origins, the human capacity to originate." If we assume here that "in the beginning lies not chaos but human capacity" (1984, 275–79),[17] we can see that Machiavelli's return to beginnings, like Nietzsche's genealogies and Derrida's deconstructions, is a dereification and a political intervention.

Arendt, like Machiavelli, sees that a beginning too firmly rooted in the past is in danger of becoming reified and foundational. Our commitment to augmentation and amendment may derive from our reverence for a beginning that is in the past; but our practices of augmentation and amendment make that beginning our own—not merely our legacy but our own construction and performative. The commitment to augmentation protects that which was glorious because it was a performative from being sanctified and turned into a law of laws, an absolute whose irresistibility would ultimately and necessarily destroy the uniquely political character of the republic.[18] On this reading of Arendt, augmentation is both a necessary condition of politics and constitutive of one form of the activity of politics itself. What Leo Strauss says of Machiavelli applies equally to Arendt: "Foundation is, as it were, continuous foundation" (1978, 44).

Since, on Arendt's account, the practice of authority consists largely in this commitment to resistibility, the practice of authority turns out to be, paradoxically enough, a practice of deauthorization. On this account, then, Derrida's own project of deauthorization—his adoption of a posture of intervention—becomes *part* of a practice of authority, not simply an unauthorized assault on the institutions of authority from some outside. This inclusion is the genius of Arendt's account.

It is noteworthy that for both Derrida and Arendt, the moment of intervention is the moment of politics. But for Derrida, politics *begins* with the entry of the irresistible absolute; it is the impossible superimposition of constative on performative utterance that occasions the Derridian intervention, an intervention that is political. For Arendt, however, politics *ends* with the entry of the *anti*political (because irresistible) absolute. Arendt's intervention consists in her insistence that acts of founding can and should resist the urge to anchor themselves in an absolute. But Arendt's account of authority as a practice of augmentation and amendment does not, in my view, commit her to this insistence. It commits her only to the insistence that we treat the absolute as an invitation for intervention, that we declare ourselves resistant to it, that we refuse its claim to irresistibility by deauthorizing it. And this, in effect, is what Arendt herself tries to do in her own interventionist critique of the constative structure of the American Declaration of Independence.

The impasse between Arendt and Derrida is not easy to bridge, but neither is it nonnegotiable. If it is at all possible to negotiate it, it is in all likelihood because both these thinkers—Derrida through his strategy of intervention, Arendt through her fable of the American Revolution—seem to be inspired by Nietzsche's counsel to seek "a past from which we may spring rather than that from which we seem to have derived" (1957).

Notes

Thanks to Richard Flathman, William Connolly, Peter Digeser, David Mapel, Tom Keenan, Tom Eagles, Judith Butler, Jeff Isaac, and George Kateb.

Versions of this paper were presented at the 1989 meetings of the American Political Science Association and the Northwestern University Workshop in Contemporary Political Theory.

1. This view, that Arendt's account of authority is antimodernist, is the standard interpretation. See, for example, Richard Flathman 1980, whose account of Arendt I discuss briefly below, and Richard Friedman 1973, who cites Arendt's account as an instance of the "peculiar but interesting and important claim that the very concept of authority has been corrupted or even lost in the modern world, and that it is this loss of understanding that lies behind the confusion over authority prevailing in contemporary thought" (p. 122).

2. Arendt is quoting Rousseau (1985, 3; 1988, bk. 2, chap. 7). In this paper I cite without comment Arendt's use of gendered language. I explore the issue elsewhere (Honig 1991).

3. The words *performative* and *constative* are Austin's (1962), not Arendt's. Arendt's description of action as a form of utterance (The "doer of deeds is possible only if he is at the same time the speaker of words" [1958, 178–79]), a de novo creation; her identification of this form of utterance with politics; and her characterization of politics as world-building—all lead me to believe that her account draws on the model of the originary performative, the Divine utterance *Let there be.*

4. Arendt's distinction between an "argument in support of an action" and actions that "appear in words" implies that only performative utterances are speech acts. Austin began with this assumption but later found he could not maintain it and concluded that both performative and constative utterances are speech acts.

Note that Arendt is not the only one to make the interesting claim that the *written* document is the "perfect way for an action to appear in words." See Warner 1987 on the importance of writing, printing, and textuality to the legitimation of the early American republic.

5. Both the new conception of authority and the older Roman one are sustained by the foundings in which they originated. Arendt says that Roman authority was sustained by particular religious and traditional beliefs, but she does also claim that "the very coincidence of authority, tradition, and religion, *all three simultaneously springing from the act of foundation,* was the backbone of Roman history from beginning to end" (1963, 199; emphasis mine).

6. Arendt makes no note of it but the phrase "in the Presence of God and one another" instantiates the same incongruous unification of a constative and performative utterance as does Jefferson's "We hold these truths to be self-evident." It suggests, contra Arendt, that the confidence the parties had in each other, far from being "granted and confirmed by no one," was guaranteed by "the Presence of God."

Although Arendt never mentions it, it is notable that the Mayflower Compact was drawn up in Britain under the sanctioning and supporting gaze of Britain's legal and political institutions, *before* the colonists left for the uncertain and unknown New World. Moreover, the document was signed on the ship, *before* the colonists disembarked in America. It would seem that the colonists' "confidence . . . in their own power" was perhaps a little less hardy than Arendt estimates it. See n. 12.

7. Sometimes Arendt toys with the notion that a "principle" might save "the act of beginning from its own arbitrariness" (1963, 212–13; cf. 1977, 156). At other times she concedes that the arbitrariness of beginnings is "complete" (1963, 201).

8. As we know from Austin, discursive practices postulate a vast array of political and cultural institutions that set many of the conditions for discursive felicity: for example, they distinguish and sanction the distinction between those who are in authority and those who are not; that is, they identify the authorized speaker of the performative "I call this meeting to order" as the chair of the board and forbid, punish, and fail to comprehend or sanction the interrogation of anyone who impersonates the chair and usurps the chair's performative privilege.

9. On Austin's account, the felicity of performatives is often secured by the use of formulaic or ritualistic utterance for performative purposes, as in "I declare this meeting adjourned."

10. The same point can be made with reference to Arendt's stories, which (Arendt assumes) are univocal, possessed of a force and meaning that are unproblematic. These are curious assumptions from one so insistent that plurality is the sine qua non of the public realm. Perhaps Arendt's account of the role of stories in politics is too influenced by the Greek model, in which an authoritative poet (Homer) gives the authoritative account of events.

11. Identity is the product, not the condition of action, on Arendt's account (1958, 193; Honig 1988, 86–88; Kateb 1983, 1–51).

12. This claim that signing requires *countersignatures* again renders problematic Arendt's faith in the power of the *We* to ensure its own action. In Arendt's process, there are only *cosigners;* but cosigners, on Derrida's account, are not sufficient to get us out of Sièyes's vicious circle. Hence, the parties to the Mayflower Compact combined "themselves together into a 'civil Body Politick'" not "*solely* by the strength of mutual promises" but (as Arendt well knows) "in the Presence of God and one another" (emphasis added; see n. 6). The parties invoke the Presence of God because they need the validation of his witness and the security of his *counter*signature.

13. Arendt believes that this gap marks only the speech acts of her public realm—hence the risk and danger of public action, which she celebrates. Contra Derrida, she assumes that some language *is* safe

and unproblematic (or at least uninteresting)—nonpolitical, nonproductive, nonperformative speech, which addresses "immediate, identical needs and wants." For this sort of thing, "signs and sounds . . . would be enough" (1958, 176).

14. Here Derrida refers to the phrase *We the people;* I take his argument to apply equally well to the *We hold.*

15. This identification of politics with resistibility is what leads Arendt to insist on her problematically severe distinction between the public and the private realm. The private realm is the realm of the body, whose demands upon us are, according to Arendt, necessarily irresistible. I suggest that Arendt's public-private distinction would lose some of its (problematic) force if instead of insisting on the inadmissibility of the irresistible to the public realm we responded to it with a Derridian strategy of intervention (see Honig 1991).

16. Arendt is not the only one to note the etymological and conceptual connections between authority and augmentation (see Friedman 1973; Friedrich 1973; Peters 1973); but she alone reasons from them to an account of authority as deeply tied to a *practice* of augmentation.

17. The return to beginnings will be violent only in regimes that are corrupt, Pitkin argues. Others will respond to nonviolent forms of reinvigoration.

18. The absence in the American republic of something like a ward system that would allow citizens to participate in the political activity of augmentation does not mean that the republic lacks authority. It does mean that "the true seat of authority in the American Republic" is the Supreme Court, which is, in Woodrow Wilson's phrase, "a kind of Constitutional Assembly in continuous session." Consequently, Arendt argues, the American concept of authority is very different from that of Rome: "In Rome the function of authority was political, and it consisted in giving advice, while in the American republic the function of authority is legal, and it consists in interpretation" (1963, 200). This substitution of legal for political authority, together with the failure of the American republic to vouchsafe spaces of freedom for popular participation in politics, marks, according to Arendt, the loss of the American republic's revolutionary spirit.

References

Arendt, Hannah. 1953. "Understanding and Politics." *Partisan Review* 20:377–92.

Arendt, Hannah. 1958. *The Human Condition.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Arendt, Hannah. 1963. *On Revolution.* New York: Penguin Books.

Arendt, Hannah. 1970. *On Violence.* New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.

Arendt, Hannah. 1977. *Between Past and Future.* Enl. ed. New York: Penguin.

Arendt, Hannah. 1978. *Willing.* Vol. 2 of *The Life of the Mind,* ed. Mary McCarthy. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.

Austin, John L. 1962. *How to Do Things with Words.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Derrida, Jacques. 1985. "Deconstruction in America: An Interview with Jacques Derrida." In *Critical Exchange* 17:1–32. Eds. James Creech, Peggy Kamuf and Jane Todd.

Derrida, Jacques. 1986. "Declarations of Independence." *New Political Science* 15:7–15.

Derrida, Jacques. 1987. "Devant la loi." In *Kafka and the Contemporary Critical Performance,* ed. Alan Udoff.

Flathman, Richard E. 1980. *Authority and the Authoritative: The Practice of Political Authority.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Friedman, Richard B. 1973. "On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy." In *Concepts in Social and Political Philosophy,* ed. Richard E. Flathman. New York: Macmillan.

Friedrich, Carl J. 1973. "Authority, Reason, and Discretion." In *Concepts in Social and Political Philosophy,* ed. Richard E. Flathman. New York: Macmillan.

Honig, B. 1988. "Arendt, Identity, and Difference." *Political Theory* 16(1):77–98.

Honig, B. 1991. "Toward an Agonistic Feminism: Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Identity." In *Feminists Theorize the Political,* eds. Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott. New York: Routledge Press. Forthcoming.

Kateb, George. 1983. *Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil.* Oxford: Rowman & Allanheld.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1957. *The Use and Abuse of History.* Trans. Adrian Collins. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1969. *On the Genealogy of Morals.* Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage Books.

Peters, R. S. 1973. "Authority." In *Concepts in Social and Political Philosophy,* ed. Richard E. Flathman. New York: Macmillan.

Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. 1984. *Fortune Is a Woman.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1985. *The Government of Poland.* Ed. and trans. Willmore Kendall. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1988. *On the Social Contract.* Ed. and trans. Donald A. Cress. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Strauss, Leo. 1978. *Thoughts on Machiavelli.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Warner, Michael. 1987. "Textuality and Legitimacy in the Printed Constitution." *The Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society,* 59–84.

B. Honig is Assistant Professor of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138.

COOPERATIVE REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT AND THE POLITICS OF ADMINISTRATIVE EFFECTIVENESS

JOHN T. SCHOLZ
State University of New York
Stony Brook

Even when political interests control bureaucratic outputs, *the control of policy* outcomes *is complicated by trade-offs between controllable versus effective implementation strategies. I use a nested game framework to explain why a cooperative strategy can increase enforcement effectiveness in the narrow administrative game and why principal–agent control problems and collective action problems associated with the strategy lead policy beneficiaries to* oppose *the effective strategy in the broader political games. Analyses of state-level Occupational Safety and Health Administration enforcement provide evidence that cooperation does enhance the impact of enforcement in reducing workplace injury rates but that policy beneficiaries oppose and sabotage cooperation. The interactions between administrative effectiveness and interest group politics in this and other implementation situations require that both be analyzed simultaneously, and the nested game framework can provide a systematic approach to such analyses.*

Why are government bureaucracies ineffective in achieving policy goals? The field of public administration has traditionally answered this question in terms of technical and management problems that decrease the likelihood of achieving a given policy goal. In the last two decades, political science has emphasized the role of interests in causing administrative ineffectiveness. Administrative choices are portrayed as the continuation of legislative politics by other means, with opposition groups sabotaging effective administration at every turn (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983; Moe 1989; Seidman 1980) and bureaucrats seeking their own interests at the cost of policy goals (Bardach 1977; Downs 1967; Miller and Moe 1983). Furthermore, a number of empirical studies have documented the responsiveness of regulatory enforcement to the demands of interest groups (Gormley 1983; Marlow 1981; Marvel 1982; Moe 1985; Scholz and Wei 1986; Williams and Matheny 1984) and their elected representatives (e.g. Moe 1982; Scholz 1989; Wood 1988; Weingast and Moran 1983). These arguments reflect the simple calculus of interests predicting that policy opponents will oppose effective administration of policies that hurt their interests while policy supporters will favor effectiveness.

I will focus on the apparently perverse situation in which *policy supporters oppose effective administration.* I argue that potentially effective administrative strategies frequently impose problems of control that make effective strategies less attractive to policy supporters than safer, more controllable strategies. I first introduce the nested game perspective to illustrate why effective administrative strategies offering higher payoffs to beneficiaries in the narrow administrative game may impose unacceptable risks in broader political games. I then discuss the regulatory enforcement dilemma in which cooperative tit-for-tat strategies lead to higher payoffs for regulatory beneficiaries than baseline deterrence strategies. The game framework is presented informally in this article to clarify the analysis. A formal treatment can be found elsewhere (Scholz 1984a).

But cooperative strategies require greater administrative discretion, which reduces the ability of beneficiaries to ensure that the enforcement agency will perform adequately. Two political games illustrate the effectiveness-control tradeoffs facing supporters. The first game utilizes a principal-agent framework (Mitnick 1980; Moe 1984) to analyze the choice of appropriate levels of discretion. The second analyzes the free-rider problem arising when beneficiaries directly participate in the enforcement process. Both games specify conditions under which policy beneficiaries will oppose cooperative strategies.

I then test the relevance of the analysis for Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) enforcement. Empirical tests confirm the greater effectiveness of cooperative strategies as well as the perverse negative impact of policy beneficiaries on effectiveness. I conclude that studies of political controls over bureaucracy need to move beyond the current focus on bureaucratic outputs, because it ignores the question of how effectively these outputs are translated into outcomes desired by interest groups. This requires political analyses to confront the classical public administration problems of effectiveness. The nested game approach provides an appropriate extension to the simple calculus of interest capable of explaining the seemingly perverse actions by policy beneficiaries.

Perverse Interests and Nested Games

Why would policy supporters not favor the most effective means of administrating their policies? Bendor and Moe (1985) may have been the first to point out the asymmetric control problem that causes policy *beneficiaries* to contribute more than adversaries to policy inefficiencies. Bureaucratic slack was the prime form of inefficiency in their simulation model. Adversaries were, of course, more willing to cut the agency's budget to control slack than were beneficiaries, since beneficiaries would also lose benefits if the budget were cut.

Moe (1989) elaborated on the regulatory control problems that led advocates of regulatory policies to favor ineffective administrative structures. In the U.S. context, groups anticipate that their current ascendancy in the legislative process is only temporary and that their opponents will soon get their turn in power. Thus, instead of selecting an administrative structure that would most effectively deliver the desired service, policy advocates prefer structures that lock in benefits even after the opposition has taken control of the administration. What appears to be a perverse choice of structure from a narrow public administration perspective becomes more sensible when viewed from the broader perspective of the political control game.

I shall argue that the *nested games* perspective provides a useful framework for systematizing the study of interests and effectiveness, and particularly for clarifying the trade-offs between control and effectiveness. Moe (1984) suggested that the hierarchy of controls from interest groups through elected representatives to bureaucratic leaders and their subordinates could be represented as a hierarchy of principal-agent games. Tsebelis (1990) introduced the concept of nested games to explain how choices in international affairs judged to be perverse in a narrow context appear to be more rational when viewed from a broader perspective. The specification of the narrow game context failed to account for strategic choices and outcomes important in other games affecting choices in the narrow game.

The nested game analysis of bureaucratic effectiveness begins with the narrow administrative game that focuses on the classical public administration problem—How can the agency most effectively use its resources to achieve the policy goal? In this game, the government agency attempts to achieve policy goals by inducing the desired behavior for the target population within its jurisdiction through positive incentives (food stamps, medicare payments) or through enforcement (tax collection, regulation). The most effective strategy is the one that produces the highest expected payoff for the agency. Note that the nested game perspective emphasizes the importance of considering strategic interactions between the government agency and target population, particularly when enforcement is a primary concern (Bianco, Ordeshook, and Tsebelis 1990; Scholz 1984a; Tsebelis 1989).

But the administrative game takes place within a political context in which political *principles* attempt to control the actions of the government *agents*. Agencies may pursue suboptimal strategies in the narrow game because of constraints from this broader political game. Many forms of the political games could be analyzed to represent various control problems. I will present the narrower administrative game and two nested political games of particular importance for understanding the role of policy beneficiaries in the ensuing empirical study of OSHA enforcement.

Cooperation, Effectiveness, and the Enforcement Game

As in most policy areas, analyses of regulatory enforcement generally reflect a decision theory framework that does not account for the strategic interaction between the enforcement agency and the entities subject to its authority (Tsebelis 1989). The standard deterrence model assumes that firms will comply with regulations to the extent that the value of expected costs of compliance and punishment for noncompliance exceeds the value of expected benefits of noncompliance. Since higher rates of inspection, citation, and penalties should increase the expected costs of noncompliance, enforcement effectiveness from this perspective should simply reflect the level of enforcement.

Several game-theoretic models of enforcement illustrate that very different predictions result when more complex strategic behavior between regulated firms and enforcement agencies is added to the analysis. (Bianco, Ordeshook, and Tsebelis 1990; Graetz, Reinganum, and Wilde 1986; Greenberg 1984; Reinganum and Wilde 1986; Scholz 1984a; Tsebelis 1989). Of particular relevance for understanding enforcement effectiveness is the model of cooperative regulatory enforcement (Scholz 1984a). This model argues that the basic deterrence equilibrium of the decision theory approach is ineffective because of the inherent inefficiency of the regulations being enforced and the costs of enforcement actions. Both firm and agency can be better off if the agency forgoes legalistic enforcement of regulations that are inappropriate for a particular firm in return for extralegal efforts on the part of that firm to work toward the policy objective—in OSHA's case, to reduce industrial injury and illness rates.

A strategy that could induce cooperation would reduce the basic inefficiencies associated with regulatory standards[1] and therefore be more effective than the basic deterrence strategy that simply enforces by the book (Bardach and Kagan 1982). To understand this cooperative strategy one needs to analyze the enforcement dilemma that I have described in detail elsewhere (Scholz 1984a and 1984b). Only a summary of the model will be presented here.

Figure 1 illustrates the enforcement dilemma in which firms can choose either

Figure 1. Payoffs for the Enforcement Dilemma

		Agency's Choice	
		Flexible Enforcement	Maximal Enforcement
Firm's Choice	Flexible Compliance	3,3 Voluntary Compliance Equilibrium	0,5 Harassment
	Minimal Compliance	5,0 Capture	2,2 Deterrence Equilibrium

Note: The numeric entries represent the utility to firm (listed first) and agency for each set of choices. To emphasize the symmetry of the choice situation, the worst case for the firm is used as the base point (0), so that the firm's utility is positive even though costs, rather than benefits, are associated with each outcome for the firm. Any payoffs consistent with the usual restrictions on prisoner's dilemma payoffs ($t > r > p > s$ and $2r > t + s$ for each player) could be substituted in the example.

minimal compliance or flexible compliance, and the agency can choose either maximal enforcement or flexible enforcement. The utility that firm and agency receive for each possible combination of choices in a given period are presented in the designated cells, with the firm's payoff given first.

In the classical deterrence equilibrium, the firm chooses *minimal compliance,* a level of compliance that minimizes the firm's expected costs of compliance, expected penalties, and legal costs net of any benefits gained by the firm from improved safety. The agency chooses *maximal enforcement* that imposes penalties for all detected violations and requires all violations to be abated regardless of cost or suitability for the firm's particular safety problems.

The voluntary compliance equilibrium is preferred over the deterrence equilibrium by both firm and agency. In this equilibrium, the agency reduces its monitoring and prosecution costs with *flexible enforcement,* overlooking minor technical violations in recognition of the firm's extralegal safety efforts to reduce greater hazards not directly addressed in regulations (Bardach and Kagan 1982; Sigler and Murphy 1988). Firms choose *flexible compliance,* a level of compliance that produced greater workplace safety levels than minimal compliance associated with the deterrence equilibrium. Such flexibility would allow a firm to tackle its worst health and safety hazards with the most efficient methods available rather than spending money to comply with safety standards that are less important and inefficient in the firm's particular situation. The voluntary compliance outcome provides both firm and agency with the mutual rewards of flexible compliance combined with flexible enforcement.

While firm and agency both prefer the voluntary compliance outcome to the deterrence outcome, both would be even better off in the short run if they took advantage of the other's flexibility. If the firm chooses minimal compliance with an agency choosing flexible enforcement, the firm may avoid most or all compliance costs and produce little safety improvement desired by the agency. Similarly, if the agency chooses maximal enforcement with a firm choosing flexible compliance, the firm loses more than full compliance costs and the agency gains greater safety than full compliance alone would bring. The first outcome is associated with the social costs of capture by regulated firms, the second with the social costs of harassment by an overzealous agency. Both outcomes are less efficient, and therefore less socially desirable, than voluntary compliance; yet both present temptation payoffs attractive to either firm or agency.

If the agency knew the firm's choice prior to committing itself, it could simply respond with flexible enforcement when the firm chose flexible compliance. However, flexible enforcement saves monitoring costs by reducing the frequency and intrusiveness of inspections. Effectively, this means that the agency's commitment to flexible enforcement can only be based on past rather than current behavior, since firms choosing minimal compliance will be able to slip through the looser monitoring associated with flexible enforcement. Similarly, the firm must decide its level of compliance prior to knowing what the next inspector from the agency will do. The difficulty in maintaining voluntary compliance is therefore similar to the problem of maintaining the cooperative solution in the prisoner's dilemma, where choices are made simultaneously. Fortunately, the enforcement dilemma is comparable to a repeated prisoner's dilemma, for which cooperative outcomes are achievable.

Extending Axelrod's analysis (1984) of cooperation under repeated play of the prisoner's dilemma, I demonstrated that the socially desirable voluntary compliance equilibrium can be maintained if (1) the agency pursues a cooperative strategy with the vengeful and forgiving characteristic of Axelrod's tit-for-tat strategy, (2) firms are sufficiently concerned with future encounters with the agency to resist the short-term temptation to avoid all compliance costs, and (3) enforcement and compliance technologies in the regulatory environment produce a prisoner's dilemma payoff matrix. Whenever these three conditions hold, formal analysis demonstrates that firms will obtain the highest payoff possible by always choosing flexible compliance (Scholz 1984a).

Several analysts have observed cooperative-type enforcement strategies in regulatory settings and argued that they are more effective than strategies that proceed by the book (Bardach and Kagan 1982; Kagan 1978; Kagan and Scholz 1984; Kelman 1982; Muir 1977; Nonet and Selznick 1978; Shover, Clelland, and Lynxwiler 1983). On the other hand, some critics argue that such strategies undermine the moral force of law by officially tolerating violations and therefore weaken enforcement (Silbey 1984). Others have argued that tit-for-tat strategies are less robust in the presence of information uncertainty (Bendor 1987), implying that cooperative strategies may be less effective if the agency is uncertain about the compliance status of the firm. The claim of effectiveness needs to be tested empirically, which requires that the cooperative strategy must be differentiated from the baseline strategy I will refer to as the deterrence strategy.

The baseline deterrence strategy always chooses maximal enforcement, which means that all firms face the same probability of being caught and punished in each round. The firm's best response is therefore minimal compliance. The cooperative strategy, on the other hand, treats firms differently based on their past behavior. As with tit-for-tat, maximal enforcement is used against firms that have established a record of minimal compliance in the past, and flexible enforcement is used against firms with an established record of flexible compliance. By being vengeful, this strategy discourages minimal compliance. By being forgiving, it encourages firms to move from minimal to flexible compliance.[2] As a result, society gains the advantages associated with the voluntary cooperative equilibrium; firm and agency avoid costly legalistic battles; and enforcement is focused on the real problems in each firm rather than technical violations of possibly inefficient standards.

But how can the cooperative strategy

be recognized empirically? Educational and cooperative gestures by the agency do not ensure the combination of vengefulness and forgivingness of a tit-for-tat strategy (Braithwaite 1985; Graboski and Braithwaite 1986). As previously noted, the cooperative strategy concentrates more enforcement activities on the small set of firms with a record of minimal compliance and on more serious, rather than technical, violations. The greater the concentration of enforcement, the stronger the cooperative component in an agency's enforcement strategy. The empirical study creates a cooperation index by summing two measures of concentration that could be obtained from OSHA: the percentage of all citations that included serious violations, and the percentage of all penalties imposed for serious violations.[3] The Occupational Safety and Health Administration classifies a violation as serious if the violation substantially increases the possibility that an injury will occur.

The hypothesis to be tested is that for a given level of enforcement, OSHA jurisdictions with a higher index of cooperation will be more effective in reducing injury rates. In other words, the same basic enforcement actions of inspections, citations, and penalties will have a greater effect on injury rates when deployed with the cooperative strategy than with the baseline enforcement strategy. To control for the level of enforcement, the empirical study uses as a stringency index the sum of three highly correlated and annual measures of enforcement: inspections, serious citations, and penalties per worker in manufacturing. Since there is no clear theoretical guide about the relative weight each enforcement measure should contribute to the stringency index, the standardized form of each measure is used to produce equal contributions to the variance of the stringency measure.

If cooperative enforcement is such an effective strategy for the enforcement dilemma, why isn't it universally employed? To answer this question, we need to move from the narrow enforcement game to the political games that restrict the agency's choice of effective strategies.

Political Interests and Cooperative Enforcement

Normally, interest group theory would predict that representatives of groups enjoying the benefits of regulation would be expected to press for higher levels of enforcement outputs *and* the most effective use of these outputs. Conversely, representatives of groups subject to enforcement actions would presumably seek less enforcement and less effectiveness. Empirical research has generally confirmed the expected responsiveness of enforcement outputs to the partisanship of presidents, congressional committees, congressional delegations, and to interest group strength. The empirical study will also test for these hypothesized effects on enforcement outputs.

Although interest group theory is based on the desired outcomes a group receives rather than the government outputs they control, little theoretical or empirical work has attempted to connect the control of outputs with the effectiveness of these outputs in achieving a group's desired outcomes. In fact, the particular nature of cooperative enforcement alters the simple interest equation in several ways that appear perverse from the straightforward interpretation of interest group theory.

The most obvious change arises because both policy beneficiaries and opponents can gain from cooperative enforcement strategies. Consequently, regulated firms should favor cooperative enforcement even while seeking the lowest possible level of enforcement activity. The occupational safety and health policy arena possesses several traits that Quirk (1989) argues should promote such cooperation—mutual gains from cooperation for the two primary well-organized factions: business and labor.

On the other hand, regulatory beneficiaries and their representatives may *not* favor cooperative enforcement despite its effectiveness. As noted, the problem for beneficiaries arises over their ability to control the bureaucracy. The two key features of the cooperative strategy—flexible enforcement and the differential treatment of firms—both require more administrative discretion than the baseline deterrence strategy. Discretion in turn creates a different set of political dilemmas for beneficiaries.

Regulatory Beneficiaries and the Principal-Agent Game

For regulatory beneficiaries and their representatives in the policy arena, the problem of controlling agency enforcement action can be represented by the principal-agent model (Mitnick 1980; Moe 1984). The political principal desires the bureaucratic agent to perform certain tasks, and must devise some incentive scheme to get the self-interested agent to perform as desired. The problem for the principal stems from asymmetric information, represented in different games as lack of knowledge about the agent's preferences and abilities, difficulties in monitoring the agent's behavior, and uncertainty about the impact of the agent on the task (Rasmusen 1989).

Such uncertainties are commonplace for political principals, but they are exacerbated by the discretionary requirements of the cooperative strategy. Inspectors must have the discretion to overlook minor violations and treat some firms less stringently than others. If inspectors are positively oriented toward policy goals and have the ability to make the tradeoffs appropriate for flexible compliance and to recognize flexible compliance in firms, beneficiaries could obtain the benefits of cooperation by providing the required level of discretion. On the other hand, if the agents are negatively oriented or incapable, discretion is likely to increase the likelihood that enforcement will be captured by business interests. Once discretion is provided, the policy decision locus is shifted more fully from the legislative to the administrative arena in which business is likely to have greater influence. Discretion increases business incentives to influence the "street-level" inspectors at the same time it decreases the ability of the national office and oversight agencies to monitor and control the behavior of inspectors (Scholz 1984b).

Figure 2 illustrates the ordering of payoffs to regulatory beneficiaries in the resultant principal-agent game. If beneficiaries provide the necessary discretion to pursue the cooperative strategy, they will receive either the highest or lowest payoff possible (three or zero, respectively). If they minimize discretion to the lesser requirements of the deterrence equilibrium, they will receive at best the more modest payoff of the deterrence equilibrium (two). But they will also avoid the worst case if the bureaucracy is incapable or unsupportive, since the greater capacity to control and monitor the deterrence strategy would help minimize the problem of lax enforcement. The agency payoffs are not given in Figure 2 because beneficiaries must choose without knowing for certain what the agency's payoffs may be. Furthermore, the choice facing beneficiaries is a one-shot, rather than a repeated, game because cooperative enforcement requires a long-term commitment in order to develop the benefits of cooperation (Scholz 1984a).

Given the uncertainty about how supportive the enforcement agency will be of policy goals, beneficiaries may feel the broader discretion required for cooperative enforcement is too risky. For exam-

Figure 2. Payoffs for the Principal-Agent Game

		Agent's Choice (Bureaucracy)	
		Favor Policy Goal	Disfavor Policy Goal
Principal's Choice (Beneficiaries)	Necessary Discretion	3,? Voluntary Compliance Equilibrium	0,? Capture
	Minimal Discretion	2,? Deterrence Equilibrium	1,? Lax Enforcement

Note: The numeric entries represent the utility payoff to beneficiaries, taken from Figure 1 for all but the outcome labeled *lax enforcement.* The agency payoffs are not given in Figure 2 because beneficiaries must choose without knowing for certain what the bureaucrat's payoffs may be.

ple, if beneficiaries have to make a single choice and if they feel that the bureaucracy is more likely to be negatively than positively oriented toward their interests, their best strategy in Figure 2 would be to opt for minimal discretion. Since cooperative enforcement most likely requires several years to develop into an efficient strategy (Scholz 1984b), beneficiaries in a given enforcement arena must be willing to make a long-term commitment to providing sufficient discretion in order to gain the benefits of cooperation.

The risks associated with cooperative enforcement were particularly salient in the polarized political environments of the 1970s that created OSHA and other regulatory agencies (McCaffrey 1982; Mendeloff 1979; Noble 1986). The provisions for automatic penalties, limited prosecutorial discretion, and citizen initiatives of enforcement written into the enforcement sections of regulatory statutes signaled a fear of agency capture and an attempt to ensure a stringent, noncooperative style of enforcement (Bardach and Kagan 1982). Reflecting this environment, OSHA in particular earned a reputation in the early years as an unbending, legalistic enforcer of the law, the very antithesis of a cooperative enforcement agency. Differing priorities introduced under the Carter and Reagan administrations, on the other hand, have increased OSHA's interest in and ability to pursue more cooperative strategies (thereby providing the variance in programs at the state level essential for this study).

The enforcement hypothesis suggested by this analysis reverses the initial interest group assumption. Policy beneficiaries in contentious political environments will oppose the more effective cooperative enforcement, while regulated interests will support it. In the empirical study I expect to find that labor involvement will have a strong positive relationship with enforcement stringency, but a negative relationship with cooperative enforcement. Business strength, on the other hand, will have a negative relationship with enforcement stringency, but a positive relationship with cooperation.

The variable measuring labor involvement in a given enforcement arena calculates the complaints per worker filed with OSHA (Scholz and Wei 1986), since this measures the direct activity of labor relative to OSHA enforcement. The proxy measure for business strength in the reported results is the value added in the state's manufacturing sector, since this represents the resources available to business for influencing OSHA enforcement.

In addition, the number of workers, the number of firms, and the value added per firm in manufacturing were also included in analyses and will be discussed when their inclusion changes the analytic results.

I also test the corollary that Democrats will be less associated with cooperative enforcement than Republicans, assuming that Democrats are most likely to represent labor interests and Republicans to represent business interests. On the state level, the variable representing governor's party equals one for Democratic governors and zero for Republicans. The variable for state legislature measures the percentage of Democrats elected to the combined state legislature. On the federal level where ideological scores are available, the variable representing the state's congressional contingent measures the mean difference between trade union (Committee on Political Education) and business (National Association of Manufacturers) ratings for the state's representatives, with higher scores indicating greater support for labor.

A plausible alternative hypothesis is that the electoral system induces representatives to be more favorably oriented to effective enforcement than are the interest groups they represent. First, cooperative enforcement may provide an electoral advantage to the extent that it reduces hostility from regulated firms (Shover, Clelland, and Lynxwiler 1983) without reducing the level of enforcement desired by labor. Second, legislators in contentious political arenas may prefer to delegate more discretion to the enforcement agency, but simultaneously increase their overseeing of agency activities (McCubbins 1985). Legislators may thereby direct business hostility toward the enforcement agency and appease labor by exposing misuse of delegated authority if things go wrong. Finally, elected officials (at least at the party leadership level) might be more concerned with the efficient use of government resources, at least to the extent that budgetary resources saved through cooperative enforcement could be used elsewhere to gain the support of other groups.

In short, Democrats have electoral reasons to support cooperative enforcement that do not apply to labor interests. In Figure 2, for example, if the above advantages added one unit to the payoffs Democrats received for supporting discretion, the resultant payoffs (four and one) would be equal to, or greater than, the payoffs for not supporting discretion (two and one) regardless of the agency's choice. The discretion alternative would weakly dominate. Empirically, this hypothesis would be supported by a finding that labor is negatively related to the level of cooperative enforcement while Democrats who represent them are less negatively related.

Presidential policies during the period of study provide an example of electoral incentives. Despite the difference in parties, both the Carter and Reagan administrations attempted to reduce the number of nonserious citations and small penalties imposed under OSHA, which essentially allowed inspectors to focus more on serious violations most likely to cause injuries. Under Carter, OSHA explicitly concentrated on the serious safety problems in a manner consistent with cooperative enforcement. Under Reagan, the emphasis was more on a reduction in penalties, particularly during the early period of the administration (Scholz and Wei 1986; Sigler and Murphy 1988).

The influence of presidential policies can be analyzed indirectly by comparing enforcement by state and federal agencies, since presidential influence is more direct on the federal agency than on the state agencies that enforce federal OSHA standards in states with approved programs. Consequently, a variable equal to one for states with federal OSHA enforcement and zero for states with state agency enforcement represents this combination of federal and presidential influence in the empirical study. Obviously, this measure reflects other factors that differ between state and federal enforcement (Scholz and Wei 1986). It also cannot distinguish between the Carter and Reagan administrations because of the cross-sectional research design. If federal enforcement is found to be significantly more cooperative despite these sources of noise, the active policy under Carter and Reagan of encouraging cooperation would appear to be the most likely explanation for the difference.

Regulatory Beneficiaries and the Third-Party Participation Game

A second nested game that reverses predictions from the simple interest group calculus occurs when interest groups participate directly in the enforcement process, rather than indirectly through the principal-agent control game. Direct participation may transform the basic payoffs of the enforcement agency in the narrow enforcement game. In the case of OSHA, I argue that existing provisions for direct labor participation in OSHA's enforcement process limit the agency's ability to pursue the cooperative strategy.

As a consequence, some characteristics of the free-rider problem limit enforcement effectiveness. Labor as a whole would benefit from the added effectiveness of cooperative enforcement. But laborers in a given plant face a short-run temptation to insist on maximal enforcement to reduce as many safety risks as possible while the inspector is in the plant. Unlike the agency, laborers have little control over when the inspector will return, particularly since labor complaints no longer require OSHA to initiate a full inspection. As in the principal-agent game, control problems lead to uncertainty over long-term benefits of the cooperative strategy.

Even if the plant opted for flexible compliance in the previous period, workers could insist on maximal enforcement when the inspector arrived. If the agency is always forced to use maximal enforcement for firms with active worker participation, these firms are best off choosing minimal compliance. Consequently, the more that workers at individual plants insist on maximal enforcement, the lower the overall benefits to labor that could be gained from cooperative enforcement.

Both the principal-agent and participation games predict that labor participation will decrease the extent of cooperative enforcement. A distinguishing test applicable only for the labor participation game hypothesis is provided by the prediction that labor participation will directly reduce the effectiveness of enforcement by minimizing benefits from any given level of cooperative enforcement.

The Enforcement Environment

Public administration studies of effectiveness would generally focus on the nature of an agency's tasks and the task environment rather than political factors. The task environment is likely to influence the level of cooperation (Scholz 1984a) and enforcement (Scholz and Wei 1986). Consequently, four task variables have been included in the study to control for possible spurious relationships as well as to estimate the relative importance of task and political factors in influencing enforcement levels, styles, and effectiveness.

The task variables will only be discussed briefly, since they are not of primary interest. The first variable—resources for safety—measures the value added per employee in the manufacturing sector. Firms that generate more value per worker are more likely to have the resources to respond to OSHA enforcement; therefore, states with resource-rich firms are likely to exhibit more effective enforcement. Worker injury rates measure the seriousness of the problem facing OSHA in the state. High rates should presumably increase concern with effectiveness and lead to higher levels of enforcement and cooperation.

High unemployment, on the other hand, emphasizes economic rather than safety concerns and tends to reduce levels of enforcement and concern with effectiveness. High per capita income in the state indicates greater wealth, which could increase resources available to the state for enforcement. High income may also increase the relative importance of safety compared to more basic economic concerns with employment and therefore increase both cooperation and the level of enforcement.

Data and Method of Analysis

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration provides one of the better opportunities to analyze the relationship between political interests and enforcement effectiveness, since measures of political interests, enforcement actions, and the desired outcomes (worker injury rates) are available. Considerable evidence indicates that political influences cause significant variation in OSHA enforcement activities at the state and local level (Marlow 1981; Marvel 1982; Scholz, Twombly, and Headrick 1988; Scholz and Wei 1986; Thompson and Scicchitano 1985). Other evidence indicates that OSHA enforcement has small but significant impacts on injury rates: a 10% increase in enforcement is estimated to reduce injury rates between 2% (Viscusi 1986) and 1.5% (Scholz and Gray 1990), depending on assumptions about impacts on safety. While most studies have found significant impacts (Cook and Gautschi 1981; Smith 1979; Viscusi 1979), some have found none (Bartel and Thomas 1985; McCaffrey 1983). (See Scholz and Gray 1990 for a review.) Studies of enforcement effectiveness have not, however, looked at differences in effectiveness across jurisdictions that may occur because of different political environments.

The following analysis combines these two research traditions to illustrate the impact of states' political environments on the effectiveness of OSHA enforcement. The state provides an appropriate unit of analysis for the "ecology" of cooperative enforcement (Scholz 1984a) for two reasons. First, the benefits of encouraging the evolution of cooperation accrue throughout the cooperative agency's jurisdiction and are not as readily detected by using individual firms as a unit of analysis. Benefits also accrue over a relatively long period of time, requiring an appropriately long period of observation for each state. Second, the political and enforcement jurisdictions correspond most closely at the state level. Of equal importance, states provide a convenient unit of analysis because data are available for 34 states—complete injury rate data are not available for the remaining 16 states because of sampling limitations in the Bureau of Labor Statistics annual survey. Data limitations unfortunately limit the conclusiveness of the analysis but provide the best available preliminary test of the hypothesized relationships between interests and enforcement effectiveness.

In the first stage of this analysis, I estimated the effectiveness of enforcement actions in reducing industrial injury rates for each of the 34 states. Independent estimates for the effectiveness of inspections, citations, and penalties in each state were combined to form an effectiveness score for the state. The mean of all political and task variables for the same period were calculated for each state and combined in a second data set with the effectiveness scores. The primary analysis then used this cross-sectional data set with 34 state observations to analyze the direct and indirect impacts of political and task variables on effectiveness.

Stage 1: Effectiveness Estimates

Effectiveness scores were calculated from a data set of annual observations from 1976 to 1985 for the 34 states in the study. Enforcement measures included the annual number of inspections, serious citations, and penalties per worker in manufacturing, which were provided by OSHA. The measure of workplace injuries—lost workday injury and illness incidence per worker—was gathered from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' annual survey, the source of data for most OSHA evaluation studies.

I first used the following equation to estimate enforcement effectiveness:

$$\text{injury}_{ti} = \beta_1\text{unemployment}_{ti} + \beta_{2i}\text{enforcement}_{t-1,i} + e_{ti},$$

where t represents the year and i the state of the observation. Thus, a negative coefficient β_{2i} indicates effective enforcement in state i, since higher levels of enforcement are associated with lower injury rates.

This equation reflects the assumption about lagged effects found in other estimations of OSHA enforcement effectiveness (Bartel and Thomas 1985; Scholz and Gray 1990; Viscusi 1986),[4] but differs in three ways: (1) the state, rather than industry, provides the unit for aggregation; (2) enforcement coefficients are estimated independently for each state unit; and (3) only unemployment, the most robustly significant variable from other studies, is included as a control for spurious relationships. The first two differences reflect the focus on state enforcement arenas, and the third reflects the small number of data points (10 per state) available for analysis. Since injury data for individual firms or even for industries within each state are not available, more powerful analytic approaches and more extensive sets of control variables could not be employed.

Two data transformations were used to correct for diagnosed regression problems. First, the data was centered (mean of each variable set to zero in each state) to remove state differences in mean levels of injury rates and in reporting standards used in the Bureau of Labor Statistics survey. No intercept term was included in the equation because the data was centered. Second, the data was adjusted to correct for first-order autocorrelation that was diagnosed by a Durbin–Watson test. Estimation was done independently for inspections, citations, and penalties to minimize problems of collinearity among the enforcement variables.

The analysis found negative coefficients in 4 states for penalties, in 11 states for inspections, and in all states for serious citations.[5] To create a single scale of effectiveness, each state was assigned a rank of zero if only the coefficient for citations was negative, one if inspections was negative as well, and two if all three were negative. This scale was chosen instead of a composite index based on the coefficient estimates in order to avoid attributing too much significance to the numerical values of the estimates, which were based on only 10 available time periods for each state. The three sets of coefficients were moderately correlated; and the scores were hierarchically consistent in that all 4 states with negative penalty coefficients also had negative coefficients for inspections and all 11 states with negative inspection coefficients also had negative coefficients for citations.

Stage 2: Estimating Impacts on Enforcement Effectiveness and the Levels of Cooperation and Enforcement

The main analysis first examines the impacts of enforcement characteristics,

Table 1. Probit Estimation of Factors Influencing Enforcement Effectiveness

Independent Variable	Standardized Coefficient[a]	Standard Error	t-ratio
Enforcement characteristics			
Cooperation level	1.64*	.55	2.96
Enforcement level	1.66*	.83	1.99
Interest groups			
Labor involvement	-1.25*	.68	-1.84
Elected officials			
Presidential/federal	-.54	.42	-1.29
Party of governor	.78*	.33	2.35
Enforcement environment			
Resources for safety	.54*	.30	1.82
Injury rates	.11	.35	.31
Unemployment	.42	.26	1.57
Threshold	2.11	.64	3.28

Note: The table reports ordered probit coefficients calculated for state effectiveness scores, the three-category dependent variable. The model predicted 74% of the cases correctly, which represents a 9% improvement over a prediction based on the modal category containing 68% of the 34 cases. The insignificant terms not included in the final analysis (business strength, Congress, state legislature, and income) were not significant in any (unreported) alternative models, and their inclusion did not affect the significance of variables reported in this table.

[a] The "standardized" coefficients are ordinary probit coefficients calculated using standardized independent variables.

*$p < .05$, one-tailed test.

political influences, and the task environment on the effectiveness scores calculated from stage 1. Ordered probit results are reported for effectiveness scores in Table 1, since the dependent variable is categorical with a highly skewed distribution. Next, I analyze the indirect effects of political and task variables on effectiveness that operate through their impact on enforcement characteristics. Standard ordinary least squares regression results are reported in Tables 2 and 3, since the levels of cooperation and enforcement are continuous variables. Standardized coefficients are presented for ordinary least squares estimations to facilitate comparisons of the relative impact of independent variables. In the case of the probit analysis, the reported "standardized coefficients" are calculated by standardizing the continuous independent variables prior to estimation.

The combination of small sample size and multicollinearity resulted in significant equations with insignificant coefficients when all relevant independent variables were included in the equations. Limiting the equation to six to eight independent variables at a time eliminated this problem. Consequently, alternative limited models with different combinations of independent variables have been tested systematically, and only variables that were significant in at least some combination were included in the reported estimations. With the few exceptions noted in the following discussion, the level of significance and relative magnitudes of the significant coefficients presented in the tables did not vary across the

Table 2. Ordinary Least Squares Estimation of Factors Influencing Level of Cooperation

Independent Variable	Standardized Coefficient	Standard Error	*t*-ratio
Interest groups			
Labor involvement	−.13	.18	−.75
Business strength	−.03	.13	−.22
Elected officials			
Congress	−.30*	.13	−2.25
President/federal	.68*	.13	5.45
Enforcement environment			
Injury rates	−.01	.18	−.02
Unemployment	.04	.13	.27

Note: Adjusted $r^2 = .53$; N = 34. The insignificant terms not included in the final analysis (party of governor, state legislature, income, resources for safety) were not significant in any (unreported) alternative models, and their inclusion did not affect the significance of variables reported in this table.

*$p < .01$.

alternative models limited to eight variables, demonstrating the robustness of reported estimates with respect to different variable specifications of the model.

Results

Cooperative Enforcement Increases Enforcement Effectiveness

The significant, positive coefficient for the level of cooperation reported in Table 1 supports the critical hypothesis that cooperation does increase effectiveness. Despite the potential difficulties that could minimize the effectiveness of collective enforcement, states with more concentrated enforcement associated with the cooperative enforcement strategy are more likely to have higher effectiveness scores when the level of enforcement is controlled. This finding is crucial for the rest of the analysis, since it implies that beneficiaries should support cooperative enforcement according to the simple calculus of interests.

The significant coefficient for the level of enforcement indicates that the overall stringency of an agency's enforcement also influences effectiveness. When the level of enforcement is low, as in "captured" enforcement agencies, the enforcement actions that do take place are apparently less effective in changing business behavior. Since the level of enforcement determines the minimal cooperative level of compliance, there may be a minimal level of stringency below which cooperation would no longer contribute to effectiveness.

The significant influence of both cooperation and enforcement level suggests a major weakness in current evaluations of enforcement effectiveness, which do not account for differences in enforcement strategies. Most studies have considered only the *average* effectiveness across all local enforcement arenas. The evidence in Table 1 suggests that the impact of inspections, citations, and penalties change with the concentration and overall level of activities in the enforcement arena.

Third-Party Participation and Enforcement Effectiveness

Table 1 also confirms the negative impact of labor involvement on effective-

Table 3. Ordinary Least Squares Estimation of Factors Influencing Level of Enforcement

Independent Variable	Standardized Coefficient	Standard Error	*t*-ratio
Interest groups			
Labor involvement	.75*	.12	6.17
Business strength	−.22*	.09	−2.45
Elected officials			
Congress	.21*	.09	2.28
President/federal	−.20*	.09	−2.38
Enforcement environment			
Injury rates	.05	.12	.39
Unemployment	−.02	.09	−.18

Note: Adjusted $r^2 = .78$; N = 34. The insignificant terms not included in the final analysis (party of governor, state legislature, income, resources for safety) were not significant in any (unreported) alternative models, and their inclusion did not affect the significance of variables reported in this table.

$^*p < .01$.

ness, as predicted in the third-party participation game. Labor involvement is significant, and the magnitude of impact indicated by the "standardized" coefficient is only slightly below the enforcement characteristics in importance. Note that this estimation tests only the direct influence of labor on effectiveness relevant to the third-party hypothesis. Labor does exert a positive influence on effectiveness through its influence on the level of enforcement, as will be discussed later. This indirect effect is eliminated from the estimation in Table 1 by the inclusion of level of enforcement, which also controls for possible spurious effects due to the potential impact of enforcement levels on labor involvement.[6]

The other variables in Table 1 were included primarily as controls but provide further insight into the factors affecting enforcement effectiveness. Among the other political variables, only the party of the governor had significant impact on effectiveness. Democratic governors were associated with higher effectiveness even after controlling for enforcement characteristics that they might influence. This direct effect apparently arises through the governor's influence on the behavior of regulated firms in their electoral districts (Scholz, Twombly, and Headrick 1988). By encouraging firms to either comply or resist agency enforcement actions, by actively working with trade and business organizations to cooperate or confront, and by either ridiculing enforcement actions or endorsing them and condemning noncompliers publicly, elected officials may influence firm responses to the cooperative strategy. To the extent that Democrats have a greater incentive to encourage cooperative responses from firms, their direct participation in enforcement should enhance enforcement effectiveness for a given level of cooperation and stringency. The lack of significance for other elected officials suggests that administrative controls over state agencies provide the governor with greater persuasive powers over state business than is possessed by federal or state legislators. The remaining control variables representing the enforcement environment had less impact on effectiveness. Only resources for safety (value added per worker) was significant, confirming the importance of the resources available to invest in safety once enforcement makes such investments worthwhile (Scholz and Gray 1990).

Principal-Agent Controls and the Level of Cooperation

The analysis of factors influencing the level of cooperation in Table 2 is consistent with the hypothesis that beneficiaries do not support the most efficient enforcement strategy. Both labor involvement and a liberal congressional constituency are *negatively* related to the level of cooperation, although only the coefficient for Congress is significant.

Business strength was not significantly related to cooperation, even though business benefits from the cost-saving aspects of cooperation and does not face labor's problem of controlling agency behavior. On the other hand, probusiness congressional representatives were associated with higher levels of enforcement. For both business and labor, representatives had more significant influence on the level of cooperation than the groups they represent. Furthermore, that influence was opposite what a simple interest calculus would suggest. Business representatives supported the more efficient enforcement strategy, while labor representatives opposed it.

The significance of Congress and insignificance of interest groups is inconsistent with the alternative hypothesis that elected officials would be more concerned with efficiency and more willing to delegate the required authority to agencies. On the contrary, it appears that liberal congressional representatives were even less inclined to support cooperative enforcement than the labor interests they represent. Democratic representatives consistently reflected the position of leaders such as Gaydos on the Labor Committee and Lantos on Government Operations, who have constantly prodded OSHA to enforce more vigorously, not more flexibly. As Quirk (1989) noted, interest group leaders and representatives find that confrontational rather than cooperative politics have advantages for organizational and coalitional maintenance. The contentious politics of business-labor relations appears to be a zero-sum game in which representatives must choose one side or the other; attempting to appease one side through cooperation reduces the electoral support of the other.

Presidential influence, as represented by the states with federal enforcement, significantly increased the likelihood of cooperation. The emphasis of the Carter and Reagan administrations on the most serious compliance problems was reflected in the significant positive impact of presidential administration on the level of cooperative enforcement (see Table 2). While this explanation of the observed presidential influence is consistent with the clear policy intent of the Carter and Reagan administrations, it should be noted that structural differences between federal and state enforcement provide a competing conjecture consistent with observed results.[7]

Finally, other political variables, as well as the task variables included to control for differences in enforcement environments, had considerably less influence than Congress or the presidential administration. Neither state officials nor task variables were significantly related to the level of cooperation, although the limited power of the research design would caution against concluding that only federal officials influenced the choice of enforcement strategy.

Enforcement Outputs Reflect the Simple Interest Calculus

Finally, Table 3 confirms the conventional wisdom that interest groups and their representatives affect enforcement outputs as expected from a straightforward application of interest group theory. Labor and their Democratic congressional representatives significantly increase the level of enforcement, while business and their Republican representatives decrease them. The results are reported primarily to confirm that the design of this study generally replicates prior studies when used for the more common analysis relating interests to policy outputs (as opposed to effectiveness).

The presidential-federal administration decreased the level of enforcement in states with federal enforcement. This reflected two emphases in presidential policies that have been confirmed elsewhere. First, both the Carter and Reagan administrations reduced the number of minor violations cited by OSHA (Centaur Associates 1985; Noble 1986). Second, the Reagan emphasis on minimizing overall citations and penalties had a greater impact on federal states than Carter's more neutral emphasis on shifting citations from minor to serious violations (Scholz and Wei 1986).

The other political variables and task variables included to control for differences in enforcement environments were not significant. As noted previously, the aggregated analysis, small sample size, and measurement problems associated with the research design limit the ability of the study to detect more subtle relationships. For example, less aggregated analysis of similar data (Scholz and Wei 1986) found significant influences of the party of the governor, injury rates, and unemployment on some enforcement measures. In short, only the most robust relationships were likely to pass significance tests, so that the lack of significance of state officials and task variables should not lead to the conclusion that they had no influence on enforcement.

As noted, the positive impact of labor involvement on enforcement levels might offset the two previously discussed negative impacts of labor involvement on effectiveness, since enforcement level has a significant influence on effectiveness. A crude approximation of the combined impact of labor involvement on effectiveness can be obtained by multiplying the coefficients for labor's impact on cooperation (Table 2) and on enforcement levels (Table 3) by the probit coefficients for the respective impacts of these levels on effectiveness (Table 1). The positive impact through higher levels of enforcement (.75 × 1.66 = 1.24) does not fully counterbalance the negative impact through the third-party participation problem (the direct effect of −1.25). Applying the same method to representatives, the positive impact of Democratic congressional representation through the level of enforcement (.21 × 1.66 = .35) does not counterbalance the negative impact through cooperation due to the principal-agent problem (−.30 × 1.64 = −.49). On the other hand, the positive direct impact of Democratic governors on effectiveness more than compensates for this difference. Furthermore, the level of enforcement has a direct impact on injury rates, as analyzed in the first stage, apart from the impact on effectiveness. In short, the main point is *not* that the net labor influence on enforcement perversely harms labor's own interests but that their influence *substantially reduces* the *potential* effectiveness of enforcement. The primary reason for this loss in effectiveness stems from the effectiveness-control trade-off imposed by the cooperative enforcement strategy.

Summary and Conclusion

Interests are not always as clear as applications of interest group theory suggest, particularly when we look into the intricacies of effective policy implementation. This study has investigated the seemingly perverse impact of policy beneficiaries on the effectiveness of regulatory enforcement. An analysis of OSHA enforcement confirmed that labor interests and their liberal representatives significantly increased state-level enforcement activities, as interest group theory would predict. However, these same interests were also found to reduce enforcement effectiveness, thereby decreasing the potential reduction in injuries that could have been obtained for the given level of enforcement activities.

I have argued that beneficiaries may ironically oppose effective implementation strategies primarily because of the control problems accompanying these strategies. A cooperative enforcement strategy that concentrated on more serious violations and on chronic noncompliers was shown to enhance the effectiveness of enforcement actions as compared with the classical deterrence strategy that treated firms randomly.

But the cooperative strategy required greater administrative discretion and trust in the enforcement agency, which led to the effectiveness-control trade-offs clarified by two relevant policy control games. In the principal-agent game, the potential gain to beneficiaries from granting necessary discretion to the enforcement agency may be offset by a greater risk that the agency will be captured by business interests. Thus, liberal congressional representatives, the political principals representing labor, were negatively associated with state-level cooperative enforcement. In the third-party participation game, workers in a given plant may prefer short-term gains to uncertain long-term gains that depend on future agency actions. Thus, labor participation in the enforcement process was negatively related to enforcement effectiveness.

The critical point is that problems of control should be recognized along with technical and political problems as an important cause of bureaucratic ineffectiveness. In the case of cooperative enforcement, the possibility of mitigating ineffectiveness depends on the perceptions of beneficiaries, not just on the political strength of business opposition or on the skills and interests of the bureaucracy. If beneficiaries always assume that their opponents will soon control the enforcement bureaucracy, as Moe (1989) argues, it appears unlikely that they would ever trust the bureaucracy with long-term discretion required for effective enforcement. But the problems Moe describes might be due to the combination of historical factors (primarily, the distrust of bureaucracy [Bardach and Kagan 1982] and the institutional split between Democratically controlled Congress and Republican presidents) during the creation of social regulatory agencies and not be a perennial feature of the U.S. political system.

If alternative institutional arrangements could be introduced to overcome the control problem by transforming the payoffs to beneficiaries, greater efficiency might be possible. For example, several analysts (e.g., Bardach and Kagan 1982) suggest that the principal-agent control problem could be mitigated through alternative management and monitoring techniques. Ayres and Braithwaite (1989) argue that the third-party participation game could be transformed into a tripartite game between the firm, its workers, and the enforcement agency that would provide plant-level labor participants with incentives to favor long-term cooperation.

One of my primary goals here has been to emphasize the advantages of simultaneously analyzing both interest group politics and the technical aspects of policy effectiveness. Interest group theory presumably focuses on policy outcomes and therefore cannot focus on bureaucratic outputs without considering how effectively these outputs are translated into the outcomes desired by interest groups. And public administration theory cannot realistically analyze policy effectiveness without considering the complex incentives of political, as well as administrative, actors to pursue policies that are "technically" most effective.

The last two decades of implementation research have uncovered a broad landscape of seemingly perverse incentives affecting administrative effectiveness. The nested game framework provides a means for systematically exploring the interaction between the narrow administrative game that emphasizes policy effectiveness and the broader political games that emphasize political interests. By systematically analyzing the structural sources of perverse incentives, political science may be able to produce a more orderly map of this terrain.

Appendix: Summary of Variables

All variables are calculated as the mean of annual state-level measures for the period 1976 to 1985 except where otherwise indicated.

Effectiveness Rank

Effectiveness Score. Categorical variable equal to zero for 23 states (68%) with negative coefficients only for serious citations; equal to one for 7 states (21%) with negative coefficients for inspections and citations; and equal to two for 4 states (12%) with negative coefficients for inspection, citations, and penalties.

Enforcement Characteristics

Cooperation Level. Mean of two standardized measures: (1) percentage of all violations that are serious and (2) percentage of all penalties imposed for serious violations.

Enforcement Level. Mean of sum of standardized measures for inspections, citations, and penalties.

Interest Groups

Labor Involvement. Complaint inspections per worker.

Business Strength. Number of firms in manufacturing sector. Several alternative proxies for business strength are analyzed and reported in the text, including value added in manufacturing sector, number of employees in manufacturing sector, and value added per firm. All are calculated as the mean from the 1977, 1982, and 1986 Census of Manufactures, from the U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Elected Officials

Presidential Administration. Dummy variable equaling one for states with federal enforcement and zero for states with state enforcement.

Congress. Mean difference between union (COPE) and business (NAM) rating for state delegation to Congress.

Party of Governor. Percentage of years in period for which governor was a Democrat.

State Legislature. Mean percentage of state legislators (in both houses) who were Democrats.

Enforcement Environment
(Control Variables)

Resources for Safety. Value added per employee in manufacturing.

Injury Rates. Lost workday injury and illness rates from annual Bureau of Labor Statistics survey.

Unemployment. Rate of unemployment.

Income. Per capita income.

Notes

I thank Kenneth Meier, Paul Quirk, Paul Sabatier, and Paul Teske for helpful comments on various stages of the manuscript. The research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant SES-8420920.

1. Economists might argue that even greater efficiency might result if regulatory standards were replaced by tax incentive schemes, such as an injury tax. It should be noted, however, that the enforce-

ment and collection of taxes impose comparable sets of difficulties and inefficiencies (Roth, Scholz, and Witte 1989).

2. There is a built-in compliance escalator in the dynamic process of converting minimal compliers to flexible compliers (Scholz 1984a). As firms switch to flexible compliance, the agency can focus its limited prosecutorial resources on a decreasing number of minimal compliers. This, in turn, increases the expected penalty for the noncompliers, which in turn can increase the standard of flexible compliance acceptable to the agency. It can be shown that there is an optimal flexible compliance standard that would provide the highest level of desired policy outcome for the lowest combination of compliance and monitoring-prosecutorial costs.

3. The measure of concentrated enforcement initially included the mean penalty per serious citation, but this component was dropped because it was more closely correlated to the level of enforcement variable than to the other measures of concentration. Other useful measures that would focus on the differential treatment of firms were not available in the aggregated data set.

4. The lag actually represents only a three-month difference, obtained because the enforcement data is for the government fiscal period (October–September) and other data is for the calendar year. Simultaneous effects of injury rates on enforcement variables are assumed not to cause an estimation problem despite this relatively short delay even though injury rates have been demonstrated to affect enforcement (Scholz and Wei 1986), since this effect was also lagged by the remaining nine-month difference between the fiscal and calendar year. The observed relationship does pose the possibility of correlation between the enforcement measure and the measure of injury rates in the previous period, but the correction for serial correlation used in the current analysis ensures that this would not in turn cause a correlation between enforcement and the error term associated with the current injury measure. If such correlation occurred, an instrumental variable approach would have been required to obtain unbiased estimates.

The selected method averages efficiency over the 10-year period and must assume that efficiency remains relatively constant over the period. This assumption is supported by Viscusi's (1986) analysis demonstrating that time periods representing changes in enforcement programs and in presidential administrations during the 1973–83 period showed no significant differences in enforcement effectiveness at the national level. In any case, data on injury rates for shorter time periods than one year are unavailable, so efficiency estimates for shorter periods within the 10 years of this study could not be calculated.

5. A separate analysis was used to check the comparability of this basic equation and data set with other studies of regulatory impact. In this analysis the equation was estimated with state coefficients constrained to be equal and with all enforcement variables in a single equation. The Parks Method estimates found that only inspections were close to having a significant impact on injuries—and only at the .10 level—while unemployment had a highly significant impact. Viscusi (1986) found similar results, while Bartel and Thomas (1985) concluded that no enforcement variable affected injury rates. The omission of several (mainly insignificant) control variables used in other studies did not appear to alter the results for our analysis. As noted in the text, the low significance level applies to *average* enforcement and does not indicate that enforcement is not significant in individual states.

6. The impact of labor should be strongest in states with the highest level of cooperation. As noted previously, the limited data set does not permit analysis of all such interactive effects. One could argue that labor involvement decreases effectiveness in other ways, but it is generally argued that greater activities in support of enforcement activities by labor should increase the effectiveness of deterrence (Bardach and Kagan 1982). A more plausible alternative explanation for the positive effect of labor could be that inspections resulting from complaints are less productive than inspections targeted by OSHA, so that more complaints will divert more resources, resulting in lower effectiveness. This argument has been made in particular by OSHA opponents who have suggested that labor uses complaints for non-safety-oriented reasons to punish employers or strengthen negotiating positions, thereby diverting OSHA's efforts from firms with greater health problems and reducing the impact of enforcement on injury rates. While this alternative explanation was supported by indirect findings in a U.S. General Accounting Office study (1979), a careful study by Smith (1986) failed to find significant differences between complaint-initiated and other types of inspections either before or after the 1980 policy change that required OSHA to respond only to formal complaints.

7. Since the variable measures only the difference between federal and state programs, a structural explanation for the greater stringency and lesser cooperation in state agencies is also plausible. Since cooperative enforcement requires more elaborate bureaucratic controls on discretion and more professionalized inspectors than does stringent enforcement (Bardach and Kagan 1982; Scholz 1984a, 1984b; Shover, Lynxwiler, and Clelland 1983), the greater informality and political sensitivity in state agencies may be less conducive to cooperation than the less permeable, more procedurally oriented federal agency. Agencies attempting cooperative enforcement with inadequate controls are politically vulnerable to attacks from both camps; firms subjected to concentrated enforcement may claim they

are being arbitrarily singled out for punishment, while advocates of more effective enforcement may claim that many noncompliers are being ignored. If this is the more relevant explanation, the advantage of flexible state agencies in terms of political responsiveness (Scholz and Wei 1986) may be offset by the disadvantage in terms of less cooperative effectiveness. The presidential influence hypothesis appears to have greater support in terms of the known policy emphases of the Carter and Reagan administrations.

References

Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation.* New York: Basic Books.

Ayres, Ian, and John Braithwaite. 1989. "Tripartism, Empowerment, and Game-theoretic Notions of Regulatory Capture." Presented to the Law and Society Association Meeting, Madison.

Bardach, Eugene. 1977. *The Implementation Game.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Bardach, Eugene, and Robert A. Kagan. 1982. *Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Bartel, Ann, and L. Thomas. 1985. "Direct and Indirect Effects of OSHA Regulation." *Journal of Law and Economics* 28:1–26.

Bendor, Jonathan. 1987. "In Good Times and Bad: Reciprocity in an Uncertain World." *American Journal of Political Science* 31:531–58.

Bendor, Jonathan, and Terry M. Moe. 1985. "An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics." *American Political Science Review* 79:755–74.

Bianco, William T., Peter C. Ordeshook, and George Tsebelis. 1990. "Crime and Punishment: Are One-Shot, Two-Person Games Enough?" *American Political Science Review* 84:569–87.

Braithwaite, John. 1985. *To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety.* Albany: State University of New York Press.

Centaur Associates. 1985. *The Impact of OSHA Enforcement Activities.* Report to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

Cook, William N., and F. Gautschi. 1981. "OSHA, Plant Safety, Programs, and Injury Reduction." *Industrial Relations* 20:245–57.

Downs, Anthony. 1967. *Inside Bureaucracy.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Gormley, William T. 1983. *The Politics of Public Utilities Regulation.* Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.

Grabosky, Peter, and John Braithwaite. 1986. *Of Manners Gentle: Enforcement Strategies of Australian Business Regulatory Agencies.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Graetz, Michael J., Jennifer F. Reinganum, and Louis J. Wilde. 1986. "The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 2:1–32.

Greenberg, J. 1984. "Avoiding Tax Avoidance: A (Repeated) Game-theoretic Approach." *Journal of Economic Theory* 32:1–13.

Kagan, Robert A. 1978. *Regulatory Justice: Implementing a Wage-Price Freeze.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Kagan, Robert A., and John T. Scholz. 1984. "The 'Criminology' of the Corporation and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies." In *Enforcing Regulation,* ed. Keith Hawkins and John M. Thomas. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff.

Kelman, Steven. 1982. *Regulating America, Regulating Sweden.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

McCaffrey, David. 1982. *OSHA and the Politics of Health Regulation* New York: Plenum.

McCaffrey, David. 1983. "An Assessment of OSHA's Recent Effects on Injury Rates." *Journal of Human Resources* 18:131–46.

McCubbins, Mathew D. 1985. "The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure." *American Journal of Political Science* 29:721–48.

Marlow, Michael. 1981. "The Impact of Different Government Units in the Regulation of the Workplace Environment." *Public Choice* 37:349–56.

Marvel, Mary K. 1982. "Implementation and Safety Regulation: Variations in Federal and State Administration under OSHA." *Administration and Society* 14:15–33.

Mazmanian, Daniel A., and Paul A. Sabatier. 1983. *Implementation and Public Policy.* Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.

Mendelhoff, John. 1979. *Regulating Safety: An Economic and Political Analysis of Occupational Safety and Health Policy.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Miller, Gary, and Terry M. Moe. 1983. "Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Governments." *American Political Science Review* 77:297–323.

Mitnick, Barry. 1980. *The Political Economy of Regulation.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Moe, Terry M. 1982. "Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration." *American Journal of Political Science* 26:197–224.

Moe, Terry M. 1984. "The New Economics of Organization." *American Journal of Political Science* 28:739–77.

Moe, Terry M. 1985. "Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB." *American Political Science Review* 79:1094–1116.

Moe, Terry M. 1989. "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure." In *Can Government Govern?* ed. John Chubb and Paul Peterson. Washington: Brookings.

Muir, William K. 1977. *Police: Streetcorner Politicians.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Noble, Charles. 1986. *Liberalism at Work: The Rise and Fall of OSHA.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Nonet, Phillipe, and Phillip Selznick. 1978. *Law and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law.* New York: Harper Colophon.

Quirk, Paul J. 1989. "The Cooperative Resolution of Policy Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 83:905-21.

Rasmusen, Eric. 1989. *Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory.* Cambridge: MA: Basil Blackwell.

Reinganum, Jennifer F., and Louis J. Wilde. 1986. "Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance." *International Economics Review* 27:739-60.

Roth, Jeffrey A., John T. Scholz, and Ann Dryden Witte. 1989. *Taxpayer Compliance: An Agenda for Research.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania.

Scholz, John T. 1984a. "Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement." *Law and Society Review* 18:601-46.

Scholz, John T. 1984b. "Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement." *Law and Policy* 6:385-404.

Scholz, John T. 1989. "Federal Versus State Regulation: Does It Matter?" In *Power Divided,* ed. Malcolm Feeley and Harry Scheiber. Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies.

Scholz, John T., and Wayne B. Gray. 1990. "A Behavioral Approach to Compliance: OSHA Enforcement's Impact on Workplace Accidents." *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* 3:283-305.

Scholz, John T., Jim Twombly, and Barbara Headrick. 1988. "Home Style Political Controls over Federal Bureaucracy: OSHA Enforcement at the County Level." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Scholz, John T., and Feng-heng Wei. 1986. "Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System." *American Political Science Review* 79:1249-70.

Seidman, Harold. 1980. *Politics, Position, and Power.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Shover, Neil, Donald Clelland, and John Lynxwiler. 1983. *Developing a Regulatory Bureaucracy: The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement.* Washington: National Institute of Justice.

Sigler, Jay A., and Joseph E. Murphy. 1988. *Interactive Corporate Compliance: An Alternative to Regulatory Compulsion.* New York: Quorum Books.

Silbey, Susan. 1984. "The Consequences of Responsive Regulation." In *Enforcing Regulation,* ed. Keith Hawkins and John Thomas. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff.

Smith, Robert S. 1979. "The Impact of OSHA Inspections on Manufacturing Injury Rates." *Journal of Human Resources* 14:145-70.

Smith, Robert S. 1986. "Greasing the Squeaky Wheel: The Relative Productivity of OSHA Complaint Inspections." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 40:35-47.

Thompson, Frank J., and Michael J. Scicchitano. 1985. "State Implementation Effort and Federal Regulatory Policy: The Case of Occupational Safety and Health." *Journal of Politics* 47:687-703.

Tsebelis, George. 1989. "The Abuse of Probability in Political Analysis: The Robinson Crusoe Fallacy." *American Political Science Review* 83:77-92.

Tsebelis, George. 1990. *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

U.S. General Accounting Office. 1979. *How Effective Are OSHA's Complaint Procedures?* Comptroller General's Report to Congress HRD-79-48.

Viscusi, W. Kip. 1979. "The Impact of Occupational Safety and Health Regulation." *Bell Journal of Economics* 10:117-40.

Viscusi, W. Kip. 1986. "The Impact of Occupational Safety and Health Regulation, 1973-1983." *Rand Journal of Economics* 17:567-80.

Weingast, Barry R., and Mark J. Moran. 1983. "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control: Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission." *Journal of Political Economy* 91:765-800.

Williams, Bruce A., and Albert R. Matheny. 1984. "Testing Theories of Social Regulation: Hazardous Waste Regulation in the American States." *Journal of Politics* 46:428-58.

Wood, B. Dan. 1988. "Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcement." *American Political Science Review* 82:213-37.

John T. Scholz is Associate Professor of Political Science, State University of New York, Stony Brook, NY 11794.

A SPATIAL BARGAINING THEORY OF GOVERNMENT FORMATION IN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS

DAVID P. BARON
Stanford University

A theory of government formation in parliamentary systems is developed from a model incorporating policy-oriented parties with spatial preferences and a formation process in which parties are selected in sequence to attempt to form a government. A government is formed when the policy proposed by the party selected is sustained on a vote of confidence. The equilibria identify the government and the policy it will implement and depend on the configuration of preferences and on the government formation process. For example, in a political system with two large parties and one small party and in which one of the two large parties will be selected to attempt to form a government, the government will be formed by a large party with the support of the small party. The policy will reflect the preferences of the small party but will be closer to the ideal point of the large party.

Nations with parliamentary systems, particularly those that have a proportional representation electoral system, often are governed by coalitions formed among parties with different interests and electoral strengths. In its composition and its policies, the government will reflect those interests, since they provide the basis for bargaining among the parties over policies and positions. That bargaining will also reflect the structure of the government formation process, since it affects the strategic alternatives available to the parties. I shall provide a bargaining theory of government formation in parliamentary systems in which parties have spatial policy preferences, such as that developed in the manifesto project (Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987), which provides estimates of party preferences for 19 democracies for the postwar period.[1] The theory is noncooperative, and the equilibrium relates the government formed and its policies to party preferences and to the institutional features of the government formation process. The results suggest that an institutionless approach to the study of government formation may not provide as precise a set of predictions and explanations as are possible when institutional features are taken into account.

The model is intended to represent political bargaining in an institutional setting characterized by a government formation process in which parties are given the opportunity to form a government and are unconstrained in their ability to make policy proposals and to achieve majority support for those proposals. The political bargaining begins with a nonstrategic president or monarch who selects a party to be accorded the opportunity to attempt to form a government. That party proposes a policy, and the other parties then decide whether to support or to oppose that program on a motion of confidence in the parliament. If that motion fails, another party (or the same one again) is selected, and the process continues. If the motion of confidence is successful, the policy program is implemented and remains in effect until the next mandated election.[2] The government formed and the policy implemented depend on the institutional process, which determines the sequence in which parties are accorded the opportunity to form a government, so that in contrast to cooperative theories of government formation, institutions matter for both the composition of the government and for the policies implemented.

Parties are the actors in the model, and they are assumed to be policy-oriented, so that party preferences are over policies implemented in the legislature and not over cabinet posts.[3] Policies, of course, may be solidified through the allocation of portfolios; but that allocation is only incidental to this theory. A government is thus identified by a policy to be implemented and by the parties that support it —or do not vote against it—on a motion of confidence. For example, Strom defines a majority government as "composed of persons acting as representatives of political parties . . . that collectively control no less than one half of all seats in the national legislative" and a minority government as one that does not represent at least half the legislature (1990, 6). A minority government remains in office because a majority of the legislature does not vote against it on a motion of confidence. In this sense, the theory presented here pertains to both majority and minority governments. The term *government* will thus be used to refer to the parties that do not vote against a motion of confidence on a policy proposal.

To allow both divergent and aligned interests and their reflection in the government formed and in the policies adopted, the policy preferences of parties are assumed to have a spatial representation.[4] Given the opportunity to form a government, party A may thus have a preference-induced incentive to propose a policy to attract the support of party B, which has preferences aligned with—or at least not too dissimilar from—its own. Party B, of course, recognizes that it is a likely partner in the government and thus may hold out for a policy it prefers. This may make B too "expensive" a partner in terms of the policy concessions that A would have to make to obtain its support; so A may instead attempt to form a government with another party with less closely aligned preferences. Strategies thus reflect not only the configuration of preferences but also the alternatives available to parties as structured by the government formation process.[5]

The theory of government formation considered here takes both party preferences and the number of seats in an election as given and focuses on explaining which policies will be implemented and which parties support those positions. A theory of government formation is thus a component of a broader theory that incorporates elections and treats the parties that compete in those elections as endogenously formed and supported by sets of voters.[6]

The principal theories of coalition and government formation have been derived from cooperative game theory, and their focus has been on coalition stability and on the payoffs to coalitions of various sizes. Using this framework, Riker (1962) demonstrated a "size principle" for a constant-sum game predicting that if some coalition were to form, it would be of minimal winning size; that is, although the game considered has no core, if some coalition were to form, it would be minimal winning size because players prefer to divide a fixed amount of benefits among as few players as possible. Theories developed from cooperative game theory are based on a number of implicit assumptions about how alternatives are proposed and compared. In particular, the theories implicitly assume that all alternatives can be simultaneously considered and that commitments can be made and broken costlessly. More importantly, the theories are silent about the expectations players are assumed to have about what will happen if they reject a particular alternative. Furthermore, the theories are typically developed in an institutionless setting, so that predictions about how alternative institutional procedures may affect behavior and outcomes cannot be generated. In the case of government formation in parliamentary systems, the government formed and its policies would be expected to depend on the characteristics of the government formation process as well as on the preferences of the parties.

Although it provides predictions about government formation, the theory presented here differs from theories of coalition formation developed from cooperative game theory in that it is both strategic and noncooperative; that is, the strategies of each political party are explicitly represented and are chosen in accord with its preferences, taking into account the strategies of the other parties. Parties are unable to commit to how they will act in the future, so their strategy choices must be consistent with their preferences and their expectations at the time at which they may act; that is, strategies must be sequentially rational, so that at each point in the government formation process the strategies constitute an equilibrium for the remainder of the process. The equilibrium strategies provide the basis for the expectations of parties about what will occur if the party selected fails in its attempt to form a government. Indeed, whether a bargain will be struck depends on the expectations that all parties have about what will happen if they fail to reach an agreement on the present attempt; and those expectations correspond to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the government formation process.

The analysis will be based on a particular restriction—stationarity—on those expectations. That restriction requires each party to believe that the value of continuing the government formation process is the same in all subgames that are identical in terms of the strategy sets of the parties and the future sequences of moves. The stationarity restriction pins down expectations and allows a theory to be derived that is internally consistent with respect both to the choices made by the parties and to their expectations. The stationarity restriction has some appeal from a focal perspective; but it should be noted that in models similar to that considered here multiple equilibria are present, and under some conditions any outcome can be supported as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.[7]

The type of government considered is of the cabinet form in which the government assumes collective responsibility for the policy that the parties supported on the motion of confidence. A cabinet government that exercises collective responsibility for its policies is in contrast to the type of government considered by Laver and Shepsle (1990, 1989) and Austen-Smith and Banks (1990). They consider a model of an independent executive in which government formation involves the allocation of ministries among the parties in the coalition with the understanding that the ministers may choose policies in their jurisdiction according to their individual preferences or to the preferences of the faction to which they belong. The cabinet in their theory thus does not exercise collective responsibility for policies. Certainly, ministers do have a degree of bureaucratic discretion, particularly in the implementation of policies; but the extent to which they can choose policies without the sanction of the cabinet or the prime minister varies across countries. The policies considered here are not intended to represent policies that need either legislative approval or agreement within the cabinet for their implementation. The formation of a government thus need not be cemented by the allocation of portfolios or ministries but, instead, is identified by a policy program that is sustained by a majority on a vote of confidence.

Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) provide a comprehensive, noncooperative theory of government formation in a model that incorporates elections based on policy positions taken by parties and an institutional process of government formation. Parties have preferences over the allocation of a fixed supply of benefits (e.g., patronage or spoils) and over future payoffs that are assumed to depend on the distance between the one-dimensional position taken prior to the election and the policy implemented by the coalition government once formed.[8] Preferences based on the difference between positions and policies implemented may be interpreted as a penalty imposed in the next election by voters.[9] In their model, the institutional process of government formation is a fixed order determined by the number of seats won in the election. Expectations about what will happen if a party fails in its attempt to form a government are pinned down by this fixed order and by a reversion point—a caretaker government—that results if each party fails in its attempt to form a government.[10] Their theory predicts that the government is always composed of the largest and smallest parties, and the policy implemented is between the positions those two parties took in the election. An analogous result is obtained here for a particular government formation process.

The equilibria of the model considered here are complex to characterize in closed form, so the focus is on the intuition underlying the theory that will be illustrated through a series of cases of government formation. Preferences are specified in terms of Euclidean distance from an ideal point, and the sensitivity of the equilibrium to preferences is illustrated by varying the location of ideal points to consider the effect on the equilibrium strategies of both centrally located and distant parties. To allow a closed form characterization of the equilibria, the cases considered are such that the party selected to attempt to form a government needs the support of only one other party. Two selection processes will be considered. The first is probabilistic, in which a party is selected according to a probability distribution that, for example, might reflect the number of seats each party holds in the legislature. The second is a fixed order in which the parties are selected in a prespecified order where that order, for example, may correspond to the number of seats they hold.

The equilibria may involve randomized strategies, and thus the government that forms is predicted probabilistically. The use of randomized strategies corresponds to the situation in which a party selected could form a government with one of a number of other parties. The theory thus predicts that in a set of government formation opportunities a distribution of coalition governments would be observed. Thus, a government could be formed by parties that do not have a close alignment of preferences, if a party with distant preferences is willing to make substantial policy concessions to become a member of the government. Conversely, if a party expects to receive an offer to join in a government from another party that has aligned interests, the former may make policy demands that are unacceptably costly. The party attempting to form a government thus may, with some probability, make a proposal to a party that does not have aligned interests as a means of controlling the expectations of the party with aligned interests. Thus, the policy preferences of a party not in the government will affect the policy of that government. The governments that result are then the outcomes of these competing pressures as reflected in the equilibrium strategies.

To summarize the results, for all selection processes considered the party selected first is successful in forming a government. This is due to the assumption that each party has complete information about the preferences of the other party and about the structure of the government formation process. Each of the parties constituting the government makes policy concessions necessary to garner the support of the other party. The extent of those concessions depends on the strategic opportunities available to all parties and on the structure of the government formation process. For example, in the case in which the ideal points of three parties are equidistant and each party has the same probability of being selected to form the government, the policy of the resulting government is closer to the ideal point of the party selected than to the ideal point of its government partner. As the ideal point of one of the parties moves away from the ideal points of the other two parties, the two parties with the most closely aligned preferences propose, with increasing probability, policies intended to form a government among the parties with closer preferences; but with positive probability those parties continue to propose policies to attract the support of the more distant party. Those policies are, however, increasingly close to their own ideal points. If there is a centrally located party, it is likely to be in the government; and the policy implemented will strongly reflect that party's preferences. In particular, if the policy alternatives are one-dimensional, the equilibrium is a generalization of Black's (1958) median voter theorem.

If the government formation process involves a fixed order of selection determined by the number of seats won in an election, for example, the equilibria depend on which parties are in that order. In a political system with three parties of which one will never be asked to form a government, the government is formed by the party selected first and the party that will never be selected. The policy implemented is closer to the ideal point of the party asked to form the government than to its government partner. If a party would never be asked to form a government because it is small, this result predicts governments composed of a large party and a small party. This suggests that small parties may have a substantial impact on government policy. If all three parties are in the order, the party given the first opportunity forms a government with the party that would be selected next; and if the ideal points are equidistant, the policy implemented is the midpoint of the contract curve between the ideal points of those two parties. The party that would be selected second thus does as well as the party selected first to form a government.[11] If the ideal point of the third party is equidistant from the ideal points of the other two parties, the policy implemented is invariant to the distance of the ideal point of the third party from those of the other two parties. When it is not equidistant, the policy implemented depends on the preferences of the third party even though it will never be in the government.

I introduce the model and characterize the stationary equilibrium corresponding to the probabilistic selection rule for a three-party system. I analyze the effects of a centrally located party. I characterize equilibria for a three-party system with fixed order of selection and make comparisons among the institutional selection processes. I then present applications and offer conclusions.

The Model

The model consists of the government formation process, the preferences of the parties, and the strategies available to the

Figure 1. Government Formation Process: Probabilistic Selection



S: Selection of a party
V: Vote of confidence

parties. The first government formation process considered has probabilistic selection, where the sequence of moves is as presented in Figure 1 and the probabilities are to be interpreted as reflecting the number of seats held in the parliament. In this process, the president or monarch chooses a party to propose a policy. That proposal is subject to a vote of confidence; and if it is sustained, the government is formed and the game ends. If the vote of confidence fails, the president or monarch chooses another party, and the process continues. Note that every subgame commencing after a rejection of a proposal is structurally identical, since the strategy sets and the possible future sequences of moves are the same.

A strategy for a party consists of the policy proposal it makes when it is selected and the choice of supporting or opposing a policy proposal on a vote of confidence. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is thus a profile of strategies such that at every point in the process at which a party may act, the strategy of a party from that point on is a best response to the strategies of the other parties. A stationary equilibrium is such that for each party i the value V_i of each identical subgame is the same.

The legislature is assumed to consist of m parties, each of which is represented as a unitary actor.[12] If selected, a party chooses a policy $x \in R^n$ and that policy will be implemented through the legislature by the government, if it forms.[13] The policy chosen is assumed to be implemented faithfully, so parties do not have the opportunity to shirk once in office. In this theory, shirking would be met by a vote of no confidence and thus would not be observed in equilibrium.

All information regarding preferences, strategy sets, and the structure of the government formation process is assumed to be common knowledge, so that the game is one of complete and perfect informa-

Figure 2. Equilibrium Indifference Curves and Policy Proposals



tion. To simplify the analysis, preferences are assumed to be represented by the Euclidean distance of the proposed policy from the ideal point of the party. Preferences of party i thus may be represented by a function $U_i(x)$ given by

$$U_i(x) = - \sum_{\ell=1}^{n} (x_\ell - t_\ell^i)^2,$$

where $t^i = (t_1^i, \ldots, t_n^i)$ denotes the ideal point. The ideal point may, for example, be interpreted as the policies used by the parties as a basis for their election campaigns. To illustrate the results, the policy space will be taken to be of dimension $n = 2$.

A government forms around a policy; and when a policy is proposed that sustains a vote of confidence, the government is formed. A party will vote for a policy x on a vote of confidence if its utility $U_i(x)$ from the approval of that policy is at least as great as the continuation value V_i associated with the subsequent bargaining resulting from rejection of that policy.[14] That continuation value represents the expectation of the outcomes associated with the play of the equilibrium strategies restricted to the subgame commencing with the rejection of the current proposal. If the continuation values were exogenously given, the analysis would be simple. To indicate the approach in that case, Figure 2 presents indifference curves corresponding to V_i for the case of a three-party system. If party 1 were selected to form a government, it would propose a policy that would attract the support of one of the other parties. That party would be the one whose indifference curve is closest to 1's ideal point. An equilibrium with exogenously given continuation values (and hence indifference curves) would thus be parameterized by those values. The theory endogenizes those values by requiring that they be supported as noncooperative, subgame perfect equilibria of the political bargaining process.

The analysis will be presented for the case in which the party selected to form a government needs the support of only one other party to form a majority.[15] This and the assumption of quadratic preferences simplifies the analysis because a proposal x^{ji} by party j that forms a government with the support of party i on a vote of confidence will be on the (linear) contract curve between their ideal points t^i and t^j. The contract curve will be denoted by $x^{ji}(\lambda_{ji})$, where

$$x^{ji}(\lambda_{ji}) = \lambda_{ji}t^j + (1 - \lambda_{ji})t^i,\ \lambda_{ji} \in [0,1],$$

and λ_{ji} denotes the proportion of the distance from t^j to t^i. The utility of party i when $x^{ji}(\lambda_{ji})$ is the policy adopted by the government formed by parties j and i, then, is

$$U_i(x^{ji}(\lambda_{ji})) = -\lambda_{ji}^2 D_{ji}^2, \qquad (1)$$

where $D_{ij} = D_{ji}$ denotes the distance between the ideal points of parties i and j. The utility of party j is

$$U_j(x^{ji}(\lambda_{ji})) = -(1 - \lambda_{ji})^2 D_{ji}^2, \qquad (2)$$

and the utility of the third party k is

$$U_k(x^{ji}(\lambda_{ji})) = -\lambda_{ji}^2 D_{ji}^2 - D_{ik}^2 - 2\lambda_{ji} \sum_{\ell=1}^{n} (t_\ell^j - t_\ell^i)(t_\ell^i - t_\ell^k). \qquad (3)$$

Party i will support a policy proposal $x^{ji}(\lambda_{ji})$ on a vote of confidence if and only if it is at least as preferred as the expected outcome from rejecting it and continuing to the next selection of a party to attempt to form a government, or[16]

$$U_i(x^{ji}(\lambda_{ji})) \geq V_i. \qquad (4)$$

Party i will thus vote for a proposal x^{ji} if and only if, using equation 1, $-\lambda_{ji}^2 D_{ji}^2 \geq V_i$. The proposal that attracts the vote of party i when i has a continuation value V_i is thus identified by

$$\lambda_{ji} = \frac{(-V_i)^{1/2}}{D_{ji}}, \qquad (5)$$

so that the continuation value determines the proposal that j must make to attract the support of i. That value depends on the selection process.

A Three-Party System with Probabilistic Selection

To indicate the nature of an equilibrium in the government formation process, consider the case of three parties, each of which could be asked to form a government, and a probabilistic selection rule with $p_i, i = 1, 2, 3$ representing the probability that party i will be selected at each stage.[17] The probabilities could, for example, be proportional to the number of seats held in the parliament. Since the support of only one other party is needed, the party selected will propose a policy on the contract curve with another party. The equilibrium proposals of the party selected may involve randomization, so let r_i denote the probability that party i makes a proposal to attract the support of party $i+1$ (mod 3). For example, r_1 denotes the probability that party 1 proposes a policy x^{12} intended to attract the support of party 2, and $1 - r_1$ denotes the probability that party 1 makes a proposal x^{13} to attract the support of party 3. Because the opportunity to form a government is valuable, a party selected will want to make proposals that will be supported by a majority and thus will sustain a vote of confidence. If party 1 is selected, the policy outcome is thus x^{12} with probability r_1 and x^{13} with probability $1 - r_1$. The value V_1 is thus

$$\begin{aligned} V_1 = {} & p_1(r_1 U_1(x^{12}) + (1 - r_1)U_1(x^{13})) \\ & + p_2((1 - r_2)U_1(x^{21}) + r_2 U_1(x^{23})) \\ & + p_3(r_3 U_1(x^{31}) + (1 - r_3)U_1(x^{32})), \end{aligned}$$

where the first term corresponds to party 1's being selected to make a proposal, the second term corresponds to party 2's being selected, and the third term corresponds to party 3's being selected.

The equations that characterize the values for the parties may thus be written, using equations 1–3, as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} V_1 = {} & p_1\big(-r_1(1 - \lambda_{12})^2 D_{12}^2 \\ & - (1 - r_1)(1 - \lambda_{13})^2 D_{13}^2\big) \\ & + p_2\big(r_2(-\lambda_{23}^2 D_{23}^2 - D_{13}^2 - 2\lambda_{23} C_{23}^1) \\ & - (1 - r_2)\lambda_{21}^2 D_{12}^2\big) + p_3\big(-r_3 \lambda_{31}^2 D_{13}^2 \\ & + (1 - r_3)(-\lambda_{32}^2 D_{32}^2 - D_{12}^2 \\ & - 2\lambda_{32} C_{32}^1)\big). \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

$$\begin{aligned} V_2 = {} & p_1(r_1 U_2(x^{12}) + (1 - r_1)U_2(x^{13})) \\ & + p_2(r_2 U_2(x^{23}) + (1 - r_2)U_2(x^{21})) \\ & + p_3(r_3 U_2(x^{31}) + (1 - r_3)U_2(x^{32})) \\ = {} & p_1(-r_1 \lambda_{12}^2 D_{12}^2 + (1 - r_1)(-\lambda_{12}^2 D_{13}^2 \\ & - D_{32}^2 - 2\lambda_{13} C_{13}^2)) \\ & + p_2\big(-r_2(1 - \lambda_{23})^2 D_{23}^2 \\ & - (1 - r_2)(1 - \lambda_{21})^2 D_{12}^2)\big) \\ & + p_3\big(r_3(-\lambda_{31}^2 D_{31}^2 - D_{12}^2 - 2\lambda_{31} C_{31}^2) \\ & - (1 - r_3)\lambda_{32}^2 D_{32}^2\big). \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

$$\begin{aligned} V_3 = {} & p_1(r_1 U_3(x^{12}) + (1 - r_1)U_3(x^{13})) \\ & + p_2(r_2 U_3(x^{23}) + (1 - r_2)U_3(x^{21})) \\ & + p_3(r_3 U_3(x^{31}) + (1 - r_3)U_3(x^{32})) \\ = {} & p_1\big(r_1(-\lambda_{12}^2 D_{12}^2 - D_{13}^2 - 2\lambda_{12} C_{12}^3) \\ & - (1 - r_1)\lambda_{13}^2 D_{13}^2\big) + p_2\big(-r_2 \lambda_{23}^2 D_{23}^2 \\ & + (1 - r_2)(-\lambda_{21}^2 D_{12}^2 - D_{23}^2 \\ & - 2\lambda_{21} C_{21}^3)\big) + p_3\big(-r_3(1 - \lambda_{31})^2 D_{31}^2 \\ & - (1 - r_3)(1 - \lambda_{32})^2 D_{32}^2\big), \end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

where

$$C_{jk}^i = \sum_{\ell=1}^{2} (t_\ell^i - t_\ell^k)(t_\ell^k - t_\ell^i).$$

A stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, then, is a profile of strategies and policies (and randomizations) and support or opposition to them, where strategies in the subgame commencing with the selection of a party are optimal for that party, given the strategies of the other parties. On a vote of confidence, those strategies are to vote for the policy proposal if equation 4 is satisfied and oppose it otherwise and, given an opportunity to attempt to form a government, to make optimal proposals characterized in equation 5 given the equilibrium strategies in the subsequent subgame.

The nature of the equilibrium may be illustrated using the case in Figure 2, where the ideal points of the three parties are equidistant and the probabilities of selection are one-third for each party. Because of symmetry, one stationary equilibrium is for each party, if selected, to randomize equally between policy proposals that will attract the support of each of the other parties. For example, if party 1 is selected to attempt to form a government, it will with probability one-half make a proposal x^{12} and with probability one-half make a proposal x^{13} such that from equation 5 the proposals are on the indifference curves corresponding to V_2 and V_3, the respective continuation values for parties 2 and 3. If party 1 finds it optimal to randomize strictly between parties 2 and 3, then party 1 must be indifferent between the policies x^{12} and x^{13}, so that $U_1(x^{12}) = U_1(x^{13})$. As indicated in Figure 2, the two policies thus are on party 1's indifference curve corresponding to its having the opportunity to attempt to form a government.[18] Once a party has been selected, it has additional bargaining power that (as illustrated in Figure 2) results in policies that are twice as close to its ideal point as to the ideal point of its government partner.

A closed form characterization of the equilibria cannot be given in general, but such a characterization can be given for certain cases, several of which will be presented here to develop insight into the nature of the equilibria and their interpretation. To generalize the case illustrated in Figure 2, consider the case in which the configuration of ideal points is such that parties 1 and 2 are equally likely to be selected to form a government with probability $(1 - p)/2$. Also, the ideal point of party 3 will be assumed to be equidistant from the ideal points of parties 1 and 2, so that $D_{31} = D_{32}$. Because of symmetry, the equilibrium randomizations are $r_1 = 1 - r_2$, which will be denoted by r, and $r_3 = .5$. Defining the parameter γ by $D_{13} \equiv \gamma D_{12}$, the equilibrium is characterized in Appendix A and is given by

$$r = \frac{p(2 - 1/\gamma)}{1 - p}. \qquad (9)$$

Since $\gamma \geq 1/2$, then $r \geq 0$ and, for $p \leq p^* \equiv \gamma/(3\gamma - 1)$, $r \leq 1$. Note that $p^* \in (1/3,1]$. For $p \geq p^*$, $r = 1$. The equilibrium policies for $p \leq p^*$ are parameterized by

$$\lambda_{12} = \lambda_{21} = \frac{3\gamma - 1}{4\gamma - 1} \in [1/2, 3/4], \qquad (10)$$

$$\lambda_{13} = \lambda_{23} = \frac{4\gamma - 2}{4\gamma - 1} \in [0,1], \qquad (11)$$

and

$$\lambda_{31} = \lambda_{32} = \frac{3\gamma - 1}{\gamma(4\gamma - 1)} \in [0,1]. \qquad (12)$$

For $p > p^*$, $r = 1$, and the equilibrium policies are parameterized by

$$\lambda_{12} = \lambda_{21} = \frac{\gamma}{2\gamma(1 - p) + p} \qquad (13)$$

and

$$\lambda_{31} = \lambda_{32} = \frac{1}{\gamma}\lambda_{12} = \frac{1}{2\gamma(1 - p) + p}. \qquad (14)$$

The values of the game are determined by substituting equations 10–12 into equations 6–8, which yields

$$V_1 = V_2 = \begin{cases} -\left(\dfrac{3\gamma - 1}{4\gamma - 1}\right)^2 D_{12}^2 & \text{if } p \leq p^* \\ -\left(\dfrac{\gamma}{2\gamma(1-p)+p}\right)^2 D_{12}^2 & \text{if } p > p^* \end{cases} \qquad (15)$$

and

$$V_3 = \begin{cases} -\left(\dfrac{4\gamma - 2}{4\gamma - 1}\right)^2 \gamma^2 D_{12}^2 & \text{if } p \leq p^* \\ -\left(\dfrac{(1-p)\gamma(2\gamma-1)(1+(2\gamma-1)(1-p)(1-\gamma))}{(2\gamma(1-p)+p)^2}\right)^2 D_{12}^2 & \text{if } p > p^*. \end{cases} \qquad (16)$$

The values are decreasing functions of γ, so all parties are worse off with more extreme—or less well aligned—preferences. For $p > p^*$, the values $V_1 = V_2$ are strictly decreasing in p and V_3 is strictly increasing in p.

In this equilibrium, parties 1 and 2 each make proposals to form a government with each other with a probability r, which is a function of the probability of selection and of the relative distance γ. Similarly, the policy proposals depend on p and γ. The probability r in equation 9 is a nondecreasing function of the distance to the ideal point of party 3. That probability is also an increasing function of the probability that party 3 will be selected to form the government. This may be interpreted as party 3's being less willing to make policy concessions to the other parties the more likely it is to be selected to form a government; so that the other two parties are less willing to form a government with party 3. Thus, the equilibria in the model have the property that the government formed and the policy adopted depend on the preferences and selection chances of all the parties, not just those in the government.

To interpret the equilibrium further, first consider how it varies in the probability p that party 3 is selected to form a government. The policy proposals that parties 1 and 2 make depend on the distance of the ideal point of party 3 from their own ideal points. For $\gamma = 1/2$, the ideal point of party 3 is the midpoint of the contract curve between the ideal points of parties 1 and 2. Then $r = 0$, and for all p the proposals of all three parties are at the ideal point of party 3. As γ increases, parties 1 and 2 make proposals closer to their ideal points. Also, the more extreme party 3's preferences, the greater the policy concessions it is willing to accept in equilibrium to participate in the government and the more concessions it makes if it is accorded the opportunity to form the government.

Figure 3 presents the equilibrium randomization for parties 1 and 2 and the parameter λ_{12} of their proposals. To interpret the equilibrium, consider the case in which parties 1 and 2 are large and party 3 is small. If the small party has no chance of being selected to attempt to form a government, then $p = 0$ and (as indicated in Figure 3) parties 1 and 2 will choose $r = 0$; that is, both large parties will make policy proposals to attract the support of party 3. The small party will thus be in the government with probability 1.

As the probability p that the small party will be selected increases, the policy proposals in equations 10–12 remain unchanged; but the probability r that the two large parties make proposals to each other increases. For $p > p^*$, the probability $r = 1$; so that parties 1 and 2, if selected, make proposals to form a government only with each other. Then, as p increases, the proposals move closer to the ideal point of the party selected to form the government. As indicated in Figure 3, the randomization probability is a strictly increasing, strictly convex function of p for $p < p^*$. On the interval $[0,p^*]$, the policies and the values V_1, V_2, and V_3 are invariant to p. The randomization probability is thus adjusted as a function of the probability that party 3 will be selected. To interpret this, note that if the probability that party 3 will be selected were to increase, its value would (out of equilibrium) increase if both parties 1 and 2 attempted with probability 1 to attract its support. The support of party 3 would then become too costly in terms of policy concessions; and parties 1 and 2 would decrease the probability $1 - r$ with which they seek the support of party 3. The equilibrium thus involves a balancing by the party selected of the probabilities that policy proposals are made to attract the support of one of the other parties.

Figure 3. Equilibrium Proposal Parameter and Randomization



The parameter p^* is a strictly decreasing function of γ, the distance of the ideal point of party 3 from that of the other two parties. Consequently (as illustrated in Figure 3), the set of probabilities p such that the proposals of the parties vary with p is smaller, the more distant the ideal point of party 3; that is, given γ' and γ'' satisfying $\gamma' < \gamma''$, the probability that parties 1 and 2 will form the government with each other is at least as great with γ'' as with γ' for all p. Thus, for a fixed p, a more distant ideal point makes it less likely that party 3 will be in the government.

As an example, consider the symmetric case in which all three parties are equally likely to be selected and in which the ideal points of the three parties are equidistant ($\gamma = 1$) and $D_{ij} = D$. Then the values are

$$V_i = -(4/9)D^2, \; i = 1, 2, 3;$$

and the equilibrium proposals are parameterized by $\lambda_{12} = \lambda_{23} = \lambda_{31} = 2/3$, and $r = 1/2$. This is the equilibrium illustrated in Figure 2. Note that although the equilibrium is symmetric in the sense that the values of the game are the same for all three parties and the policies are permutations of the same generic policies, the policies are closer to the ideal point of the proposer than to the ideal point of the government partner.

The predictions of this theory are distinct from those in the literature based on cooperative game theory. For example, the competitive solution concept introduced by McKelvey, Ordeshook, and Winer (1978) predicts that in the equidistant case the possible policies are the midpoints between the ideal points of two of the parties. These policies are also in the bargaining set.[19] In addition to differences in the policy predictions, these solution concepts are not based on a selection process and hence do not provide predictions of the probabilities that the possible policy outcomes will result.

For the more general case characterized in equations 9–16, the probabilities ϱ_i that party i will be in the government are:

$$\varrho_1 = p_1 + p_2 r + p_3 r_3,$$

$$\varrho_2 = p_2 + p_1 r + p_3(1 - r_3),$$

$$\varrho_3 = (p_1 + p_2)(1 - r) + p_3.$$

For $p_1 = p_2 = (1 - p)/2$, $p \leq p^*$, and $r_3 = 1/2$, these are

$$\varrho_1 = \varrho_2 = (1/2)(1 + (p/\gamma)(2\gamma - 1))$$

$$\varrho_3 = 1 - (p/\gamma)(2\gamma - 1).$$

The probabilities ϱ_1 and ϱ_2 are strictly increasing, and ϱ_3 is strictly decreasing in the probability p that party 3 is selected. The probability that the coalition is composed of parties 1 and 2 is $p(2 - 1/8)$. Consequently, as the ideal point of party 3 becomes more distant, the probability that the government is composed of parties 1 and 2 increases. This, of course, is because as p increases, the value V_3 increases because party 3 is in a better strategic position. Similarly, that probability is a decreasing function of γ, so the more extreme party 3's preferences, the lower is the likelihood that it will be in the government. For example, if the ideal point of party 3 is twice as distant from the ideal points of the other parties as they are from themselves ($\gamma = 2$) and $p = 1/3$, then $\varrho_1 = \varrho_2 = 3/4$ and $\varrho_3 = 1/2$. The probability that the coalition is composed of parties 1 and 2 is 1/2, and the probability that it is composed of parties 1 and 3 (or 2 and 3) is 1/4.

When the probability p that party 3 will be selected is at least p^*, parties 1 and 2, if selected, will form a government with each other with probability 1. The probabilities that parties are in the government are then $\varrho_1 = \varrho_2 = 1 - p/2$ and $\varrho_3 = p$. Thus, when γ and p are such that $p \geq p^*$, the probability ϱ_3 that party 3 is in the government is increasing in p, and ϱ_1 and ϱ_2 are decreasing in p.

The Role of Centrality in Government Formation with Probabilistic Selection

Theories of coalition formation developed from the theory of cooperative games find that centrally located parties can be expected to participate in coalition governments.[20] The significance of centrality in a three-party system can be illustrated in the characterization given above for probabilistic selection by letting γ go to one-half. For $\gamma = 1/2$, party 3's ideal point is located at the center of the contract curve between the ideal points of parties 1 and 2. Then, for $p_1 = p_2 = (1 - p)/2$ and $p_3 = p$, the equilibrium is $r = 0$ and $\lambda_{13} = \lambda_{23} = 0$, so that, if selected, parties 1 and 2 will propose a policy to attract the support of party 3, and that policy will be at party 3's ideal point. If selected, party 3 will propose a policy at its ideal point (i.e., $\lambda_{31} = \lambda_{32} = 1$), so that with probability 1 party 3 will be in the government. Consequently, with probability 1 the policy implemented is the ideal point of the centrally located party, and both of the other parties support that policy.[21] Note that this outcome is invariant to the probability with which party 3 is selected to form a government. Centrally located parties are thus able to form what appears to be a consensus government.

This result holds more generally. Suppose the ideal points are arrayed on a line with t^3 between the other two ideal points. Let the distance between t^1 and t^2 be D and the distance between t^1 and t^3 be γD, so that $D_{23} = (1 - \gamma)D$. For any probabilities (p_1, p_2, p_3) of selection, the equilibrium is that all proposals are at the ideal point t^3 of the centrally located party. This result may also be viewed as a bargaining theory analog of Black's (1958) median voter theorem, since it demonstrates that the median is the equilibrium for any probabilities of selection in the government formation process.

To indicate further the consequences of centrally located parties in the context of the theory developed here, consider the case in which parties 1, 2, and 3 have ideal points that are located at the vertices of an equilateral triangle. Then introduce a centrally located party 4 that is equally distant from each of the other parties as illustrated in Figure 4. Then, if D is the distance between the ideal points of the parties located at the vertices, the distance between the ideal point of the centrally located party and the ideal point of any other party is $D/\sqrt{3}$. Consider the case in which the parties are of equal size and assume that any two can form a government, since a vote of confidence will fail on a tie vote. If each is equally likely to be selected to form a government, the equilibrium is for each of the parties on the perimeter to make the same generic proposal and for the centrally located party to randomize its proposals equally among the other three parties. The equilibrium is characterized in Appendix B and is illustrated in Figure 4.

In equilibrium, the centrally located party 4, if selected, is able to propose its ideal point; and all three of the other parties support it. This thus provides a prediction that a centrally located party, if selected, can form what appears to be a consensus government and that the policy implemented will be its ideal point. If one of the other perimeter parties is selected, with probability $2r = .183$ it makes a proposal to one of the other parties on the perimeter, and with probability .817 it makes a proposal to the centrally located party. The former proposal is closer to the ideal point of the other party than to that of the proposer. The latter proposal is closer ($\lambda_{14} = .317$) to the ideal point of the centrally located party than to the ideal point of the party making the proposal. Consequently, the policy implemented will strongly reflect the preferences of the centrally located party. This theory thus predicts that a perimeter party is more likely to make a policy concession to the centrally located party than to another perimeter party. The probability ϱ_4 of the centrally located party being in the government is .864, and the corresponding policy will be no more than

Figure 4. Equilibrium with a Centrally Located Party



31.7% of the distance from its ideal point to the ideal point of any other party. Policy thus strongly reflects the preferences of the centrally located party.

Government Formation with a Fixed Order of Selection

The government formation process considered above involves probabilistic selection, which may be appropriate when at least two parties are of approximately equal size. Otherwise, the largest party is often given the first opportunity to form a government. Two cases will be considered. One corresponds to the case of two large parties (both of which may be accorded the opportunity to form a government) and a third party that will never be selected. The second is when all three parties may have the opportunity to form a government. The former may be the more realistic for a country such as Germany, but the second case will be presented first because it better illustrates the method of analysis.

Three Parties in the Selection Process

Consider the case in which each of three parties will be asked in sequence to form a government, so that party 1 will be selected first, party 2 will be selected if party 1 fails to form a government, and party 3 will be selected if party 2 fails. In the event that all three fail, the process repeats. To characterize a stationary equilibrium, first note that the subgames are identical only when the same party is selected. Consequently, the values of the game when party j is selected to attempt to form a government will be denoted by V_i^j, $i = 1, 2, 3$, $j = 1, 2, 3$. Consider the strategy of party 1. Party 1 will make a proposal x^{12} with probability r_1 to form a government with party 2 and a proposal x^{13} with probability $1 - r_1$ to form a government with party 3; and since those proposals will be chosen so that they will be accepted, the value V_1^1 is given by $V_1^1 = r_1U_1(x^{12}) + (1 - r_1)U_1(x^{13})$. For the proposals to be accepted, they must satisfy

$$U_k(x^{1k}) \geq V_k^2,\ k = 2, 3, \qquad (17)$$

where V_k^2 is the value to party k if it rejects x^{1k} and continues to the next selection, in which party 2 will have the opportunity to form a government. Similarly, when it has the opportunity to form a government, party 2 will propose x^{23} with probability r_2 and propose x^{21} with probability $1 - r_2$, satisfying

$$U_k(x^{2k}) \geq V_k^3,\ k = 3, 1. \qquad (18)$$

Similarly, party 3 will propose x^{31} with probability r_3 and x^{32} with probability $1 - r_3$, where support is granted if

$$U_k(x^{3k}) \geq V_k^1,\ k = 1, 2.$$

The equilibrium is characterized in Appendix C and is such that no party strictly randomizes between forming a government with one party and forming a government with another party. Furthermore, the party that has the opportunity to form a government makes a proposal to the party that would be asked next, and that proposal is such that it will be accepted. This results because party 3 recognizes that if party 1 were to make a proposal to attract its support, it could reject that proposal and at the next stage receive a proposal from party 2. In considering a proposal from party 2, party 3 will recognize that if it rejects that proposal, it will have the next opportunity to attempt to form a government. In an equilibrium, then, party 2 is as good a government partner as party 3. For a fixed order of selection, Austen-Smith and Banks find that the government is formed by the largest and smallest parties. Their result differs from that obtained here because of their assumption that a caretaker government is formed if all three parties fail in their attempts to form a government. As indicated below, there may be another equilibrium in which the first and third, or largest and smallest, parties form the government.

The values of the game are

$$V_i^i = -1/4(D_{i,i+1} - D_{i+1,i+2} + D_{i+1,i})^2, \qquad (19)$$

where the indices are modulo 3. The corresponding proposals are parameterized by

$$\lambda_{i,i+1} = \frac{1}{2D_{i,i+1}} (D_{i,i+1} - D_{i+2,i} + D_{i+1,i+2}). \qquad (20)$$

The equilibrium proposals and the values depend on the distances between the ideal points. To illustrate the equilibrium and to interpret it, first consider the case in which the ideal points are equidistant with $D_{ij} = D$. Then, $\lambda_{ij} = 1/2$, $\forall i, j$, $i \neq j$. The values are then

$$V_1^1 = V_2^1 = V_2^2 = V_3^2 = V_3^3 = V_1^3 = -\frac{1}{4} D^2 \qquad (21)$$

and

$$V_3^1 = V_1^2 = V_2^3 = -\frac{3}{4} D^2. \qquad (22)$$

The equilibrium policy proposals are illustrated in Figure 5.

For the case of a fixed order of recognition, another stationary equilibrium may

Figure 5. Equilibrium with a Fixed Order of Selection



exist in which the party with the first opportunity to form a government makes a proposal to party 3, party 2 makes a proposal to party 1, and party 3 makes a proposal to party 2. For example, in the case in which the ideal points of the parties are equidistant there is such an equilibrium, which is characterized in Appendix D. In this equilibrium, the party that has the opportunity to form a government proposes its ideal point, and the other party supports it. The values thus are $V_1^1 = V_2^2 = V_3^3 = 0$ and $V_2^1 = V_3^1 = V_1^2 = V_3^2 = V_1^3 = V_2^3 = -D^2$.[22] The intuition underlying this equilibrium is that party 1 proposes its ideal point and party 3 supports it because party 3 expects that if it rejects 1's proposal, party 2 will have an opportunity to make a proposal that is on the contract curve between the ideal points of parties 1 and 2. This property is similar to that in Austen-Smith and Banks' model, as is the result that the government is formed by the largest and smallest parties.

To indicate how the equilibrium in equations 20–22 responds to a change in preferences, consider the case analyzed above in which the ideal point of party 3 is equidistant from the ideal points of parties 2 and 3, that is, $D_{31} = D_{32} = \gamma D_{12}$. Then equations 19 and 20 indicate that party 1's proposal and value are unaffected by the location of the ideal point of party 3. This results because even though as γ becomes smaller, party 3's preferences approach those of party 1, they also approach those of party 2. Thus, party 2 does not make policy concessions to party 1 because party 2 knows that if it rejects party 1's proposal, it will have the opportunity to make a proposal to party 3. Similarly, party 1 cannot make a better proposal to party 3 because party 3 anticipates an attractive proposal in the event that it rejects a proposal from party 1. Party 3, of course, is better off when the ideal points of the other two parties are closer to its ideal point.

As an example, consider the case in which $\gamma = 1/2$, so that the ideal point of party 3 is at the midpoint of the contract curve between the ideal points of parties 1 and 2. The equilibrium in this case is $\lambda_{12} = 1/2$, $\lambda_{23} = 0$, $\lambda_{31} = 1$, so all policies are at the ideal point of the centrally located party. This is the same result as with probabilistic selection and indicates the robustness of the median outcome in majority rule systems.

Two Parties in the Selection Process

In some political systems, only two parties may be reasonable candidates to be asked to form a government. This is representative of pre-unification West Germany, where the Free Democratic party might not have an opportunity to form a government and selection would go to the Christian Democratic Union or the Social Democratic party. In spite of having no opportunity to form a government, the third party may influence the composition of the government and the policy adopted. The equilibrium for the case in which parties 1 and 2 alternate in attempting to form a government is characterized in Appendix E. The equilibrium has the property that the government is always formed by the party accorded the first opportunity, and that party forms a government with the third party. Indeed, except for the 1966-69 period, when a coalition of all three parties constituted the government, the Free Democratic party has always been in the government with a large party.

In the case in which only two parties would have the opportunity to form a government, the equilibria are characterized in Appendix E. A set of values of the game is supported as stationary subgame perfect equilibria because the value to party 3 when party 1 has the opportunity to form a government depends on what policy party 2 would propose to attract 3's support when it is accorded the opportunity. That, however, depends on what policy party 1 would propose, so there are multiple equilibria. All such equilibria, however, have the property that the party given the first opportunity will form a government with party 3.

To illustrate the equilibrium, consider the case in which the ideal point of party 3 is equidistant from the ideal points of parties 1 and 2 with $D_{12} = D$ and $D_{13} = D_{23} = \gamma D$. The equilibria are characterized by the conditions

$$\lambda_{13} \geq 1 - \frac{1}{2\gamma}, \qquad (23)$$

$$V_3^1 = V_3^2 \leq -(1/4)(2\gamma - 1)^2 D^2, \text{ and}$$
$$V_1^1 = V_2^2 \geq -(1/4)D^2.$$

For the equidistant case, all of the equilibria have the property that the policies are at least as close to the ideal point of party 1 as to the ideal point of party 3. The set of values V_1^1 that can be supported as equilbria for the party that has the opportunity to form a government is unaffected by the preferences of its government partner, but the policies are affected. To see this, suppose λ_{13} is given by an equality in equation 23. Then, the more distant the preferences of party 3, the greater the policy concessions it is willing to make in equilibrium. As γ approaches one-half, the policy proposal of party 1 approaches the ideal point of party 3, giving another analog of the median voter result.

Comparison of the Selection Processes

The equidistant case can be used to indicate the effect of the selection rule on the equilibrium. Under both the probabilistic and the fixed order selection rules, the party selected first proposes a policy that is sustained on the vote of confidence, so that a government is formed on the first attempt. In the case of probabilistic selection in which each party is equally likely to be selected the values of the game for each party are identical, yet the policies are twice as close to the ideal point of the party selected as to the ideal point of the coalition partner. In contrast, when the order of selection is fixed and all three parties may be asked to form a government, a government is formed by the first two parties and the equilibrium proposals are at the midpoint of their ideal points. Neither order of recognition, of course, yields the welfare-maximizing policy, which is the centroid of the convex hull of the ideal points and yields an aggregate value of $-(1/3)D^2$. Majority rule thus allows the party selected to form a government to serve its interests.

For the equidistant (γ) case, the case in which only two of the three parties have an opportunity to form a government corresponds to the case of $p = 0$ with probabilistic selection. With probabilistic selection, whichever party has the opportunity to form a government will do so with the party that will never be given that opportunity. The same result obtains with a fixed order of selection. This result thus has a degree of robustness to variations in the selection process. The equilibrium policies depend on the selection process; and with probabilistic selection $p = 0$ and $\gamma = 1$, the policy adopted by the government is twice as close to the ideal point of the party proposing the policy as to the ideal point of party 3. With a fixed order of selection involving only two parties and with $\gamma = 1$, the policy adopted by the government is at least as close to the ideal point of the party proposing the policy as to the ideal point of party 3. Thus, although the policy predictions are not identical, they are qualitatively similar.

Applications

To apply this theory to actual government formation situations, data are needed on the policy preferences of the parties and on the selection process. Policy positions and the issue space in which they are located have been developed in a major study of party manifestos of 19 democracies for the postwar period. Studies for each country are presented by Budge, Robertson, and Hearl (1987), and the data have been extended in a recent project coordinated by Ian Budge and Michael Laver.[23] Their approach is to code the content of party manifestos and to apply factor analysis to determine a space in which party positions can be located. Although the appropriate interpretation of the results of a factor analysis is subject to some debate, this approach yields spatial locations of ideal points for parties. The data, however, do not indicate the structure of the government formation process. Consequently, several assumptions about that structure will be considered.

The theory as presented here is applicable to the case in which no single party has a majority and any two of three parties can constitute a majority. Two examples will be considered. The first is

Austria following the 1970 election, and the second is Luxembourg following the 1974 election. These two cases have been selected because the location of ideal points corresponds to the case in which the ideal point of one of the parties is equidistant from the ideal points of the other two parties and those latter two parties have approximately the same number of seats. These cases thus fit the assumptions of the equilibria characterized above.

As Horner (1987) indicates, 1970 marked a transition in Austria from majority rule by the People's party (OVP) to majority rule by the Socialist party (SPO). The 1970 election resulted in the SPO's having 81 seats, the OVP's having 79 seats, and the Freedom party's having 4 seats. The SPO formed a minority government with the support of the Freedom Party (FPO). The two dimensions identified by the factor analysis are labeled "new issues" and "leftism," and in this space the ideal point of the FPO is equidistant from the ideal points of the other two parties. Letting the SPO be party 1 and the OVP be party 2, the parameter $\gamma = 4/5$.

If a probabilistic selection rule is used with the probabilities of selection proportional to the seats held, then the SPO and the OVP are approximately equally likely to be selected, and the probability that the FPO would be selected is .03. The equilibrium then is that if selected, the SPO and the FPO will make a proposal to form a government with the FPO with probability $1 - r = .977$, and the equilibrium policies are parameterized by $\lambda_{12} = \lambda_{21} = 7/9$ and $\lambda_{31} = \lambda_{32} = 6/11$. The prediction is thus that it is highly likely that either the SPO or the OVP will be selected to form a government, and whichever party is selected will form a government with the support of the FPO. The policy implemented will be close to the ideal point of the party selected.

If a fixed order of selection, rather than probabilistic selection is employed, it is most likely that only the SPO and the OVP would be given the opportunity to form a government. The appropriate model is thus that in which two parties alternate in attempting to form a government. If the larger of the two parties is selected first, the equilibrium has the SPO forming a government with the support of the FPO, and the policy implemented is parameterized by $\lambda_{13} \geq 3/8$.

The 1974 election in Luxembourg sent five parties to the 59-seat parliament. Two small parties, the Communists and the Popular Independents, each had 5 seats. The three larger parties had the following number of seats: Christian Social party (CSV) 18, Socialists (LSAP) 17, and Liberals (DP) 14. Note that any two of the three largest parties constitutes a majority and that two of those three parties is required. The government was formed by the LSAP and the DP. The dimensions identified by the factor analysis are labeled "social justice" and "new issues," and the ideal point of the DP is equally distant from the ideal points of the other two parties with $\gamma = 2/3$.

If probabilistic selection were used and only the three largest parties could be selected, the probabilities that the LSAP and CSV would be selected are approximately equal and the probability that the DP would be selected is $p = 2/7$. The equilibrium then has $r = .2$, $\lambda_{12} = \lambda_{21} = .6$, $\lambda_{13} = .4$, and $\lambda_{31} = .4$. The government thus is highly likely ($\varrho_3 = .86$) to involve the DP. The policy implemented, however, will be closer to the ideal point of the other party than to that of the DP.

If selection were according to a fixed order determined by the size of the three largest parties, the government would be formed by the CSV and the LSAP. The equilibrium policies are parameterized by $\lambda_{12} = 1/2$, $\lambda_{23} = 1/4$, and $\lambda_{31} = 3/4$. This model thus predicts that the policy that will be implemented is midway between the ideal points of the two parties. If only the two largest parties have an opportunity to form a government, the equilibrium is that whichever of the two (LSAP or CSV) has the opportunity to form a government will do so with the DP. The equilibrium policy is then parameterized by $\lambda_{13} \geq 1/4$.

As these examples indicate, the predictions of the theory can be sensitive to the nature of the selection process. The predictions, however, are amenable to systematic empirical analysis. For the two examples given here, the models with probabilistic selection and with two parties alternating in attempting to form a government predict fairly well the government formed.

Conclusions

This theory characterizes political bargaining over government formation in a system with a minimal institutional structure. Although the equilibria characterized are based on the restriction of stationarity, the theory is explicit about what is anticipated to happen in the event that a proposal is rejected and the bargaining continues. Those expectations are endogenous and are based on subgame perfect strategies that generate continuation values that parties use to determine both whether they will give their support to a policy proposal and what proposal to make if they have an opportunity to form a government. In equilibrium, parties make proposals that reflect their and the other parties' future opportunities to make and to support or to oppose policy proposals. The theory thus provides a set of internally consistent predictions about government formation. Those predictions are in general probabilistic and institution-dependent, and the theory indicates that a variety of governments could form depending on preferences and on the structure of the formation process. The predictions are thus induced by preferences and by institutional structure.

Although the equilibria depend on structure and preferences, they share several qualitative features. First, the equilibrium policy proposals reflect the preferences of the parties out, as well as in, the government. Second, a small party is very likely to be in the government under either a probabilistic selection procedure or a fixed order involving the two larger parties. Third, a centrally located party is highly likely to have the government policy located at or near its ideal point, establishing another version of the median voter theorem.

The predictions of the theory can be tested using data on the parties that constitute the government and/or using data on the policies implemented by the government. In either case, testing the predictions requires information on the selection process and a characterization of the stationary equilibrium corresponding to the outcome of each election. Any such test would be a joint test of the theory and of the stationarity restriction. Since the set of possible governments is finite and the predictions of the theory are probabilistic, a discrete choice procedure would be appropriate to test the prediction of which parties constitute or support the government. A stronger test would be based on the policies implemented by the government.

Although the theory pertains to government formation, it may also be capable of providing insight into when a government will fail. Of course, governments may end because of mandatory elections, but they may also dissolve because of a change in preferences either on the part of the government parties or on the part of a nongovernment party. If, for example, preferences of one of the government parties change, a party may prefer to dissolve the government and take its chances on the formation of a new government or on an election. This incentive depends on the selection process as well as on the expectations that parties have about the subsequent equilibrium.

This spatial bargaining theory may also be applicable to a number of issues not considered here. The preferences of parties have been taken as given, but those preferences and their associated policy statements are in some cases the result of bargaining among party factions. That bargaining may be governed not by majority rule but rather by supermajority rule or even unanimity. This theory can be extended to such cases but should incorporate the possibility of party splitting and mergers. The spatial bargaining theory may also be applied to intercountry bargaining that may be governed by majority rule or by unanimity as in the case of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the European Community.

The government formation problem takes political parties as given, but an extension of this theory to the formation of political parties may be possible; that is, if a set of individuals, each of whom acts noncooperatively, finds it in their interest to make policy proposals that attract the support of those within that set, the basis for a party can be imagined. In this setting, this would provide a theory of legislative parties, or parties with a legislative origin. The party as such is identified endogenously by the equilibrium strategies that specify which members propose policies intended to attract the support of which other members. The same alignment of interests that results in those policies then could give rise to electoral strategies intended to secure seats in the legislature. The electoral strategies then can provide the basis for sustaining those policies.

This model also indicates the legislative origins of electoral incentives. In a political system with a fixed order of recognition in which the largest party is selected first to attempt to form a government, each party has an incentive to compete for seats in the parliament. If the ideal points are equidistant, however, the values to the largest two parties are equal, so that the incentive is to finish either first or second but not last. If only the two largest parties may be selected, a party prefers to finish first and then third but not second. With probabilistic recognition, the incentive may be similar.

Appendix A: Characterization of an Equilibrium with Probabilistic Selection

In the case considered, all three parties randomize their proposal making in equilibrium. If party 3 is selected, it will make with probability r_3 a proposal that party 1 will accept or $U_1(x^{31}) = V_1$. Party 2, if selected, will with probability $1 - r_2$ make a proposal that party 1 will accept or $U_1(x^{21}) = V_1$. Using equation 1, these two conditions imply that $-\lambda_{31}^2 D_{31}^2 = -\lambda_{21}^2 D_{12}^2$, or

$$\lambda_{31} = \frac{D_{12}}{D_{31}} \lambda_{21}. \tag{A1}$$

The same analysis for proposals that party 2 would accept implies that

$$\lambda_{32} = \frac{D_{12}}{D_{32}} \lambda_{12}, \tag{A2}$$

and the same analysis for proposals that party 3 would accept implies that $\lambda_{23} = (D_{13}/D_{23})\lambda_{13}$. Randomization by party 3 implies that $U_3(x^{31}) = U_3(x^{32})$ or that

$$-(1-\lambda_{31})^2 D_{31}^2 = -(1-\lambda_{32})^2 D_{32}^2, \tag{A3}$$

or

$\lambda_{31} = 1 - (D_{32}/D_{31})(1 - \lambda_{32})$. Substituting equations A1 and A2 into A3 yields $\lambda_{21} = \lambda_{12} + (D_{31} - D_{32})/D_{21}$. Party 1 will randomize only if $U_1(x^{12}) = U_1(x^{13})$, which implies that $\lambda_{13} = 1 - (D_{12}/D_{13})(1 - \lambda_{12})$.

For the case in which $D_{31} = D_{32}$, let γ

$\equiv D_{31}/D_{12}$. Symmetry implies that $r \equiv r_1 = 1 - r_2$, $\lambda_{12} = \lambda_{21}$, $\lambda_{13} = \lambda_{23}$, and $\lambda_{31} = \lambda_{32} = (1/\gamma)\lambda_{12}$. Using equations 1, A1, and A2, $C^1_{23} = C^2_{13} = -(\gamma^2 - 1/2)D^2_{12}$ and $C^1_{32} = C^2_{31} = C^3_{21} = C^3_{12} = -(1/2)D^2_{12}$, equations 6 and 7 depend only on λ_{12}, r, and r_3: respectively,

$$\lambda_{12}[(1-p)((1-1/2\gamma)(1-r)+1)+p/\gamma-pr_3/\gamma] - (1-p)((1-r)(1-1/2\gamma)-1/2)-1 + pr_3 = 0 \tag{A4}$$

and

$$\lambda_{12}[(1-p)((1-1/2\gamma)(1-r)+1)+pr_3/\gamma] - (1-p)((1-r)(1-1/2\gamma)+1/2)-pr_3 = 0.$$

These two conditions are identical when $r_3 = 1/2$.

The value equation for V_3 is independent of r_3 when party 3 randomizes, and equation 8 simplifies to

$$\lambda_{12}(-2p - r(1-p)) + p + r(1-p) = 0, \text{ so that}$$

$$\lambda_{12} = \frac{p + r(1-p)}{2p + r(1-p)}. \tag{A5}$$

Note that λ_{12} is in the interval [.5, 1] so that party 1 makes a proposal that is closer to its ideal point than to the ideal point of its government partner. Substituting (A5) into (A4) and solving for r with $r_3 = .5$ yields equation 9. The characterization in equations 10–16 then follows.

Appendix B: Characterization of the Equilibrium with a Centrally Located Fourth Party

If party 1 randomizes between parties 2 and 4, then $U_1(x^{12}) = U_1(x^{14})$, which implies that $-(1-\lambda_{12})^2D^2_{12} = -(1-\gamma_{14})^2D^2_{14}$ and, using $D_{12} = \sqrt{3}D_{14}$, that

$$\lambda_{14} = 1 - \sqrt{3}(1-\lambda_{12}). \tag{B1}$$

Similarly, if both parties 3 and 2 make proposals to attract the support of party 1, then $U_1(x^{21}) = V_1 = U_1(x^{31})$, which implies that $\lambda_{21} = \lambda_{31}$. The proposals that party 4 will make will be such that they attract the support of one other party, and such a proposal satisfies $U_i(x^{4i}) \geq V_i$. Party 4 will propose its ideal point whenever $U_i(t^4) \geq V_i$, and the equilibrium in this case can be shown to be such that $x^{4i} = t^4$, $i = 1, 2, 3$, which implies that $\lambda_{41} = 1$.

Symmetry implies that parties 1, 2, and 3 will employ the same randomization, and each will make a proposal to attract the support of the other two perimeter parties with probability r and with probability $1 - 2r$ will make a proposal to attract the support of party 4. Party 4 will randomize among the other three parties with probability 1/3. The values for parties 1, 2, and 3 will be the same; and the value V, using the expression for party 1, is given by

$$\begin{aligned} V = {} & \frac{1}{4}[rU_1(x^{12}) + rU_1(x^{13}) \\ & + (1-2r)U_1(x^{14})] + \frac{1}{4}[rU_1(x^{21}) \\ & + rU_1(x^{23}) + (1-2r)U_1(x^{24})] \\ & + \frac{1}{4}[rU_1(x^{31}) + rU_1(x^{32}) \\ & + (1-2r)U_1(x^{34})] \\ & + \frac{1}{4}\left[\frac{1}{3}U_1(x^{41}) + \frac{1}{3}U_1(x^{42})\right. \\ & \left. + \frac{1}{3}U_1(x^{43})\right]. \end{aligned} \tag{B2}$$

Then, using $U_1(x^{21}) = U_1(x^{31}) = V$, $x^{41} = x^{42} = x^{43} = t^4$, and noting that symmetry implies that $U_1(x^{24}) = U_1(x^{34})$ and $U_1(x^{32}) = U_1(x^{23})$, equation B2 is

$$(1 - \frac{r}{2})V = \frac{1}{4}U_1(x^{14})$$

$$+ \frac{r}{2} U_1(x^{23})$$

$$+ \frac{(1-2r)}{2} U_1(x^{24}) + \frac{1}{4} U_1(t^4).$$

Substituting equations 1–3 yields

$$(1 - \frac{r}{2})V = - \frac{1}{4}(1 - \lambda_{14})^2 D_{14}^2$$

$$+ \frac{r}{2}(-\lambda_{12}^2 D_{12}^2 - D_{31}^2 - 2\lambda_{12}C_{23}^1)$$

$$+ \frac{(1-2r)}{2}(-\lambda_{12}^2 D_{14}^2 - D_{14}^2$$

$$- 2\lambda_{14}C_{24}^1) - \frac{1}{4} D_{14}^2.$$

Then, using $C_{23}^1 = -(1/2)D^2$, $C_{24}^1 = (1/6)D^2$, $D_{14} = D/\sqrt{3}$, and the expression for λ_{14} in equation B1 yields

$$(1 - \frac{r}{2})V = [- \frac{1}{4}(1 - \lambda_{12})^2$$

$$+ \frac{r}{2}(-\lambda_{12}^2 - 1 + \lambda_{12})$$

$$+ \frac{(1-2r)}{6}(-(1 - \sqrt{3}(1 - \lambda_{12}))^2$$

$$- 1 - (1 - \sqrt{3}(1 - \lambda_{12})))$$

$$- 1/12]D^2. \qquad \text{(B3)}$$

Finally, noting that $V = -\lambda_{12}^2 D^2$, equation B3 is an equation in only the variables r and λ_{12}.

The value V_4 is given by an expression analogous to equation B2 and may be simplified by noting that symmetry implies $U_4(x^{12}) = U_4(x^{13}) = U_4(x^{21}) = U_4(x^{23}) = U_4(x^{31}) = U_4(x^{32})$ and $U_4(t^4) = 0$. The value V_4 for party 4 is then given by

$$\left(1 - \frac{3(1-2r)}{4}\right)V_4 = \frac{3r}{2} U_4(x^{12})$$

$$+ \frac{1}{4} U_4(t^4)$$

$$= \frac{3r}{2} U_4(x^{12})$$

$$= \frac{3r}{2}(-\lambda_{12}^2 D_{12}^2 - D_{24}^2 - 2\lambda_{12}C_{12}^4).$$

Then, using $C_{12}^4 = -(1/2)D^2$ and $D_{14} = (1/\sqrt{3})D$ yields

$$V_4 = \frac{6r(-\lambda_{12}^2 - 1/3 + \lambda_{12})D^2}{1 + 6r}. \qquad \text{(B4)}$$

Finally, substituting $V_4 = -\lambda_{14}^2 D_{14}^2$ and equation B1, and solving equation B4 yields

$$r = \frac{(1 - \sqrt{3}(1 - \lambda_{12}))^2}{6\sqrt{3}(1 - \lambda_{12})(2 - \sqrt{3})}. \qquad \text{(B5)}$$

Similarly, solving equation B3 for r yields

$$r = \frac{(1/2)\lambda_{12}^2 - 8/3 + \sqrt{3} + \lambda_{12}(3 - \sqrt{3})}{\sqrt{3}(2 - \sqrt{3})(1 - \lambda_{12})} \qquad \text{(B6)}$$

Equating equations B5 and B6 yields $\lambda_{12} = .60566$ and $r = .0915$. Thus, $\lambda_{14} = .3170$.

Appendix C: Equilibrium with a Fixed Order Involving Three Parties

The structurally identical subgames are those in which the same party has an opportunity to form a government. Since a party will only make a proposal that will be accepted, working backward the value $V_3{}^3$ when party 3 has the opportunity to form the government is given by

$$V_3{}^3 = r_3 U_3(x^{31}) + (1 - r_3)U_3(x^{32}). \qquad \text{(C1)}$$

For $r_3 \in (0,1)$, equation C1 can be written, using equations 2 and 18, as

$$V_3{}^3 = U_3(x^{31}) = -(1 - \lambda_{31})^2 D_{31}^2$$

$$= -\left(1 - \frac{(-V_1{}^1)^{1/2^{2}}}{D_{31}}\right) D_{31}^2$$

$$= -(D_{31} - (-V_1{}^1)^{1/2})^2. \qquad \text{(C2)}$$

When party 2 has the opportunity to form the government and randomizes its proposals ($r_2 \in (0,1)$), party 3 will accept a proposal if it satisfies equation 18, which, using equations 1 and C2, implies

$$-\Lambda_{23}^2 D_{23}^2 = V_3{}^3 = -(D_{31} - (-V_1{}^1)^{1/2})^2.$$

Thus, $\lambda_{23} = (1/D_{23})(D_{31} - (-V_1{}^1)^{1/2})$.

The value $V_2{}^2$ for $r_2 \in (0,1)$, then, is

$$V_2{}^2 = U_2(x^{23}) = -(1 - \lambda_{23})^2 D_{23}^2$$
$$= -(D_{23} - (D_{31} - (-V_1{}^1)^{1/2}))^2.$$

When it has an opportunity to form a government, party 1 will make a proposal satisfying equation 17, which implies

$$-\lambda_{12}^2 D_{12}^2 = V_2{}^2 = -(D_{23} - (D_{31} - (-V_1{}^1)^{1/2}))^2,$$

$$\lambda_{12} = (1/D_{12})(D_{23} - (D_{31} - (-V_1{}^1)^{1/2})).$$

The value $V_1{}^1$ then is, for $r_1 \in (0,1)$,

$$V_1{}^1 = U_1(x^{12}) = -(1 - \lambda_{12})^2 D_{12}^2$$
$$= -(D_{12} - (D_{23} - (D_{31} - (-V_1{}^1)^{1/2})))^2. \qquad \text{(C3)}$$

Solving equation C3 yields $V_1{}^1 = -(1/4)(D_{12} - D_{23} + D_{31})^2$. Similarly,

$$V_2{}^2 = -(1/4)(D_{12} - D_{31} + D_{23})^2$$

and

$$V_3{}^3 = -(1/4)(D_{31} - D_{12} + D_{23})^2.$$

The corresponding proposals are parameterized by

$$\lambda_{12} = \frac{1}{2D_{12}}(D_{12} - D_{31} + D_{23}) \qquad \text{(C4)}$$

$$\lambda_{23} = \frac{1}{2D_{23}}(D_{23} - D_{12} + D_{31}) \qquad \text{(C5)}$$

$$\lambda_{31} = \frac{1}{2D_{31}}(D_{31} - D_{23} + D_{12}). \qquad \text{(C6)}$$

To determine if this is an equilibrium, it is necessary to verify that party *i* is willing to make the proposals identified in equations C4–C6. First, the randomization probabilities will be determined. If party 3 has the opportunity to form a government, it will strictly randomize if and only if

$$-(1 - \lambda_{31})^2 D_{31}^2 = -(1 - \lambda_{32})^2 D_{32}^2,$$

which implies that

$$\lambda_{32} = (1/(2D_{23}))(D_{23} - D_{31} + D_{12})^2.$$

The value $V_2{}^1$ then is

$$V_1{}^1 = -\lambda_{32}^2 D_{23}^2 = -(1/4)(D_{23} - D_{31} + D_{12})^2. \qquad \text{(C7)}$$

The value $V_2{}^1$ also satisfies

$$V_2{}^1 = r_1 U_2(x^{12}) + (1 - r_1) U_2(x^{13})$$
$$= -r_1 \lambda_{12}^2 + (1 - r_1)(-\lambda_{12}^2 D_{13}^2 - D_{32}^2 - 2\lambda_{13} C_{13}^2)$$
$$= -r_1(1/4)(D_{12} + D_{23} - D_{31})^2 + (1 - r_1)(-\lambda_{13}^2 D_{13}^2 - D_{32}^2 - 2\lambda_{13} C_{13}^2). \qquad \text{(C-8)}$$

Substituting equation C7 into equation C8 implies that $r_1 = 1$.

Next it is necessary to determine whether party 1 will prefer to make a proposal to party 2 as implied by $r_1 = 1$. This requires that $U_1(x^{12}) \geq U_1(x^{13})$ or

$$-(1 - \lambda_{12})^2 D_{12}^2 \geq -(1 - \lambda_{13})^2 D_{13}^2. \qquad \text{(C9)}$$

The parameter λ_{13} is determined from

$$-\lambda_{13}^2 D_{13}^2 = V_3{}^2 = U_3(x_{23}) = -\lambda_{23}^2 D_{23}^2,$$

since $r_1 = 1$. Consequently, $\lambda_{13} = (D_{23}/D_{13})\lambda_{23}$, and, using equation C5,

$$-(1 - \lambda_{13})^2 D_{13}^2 = -(D_{13} - \lambda_{23} D_{23})^2$$

$$= -(1/4)(D_{13} - D_{23} + D_{12})^2. \quad \text{(C10)}$$

Then, substituting equations C10 and C4 into equation C9 verifies that $r_1 = 1$ is optimal for party 1. The same analysis for the other two parties establishes the equilibrium.

Appendix D: An Alternate Equilibrium with a Fixed Order of Selection

This equilibrium is characterized by two conditions. Party 3 will accept party 1's proposal if $-\lambda_{13}^2 D_{13}^2 = V_3^2$; and since party 2 will make a proposal x^{21} that party 1 will accept, V_3^2 is given by

$$V_3^2 = U_3(x^{21}) = -\lambda_{21}^2 D_{21}^2 - D_{13}^2 - 2\lambda_{21} C_{21}^3.$$

These two conditions imply that

$$-\lambda_{13}^2 D_{13}^2 = -\lambda_{21}^2 D_{21}^2 - D_{13}^2 - 2\lambda_{21} C_{21}^3. \quad \text{(D1)}$$

A similar analysis yields for party 2

$$-\lambda_{32}^2 D_{32}^2 = V_2^1 = U_2(x^{13}) = -\lambda_{13}^2 D_{13}^2 - D_{32}^2 - 2\lambda_{13} C_{13}^2 \quad \text{(D2)}$$

and similarly for party 1

$$-\lambda_{21}^2 D_{21}^2 = V_1^3 = U_1(x^{32}) = -\lambda_{32}^2 D_{32}^2 - D_{12}^2 - 2\lambda_{32} C_{32}^1. \quad \text{(D3)}$$

Substituting equation D2 into equation D3 yields

$$-\lambda_{21}^2 D_{21}^2 = -\lambda_{13}^2 D_{13}^2 - D_{32}^2 - 2\lambda_{13} C_{13}^2 - D_{12}^2 - 2(1/D_{32})(\lambda_{13}^2 D_{13}^2 + D_{32}^2 + 2\lambda_{13} C_{13}^2)^{1/2} C_{32}^1. \quad \text{(D4)}$$

Then, substituting equation D4 into equation D1 yields

$$-\lambda_{13}^2 D_{13}^2 = -\lambda_{13}^2 D_{13}^2 - D_{32}^2 - 2\lambda_{13} C_{13}^2 - D_{12}^2 - 2(1/D_{32})(\lambda_{13}^2 D_{13}^2 + D_{32}^2 + 2\lambda_{13} C_{13}^2)^{1/2} C_{32}^1 - D_{13}^2 - 2C_{21}^3(1/D_{12})(\lambda_{13}^2 D_{13}^2 + D_{32}^2 + 2\lambda_{13} C_{13}^2 + D_{12}^2 + 2C_{32}^1(1/D_{32})(\lambda_{13}^2 D_{13}^2 + D_{32}^2 + 2\lambda_{13} C_{13}^2)^{1/2})^{1/2}. \quad \text{(D5)}$$

The solution of this equation can then be used to recover the parameters of the other proposals. It appears that for most locations of the ideal points no equilibrium satisfying this condition exists.

When the ideal points are equidistant, equation D5 reduces to

$$3 = \lambda_{13} + (\lambda_{13}^2 + 1 - \lambda_{13})^{1/2} + (\lambda_{13}^2 + 2 - \lambda_{13} - (\lambda_{13}^2 + 1 - \lambda_{13})^{1/2})^{1/2},$$

which has the solution $\lambda_{13} = 1$. This implies that $\lambda_{21} = \lambda_{32} = 1$, $V_1^1 = V_2^2 = V_3^3 = 0$, and $V_2^1 = V_3^1 = V_1^2 = V_3^2 = V_1^3 = V_2^3 = -D^2$.

Appendix E: Equilibria with Two Parties in the Selection Process

To establish the equilibrium, suppose that parties 1 and 2 will alternate in making proposals to form a government. In this case, both parties 1 and 2 will form a government with party 3 when they have an opportunity to do so. To verify that this is an equilibrium, note that party 1 will make a proposal, parameterized by λ_{13}, such that $-\lambda_{13}^2 D_{13}^2 = V_3^2$. Since party 2 will make a proposal that party 3 will accept, the value V_3^2 is given by

$$V_3^2 = U_3(x^{23}) = -\lambda_{23}^2 D_{23}^2, \quad \text{(E1)}$$

so that $\lambda_{13} = (D_{23}/D_{13})\lambda_{23}$. A similar argument for V_3^1 indicates that $V_3^1 = V_3^2$.

The value V_2^2 for party 2 when it has an opportunity to form a government is given by

$$V_2^2 = U_2(x^{23}) = -(1 - \lambda_{23})^2 D_{23}^2;$$

and substituting for λ_{23} from equation E1 yields $V_2^2 = -(D_{23} - D_{13}\lambda_{13})^2$. Defining λ_{12}^* as the parameter of the proposal that would be necessary if party 1 were to attract the support of party 2, that is, $-(\lambda_{12}^*)^2 D_{12}^2 = V_2^2$, then $\lambda_{12}^* = (1/D_{12})(D_{23} - D_{13}\lambda_{13})$. Party 1 will thus make a proposal to attract the support of party 3 whenever

$$\begin{aligned} U_1(x_{12}) &= -(1 - \lambda_{12}^*)^2 D_{12}^2 \\ &= -(D_{12} - D_{23} + D_{13}\lambda_{13})^2. \end{aligned}$$

Then,

$$\begin{aligned} &U_1(x^{12}) \leq U_1(x^{13}) \leftrightarrow \lambda_{13} \geq (1/(2D_{13})) \\ &\quad (D_{13} - D_{12} + D_{23}). \end{aligned} \tag{E2}$$

Repeating the same argument to determine the proposal, parameterized by λ_{21}^*, of party 2 that would be necessary to attract the support of party 1 yields

$$\begin{aligned} &U_2(x^{23}) \leq U_2(x^{21}) \leftrightarrow \lambda_{23} \\ &\quad \geq (1/(2D_{13}))(D_{13} - D_{12} - D_{23}). \end{aligned}$$

This implies that any value $V_3^1 = V_3^2$ satisfying $V_3^1 = V_3^2 \leq -(1/4)(D_{23} - D_{12} + D_{13})^2$ can be supported as an equilibrium.

The prediction of this theory is thus that the government is formed by party 1 and party 3 and that the equilibrium policy x^{13} is no farther from the ideal point of party 1 than indicated by the bound on λ_{13} in equation E2. As an example, consider the case in which the ideal points are equidistant. Then, $\lambda_{13} \geq 1/2$ and $-D^2 \leq V_3^1 = V_3^2 \leq -(1/4)D^2$, $0 \geq V_1^1 = V_2^2 \geq -(1/4)D^2$, and $-D^2 \leq V_2^1 = V_1^2 \leq -(3/4)D^2$.

Notes

The paper was prepared while I was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. The research was supported by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and National Science Foundation grants SES-8808211 and BNS-8700864. I thank Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle for helpful comments.

1. The empirical literature on government formation is extensive and includes Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987; Daalder 1986; de Swaan 1973; Dodd 1976; Laver and Budge n.d.; Laver and Schofield 1990; Robertson 1986; and Strom 1986, 1990.

2. Since preferences are assumed to remain constant, this implies that a subsequent vote of no confidence would not occur. In the context of this theory, a change in government would occur only through a change in underlying preferences or by the revelation of information. Consequently, the issue of the strategic call for an election before the mandated date is not addressed here.

3. The model may also be applied to interfaction bargaining over party policy preferences.

4. Data from the manifesto project are used to represent preferences in the applications presented below.

5. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) provide an example of government formation in the context of a purely distributive setting in which parties have diametrically opposed preferences. In a model with the same preference structure, Baron (1989) considers the incentives to form legislative coalitions that coordinate proposal making but not voting.

6. Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) provide a theory that incorporates these features.

7. See Baron and Ferejohn 1989 for a characterization of the set of equilibria under majority rule for a divide-the-dollar game.

8. Parties thus do not have policy preferences, although they do in effect at the coalition formation stage because of the positions they took during the election to which voters hold them accountable.

9. This may be thought of as voters penalizing parties for the difference between what they say and what they do. The specification of preferences in their model implies that even though a party is not in the government, it may be penalized by voters as a function of the position it took and of the policy implemented by a government in which it does not participate.

10. These two assumptions allow the equilibrium to be determined by backward induction.

11. In the equidistant case, another equilibrium exists in which the government is formed by the first and the third parties. The equilibrium policy in this case is the ideal point of the party that has the opportunity to form the government.

12. In many countries, it is more appropriate to view a party as consisting of factions that bargain among themselves regarding policies. Laver and Shepsle (1989) consider factions in the context of their model of ministerial discretion.

13. The model does not have an explicit status quo that parameterizes the equilibrium. This corresponds to the notion that government formation proceeds expeditiously, so that the status quo does not prevail for long.

14. The government formation process is viewed

as taking place expeditiously, so that time preference will not be considered.

15. This includes the case of a political system with more than three parties if any two of the parties that might be selected to attempt to form a government can constitute a majority. This also implies that the equilibria are independent of the size of the parties; that is, because any two parties constitute a majority, what matters is the policy preferences of the parties and the likelihood that the parties will be selected to attempt to form a government.

16. That is, weakly dominated voting strategies are eliminated.

17. The fixed order of selection considered below may be interpreted as a case in which the probabilities change at each stage.

18. In this case, there is a continuum of equilibria with mixed strategies, all of which yield the same values as with equal randomization and involve the same proposals (x^{12}, x^{13}, x^{21}, x^{23}, x^{31}, x^{32}) identified in Figure 2. For example, one is (x^{12}, x^{23}, x^{31}) with probability 1, and another is policies (x^{13}, x^{21}, x^{32}) with probability 1. The other equilibria are "balanced" randomizations that yield the same values as with equal randomization. This multiplicity of equilibria is special to the case of symmetric locations of ideal points.

19. See Aumann and Maschler 1964 and Ordeshook 1986, chap. 9.

20. See Schofield, Grofman, and Feld 1988; and Schofield 1989.

21. This result is contrary to Axelrod's (1970) notion of a minimal connected coalition. The coalition in this case may be viewed as connected; but it is not minimal, since all parties support the same policy.

22. Note that the total value of the game is lower in this equilibrium than in the equilibrium characterized above.

23. Budge and Laver have generously provided me with their recent data, which is as yet unpublished.

References

Aumann, Robert J., and M. Maschler. 1964. "The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games." In *Advances in Game Theory*, ed. Melvin Drescher. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey Banks. 1988. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes." *American Political Science Review* 82: 405–22.

Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey Banks. 1990. "Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios." *American Political Science Review* 84:891–906.

Axelrod, Robert. 1970. *Conflict of Interest.* Chicago: Markham.

Baron, David P. 1989. "A Noncooperative Theory of Legislative Coalitions." *American Journal of Political Science* 33:1048–84.

Baron, David P., and John A. Ferejohn. 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 83:1181–1206.

Black, Duncan. 1958. *The Theory of Committees and Elections.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Budge, Ian, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl, eds. 1987. *Ideology, Strategy, and Party Change: Spatial Analyses of Post-War Election Programmes in Nineteen Democracies.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Daalder, Hans. 1986. "Changing Procedures and Changing Strategies in Dutch Coalition Formation." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 11:507–31.

de Swaan, Abram. 1973. *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Dodd, Laurence C. 1976. *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Horner, F. 1987. "Austria: 1945–1978." In *Ideology, Strategy, and Party Change,* ed. Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Laver, Michael, and Ian Budge. N.d. *Party Policy and Coalition Government.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. Forthcoming.

Laver, Michael, and Norman Schofield. 1990. *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. Forthcoming.

Laver, Michael, and Kenneth Shepsle. 1990. "Coalitions and Cabinet Government." *American Political Science Review* 84:873–90.

Laver, Michael, and Kenneth Shepsle. 1989. "Government Coalitions and Intraparty Politics." Harvard University. Typescript.

McKelvey, Richard D., Peter C. Ordeshook, and M. Weiner. 1978. "The Competitive Solution for *n*-Person Games without Transferable Utility with an Application to Committee Games." *American Political Science Review* 72:599–615.

Ordeshook, Peter C. 1986. *Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Riker, William. 1962. *The Theory of Political Coalitions.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Robertson, J. D. 1986. "Economic Polarization and Cabinet Formation in Western Europe." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 11:533–49.

Schofield, Norman. 1989. "Strategy of Party Competition." Washington University. Typescript.

Schofield, Norman, Bernard Grofman, and S. L. Feld. 1988. "The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games." *American Political Science Review* 82:195–211.

Strom, Kaare. 1986. "Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 11:583–605.

Strom, Kaare. 1990. *Minority Government and Majority Rule.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

David P. Baron is William R. Kimball Professor of Business, Economics, and the Environment, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305.

THE IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNING ON MIDTERM U.S. SENATE ELECTIONS

JEFFREY E. COHEN
MICHAEL A. KRASSA
University of Illinois
Urbana
JOHN A. HAMMAN
Southern Illinois University
Carbondale

The conventional wisdom about presidential campaigning in midterm Senate elections is that presidential efforts lack impact or have negative impact. We discuss conceptual problems with the conventional view and offer an alternative that views presidential campaigning as strategic. We test this alternative and find support for it. Further, we find that presidential campaign efforts have a positive impact on the vote through the mobilization of nonvoters. Finally, in a significant number of cases, presidential campaigning may have been the margin of victory for candidates of the president's party. We discuss the implications of these findings on assessments of the president and relations with Congress during the second half of the term.

The conventional wisdom of journalists and politicians asserts that a president's attempts to help his party's senatorial candidates in midterm elections usually fail.[1] Midterm elections are assumed to be referenda on the president; and as presidential popularity dips from the onset of the administration to the midterm, losses of seats attend.[2] As a result, presidents can rarely have much impact. For instance, one journalist writes about Lyndon Johnson and the poor Democratic showing in 1966: "In light of the election results, it was probably just as well for President Johnson that he canceled the political tour that he had set up for the weekend before the election in favor of a pre-operation rest. . . . Of ten states that were on the tentative presidential schedule, all but Montana saw Democrats lose, which would have been a rather sorry reward for Mr. Johnson" (Weaver 1966, 28).

Similar comments were made about President Ford's efforts in 1974: "President Ford's impact on the campaign this fall was minimal despite his gruelling month-long Republican rescue mission that took him 16,685 miles through 20 of the 50 states" (Hunter 1974, 32; see also Congressional Quarterly 1974, 3091).

Even President Nixon, whose party fared better than expected in 1970, was thought to have had little impact: "The President's campaigning failed to produce enough Republican Senate victories for a Republican majority. . . . The impact of a Presidential appearance is unclear. In several races in which the President personally intervened, one member of the Senate–Governorship campaign team lost while the other won" (Congressional

Table 1. Presidential Campaigning and Midterm U.S. Senate Elections (%)

	Winners		
Year	With President Campaigning	With President Not Campaigning	Difference
1966	44.4 (4/9)	41.7 (10/24)	2.7
1970	36.4 (8/22)	25.0 (3/12)	11.4
1974	29.4 (5/17)	35.7 (5/14)	-6.3
1978	30.8 (4/13)	46.7 (10/21)	-16.8
1982	45.5 (5/11)	36.4 (8/22)	9.1
1986	27.8 (5/18)	56.3 (9/16)	-28.5
Mean	34.4 (31/90)	41.3 (45/109)	-6.9

Note: Figures exclude races not contested in the general election but include special elections to fill midterm vacancies.

Quarterly 1970, 2755; see also Roberts 1970, 39).

And the few times that presidents were credited with impact, it was thought to be negative. Reagan's efforts in 1986 provide one dramatic example. Despite relatively high popularity levels and a vigorous schedule, only 5 of the 18 Republican senatorial candidates for whom Reagan campaigned won (Broder 1986, A-19). Thus, despite strong efforts and even when the party does well, the impact of a president's campaign effort is thought to be trivial or negative.

A number of conceptual and theoretical problems plague the conventional wisdom. If presidential campaigning is so fruitless, why do presidents campaign so often? Of the 199 contested midterm elections from 1966 to 1986, presidents campaigned in 90 (45.2%). The conventional wisdom's assumption that midterm contests are referenda on the president shifts responsibility for losing from the candidate to the president. Blaming these losses on the president harms his reputation, one of Neustadt's (1960) pillars of presidential power. Under such adverse and damaging conditions, why would presidents campaign? The conventional wisdom has a difficult time accounting for presidential motivations and behavior.

Moreover, the conventional wisdom focuses too exclusively on the win-loss ratio of Senate candidates for whom the president campaigns, which makes presidential effort look dismal. For instance, across all midterm Senate contests from 1966 through 1986, candidates for whom the president campaigned lost 65.6% of the time. However, in three out of six of these midterm contests presidentially supported candidates fared better than those for whom the president did not campaign (see Table 1).

Rather than focus on a crude win-loss rate, as the conventional wisdom does, it makes more sense to ask whether presidential campaigning added to, or subtracted from, the candidate's vote total and whether that increment was large enough to affect the election's outcome. On these crucial issues, the conventional wisdom is silent. Thus, the conventional wisdom is deficient on a number of counts. It fails to explain presidential motivations to campaign, and it is based on a very crude assessment of the impact of campaigning.

First, we consider the presidential decision to campaign. We find that presidents campaign for candidates for whom they think campaigning can make a difference; they do not campaign for those who look like sure winners or losers. Second, we find that after holding constant other influences on the vote, presidential campaigning has a statistically significant and *positive* impact on the vote. Further, this effect is large enough to turn election tides in relatively close contests.

The Rationality of Presidential Campaigning

Assumptions and Motivations

Why do presidents campaign in some races, but not in others? We begin with two assumptions about presidential campaign appearances. First, we conceive of a president's time (and thus campaign appearances) as a scarce resource. Presidents, therefore, develop an appearance allocation strategy that maximizes presidentially preferred outcomes. Second, presidents are primarily interested in programmatic success in Congress. They desire a supportive Congress, which usually means increasing their party's control of legislative seats. Presidents are thus more likely to campaign where they will safeguard a threatened seat or help wrest a seat from the opposition. Further, they will avoid campaigning if it will damage the electoral prospects of copartisans. In other words, presidential campaigning is a problem of political action, where presidents are concerned with the marginal expected utility of their action. Rational presidents will campaign for a supporter only when the expected marginal benefits from electing that supporter are greater than the costs of campaigning for him.

To derive a benefit from campaigning, a presidential campaign appearance must have some impact. Under what conditions will it have an impact? Impact depends upon the number of voters that the president can sway and whether that number is sufficient to determine who wins. A president must thus make some estimates of the votes each candidate in an election will receive and determine whether a campaign appearance is necessary for his copartisan to win. If his copartisan appears a likely and easy winner, the president need not intervene. If the copartisan does not possess such an advantage, the president must estimate whether a campaign appearance can help sway enough voters to the copartisan's side, resulting in the copartisan's victory. If the president cannot sway enough voters, the president will not campaign.

A president may sway more votes the more popular he is in the state; and the combination of popularity and competitiveness determines if he can sway enough voters to affect the election outcome. However, if the president is not popular, he may damage the candidate's prospects (a possible *cost* of campaigning). Further, when a seat is safely in opposition hands, he may not be able to sway enough voters to affect the final outcome.

Similarly, presidents with lower levels of programmatic success in Congress may derive a larger benefit from increasing their party's control of seats. If a president's party is hegemonic and/or support of his program is usually guaranteed, the loss of a program supporter may not make much difference. Only when seat losses might undermine the passage of his program will campaigning be beneficial. Hence, presidents who have smaller and/or less stable congressional support coalitions, as witnessed by lower levels of floor success, will derive greater marginal benefits from campaigning.

Thus far, we have focused mostly on the benefits of campaigning. However, campaigning also entails costs. Some of these costs are constant across races; others are variable. For our purposes, the *constant* costs constrain the total number of appearances rather than determine appearance prioritization—and thus are relatively trivial.

Variable costs are more important to us because they help us understand how presidents prioritize the races that they will consider entering. Some of these are associated with failed campaign efforts and may include the loss of public prestige and image that accompany an association with a losing campaign, as well as the risk of increasing the legislative activism of the opponent against whom the president campaigned. Thus, presidential popularity in part determines the probability of an appearance, but it also influences the chance that the president must bear the cost of being associated with a losing candidate.

Other variable costs relate to possible effects on the strength of the opponent's campaign. If the president's campaign appearance improves the opponent's ability to secure financing or increases his popularity among constituent groups, the president may have done more harm than good. The probability of bearing such costs (while not directly related to the probability of winning the election) may be related to election outcomes, since they should also be a function of presidential popularity.

Model and Data

We operationalize these ideas as follows:

$$CA = f\,(\text{COMPET, POPULARITY, PFAILURE}),$$

where CA is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the president campaigned or not, COMPET is whether the contest is competitive as opposed to safe) for either party,[3] POPULARITY is the difference between the vote for the president and the number two candidate in the previous presidential election at the state level, and PFAILURE is the percentage of legislative losses in the last legislative session where the president took a position.[4] The COMPET and POPULARITY variables measure the probability that the president's campaign appearance will have an effect, while the failure variable measures the expected benefit. We expect positive signs between each variable and campaign appearances.

The dependent variable is a measure of whether or not the president campaigned in the midterm Senate race and is coded one if he campaigned, zero if not. A number of standards can be used to measure presidential support for a senatorial candidate. The one that we employ is relatively conservative; to be considered to have supported a Senate candidate, for our purposes, the president must have visited the state during the campaign and made an explicit appearance for the candidate. Appearing in the state for any other reason does not constitute a campaign appearance. Further, the president must overtly express support for the senatorial candidate while campaigning. We use multiple sources to determine whether a president campaigned, including the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, the *New York Times*, the *Public Papers of the President*, or the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*. We read the actual text of speeches to determine whether the president overtly supported the senatorial candidate.

Results

The data used to test the hypotheses include all contested Senate midterm elections from 1966 through 1986.[5] Results of the probit analysis on the *campaign/not campaign* dichotomy are presented in Table 2. All three independent variables are statistically significant, and their signs point in the direction predicted by the cost-benefit strategy outlined above.[6] As expected, these estimates show that presidents are more likely to campaign in a state where the vote spread in the previous presidential election was wide, the Senate race is competitive, and the

Table 2. Probit Results on Whether or Not Presidents Will Campaign in a U.S. Senate Midterm, 1966–86

Variable	Maximum Likelihood Estimate	Standard Error	t-ratio
POPULARITY	.014	.005	2.68
COMPET	1.06	.21	5.07
PFAILURE	.015	.003	5.39
Percent correct	64.5	—	—
Log-likelihood	–116.61	—	—
Baseline	54.6	—	—
Number of cases	194	—	—

presidential floor loss rate in Congress is high.

The model also demonstrates some statistical power. By chance alone, presidents will campaign in 45.4% of all races. This chance prediction can serve as a baseline against which to measure the power of the model. Our three-variable model represents an improvement of 9.9 percentage points over the baseline with 64.5% correctly predicted, an increase of nearly 20% in predictive ability. Clearly, there is a rational calculation on the part of presidents in deciding when to campaign.

These results offer strong support for our argument: if presidents strategically decide when to campaign, it should follow that their efforts will pay off. If campaigning has negative or trivial impacts, as the conventional wisdom asserts, experience over time would lead presidents away from such interventions. The conventional wisdom cannot explain this rational component to presidential campaigning.

The Impact of Campaign Appearances

Our results thus far undermine the conventional wisdom. Unlike that wisdom, we find that presidents strategically campaign where their impact might make the most difference and when they are in the greatest need of congressional support. However, to overturn the conventional wisdom decisively, campaign appearances must also have an impact on the vote that in some cases is large enough to turn election tides.

General Estimation and Data Considerations

Clearly, presidential campaign appearances do not singularly determine the vote. To calibrate the impact of campaigning, we must control for other influences on the vote by estimating a baseline. The literature on midterm and Senate voting leads us to expect incumbency, senatorial candidate campaign efforts, and noncampaign presidential effects on the vote;[7] these factors will constitute our baseline. Further, we must control for any effects peculiar to specific election years that may exist (e.g., Watergate in 1974). Our general model takes the following form:

$$\text{PVOTE} = f\,(\text{year, baseline, presidential campaign effects}),$$

where the vote is a function of year-specific events, the baseline model, and presidential campaign effects.

The data used for this test pool the CPS/NES midterm election studies from 1974 through 1986; extending the data set much earlier is not practical because too many useful variables are absent. However, we also present an analysis of a 1970–86 pooling. This longer series excludes one important variable from the model—campaign expenditures—which was not available until 1974. As we show below, substantive interpretations of the two series are essentially identical. We pool the data to provide an opportunity to build a more general explanation than would be possible if we relied on only one contest.

We operationalize the model presented above with the following equation:

PVOTE = constant + (year dummy variables) + (rescaled party ID) + (presidential feeling thermometer) + (presidential party candidate campaign expenditures [%]) + (whether opposition party incumbent ran) + (whether the president campaigned) + (error term).

We define the dependent variable (PVOTE) as whether or not a voter cast his or her ballot for the senatorial candidate of the president's party. (Nonvoters and those from states without Senate contests are excluded.) The year dummy variables identify election-specific factors that may affect the vote. Such factors do not help build a generic model but may be important in reducing spurious effects associated with the variable of interest.

Four variables estimate the baseline: party identification, the presidential feeling thermometer, campaign spending, and opposition party incumbency status. As party identification is found to be among the most important determinants of the vote, even in midterm contests, we include it in the model. We rescaled the standard seven-point index so that high values (six) denote strong partisans of the president's party and low values (zero) strong partisans of the opposition party.

Public assessments of the president also may affect midterm voting (Kernell 1977). To measure this referendum effect, we use the presidential feeling thermometers, which are only available from 1970 through 1986.[8] Failure to control for this may confound campaign attempts with referenda or popularity-induced voting.

Incumbency has also been shown to be a powerful influence on congressional elections. We use a dummy variable for whether or not an opposition incumbent was running to account for incumbency effects. Experimentation with a simpler *incumbent/open seat* variable and another dummy for presidential party incumbent showed no effects, and were thus eliminated from the equation.

Congressional election studies now uniformly find that campaign expenditures affect the vote. Our expenditure variable is operationalized as the presidential party candidate's percentage of the two-party total expenditure in the election. Last, we include the dummy variable indicating whether or not the president campaigned.

Missing from the equation is one important factor: candidate-voter issue proximities. The data do not exist prior to 1978; nor do they exist uniformly since then. Using them would thus seriously limit our data series. However, as we will demonstrate, our model remains strong.

Analysis and Results

We estimate the model using probit regression. Results are presented in Table 3. The model currectly predicts 78% of the cases, a 23.7% improvement over the baseline (the vote split). Even with the limitations noted, the model is quite powerful.

The coefficients also behave reasonably. The constant (−2.36) indicates, as expected, that candidates of the president's party receive fewer votes than those from the opposition, which helps explain why the conventional wisdom exists. However, the dummy variables for years are statistically insignificant, indicating that no events or factors specific to any midterm had an impact on the vote decision.[9]

Table 3. Impact of Presidential Campaigning on Midterm Senate Voting, 1970–86

	1970–86			1974–86		
Variable	Maximum Likelihood Estimate	Standard Error	*t*-ratio	Maximum Likelihood Estimate	Standard Error	*t*-ratio
Constant	-2.004	—	—	-2.359	—	—
1974 dummy	.043	.087	.49	—	—	—
1978 dummy	.252	.078	3.23	.096	.010	1.07
1982 dummy	.210	.092	2.27	.088	.093	.95
1986 dummy	.112	.080	1.39	-.119	.091	-1.30
Presidential feeling thermometer	.010	.001	9.51	.011	.001	7.87
Presidential party ID	.342	.013	25.89	.324	.016	19.62
Opposition incumbent	-.259	.080	-3.23	-.228	.099	-2.30
Spending	—	—	—	1.070	.150	7.10
Presidential campaign	.188	.052	3.61	.145	.066	2.26
	Number of cases = 3,740 (1 = 1,689; 0 = 2,051)			Number of cases = 2,300 (1 = 1,051; 0 = 1,249)		
Percent correctly predicted	77.9			78		
Log-likelihood	1562.43, 8 df			966.5, 8 df		
Pseudo R^2s						
Maddala	.34			.34		
Craig-Uhler	.46			.46		
McFadden	.30			.30		
Adj. McFadden	.30			.30		
Chow	.37			.37		
Hensher-Johnson normalized success index	.371			.371		

The rescaled party identification variable is very potent, with a striking *t*-ratio (almost 20); the feeling thermometer, similarly, is strong and has a positive influence on the vote. Also as expected, the presence of an opposition incumbent reduces the likelihood of a vote for a candidate of the president's party. Lastly, campaign spending demonstrates a strong impact on the vote decision.

Most crucial for our argument, presidential campaigning has a significant and positive effect on the vote choice. When presidents campaign, senatorial candidates of their party do better. To check for the generality of the results, we dropped each year one at a time and reestimated the equation. In each case results differed only trivially. No substantive interpretations were altered, and only slight changes in the magnitude of coefficients were seen. Hence, specific midterm contests do not determine the general findings reported here.

To better understand what the probit equation tells us about the effects of presidential campaigning, we compute the effects of campaigning under different conditions. Four scenarios, based upon the significant substantive variables in our estimated model, are used to describe variations in these conditions: opposition party incumbency status, each candidate's share of campaign expenditures, the distribution of party identification in the state, and presidential feeling thermometer ratings (popularity) for each partisan group.

First, consider the case where the president's copartisan looks like a sure loser.

Table 4. Probability of a Vote for the President's Candidate under Varying Competitive Conditions

	President's, Independent, and Opposition Parties, Respectively				Probability of Vote for President's Candidate	
Case	Party Identifiers (%)	Group Feeling Thermometer	Spending of President's Candidate (%)	Opposition Incumbency	With President Not Campaigning	With President Campaigning
Sure loser	25,20,55	90,65,40	50	yes	.29	.30
Sure winner	55,20,25	90,65,40	60	no	.59	.63
Prototype close race	33,34,33	90,65,40	50	no	.45	.49
Close with popular president	33,34,33	90,75,50	50	no	.48	.51
Close with higher spending	33,34,33	90,65,40	60	no	.48	.52

We define this situation as one where an opposition incumbent is running; the candidate spending rates are equal; and the distribution of party identifiers is 25% for the president's party, 55% for the opposition party, and 20% Independent. Further, we set the thermometer rating at 65 for Independents (the mean across the surveys), 90 for presidential party identifiers, and 40 for opposition identifiers. In a state with these characteristics the probit estimates predict that the Senate candidate of the president's party will receive 29% of the vote. Clearly, that candidate will lose. Further, a presidential intervention has little impact, raising the candidate's vote total to only 30% (Table 4).

Next consider the opposite, when the president's candidate looks quite strong. Such a situation might be one where there is no opposition incumbent running; the presidential copartisan can outspend his opponent by a three-to-two margin; and the distribution of party identifiers is 55% for the president's party, 25% for the opposition party, and 20% Independent. Further, we keep the thermometer ratings at 65 for Independents, 90 for presidential party identifiers, and 40 for opposition identifiers. Under such conditions, 59% of the vote will go to the president's copartisan. If the president campaigns, the vote total increases to a hefty 63%.

However, our model suggests that a president would intervene in neither type of race. In the first, the president's copartisan is too far behind to help and in the second he is too far ahead to need presidential assistance. While many races may resemble these conditions (with some modification of parameters), our model argues that presidents are most likely to campaign in closer races, when an intervention may tip the outcome into the president's party column.

Consider what may be a relatively typical closer race—what we will call our *prototype close race.* We define the prototypical close race as one with no opposition incumbent, when the presidential candidate can spend 50% of the two-party total and the distribution of party identifiers is now 33% for the president's party, 33% for the opposition party, and 34% Independent. We again keep the thermometer ratings at 65 for Independents, 90 for presidential party identifiers, and 40 for opposition identifiers. Under such conditions, the probit estimates predict a vote split of 45% for the president's candidate and 55% for the opposition. If the president campaigns on behalf of the candidate from his party, the copartisan's expected vote total rises to 49%. While the presidential copartisan might still lose, matters are perhaps too close to call; and as we shall see, minor changes in the prototypical case can easily lead to a copartisan victory.

For instance, hold all parameters at prototypical levels but boost presidential popularity to a level where we can say the president is highly popular, that is, set the thermometer ratings at 90 for copartisan identifiers (the standard level), 75 for Independents, and 50 for opposition identifiers (a boost of 10 points for the latter groups). Under these conditions the predicted vote for the president's candidate is 48%; with a presidential appearance it rises to 51%; which tips the balance in favor of the presidential copartisan.

Similarly, if we reset the candidate expenditure ratio such that the president's candidate spends 60% of the total but leave the other prototypical parameters at their earlier levels, the president's candidate will receive 48% of the vote. If the president campaigns, it increases to 52%; and again the president's candidate wins.

Experimentation with other definitions of close races shows that in quite a few instances, the presidential campaign appearance will convert a loss into a win. Generally, a president's visit increases the probability of voting for the president's candidate by three to four percentage points in these close races. And there are many midterm contests where that margin means the difference between winning and losing.

The Dynamics of Presidential Campaign Impacts

This analysis allows us to understand the direction and magnitude of the presidential campaign effect. We shall now address the question of the dynamics of the effect. Two reasonable possibilities present themselves: presidential campaigning either converts voters or mobilizes nonvoters. Testing the mobilization-versus-conversion hypotheses requires estimating the impact of presidential campaigning on turnout levels. If turnout levels are higher when presidents campaign than when they do not, mobilization effects are evidenced. If no turnout differential is found, then some type of conversion process is probably operating.

To test these possibilities, we estimate an equation that includes many variables usually associated with turnout, as well as the presidential campaign variable. The baseline turnout model includes dummy variables for each year to pick up year-specific properties; standard demographics (age, income, education); psychological involvement in the election (interest in the campaign, concern about the election's outcome); attitude toward the president (the feeling thermometer); strength of party identification; characteristics about the Senate contest (whether there is an incumbent; and lastly, presidential campaigning. States without Senate races are excluded from the analysis. We estimate the turnout model on the 1970–1986 pooled data series. Table 5 presents the results.

The model proves impressive statistically, correctly predicting 73.7% of the cases, an improvement of 21.2 percentage points over the baseline (the distribution of voters). All variables in the equation are statistically significant.[10] As expected, turnout is higher among older people, those with higher incomes and more education, those who are more interested in and concerned with the election, strong partisans, voters in open races, and those who have cooler feelings toward the president (negative voting, perhaps).

Significantly, presidential campaigning stimulates turnout: when presidents campaign, the likelihood of voting increases.[11] This finding raises the question, Why would a presidential campaign appear-

Table 5. The Impact of Presidential Campaigning on Turnout, 1970–86

Variable	Estimated Coefficients	Standard Error	*t*-ratio
Constant	-13.766	—	—
1974 dummy	10.245	3.396	3.02
1978 dummy	10.459	3.394	3.08
1982 dummy	10.454	3.393	3.08
1986 dummy	10.323	3.393	3.04
Presidential feeling thermometer	−.002	.001	−1.88
Presidential party identification	.207	.025	8.31
Open race	.139	.055	2.50
Interest in campaign	.446	.037	11.88
Concern about outcome	.287	.028	10.36
Age	.019	.001	12.66
Income	.190	.036	5.31
Education	.160	.016	9.81
Presidential campaign	.214	.049	4.40
	Number of cases = 3,823 (1 = 1,816; 0 = 2,007)		
Percent correctly predicted	73.7		
Log-likelihood	1,348.43, 14 df		
Pseudo R²s			
Maddala	.30		
Craig–Uhler	.40		
McFadden	.25		
Adj. McFadden	.25		
Chow	.30		
Hensher–Johnson normalized success index	.305		

ance stimulate turnout? Three possible dynamics may be at work: direct stimulation of voters, increased resources flowing into campaign organizations, and greater effort on the part of campaign workers.

First, the distinction between high-stimulus and low-stimulus elections that Angus Campbell (1960) offered provides one possible answer. According to Campbell, congressional elections are low-stimulus elections, whereas presidential elections exemplify the classic high-stimulus election. Turnout levels in presidential elections are about 14% higher than levels in congressional elections.[12]

One explanation for our finding is that presidential campaigning for a senatorial candidate increases the level of campaign stimulation, leading to higher turnout. For instance, extensive media coverage and public discussion, which may continue for days, usually follow a presidential visit. However, we are not suggesting that a campaign trip transforms a traditionally low-stimulus election into a high-stimulus one—rather, the campaign appearance leads to a medium-stimulus election, resulting in modest turnout increases.

While this argument suggests direct effects on voters, the second argument suggests that campaign appearances affect the campaign organization, which in turn affect voter turnout. Thus, presidential campaigning may have indirect effects on voters, as well. Presidential campaigning may affect two aspects of campaign organizations: financial resources and worker activity. (Donors may give more; activists may work harder.)

A key activity of presidents during these campaign jaunts is an appearance

Table 6. Senatorial Campaign Monies Attributable to Presidential Campaign Visits, 1986

State	Money from Reagan Visit	Total Money	Presidential Money/ Total Money
Alabama	900,000	4,621,000	19.5
California	1,500,000	11,781,000	12.7
Colorado	920,000	3,786,000	24.3
Florida	1,710,000	6,724,000	25.4
Georgia	1,350,000	5,119,000	26.4
Idaho	180,000	3,230,000	5.6
Louisiana	1,075,000	5,986,000	18.0
Maryland	420,000	1,699,000	24.7
Missouri	841,000	5,376,000	15.6
Nevada	800,000	2,657,000	30.1
New York	1,700,000	12,915,000	13.2
North Carolina	692,000	5,188,000	13.3
North Dakota	35,000	2,271,000	1.5
Oklahoma	740,000	3,253,000	22.7
South Carolina	330,000	584,000	56.5
South Dakota	360,000	6,523,000	5.5
Washington	700,000	3,290,000	21.3
Wisconsin	400,000	3,434,000	11.6
Average	—	—	19.3

Source: Personal communication from Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., assistant to the president for political and intergovernmental affairs, White House, 5 December 1986.

at a fund-raiser, as well as at the standard mass media event. Presidential fund-raising activities seem to lead to significant bounties for Senate candidates, as the data displayed in Table 6 suggest for the 1986 midterm. The table presents how much money each of Reagan's visits generated, according to the White House. On average, about 19% of money collected derived from the president's visit, a more-than-trivial amount; greater campaign efforts in the form of more advertising and the hiring of more canvassers and other campaign workers should result from such an infusion of cash.

The third argument follows from the second. Greater campaign resources should enable the campaign to increase its intensity level, running more ads, scheduling more events, and attracting more campaign workers—who in turn, should be able to contact and canvass more voters, thereby stimulating turnout. Research has found that contacting spurs turnout, sometimes quite substantially. For example, Kramer (1970) found that canvassing a neighborhood may increase turnout by as much as 20%; other studies estimate contacting effects to range between 5% and 15%. (For a review of these findings, see Krassa 1988.) In all, then, there are good reasons to believe that a presidential appearance may lead to higher turnout levels, affecting voters either directly or indirectly.

Conclusions

The conventional wisdom is that presidential campaigning in midterm Senate elections either has no impact or hurts Senate candidates of the president's party. This conventional wisdom is deficient on a number of grounds. It cannot explain why presidents campaign so often, nor does it contain a standard to assess the impact of presidential campaigning.

We argue that presidents campaign strategically. Presidents enter races where they feel that their campaign appearance may help their candidate win the election, in close races. Further, presidents campaign when their legislative programs are bogged down in Congress. A statistical test finds support for this line of argument.

Second, we suggest—based on the model of strategic behavior—that presidential campaigning will help candidates. We also find support for this proposition. The positive impact of presidential campaigning is seen clearly in a series of midterm elections, and sensitivity testing suggests that in many close races the president's intervention may mean the margin of victory. Last, we find that a presidential campaign appearance mobilizes voters, rather than converting them. In all, this soundly overturns the conventional wisdom, upsetting it on grounds of logic, theoretical development, and empirical support.

With so many midterm tides against the president's party, the fact that these campaign appearances have a positive impact attests strongly to the power of the presidency. If our strategic perspective were employed, public evaluations of the president's role in the midterm might change, and this change might affect relations with Congress during the final two years of the term. Resurrecting the president's reputation may thus lead to more congressional support when he might need it the most. Further, if Light's (1982) no-win presidency cycle is correct—that the president's resources to influence Congress decline over time but his ability to develop good public policy improves—our more realistic assessment of presidential reputation may have significant policy impacts and may result in better public policy.

Notes

This research was sponsored by a grant from the University of Illinois, Urbana, Office of the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs. We thank James Kuklinski for helpful comments. And, we thank Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr. (assistant to the president for political and intergovernmental affairs during the 1986 election year) for making data available to us.

1. Representative statements of the conventional wisdom can be found in Broder 1986; Hunter 1974; Roberts 1970; Weaver 1966. For one scholarly discussion see Brown 1984.

2. The literature on midterm elections is very large. For a representative sample, see Abramowitz 1985; Abramowitz, Cover, and Norpoth 1986; A. Campbell 1960; J. Campbell 1985, 1987; Cover 1985, 1986; Erikson 1988; Hinckley 1981; Jacobson and Kernell 1981; Kernell 1977; Mann 1978; Piereson 1975; Ragsdale 1980; Tufte 1975.

3. We used the *Congressional Quarterly* preelection competitiveness assessments to measure COMPET. If *Congressional Quarterly* assessed the race as safe, COMPET is coded zero; if either party's candidate is advantaged, COMPET is coded one; and if the race is a toss-up, COMPET is coded two. While the *Congressional Quarterly* assessments may be in error, they do present what keen observers perceive the race's competitive level to be. And, as they are taken prior to the election, we do not have to rely on actual election results to assess competitiveness. Further, they are most similar to assessments that presidents and candidates use in evaluating a race. Thus, while they might incorrectly predict election outcomes, they accurately reflect the information used in the decisions examined herein. Lastly, they can also be viewed as summaries of all relevant campaign-related conditions affecting competitiveness, such as candidate recruitment functions (Jacobson and Kernell 1981), spending levels (Jacobson 1978), and candidate quality (Jacobson and Kernell 1981).

4. See Stanley and Niemi 1988, 220-21.

5. Including special elections, there were 206 midterm Senate elections during the period. However, some races witnessed no midterm opposition. With missing data, the number of cases drops to 197.

6. We experimented with five other variables, but none were statistically significant. They were presidential popularity at the time of the election, change in presidential popularity from the beginning of the campaign period to the election, level of support for the administration, and whether or not the seat was an open race or not. Further, the support variable was also reconstructed into two variables, one for each party. Not unexpectedly, these variables tended not to have impact because they were correlated with those already in the equation. The popularity variables were related to the president's victory level, open status related to competitiveness,

and the support/opposition variables related to presidential support in the state (spread).

Also, we might expect that first-term presidents are more likely to campaign than second-term presidents. However, across our series, only 1986 was a second-term midterm election. In the probit equation, we entered dummy variables for each year, singularly and together; but none had any impact.

7. See n. 1.

8. We use the feeling thermometer rather than Gallup-styled questions because the latter occur less often in the CPS/NES data series. However, the two variables are highly correlated.

9. We also present results of the 1970–86 pooling, which does not include the campaign expenditure variable. Results are essentially identical.

10. Race and sex were found insignificant and are excluded from this presentation. Their inclusion or exclusion hardly affects results.

11. If we drop the income variable (which contains much missing data), the presidential campaign effect doubles in magnitude but model performance declines. Nothing else in the model is affected very much except the education variable; as expected, education increases in impact when income is dropped from the estimation.

12. This calculation comes from the figures in Stanley and Niemi 1988, 66–67.

References

Abramowitz, Alan. 1985. "Economic Conditions, Presidential Popularity, and Voting Behavior in Midterm Congressional Elections." *Journal of Politics* 47:31–43.

Abramowitz, Alan, Albert Cover, and Helmut Norpoth. 1986. "The President's Party in Midterm Elections: Going from Bad to Worse." *American Journal of Political Science* 30:562–76.

Broder, David. 1986. "Reagan on the Campaign Trail: Right in Every Way." *New Orleans Times–Picayune*, 5 November.

Brown, Roger. 1984. "Presidents As Midterm Campaigners." In *Presidents and Their Parties*, ed. Robert Harmel. New York: Praeger.

Campbell, Angus. 1960. "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 24:397–418.

Campbell, James. 1985. "Explaining Presidential Losses in Midterm Congressional Elections." *Journal of Politics* 47:1140–57.

Campbell, James. 1987. "The Revised Theory of Surge and Decline." *American Journal of Political Science* 31:965–79.

Congressional Quarterly. 1966. "Reaction to Election." *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 11 November.

Congressional Quarterly. 1970. "Extensive Nixon-Agnew Campaigns Have Mixed Results." *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 6 November.

Congressional Quarterly. 1974. "Ford's Election Impact." *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 9 November.

Congressional Quarterly. 1978. "Another Stubborn Democratic Congress." *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 4 November.

Congressional Quarterly. 1982. "Personalities, Local Issues." *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 6 November.

Cover, Albert. 1985. "Surge and Decline in Congressional Elections." *Western Political Quarterly* 38:606–19.

Cover, Albert. 1986. "Presidential Evaluations and Voting for Congress." *American Journal of Political Science* 30:786–801.

Erikson, Robert S. 1988. "The Puzzle of Midterm Losses." *Journal of Politics* 50:1011–29.

Hinckley, Barbara. 1981. *Congressional Elections.* Washington: Congressional Quarterly.

Hunter, Marjorie. 1974. "Ford's Impact Is Called Minimal." *New York Times*, 7 November.

Jacobson, Gary C. 1978. "The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections." *American Political Science Review* 72:469–91.

Jacobson, Gary, and Samuel Kernell. 1981. *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections.* New Haven: Yale.

Kernell, Samuel. 1977. "Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Midterm Congressional Decline of the President's Party." *American Political Science Review* 71:44–66.

Kramer, Gerald. 1970. "The Effects of Precinct Level Canvassing on Voter Behavior." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 34:560–72.

Krassa, Michael. 1988. "Context and the Canvass: The Mechanisms of Interaction." *Political Behavior* 10:233–46.

Light, Paul. 1982. *The President's Agenda.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Mann, Thomas E. 1978. *Unsafe at Any Margin: Interpreting Congressional Elections.* Washington: American Enterprise Institute.

Neustadt, Richard E. 1960. *Presidential Power.* New York: Wiley.

Piereson, James. 1975. "Presidential Popularity and Midterm Voting at Different Electoral Levels." *American Journal of Political Science* 19:683–94.

Ragsdale, Lyn. 1980. "The Fiction of Congressional Elections As Presidential Events." *American Politics Quarterly* 8:375–98.

Roberts, Steven V. 1970. "Four Moderate Democrats in the Mountain States Survive Republican Efforts To Replace Them in the Senate." *New York Times*, 5 November.

Stanley, Harold W., and Richard G. Niemi. 1988. *Vital Statistics on American Politics.* Washington: Congressional Quarterly.

Tufte, Edward. 1975. "Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections." *American Political Science Review* 69:812–26.

Weaver, Warren. 1966. "GOP Finds '68 Outlook Brighter." *New York Times,* 10 November.

Jeffrey E. Cohen is Associate Professor of Political Science, and Michael A. Krassa is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801.

John A. Hamman is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL 62901.

RESEARCH NOTES

MACROPARTISANSHIP: AN EMPIRICAL REASSESSMENT

PAUL R. ABRAMSON
CHARLES W. OSTROM, JR.
Michigan State University

To evaluate the comparability of the Gallup and Michigan Survey Research Center measures for studying levels of partisanship among the U.S. electorate we compare the overtime distribution of partisanship and the correlates of partisanship using the results of Gallup surveys, the National Election Studies, and the General Social Surveys. Compared with the Gallup results, both the other two surveys reveal less short-term variation and also less total variation. Compared with the Gallup results, the National Election Studies partisanship results are less related to short-term electoral outcomes and do not appear to be strongly driven by short-term economic and political evaluations. Our analyses suggest that scholars should be cautious about using Gallup results to revise conclusions based upon analyses that employ the Michigan Survey Research Center party identification measure.

The correlates and consequences of party identification have been an ongoing concern among political scientists for the last three decades. There have been arguments about the origins of partisanship, its stability among individuals and electorates, the best way to measure partisan loyalties, the extent to which party identification shapes, or is shaped by, policy preferences, the dimensionality of the party identification measure, and the meaning of partisan independence.

The recent article by MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1989) appears to provide important insights that could lead scholars to alter their conception of the meaning of party identification. Using the results of Gallup surveys conducted from 1945 through 1987, they analyze the party affiliations of the U.S. electorate, measuring the proportion of all partisans who consider themselves to be Democrats, a measure they call *macropartisanship.* Their analyses reveal a great deal of variability in partisan preferences. MacKuen and his colleagues suggest that this short-term variation follows structured patterns of change within presidential administrations, that these changes have short-term electoral consequences, and that they are largely driven by short-term economic and political evaluations.

MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson generalize their findings to the extensive research literature on party identification, arguing that variability in party identification "forces us to reconsider the standard view of party systems and realignment theory" (1989, 1139). The "mid-range dynamics" of partisan change, they maintain, "yield partisan movements of realignment magnitude (though not realignment duration) that require neither miracles nor catastrophes but instead arise from the routine success and failure of ordinary politics" (p. 1139). Rather than focusing on long-term changes that may lead to partisan realignments, MacKuen and his colleagues suggest that scholars attempt to account for short-

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOLUME 85 NO. 1 MARCH 1991

term variation and its contribution to electoral change.

As we shall see, MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson's claims are essentially correct if one uses Gallup surveys to measure partisan loyalties. But their findings may have limited generalizability in reevaluating the concept of party identification. Based upon the sweeping generalizations in their conclusions, it appears that MacKuen and his colleagues view the Gallup measure (which Gallup labels *party affiliation*) and the measure of party identification developed by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center (SRC) to be interchangeable.[1] Admittedly, as Converse and Pierce (1985) have argued, there may be no "right" way to measure partisanship. But we also agree with them that "it is of great importance not to treat diverse measures of partisanship as functional equivalents of one another" (p. 143).

We question the implicit assumption that the Gallup and the SRC measures are equivalent, especially since MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson do not evaluate this assumption empirically. As we shall see, MacKuen and his colleagues exaggerate the degree of volatility in the Gallup measure. But even if this problem is ignored, there is reason to believe that the wording of the Gallup party affiliation question may lead to volatile results.

Let us briefly compare the wording of the Gallup and SRC items. The Gallup question reads, "In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?" By contrast, the basic Michigan SRC question reads, "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" As Converse has argued: "The 'generally' and 'usually' qualifiers in the SRC question were originally intended to broaden the time reference and properly classify the long-term identifier who is momentarily piqued at his own party, or tempted to defect temporarily to vote for a charismatic candidate of another party. A verb like 'consider' in the Gallup question has somewhat parallel, if perhaps weaker, overtones; but the 'as of today' invites in the baldest way a very transient frame of reference" (1976, 35). Converse reports that he had conducted "many casual comparisons" of the two items, and concluded that the responses appeared to be strongly correlated over time. However, he argues, the "face differences in content bear chiefly on the time referent" and concludes, "It is my impression that . . . the Gallup item is visibly more volatile and situation-bound than the SRC party identification measure" (1976, 36).[2]

Given the extent to which MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson generalize from their findings, it is essential to determine whether similar results obtain when the widely used Michigan SRC party identification measure is employed. As relatively few national surveys have employed the Michigan measure, there is no way to replicate the MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson findings with the Michigan measure; and we do not attempt a replication. Instead, our goal is to evaluate the comparability of the Gallup and Michigan SRC measures for studying overall levels of partisanship by comparing Gallup results with results from the two major academic surveys that use the Michigan SRC measure: the National Election Studies (NES) conducted by the Michigan SRC and the Center for Political Studies and the General Social Surveys (GSS) conducted by the University of Chicago National Opinion Research Center.[3]

As we shall see, the results using the Gallup measure and Michigan measure are substantially different. Compared with the Gallup measure, both the NES and the GSS surveys reveal less short-term variation and display less total variation. Compared with the Gallup measures, the NES measure of partisanship is not strongly related to short-term elec-

Figure 1. Percentage of Partisans Who Are Democrats: Gallup Measure, Quarterly Results, 1952–87



toral outcomes and does not appear to be driven by short-term economic and political evaluations. Based upon our analyses, we must caution scholars to use great care in generalizing the MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson results to studies of partisanship that employ the Michigan SRC measure.

Variation in Partisanship

Like MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson, we analyze the percentage of partisans who consider themselves to be Democrats. As Gallup results do not differentiate among independents who lean toward a party and those who do not, they provide only a single measure of the relative strength of the two major parties. Because the SRC measure always asks independents whether they feel closer to the Republican or the Democratic party, at least two measures of the relative strength of the parties are possible.[4] The first, which we label NES_1 and GSS_1, is the percentage of party identifiers who identify with the Democratic party. In many respects, this measure seems closer to the way the Gallup measure is constructed, but some scholars argue that many self-professed independents are in fact "hidden partisans" (see especially Keith et al., 1986). The proportion of independents is higher today than it was during the 1950s and early 1960s, and it is important to employ a measure that taps their partisan leanings. Our second measure, which we label NES_2 and GSS_2, is the percentage of party identifiers and independent leaners who either identify with, or lean toward, the Democratic party.

Even though most of our analyses are restricted to the same time points employed by the NES and GSS, we began by examining the relative level of Democratic strength for every quarter from 1952 through 1987.[5] Unlike MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson, who use selected surveys for each quarter,[6] we employed all the available Gallup surveys, except for telephone polls that consistently show relatively low levels of Democratic support. Our results are presented in Figure 1. As can be seen

Table 1. Variances in Partisanship

Time Periods	Measure of Partisanship Gallup	NES$_1$	NES$_2$	GSS$_1$	GSS$_2$
1945–87 (all quarters)[a]	25.44	—	—	—	—
1952–87 (all quarters)	16.97	—	—	—	—
1952–88 (4th quarter of election years)	16.27	7.89	10.85	—	—
1972–89 (1st quarter Gallup and GSS; 4th quarter NES)[b]	27.87	10.84	14.01	18.49	17.95

[a] Result reported in MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989, 1128.

[b] The NES results are for 1972–88.

by comparing our figure with the results presented by MacKuen and his colleagues (1989, Figure 1), the overall pattern of results tracks their results fairly closely through the early 1980s.

During the mid-to-late 1980s, however, there are clear differences between the MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson results and those we report. Admittedly, both their results and ours show a sizable decline in Democratic loyalties. But their results display substantially more variation from quarter to quarter, and they present at least one quarterly result in which there are more Republicans than Democrats. Although there are single polls that show more Republicans than Democrats, published Gallup results make it clear that there was not a single quarter during the 1980s for which there were more Republicans than Democrats. At least some of the variability in the MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson analysis results from the relatively high variation they report during the mid-to-late 1980s. Thus, if changes of "realignment magnitude" involve a shift in majority party status, the published Gallup results do not show changes of this size during the 1980s.[7] The only result published by the Gallup organization showing an actual Republican lead in party affiliation is based upon surveys conducted in 1946, a period when Gallup quota sampling deliberately underrepresented nonwhites, Southerners, and persons with low social status (Glenn and Frisbie 1977).

Even though the procedures used by MacKuen and his colleagues to measure partisanship exaggerate the variability of party affiliations, the Gallup measure clearly displays considerable volatility. Figure 1 reveals that the Gallup data display considerable variation over time; and adding the years before 1952 (see MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989, Figure 1) reveals even more variation. MacKuen and his colleagues justify their choice of the Gallup data by arguing that one needs a large number of data points to treat party identification as "a continuous macro phenomenon measured through time" (1989, 1127).

In Table 1 we report variation in overall levels of Democratic support using alternative measures of partisanship. MacKuen and his colleagues report that from 1945 through 1987 the variance with the Gallup measure was 25.44, and we have presented their finding in our table. As our table shows, there is less variation on the Gallup measure between 1952 and 1987, partly because party loyalties appear to have been in considerable flux shortly after World War II (see MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989, Figure 1), and partly because variation is substantially less during the mid-to-late 1980s when one relies upon published quarterly results. Even so, variation during the 144

Figure 2. Gallup Measure of Partisanship Compared with NES_1 and NES_2, 1952–88



quarters between 1952 and 1987 is still substantial.

However, one need not examine every quarter during these years to demonstrate variability with the Gallup measure; for, as Table 1 reveals, variation is almost as great when the analysis is restricted to the 19 biennial time points that correspond with the NES election year surveys. As variability can be demonstrated by a relatively small number of observations, it is reasonable to employ both the NES and the GSS data to determine whether partisanship is highly variable when the Michigan SRC measure is employed. As Table 1 shows, the basic NES measure that includes only self-proclaimed partisans displays less than half the variation found with the Gallup measure.[8] Including leaners leads to more variation in the NES surveys; but even when leaners are included, the variance in the NES surveys is substantially less than variation in the Gallup surveys.

The GSS provide 16 observations between 1972 and 1989.[9] As Table 1 shows, there is clearly more variability in the Gallup measure during this more recent period. GSS_1 and GSS_2 also display considerable variation but only about two-thirds of the variation revealed by the Gallup surveys. Only 9 NES observations are available during these years, and both NES_1 and NES_2 display more variation during this more recent period. But, as with the 1952–1988 period, NES_1 displays less than half the variation revealed by the Gallup surveys, while NES_2 exhibits approximately half the variation found using the Gallup data.

Patterned Variation

MacKuen and his colleagues provide a "visual 'test' of the responsiveness of macropartisanship to presidential approval and consumer sentiment" (1989, 1130). They display changes in partisanship during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy–Johnson, Nixon–Ford, Carter, and Reagan presidencies. Neither the NES nor GSS data provide enough time points to merit separate displays for each of these periods. Nonetheless, we can compare the 19 NES observations to the comparable 19 Gallup quarters, and the 16 GSS observations with the 16 comparable Gallup observations.

Figure 2 compares the biennial NES results between 1952 and 1988 with the Gallup surveys conducted during the

Figure 3. Gallup Measure of Partisanship Compared with GSS$_1$ and GSS$_2$, 1972–89



same period. Both the SRC and the Gallup measures follow similar trends; but it is readily apparent that the Gallup measure displays more variability, reaching higher levels of Democratic support when the Democrats are strong (e.g., following the Watergate affair) and lower levels of Democratic support when Democratic loyalties are waning, as in the late 1960s and the mid-to-late 1980s.

Table 2. Correlations among Measures of Partisanship, 1952–88 and 1972–89

Time Periods	NES$_1$	NES$_2$	GSS$_1$	GSS$_2$
1952–88[a]				
Gallup	.70	.75	—	—
NES$_1$	—	.97	—	—
1972–89[b]				
Gallup	.74	.81	.75	.82
NES$_1$	—	.98	.85	.88
NES$_2$	—	—	.83	.88
GSS$_1$	—	—	—	.98

[a] Comparisons of Gallup and NES are based upon fourth-quarter surveys conducted during each election year.

[b] The NES results are for 1972–88. Comparisons of Gallup and GSS are based upon first-quarter surveys conducted during each survey year. We compare NES surveys conducted in the fourth quarter of 1972, 1974, 1976, 1982, 1984, 1986, and 1988 with GSS surveys conducted during the first quarter of the following year.

In Table 2 we present the correlations among the various measures. As NES$_1$ and NES$_2$ are based upon the same respondents, these measures are very highly related. Of course, the relationships between Gallup and NES$_1$ and NES$_2$ are high by survey research standards. However, these relationships are below what we hope to find if the Gallup and SRC questions were measuring the identical attitude.

Figure 3 compares the annual GSS results between 1972 and 1989 with the Gallup results for the same period. As with the NES and Gallup measures, the GSS and the Gallup results follow similar patterns; but once again, it is clear that the Gallup measure displays more variability. For example, the impact of Watergate is greater with the Gallup data, and the Gallup data reveal greater Democratic losses during the mid-1980s.

Obviously, GSS$_1$ and GSS$_2$ will be very highly correlated (see Table 2). Both these measures are more highly correlated with the Gallup measure than the NES measures were; but between 1972 and 1988 the NES measures are also more highly correlated with the Gallup measure than they were for the full 36 years for which NES and Gallup results can be compared. But the relationships between the NES and GSS measures and the Gallup measures are below what one would hope to find if identical attitudes were being tapped. In fact, even though the NES and GSS surveys are conducted during different periods, NES and GSS results are more highly correlated with each other than they are with the more proximate Gallup results.

Electoral Consequences

MacKuen and his colleagues claim that changes in overall levels of partisanship have short-term electoral consequences. They report that a one-point shift toward a party in macropartisanship (in the third quarter) leads to a three-seat gain for the party in U.S. House elections, a third of a point gain in the percentage of House votes, and a half-point gain in the presidential popular vote (1989, 1129). We report their results, along with our analyses for the years since 1952, in Table 3. Although we believe that aggregate changes in overall levels of partisanship have electoral consequences (see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1990, chap. 8), we wanted to determine whether short-term changes in the SRC measure yielded similar short-term political results. We restrict our analysis to the NES surveys, since they are conducted shortly before or after general elections. We compared the short-term electoral impact of changes in partisanship as measured by the NES surveys with the impact of changes in partisanship as measured by Gallup surveys conducted during the fourth quarter of each election year.

As Table 3 reveals, between 1952 and 1986 (the last election MacKuen and his colleagues studied) a one-point gain in the Gallup party affiliation measure leads to a 2.89-seat gain in House elections; but the R-squared is only .26. For this period the predicted seat change is similar using NES_1 and NES_2; but the R-squareds fall dramatically, and the *t*-ratios are no longer significant. Adding the 1988 results slightly reduces the predicted seat change for the Gallup measure, slightly reduces the R-squared, and the *t*-ratio remains significant. When the 1988 results are added, the results for the NES measures clearly deteriorate. Although a modest seat change is predicted (now less than two seats for each percentage point change in party identification), the R-squareds are now quite low. The Michigan SRC measure does not appear to be useful for explaining short-term seat change. Similar results obtain when one examines the relationship between alternative measures of partisanship and the percentage of the popular vote for Democratic House candidates. Our results employing the Gallup measure are very similar to those reported by MacKuen and his colleagues. For both the 1952–86 and the 1952–88 periods predicted vote change is less with the NES measure, and the *t*-ratios are far lower. Moreover, for both NES_1 and NES_2 the R-squareds are extremely low for both the 1952–86 and 1952–88 periods.

As MacKuen and his colleagues point out, testing the relationship of partisanship to the percentage of the vote for Democratic presidential candidates is problematic, for the number of cases is small. Our analyses consistently show partisanship to be more strongly related to the major party presidential vote than the results reported by MacKuen and his colleagues. Their results include the 1948 election, in which Truman did far better than one would have predicted from the Gallup party affiliation results. For the 1952–84 elections, the Gallup and Michigan measures yield similar results. Including the 1988 results weakens the predictive power of the Michigan measure. While all the *t*-ratios are significant, the R-squared is higher when the Gallup measure is employed.

Short-Term Evaluations

"Macropartisanship," MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson argue, "is a variable like others, subject to routine ebb and flow as citizens in the aggregate reflect their experiences of politics onto the parties" (1989, 1125). MacKuen and his colleagues' time series analysis demonstrates that the Gallup measure responds to short-term evaluations of the economy. They conclude, "We now know that partisanship moves and that the economy moves it. More precisely, we know that the aggregate division of partisanship has fluctuated over the past 40 years, that those fluctuations have been substantial, and that they have had political consequences. Finally, we now know that partisanship's twisting course has been shaped by the winds of political and economic fortune" (pp. 1138–39).

We have already seen that most of these claims are undermined when partisanship is measured by the SRC party identification question. Changes in partisanship are

Table 3. Partisanship and Election Results

Election Years	Measure of Partisanship	B	*t*-ratio	R^2	Durbin-Watson
Number of Democratic House seats					
1946–86[a]	Gallup (3d quarter)	3.00	—	.38	—
1952–86	Gallup (4th quarter)	2.89	2.39*	.26	1.11
	NES$_1$	2.77	1.18	.08	1.08
	NES$_2$	2.65	1.39	.11	.95
1952–88	Gallup (4th quarter)	2.73	2.36*	.25	1.10
	NES$_1$	1.72	.92	.05	1.16
	NES$_2$	1.76	1.12	.07	1.05
Democratic House vote (%)					
1946–86[a]	Gallup (3d quarter)	.31	—	.23	—
1952–86	Gallup (4th quarter)	.27	2.00*	.20	1.53
	NES$_1$	.19	.71	.03	1.68
	NES$_2$	.23	1.08	.07	1.49
1952–88	Gallup (4th quarter)	.26	1.97*	.19	1.57
	NES$_1$	.11	.53	.02	1.77
	NES$_2$	.15	.86	.04	1.62
Democratic share of major party presidential vote (%)					
1948–84[b]	Gallup (3d quarter)	.56	—	.17	—
1952–84	Gallup (4th quarter)	.96	2.45*	.46	1.41
	NES$_1$	1.47	2.20*	.41	2.08
	NES$_2$	1.45	2.77**	.52	2.05
1952–88	Gallup (4th quarter)	.92	2.56*	.45	1.39
	NES$_1$	.98	1.79*	.29	1.93
	NES$_2$	1.02	2.23*	.38	1.84

[a] Results reported in MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989, 1129.

[b] Results reported in MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson, 1989, 1140, n. 4.

*$p < .05$.

**$p < .01$.

substantially smaller, and those changes do not significantly affect short-term congressional election results. However, individual-level data clearly show that the Michigan SRC party identification measure responds to short-term forces (see Brody and Rothenberg 1988; Fiorina 1981; and Lockerbie 1989), so that we would also expect aggregate measures of SRC partisanship to be affected by short-term considerations.[10] But as the Michigan SRC measure seems to tap longer-term party loyalties than the Gallup measure, results that employ the Michigan measure should be less driven by short-term economic and political considerations.

Conducting a time series analysis that compares the NES, GSS, and Gallup results is complicated because there are relatively few NES and GSS surveys. Moreover, the GSS studies were conducted at unequal intervals, and thus cannot be used without violating the basic time series assumption of equally spaced time intervals. Lacking monthly or quarterly data that use the Michigan SRC measure, we cannot replicate the transfer function analysis used by MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson. Nonetheless, a test we provide clearly suggests that variation in the Michigan measure is not shaped "by the winds of political and economic fortune."

Instead of replicating their causal model, we focus on Table N-1 (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989, 1140–41, n. 13), in which they utilize ordinary least squares to assure readers that their results "are no artifact" of their transfer function approach. They seek to demonstrate that lagged macropartisanship, political approval, and consumer sentiment can explain macropartisanship. We attempt to approximate their results with the following steps. First, we create political approval using actual presidential approval[11] minus .29 lagged consumer sentiment (see MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989, 1140–41, n. 13). Second, we standardize political approval and consumer sentiment, employing (as MacKuen and his colleagues did) the index of consumer sentiment (ICS), which has been measured by the Michigan SRC since 1953. Third, we multiply the standardized measures of each variable by −1 during Republican administrations. Fourth, we employ the NES measures and the Gallup surveys conducted during the fourth quarter of each election year and create a lagged partisanship measure by using Gallup and NES measures from two years in the past.[12] Finally, we regress each partisanship measure on fourth-quarter partisanship (lagged two years), fourth-quarter political approval, and fourth-quarter consumer sentiment.

Table 4 presents the results of this analysis for each of the three measures. Although we used far fewer observations than MacKuen and his colleagues, we demonstrate that the Gallup measure does respond to political—and especially to economic—conditions. Lagged partisanship, the ICS, and political approval account for 56% of the total variation; and, as the Q (or residual autocorrelation) statistic demonstrates, there is no indication of significant serial correlation (see Ostrom 1990). These results support MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson's claims that partisanship (as measured by Gallup) responds to short-term conditions. The analysis also shows that one can demonstrate the impact of short-term conditions even if one employs relatively few observations. If the Michigan SRC measure does respond to short-term evaluations, we have enough data points to demonstrate their impact.

As Table 4 shows, the standard Michigan measure responds somewhat to short-term economic and political evaluations, but it is far less responsive than the Gallup measure. None of the three variables is significantly related to NES_1; and, more importantly, together they account for

Table 4. Impact of Short-Term Evaluations upon Partisanship, 1954–88

Measure of Partisanship	Constant	Lagged Partisanship[a]	Index of Consumer Sentiment[b]	Political Approval[c]	R^2	Q[d]
Gallup	28.13* (2.45)[e]	.54** (2.90)	1.92* (2.32)	1.31 (1.11)	.56	2.88
NES$_1$	49.55* (2.05)	.21 (.55)	1.18 (1.41)	–.25 (–.18)	.19	1.43
NES$_2$	46.39* (2.23)	.24 (.70)	1.66* (1.85)	.13 (.09)	.27	1.37

[a] Lagged partisanship: the lag is two years. The analysis begins with 1954 because the ICS was not measured in 1952; the 1952 partisanship results are used for our lags for 1954.

[b] Standardized index of consumer sentiment multiplied by –1 during Republican administrations.

[c] Standardized political approval multiplied by –1 during Republican administrations.

[d] Box Pierce Q-statistic with four degrees of freedom.

[e] The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.

*$p < .05$.
**$p < .01$.

only 19% of the total variation. As with the Gallup measure, there is no evidence of serial correlation. NES$_2$ is more responsive to short-term evaluations; for consumer sentiment has a statistically significant impact, and somewhat more variation is explained. However, the model as a whole accounts for only 27% of the variation, only half the impact of the three variables on the Gallup results. Once again, there is no evidence of serial correlation.

These findings lead to two conclusions. First, MacKuen and his colleagues are correct when they conclude that the Gallup partisanship results do strongly vary in concert with political and economic variables. We demonstrate that this variation is sustained even when the number of data points is reduced substantially. Second, their conclusions do not hold when the Michigan SRC measure of party identification is employed, calling into question the generalizability of their findings.

Conclusions

Although MacKuen and his colleagues exaggerated the extent of variability in partisanship during the mid-to-late 1980s, they have on balance provided a careful analysis of the correlates of partisanship as measured by the Gallup surveys. Their claims that the Gallup measure is highly variable, that changes in Gallup partisanship correlate with election results, and that Gallup partisanship appears to be driven by short-term economic and political evaluations are supported by our analyses.

Despite these results, their findings may have limited implications for the study of party identification. MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson fail to consider that the Gallup measure might have built-in short-term volatility compared with the Michigan SRC measure, which is designed to tap long-term partisan attachments. The SRC measure, too, has some short-term properties, as both this analysis and individual-level analyses have demonstrated. But the SRC measure, whether employed in the NES surveys or in the GSS, has substantially less volatility than the Gallup measure. Moreover, results using the NES and GSS surveys show less total variation than results using the Gallup surveys. The NES results are not strongly related to congressional election results. Finally, a time series analysis employing the NES surveys suggests that the SRC measure is not strongly driven by short-term economic and political evaluations.

As Converse suggested over a decade ago, the Gallup-type measures are likely to evoke a different response than the SRC measures. Our empirical reassessment demonstrates that the SRC measure has different properties than the Gallup measure. At the very least, the Gallup and the SRC measures are not interchangeable; and scholars should exercise considerable caution in generalizing findings based upon analyses of the Gallup measure to studies of party identification that have relied upon the Michigan SRC questions.

Although MacKuen and his colleagues should have been more careful in generalizing their findings to the study of party identification, their research may lead to fruitful insights. The Gallup measure is different from the SRC measure, but it may well prove to be useful. Their causal analyses suggest that we may need to combine such measures as presidential approval, the ICS, and partisanship. Further analysis is needed to evaluate the meaning of the Gallup party affiliation measure and to determine how it can best add to our understanding of public evaluations of parties, policies, and political leaders.

Notes

We are grateful to Renée M. Smith for her assistance and comments, and to John H. Aldrich, Cleo H. Cherryholmes, Ada W. Finifter, Robert W. Jackman, Brian D. Silver, and Dennis M. Simon for their comments.

1. MacKuen and his colleagues do not report the wording of the Gallup party affiliation question and do not raise the possibility that it may have different properties than the Michigan SRC measure. The manner in which they introduce the Gallup results makes it clear that they view these measures as interchangeable: "Party identification may be treated as a continuous macro phenomenon measured through time. We have gathered data for such a series, presented here as a quarterly compilation of the Gallup identification measure from 1945 through 1987" (1989, 1127).

2. A recent study by Borrelli, Lockerbie, and Niemi (1987) of polls conducted during the 1980 and 1984 elections also suggests that using the phrase *as of today* to measure partisan preferences yields results that tend to favor the party advantaged in the most recent presidential contest.

3. The data employed in our analyses are based upon the following sources. Gallup party affiliation results from 1952 through 1959 were provided by John E. Mueller of the University of Rochester, results for 1960–1980 were based upon Public Opinion Location Library (POLL) results provided by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, and the results from 1981 through the first quarter of 1989 are based upon *The Gallup Report.* The NES party identification results are based upon individual codebooks for each election year published by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research; and the GSS results are based upon cumulative code books published by the Roper Center. The number of Democratic House seats at the beginning of each Congress from 1952 through 1984 are from Congressional Quarterly 1985, and the 1986 and 1988 results are from the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report.* The percentage of the total popular vote for Democratic House candidates is reported in Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1990, and the presidential election results come from Scammon and McGillivray 1989. The Gallup presidential approval results from 1952 through 1959 were provided by Mueller, results from 1960 through 1984 were based upon POLL, and results from 1985 through 1988 were based upon *The Gallup Report.* Results for the index of consumer sentiment are based upon the CITIBASE Data Bank. Procedures for aggregating Gallup partisanship and approval results follow those employed by Ostrom and Simon (1985). With the exception of the results provided by Mueller, all of the results we employ are available in published sources or from data archives. However, we have prepared a list of the values for every variable used in our analyses, available upon request.

4. Because the SRC measure also differentiates between partisans who feel strongly attached to their party and those who do not, it would also be possible to develop mean scores that take these responses into account. See Abramson 1983, chap. 7 for examples of such measures.

5. As we are not able to compare Gallup surveys conducted before 1952 with surveys using the Michigan SRC measure, we did not analyze Gallup surveys conducted between 1945 and 1951.

6. MacKuen and his colleagues report that their measure of partisanship was based upon data obtained from the Roper Center as a systematic sample of Gallup surveys using the first Gallup survey conducted during every odd-numbered month. These results were aggregated into quarterly results (1989,

1139-40, n. 3).

7. Just what changes of "realignment magnitude" might be is clearly a subject for debate. For an outstanding discussion of alternative definitions of realignment, see Sundquist 1983.

8. The NES surveys are usually conducted between early September and early November during presidential election years; for most midterm elections they are conducted during November, December, and the following January. We therefore compare the NES results with Gallup surveys conducted during the fourth quarter of each election year.

9. The GSS surveys began in 1972 and were conducted in every subsequent year except 1979 and 1981. As the GSS are conducted in February, March, and April, we compare these results with Gallup surveys conducted during the first quarter of each survey year.

10. For further evidence on the sources of short-term change in aggregate levels of partisanship, see Allsop and Weisberg 1988.

11. Because the NES surveys have measured presidential approval only since 1972, we rely only upon the Gallup measure.

12. If partisanship is highly variable (as MacKuen and his colleague argue), there may be problems in using a two-year lag for partisanship. However, even with the two-year lag, lagged partisanship is significantly related to the Gallup measure of party affiliation.

References

Abramson, Paul R. 1983. *Political Attitudes in America: Formation and Change.* San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

Abramson, Paul R., John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde. 1990. *Change and Continuity in the 1988 Elections.* Washington: Congressional Quarterly.

Allsop, Dee, and Herbert F. Weisberg. 1988. "Measuring Change in Party Identification in an Election Campaign." *American Journal of Political Science* 32:996-1017.

Borrelli, Stephen, Brad Lockerbie, and Richard G. Niemi. 1987. "Why the Democrat-Republican Partisanship Gap Varies from Poll to Poll." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51:115-19.

Brody, Richard A., and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 1988. "The Instability of Partisanship: An Analysis of the 1980 Presidential Election." *British Journal of Political Science* 18:445-65.

Congressional Quarterly. 1985. *Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections.* 2d ed. Washington: Congressional Quarterly.

Converse, Philip E. 1976. *The Dynamics of Party Support: Cohort-Analyzing Party Identification.* Beverly Hills: Sage.

Converse, Philip E., and Roy Pierce. 1985. "Measuring Partisanship." *Political Methodology* 11:143-66.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Glenn, Norval D., and W. Parker Frisbie. 1977. "Trend Studies with Survey Sample and Census Data." In *Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 3,* ed. Alex Inkeles. Palo Alto: Annual Reviews.

Keith, Bruce E., David B. Magleby, Candice J. Nelson, Elizabeth Orr, Mark C. Westlye, and Raymond E. Wolfinger. 1986. "The Partisan Affinities of Independent 'Leaners'." *British Journal of Political Science* 16:155-85.

Lockerbie, Brad. 1989. "Change in Party Identification: The Role of Prospective Economic Evaluations." *American Politics Quarterly* 17:291-311.

MacKuen, Michael B., Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson. 1989. "Macropartisanship." *American Political Science Review* 83:1125-42.

Ornstein, Norman J., Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin. 1990. *Vital Statistics on Congress, 1989-1990.* Washington: Congressional Quarterly.

Ostrom, Charles W., Jr. 1990. *Time Series Analysis: Regression Techniques.* 2d ed. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Ostrom, Charles W., Jr., and Dennis M. Simon. 1985. "Promise and Performance: A Dynamic Model of Presidential Popularity." *American Political Science Review* 79:334-58.

Scammon, Richard M., and Alice V. McGillivray, eds. 1989. *America Votes 18: A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics.* Washington: Congressional Quarterly.

Sundquist, James L. 1983. *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States.* Rev. ed. Washington: Brookings.

Paul R. Abramson and Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., are Professors of Political Science, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824.

DO ENDORSEMENTS MATTER? GROUP INFLUENCE IN THE 1984 DEMOCRATIC CAUCUSES

RONALD B. RAPOPORT
College of William and Mary
WALTER J. STONE
University of Colorado
ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ
Emory University

Although candidates are very concerned about garnering prenomination group endorsements, there is virtually no research on the effects of such endorsements at the presidential level. In 1984, teachers', women's, and labor groups all endorsed Mondale for the Democratic nomination. Using a survey of Democratic caucus participants, we examine the effects of these endorsements on both candidate support and prenomination activity for the endorsed candidate. We find substantial effects of labor and teachers' group endorsements on the candidate choice of their members, but virtually no effect of women's groups. Labor union membership also had the greatest impact on campaign activity for Mondale.

Candidate endorsements by groups are one of the least-studied aspects of electoral behavior. This is a serious shortcoming given the opportunity groups have to participate in the contemporary electoral process coupled with the claims they typically make about their influence. The research that has been done shows that general election endorsements by labor unions can have significant effects on members (Converse and Campbell 1968; Kornhauser, Sheppard, and Mayer 1956; Sheppard and Masters 1959). However, there is no research on the effect of prenomination group endorsements. We examine the influence of endorsements on group members' candidate choice and campaign activity in presidential nomination contests.

The contemporary presidential nomination process offers unprecedented opportunities for group participation. Prior to the reforms of the 1970s, the unit rule and the large number of party-controlled caucuses and guaranteed convention slots for organization leaders ensured that "in each major party some fifty to one hundred men . . . decided nominations" (Richard Neustadt, quoted in Huckshorn and Bibby 1982, 75). The wave of reforms that took hold beginning with the 1972 presidential election opened the nomination process to popular and group participation, and reduced organizational leaders' control over nomination outcomes (Goldwin 1983; Price 1984; Shafer 1988).

At about the same time there was an explosion in interest-group formation and activity (Berry 1989; Walker 1983). It is not surprising, therefore, to find increased group activity in the presidential selection process, including public endorsement of nomination contenders. For example, in the 1980 Democratic nominations contest between President Jimmy Carter and Senator Edward Kennedy, the National Education Association endorsed Carter's renomination. In 1984, the NEA, the National Organization of Women, the AFL-CIO, the American Federation of Teachers, and the United Auto Workers all endorsed Walter Mondale's bid for the Democratic nomination. These endorsements were actively sought by the candidates, and groups received tangible rewards in the form of platform commitments. Carter's endorsement in 1980 was partly in return for his success in creating the Department of Education, but the NEA was also allowed to write the education plank in that year's Democratic platform (Donnelly 1980, 2278). In return for NOW's 1984 endorsement, the Mondale campaign ceded 'sign off' authority on all platform language concerning women to Mary Jean Collins, NOW's action vice president (Freeman 1988, 876).

In sum, the strategic environment of presidential nominations has changed. In the participatory and fluid contemporary process, candidates need groups because of groups' presumed abilities to influence their members and provide campaign support. Groups have a vested interest in signing on early with a preferred candidate to extract the maximum reward and to repay past support for group goals by that candidate. Since candidates seek to build momentum early in order to generate credibility and support in the round-robin of caucuses and primaries, groups can be key players in a process no longer dominated by organizational leaders of the parties.

Underlying the claims groups make to wield influence and the willingness of candidates to make concessions is the largely untested assumption that groups are able to exercise influence over their members. How successful are groups in generating support for their endorsed candidate among their own membership? Can groups deliver the campaign activity of their members as well as their votes? Do groups differ in their abilities to influence their members' behavior?

We examine these questions by focusing on the 1984 Democratic nomination contest in three caucus states. Nineteen-eighty-four provides an ideal opportunity to examine these questions because it was the year of a nomination race in which several large and politically significant groups made endorsements.[1] In addition, the competitive nature of the race provided groups with an incentive to mount a strong effort on Mondale's behalf.

Converse and Campbell (1968) found that group members were more likely to support endorsed general election candidates when their level of identification with the group was high, when they viewed the organization's political activity as a legitimate part of its organizational goals, and when the endorsement was unambiguous.

It is not clear, however, that findings regarding general election endorsements are directly applicable to prenomination endorsements. First, because groups often work closely with political parties, general election endorsements of that party's candidates may seem a natural outgrowth of that relationship, particularly when there are strong ideological and issue differences between the parties' candidates. Nomination candidates of the same party are much more likely to be similar, both in ideology and in their support of group goals. As a result, the differences that do exist between candidates will be more difficult to explain to the members, and less clearly related to group interests.

Second, the level of attack on the unendorsed candidate is likely to be far less than in a general election, diminishing the clarity of the endorsement. The groups that endorsed Mondale in 1984 (the AFL-CIO and related unions, the NEA, AFT, and NOW) made clear that their greatest antipathy was to Reagan, not to Hart, and a general election endorsement of either Democratic nominee was all but guaranteed.

The groups we examine differ in ways that allow us to speculate on the factors promoting endorsement success. They differ in their history of political endorsements, in the patterns of interaction between members and groups, and in their level of organizational centralization. As partisan political forces, the NEA and NOW are relatively new to the political arena. Although the NEA was founded in 1857, its first cash contributions for political action did not come until 1973 (West 1980, 190), and its first presidential general election endorsement was not until 1976. NOW was only founded in 1966, and its first presidential endorsement, like the NEA's, was for Carter in 1976. Unlike the NEA, however, NOW made no endorsement, either pre- or postnomination, in 1980. In contrast, the AFL-CIO has been a mainstay of the Democratic Party for many years, and has been heavily involved in Democratic party politics (Wilson, 1979). The events of 1984 provided an opportunity for labor to show its muscle in the reform era by backing Mondale, a candidate with long-standing and unquestioned labor credentials.

Organizationally, the three types of groups also differ from one another. NOW is less bureaucratic, less hierarchic, and less unified than either the NEA or the AFL-CIO (Ferree and Hess 1985). As a result, national endorsements are not binding on state committees. In 1982, the national committee of NOW endorsed Lowell Weicker, the Republican Senator from Connecticut, while the state committee endorsed his Democratic opponent. This tolerance for diversity might make group endorsements less influential for members who disagree with the organizational choice. On the other extreme, when the Colorado AFL-CIO endorsed McGovern in 1972, in opposition to the official line of neutrality, its president was removed by the national office.

Finally, as members of workplace organizations, teachers and union members come into frequent contact with organizational representatives, while the contact with the organization for women's group members is dependent on voluntary meeting attendance. We expect to find, then, group endorsement effects greatest for unions and smallest for women's groups.

Methods

Our sample consists of individuals who attended the 1984 Democratic first-stage caucuses in Michigan, Virginia, and Iowa. These caucuses elected delegates who were committed to particular candidates, and who then attended higher-level caucuses, which in turn nominated the state's national convention delegation. Our respondents were sampled through a two-stage sampling process. First precincts (or counties) were sampled proportionate to population. Then, within each selected precinct caucus participants were sampled.

The Iowa caucus is particularly important since it is the first caucus of the candidate selection season. As such, it garners extensive press coverage (Robinson and Sheehan 1983). Virginia is a southern state and its caucuses came more than a month after Iowa's; and Michigan was the only major industrial state using the caucus system for party nominations. Questionnaires were mailed shortly after the respondents had attended their respective caucuses. There was a reminder postcard, and a second questionnaire sent to those respondents who had not returned the first questionnaire. Surveys were sent to both Republican and Democratic caucus participants, although only Democrats are discussed here. The return rate for the Democratic sample was 44.9%.[2] Our response is only slightly lower than

Table 1. Mondale Support Among Group Members, by Level of Group Activity (in percentages)

Group Type	Nongroup Members	All Group Members	Active Members Only	Passive Members Only
Labor unions	38.4 (2,506)	54.8 (1,016)	67.3 (450)	44.3 (566)
Teachers' groups	43.4 (2,753)	45.4 (769)	48.4 (427)	41.8 (342)
Women's groups	44.4 (3,058)	40.0 (464)	34.0 (174)	43.9 (290)

Note: Number of cases on which percentages are computed are in parentheses.

what Miller and Jennings (1986, 18) report for their 1981 mail sample of 1980 Democratic national convention delegates (49%).

We received questionnaires from 4,223 Democratic caucus participants, 1,526 from Iowa, 824 from Michigan, and 1,873 from Virginia. To correct for differential return rates from supporters of different candidates, we weighted the sample to conform to actual state results and to give each state a weighted N of 1500.[3] In the survey, respondents were asked if they were members, active members, or leaders in a variety of groups, including labor unions, teachers' organizations or unions, or women's rights groups.[4] This delineation between members and nonmembers and between active members or leaders gives us a measure of group identification.

Although we do not have direct measures of respondents' awareness of organizational endorsement, it is important to note that our respondents are actual caucus participants in Iowa, Michigan, and Virginia. As such they are an unusually politically active group, with high levels of political involvement and knowledge.[5]

Findings

Overall, how successful was each group's endorsement of Mondale in affecting members' support for the candidate? As Table 1 shows, there was an increase in Mondale's support among the two workplace-based groups. Mondale's support was slightly higher among teachers than among nonteachers' group members (45.4% versus 43.4%), and significantly higher among union members than nonmembers (54.8% to 38.4%; $p < .001$).

On the other hand, among women's rights group members Mondale actually received 4% less support than from nonmembers (40% versus 44.4%). As discussed above, organizational weakness is no doubt one reason for this failure to deliver on the NOW endorsement, particularly in a year like 1984, when a variety of candidates vying for the nomination in addition to Mondale, including McGovern, Cranston, and Jackson, had strong feminist credentials and past records of feminist support.

Of course not all individuals who are members of a group will be equally aware of or influenced by that group's endorsements or norms. As Chowdhry and Newcomb (1952) found, the accuracy with which group norms are perceived is frequently low and depends on one's position in the group. In all groups, active members and leaders should be more aware of group endorsements than nonactive members. In addition, where group membership is less voluntary, as in labor unions and teachers' groups, many

Table 2. Group Effects on Candidate Support (Logit Analysis)

Independent Variables	Coefficient	*t*-ratio	Slope Analogue
Background			
Age	.024	6.88	.006
Sex	.132	1.34	.033
Race	1.717	10.69	.429
Income	.105	4.04	.027
Education level	-.405	-9.49	-.101
Length of party activity	.007	.17	.002
Ideological self-placement	-.114	-3.15	-.028
Membership effects[a]			
Labor unions	.087	.71	.022
Teachers' groups	.429	2.81	.107
Women's groups	.212	1.22	.053
Leadership effects[a]			
Labor unions	.879	6.52	.220
Teachers groups	.623	4.40	.156
Women's groups	-.351	-1.55	-.088
Number of cases	2,841		

Note: For all group variables, positive coefficients indicate increased support of members and activists for Mondale. On background variables, positive coefficients indicate that more educated, older, higher income, female, white, more liberal, and longer term respondents supported Mondale.

[a] Compared with nongroup members.

members may have little political identification with the organization.

When we compare those who are members, but not group activists, across the three types of groups, it is striking how similar the levels of Mondale support are (ranging only from 41.8% to 44.3%). But this changes radically when we focus on group activists. For example, while 44.3% of rank-and-file union members preferred Mondale for the Democratic nomination, 67.3% of union activists did so. Mondale's support among teachers also increased among more active members, by 6.6%. Among women's group activists, however, Mondale received 8.7% *less* support than he did in the sample as a whole (34% versus 42.7%), and 9.9% less than among passive members.[6]

In sum, the three groups that endorsed Mondale differed in their levels of member support for him. The difference in support, however, showed up primarily among the active members, with teachers and union members being much more supportive than members of women's rights groups.

Comparative Group Effects

Thus far we have dealt with group memberships one at a time, but we are most interested in the independent contribution of group membership to Mondale support. That an AFL-CIO member supported Mondale may be a function of membership in one of the other endorsing groups (23.8% of members of one group belonged to one of the others), or to variables exogenous to group membership such as sex, race, income, education, ideology, and length of party involvement. By controlling for these as well as for other group memberships, we can ascertain independent group effects. Our estimates are conservative because we exclude any indirect effect that group membership might have on candidate choice through getting the person involved in party affairs, or through group socialization effects on ideology.[7] Having found important effects of group activism in Table 1, we will retain the active-inactive distinction. We use logit models since our dependent variable, candidate supported at the caucuses, is dichotomous (all three groups endorsed Mondale, and, therefore, support for any other candidate went against the group's endorsement).

Even with controls, we continue to find group effects similar to the zero-order effects. For workplace-based groups leadership coefficients continue to surpass those for rank-and-file members, and the significance levels reflect the zero-order findings. On the other hand, for women's groups group leadership has an insignificant (even negative) effect on Mondale support.

In addition to reporting the logit coefficients and the associated *t*-values, we report the partial derivative at the point in which the probability of voting for Mondale is equal to .5. This gives us an analogue to an OLS regression slope estimate at that point (Aldrich and Nelson 1984), and allows for easier interpretation of group membership and activism effects. As Table 2 shows, labor union activists show 22% higher levels of support for Mondale than do nonmembers ($p < .001$). Rank-and-file union members, however, do not show a significant increase in Mondale support over nonmembers. On the other hand, even nonactive teachers' group members show a 10.7% increase in Mondale support over demographically similar nongroup members ($p < .01$). Although teacher group activism increases Mondale support by an additional 4.9% over rank-and-file members (and 15.6% over nonmembers), the difference between active and nonactive members is statistically insignificant ($p > .20$). For women's groups, the most voluntary group, rank-and-file membership effects on Mondale support exceed those for unions (5.3% increase versus 2.2%), although neither is significant. However, active women's group involvement actually decreases support for Mondale by 14.1% ($p < .05$) compared with less active members, and by 8.8% in comparison with similar nongroup members ($p > .05$).

Aggregate Group Effects on Candidate Support

Although from the standpoint of organizational influence it is the endorsements' influence over members that is most significant, from the standpoint of the candidate this is only half the story. The second half is the number of organizational members who turn out at the caucuses. An endorsement by an organization that is poorly represented in the caucuses, but whose members uniformly support the endorsed candidate, is of less value than an endorsement from a group less influential with its membership but better represented among caucus participants.

All three groups discussed here were well represented among our respondents. Almost a third of the sample (31.8%) were members of unions; almost a quarter (22.4%) were members of teachers' groups, and about one in nine were members of women's groups (11.4%). More than half of all respondents (52%) were members of at least one of the three types of endorsing groups.[8] In addition, almost half of labor union members, and more than half of teachers' group members, attending the caucuses, were *active* members or leaders of the organization. Among women's groups, however, only a little more than a third of group members (38.1%) were active members.

Combining the endorsement effect with the levels of group representation in the caucuses allows us to assess the net effect of group endorsements.[9] We find that

Table 3. Group Representation and Effects Among Democratic Caucus Participants (in percentages)

Group Type	Total Membership	Active Members & Leaders	Percent of Total Membership that is Active	Aggregate Group Effect[a]
Labor unions	31.8	14.1	44.4	3.5
Teachers' groups	22.4	12.3	55.2	3.0
Women's groups	11.4	4.4	38.1	0.0

[a]Increase in support for Mondale.

labor union membership increased Mondale's support by 3.5% among all caucus participants, teachers' groups contributed an additional 3%, while women's groups had no effect at all. The total effect of the three groups was a 6.5% increase in Mondale's level of caucus support.[10]

Endorsement Impact on Campaign Activity

Almost all the work on group endorsements has dealt exclusively with endorsement effects on voting choice. However, with the changing nomination environment, the role of interest groups in providing campaign organizational support has increased (Shafer 1988). As a result, group endorsements may also prove valuable by inciting member activity in the endorsed candidate's nomination campaign.[11]

We asked our respondents if they contributed money, canvassed, did clerical work, raised funds, tried to convince friends to support, or attend public meetings or rallies on behalf of each nomination candidate. From the list of activities for Mondale we created a seven-point additive index. We regressed this Mondale activity scale on the same demographics and group membership/activity variables as in Table 2. Once again neither membership nor activism in a women's group is significantly related to increased campaign activity. For both labor and teachers' groups, group leadership or active membership is strongly related ($p < .01$) to Mondale campaign activism, and once again it is labor activism that has the strongest effect. In fact the only deviation from the candidate preference analysis is that teacher group membership has an insignificant effect on campaign activity ($b = .027$; $p > .40$).

The insignificant effects for women's groups are expected given the relatively small percentage of women's group members (particularly activists) who were supporting Mondale. However, if we restrict ourselves to respondents who preferred Mondale for the nomination (the only ones with a realistic likelihood of campaigning for him), we should find significant increases in the effects of women's group membership and leadership.[12] By organizing campaign activities on behalf of the endorsed candidate, groups lower the costs of participation for their members; and by identifying the group with the campaign, groups motivate members to get involved.

Regressing campaign activity on behalf of Mondale on the same predictors as before—but this time for Mondale supporters only—we find an interesting change for women's group activists. While simple membership continues to have no significant effect, group activism results in an average increase of .567 campaign activities compared with nongroup members ($p < .01$). This effect is impressive since only 21.1% of the sample performed more than one campaign activity for Mondale. In fact, this result is very close to the effect of labor union activism over nonunion members ($b = .636$; $p < .01$). Activists in women's groups were the most resistant to voting for Mondale at the caucuses, but they were most willing to campaign actively for him when he was their preferred candidate. The effects on campaign involvement of both labor union membership and activism mirror those for the sample as a whole. Surprisingly, for teachers, on the other hand, the effects become insignificant.

Although we find a clear effect of women's group involvement on Mondale campaign activity, women's group members may just be unusually active on behalf of their preferred candidate, whether or not he has the group's endorsement. If this were the case, it would follow that women's group members supporting Hart would also be particularly active on his behalf. Given the high level of support for Hart, this would effectively cancel out the effect we found for Mondale supporters. However an identical analysis of Hart campaign activity reveals no significant effect of either women's group membership ($b = .011$; $p > .90$) or activism ($b = .028$; $p > .90$).[13]

Conclusions

Although earlier research has examined the effect of group endorsements in gen-

Table 4. Effects of Group Membership and Activism on Level of Mondale Nomination Campaign Activity

	Total Sample		Mondale Supporters Only	
Independent Variables	b	*t*-ratio	b	*t*-ratio
Background Effects				
Age	.008	4.710	.005	1.521
Sex	.103	2.233	.107	1.121
Race	-.315	5.126	-.347	-2.679
Income	.022	1.749	.076	2.908
Educational level	-.017	-.900	.042	1.111
Length of party activity	.103	5.042	.117	1.898
Ideological self-placement	-.053	-3.233	-.070	-1.986
Membership effects[a]				
Labor unions	.103	1.758	.402	3.185
Teachers' groups	-.027	-.379	-.138	-.902
Women's groups	.052	.630	.180	1.079
Leadership effects[a]				
Labor union	.442	6.842	.636	5.405
Teacher's groups	.204	3.071	.186	1.532
Women's groups	.166	1.590	.567	2.520
Constant	-.408	-1.854	-9.64	-2.054
Adjusted R^2	.06		.06	
Number of cases	3,249		1,115	

Note: For all group variables, positive coefficients indicate increased support of members and activists for Mondale. On background variables, positive coefficients indicate that more educated, older, higher income, female, white, more liberal, and longer-term respondents supported Mondale.

[a] Compared with nongroup members.

eral elections, this is the first systematic analysis of group endorsements in the presidential nomination process. The results confirm that group endorsements in 1984 did have a significant impact on caucus participants' behavior both in candidate supported at the caucuses and in prenomination campaign activity on behalf of the endorsed candidate. Mondale gained more than a 6% advantage at the caucuses, attributable to support from members of teachers' groups, labor unions, and women's groups in the three states we studied.[14]

The three types of groups, however, achieved very different levels of success. In fact, unions and teachers' groups accounted for the entire endorsement effect at the caucuses. These two groups are similar to each other in their history of partisan political involvement, their base in the workplace, and their more hierarchical structure. And they differ in all these ways from women's groups. With only one election and three groups it is impossible to be certain which factors are dominant, but we believe that all three contribute to the impact of group endorsements. Labor union membership also had the greatest marginal effect on Mondale prenomination campaign activity. Once again, teachers' groups had the second greatest effect, and women's groups had insignificant effects for both rank-and-file and more active members.

If groups can have direct influence on the nomination process, they have the ability to make demands on candidates directly and circumvent ongoing party organizations. However, such influence is likely to occur only for certain types of groups and under limited circumstances. Groups will continue to make strong claims, and candidates will continue to be faced with uncertainty about the ability of groups to deliver the promised endorsement bonus. As a result, we can expect that concerns about group endorsements will continue in presidential nominations for the foreseeable future.

Notes

The National Science Foundation provided support for the surveys on which this study is based (SES-8308871). The authors acknowledge helpful comments from Joel D. Schwartz, C. Lawrence Evans, and research assistance from Jay McCann.

1. This is not to say that 1984 is typical. It had more prenomination endorsements by large groups than any other year. But it is precisely this large number of endorsements that allows us to compare groups in the context of the same campaign.

2. The rate varied by state and by party. Among Democrats, the return rates were 48.3%, 34.7%, and 48.5% for Iowa, Michigan, and Virginia respectively. Among Republicans the rates were 55.1% for Iowa, 38.6% for Michigan, and 59.7% for Virginia. In all cases this rate is lowered by the fact that the mailing was sent out at bulk rate, so any respondent who had moved, or with an incorrect address never received the questionnaire (bulk rate letters are neither forwarded nor returned to the sender).

3. In both Michigan and Virginia respondents reported whom they had actually supported at the caucuses. Based on this report (which we were able to validate with official party records of respondents' candidate support for the Virginia sample), we weighted the sample to conform to actual state results. For Iowa Democrats, we had party records of candidate support for about half of the respondents, and, based on the results for this group, we were able to extrapolate to the rest of the Iowa Democratic sample.

For the analysis that follows, only respondents who answered the questions about group membership are included. For the analysis dealing directly with candidate support (Tables 1 and 2) the Iowa data is reweighted to keep the states equal in the sample. Rerunning the analysis without such weighting produces no differences in conclusions.

4. Certain categories of groups are inherently ambiguous. To avoid such ambiguity, we supplied respondents with examples in the case of women's rights groups (i.e., NOW and NWPC) and teachers' organizations (NEA and AFT). In the case of women's groups, NOW is clearly the largest. It has 260,000 members, compared to 75,000 in NWPC (and we should expect significant overlap between the groups). In the case of teachers' organizations, we have combined an AFL-CIO unit, the AFT, with the NEA. However, both groups did support Mondale, and in addition, both groups have similar structure. Although it is impossible to disentangle the effects of the two groups, it should be borne in mind that nationally the NEA has about three times the membership of the AFT, and in two of the three states in our survey, this ratio is even greater. Although the AFL-CIO does not include all labor unions in the U.S., it does include most. The most important one it does not include, the Teamsters, en-

dorsed Ronald Reagan in 1984 and should not have been a factor in the Democratic nomination process. Similarly, although NOW was the only women's group to make an endorsement, it is the largest and most public of all these groups.

Our actual question asks respondents whether they "have been a member, an active member, or a leader" of each group. This wording runs the risk of including former members as current group members. The main effects of this should be to overstate group membership slightly, while attenuating the relationship between group involvement and our support and activity measures. The net effect should be very small.

5. The Iowa caucus turnout was about 85,000, Michigan's was 132,000 and Virginia's 25,500. To give an idea of how small these turnouts were, even in Iowa, the caucus turnout was less than 15% of the Mondale vote in the general election, in Michigan it was less than 9%, and in Virginia it was only about 3% of the November election vote for Mondale.

6. Baer and Bositis (1988) find a similar zero-order result for their analysis of 1984 Democratic national convention delegates and for Democratic county chairs.

7. The analysis presented here does not include a full model of candidate support. In other work we present a more fully developed model (Stone, Rapoport, and Abramowitz 1990). Here we try to ascertain how group members differ from other caucus participants with similar demographic and ideological backgrounds and similar histories of party involvement.

8. Group representation varies by state. Not surprisingly, Michigan showed the largest interest group representation, with 61.8%. But even in the least-well-represented state, Iowa, 45.5% of all caucus participants were members of at least one of the three groups. Type of group represented also varies by state. Whereas labor union members comprised almost half of Michigan caucus participants (48.6%), they comprised only 25.9% and 21.0% of the Iowa and Virginia electorates respectively. In fact, labor representation barely outpaced that of teachers in Iowa, and actually trailed teachers in Virginia. And in Virginia, even women's groups were almost as large a force as union members.

9. To derive our estimate of aggregate group effect, we multiplied the percentage of the sample who were rank-and-file members of a group by the marginal impact of group membership on Mondale support. We then multiplied the percentage of the sample who were active members of that group by the marginal effect of group activism on Mondale support. Adding the two together gives us the resulting aggregate group endorsement effects shown in Table 3.

10. The group effects also vary by state. Women's groups effects ranged from a decrease in Mondale support of 0.8% in Iowa to an increase in Mondale's caucus support in Virginia of 1.6%; unions had their strongest effect in Michigan (4.8% increase in Mondale's vote), and their smallest in Iowa (a 1.9% increase in the Mondale vote); and teachers' groups effects ranged from 1.9% in Michigan to 4.1% in Iowa.

This amount does not take into account the possible negative effects of the group endorsements (Moore 1986, 46–49). Hart used the group endorsements against Mondale in the primaries. On the other hand, we are unable to calculate the stimulating effect that group endorsements may have had in increasing the number of group members who attended the caucuses.

11. Even though we are looking only at caucus state participants, the endorsement effects on campaign participation that we find are important for primary states as well. In either type of state it is the partisan activists (those types of individuals who turn out for a caucus, rather than those who turn out for a primary), who are also group members, that are likely to be mobilized for a campaign.

12. Our expectations for the other two groups are less clear cut. Their impacts on campaign activity are enhanced by the large base of Mondale support among group members and leaders. By looking at Mondale supporters separately, one of their bases of advantage is eliminated. On the other hand, those already committed to Mondale should be easier to mobilize by group-organized campaign activities.

13. For the sample as a whole, regressing Hart campaign activities on group membership and activism, and controlling for demographics, produces no significant coefficients for either teacher group membership or activism, nor for labor union activism. The only significant effect (a strongly negative one) was for union rank-and-file members.

14. Our caucus state results might be higher than would be found in primary states because of the smaller representation of members of endorsing groups relative to the total turnout. Our survey of 1988 nomination participants in the same three states supports this expectation. Both Michigan and Iowa used the same caucus format as in 1984. Virginia, however, changed to a primary. In both 1988 caucus states, representation of the three groups studied here remained about the same. In Virginia, the percentage of primary voters in 1988 who were members of these interest groups was more than 10% lower than in the 1984 caucuses.

References

Aldrich, John, and Forrest D. Nelson. 1984. *Linear Probability, Logit and Probit Models.* Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Baer, Denise L., and David A. Bositis. 1988. *Elite*

Cadres and Party Coalitions. New York: Greenwood Press.

Berry, Jeffrey M. 1989. *The Interest Group Society.* 2d ed. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company.

Chowdhry, Kalma, and Theodore M. Newcomb. 1952. "The Relative Abilities of Leaders and Nonleaders to Estimate Opinions of their own Groups." *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 47:51–57.

Converse, Philip E., and A. Angus Campbell. 1968. "Political Standards in Secondary Groups." In *Group Dynamics,* eds. Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, 2d ed.

Donnelly, Harrison. 1980. "Teacher Organization Unites Behind Carter—For a Price." *CQ Weekly Report* 38:2277–79.

Ferree, Myra Marx, and Beth B. Hess. 1985. *The New Feminist Movement.* Boston: Twayne.

Freeman, Jo. 1988. "Women and the Democratic Convention." *PS* 21:875–81.

Goldwin, Robert. 1983. *Whither the Parties?* Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.

Huckshorn, Robert, and John Bibby. 1982. "State Parties in an Era of Political Change." In *The Future of American Political Parties,* ed. Joel L. Fleishman. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Kornhauser, Arthur, Harold L. Sheppard, and Albert J. Mayer. 1956. *When Labor Votes, A Study of Auto Workers.* New York: University Books.

Miller, Warren E., and M. Kent Jennings. 1986. *Parties in Transition.* New York: Russell Sage.

Moore, Jonathon. 1986. *Campaign for President: The Managers Look at '84.* Dover, MA: Auburn House.

Price, David. 1984. *Bringing Back the Parties.* Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Robinson, Michael A., and Margaret J. Sheehan. 1983. *Over the Air and On the Wire.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Shafer, Byron. 1988. *Bifurcated Politics.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Sheppard, Harold L., and Nicholas A. Masters. 1959. "The Political Attitudes and Preferences of Organized Labor: The Case of the Detroit Auto Workers." *American Political Science Review* 53:437–47.

Stone, Walter J., Ronald B. Rapoport, and Alan I. Abramowitz. 1990. "Candidate Support in Presidential Nomination Campaigns. The Case of Iowa in 1984." University of Colorado. Typescript.

Walker, Jack L. 1983. "The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America." *American Political Science Review* 77:390–406.

West, Allen M. 1980. *The National Education Association: The Power Base for Education.* New York: Free Press.

Wilson, Graham. 1979. *Unions in American National Politics.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Ronald B. Rapoport is Professor of Government, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23185.

Walter J. Stone is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309.

Alan I. Abramowitz is Professor of Political Science, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322.

DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF INTEREST GROUP INVINCIBILITY IN THE COURTS

LEE EPSTEIN
Southern Methodist University
C. K. ROWLAND
University of Kansas

Research on interest group litigation has provoked a reevaluation of the conventional wisdom about the study of pressure group activity and judicial politics. Nevertheless, the notion that interest groups are intrepid litigators that rarely lose to nongroup adversaries persists unchallenged and unscathed. We seek to determine if groups are, in fact, as invincible as the literature suggests. Several findings emerge that may undermine conventional wisdom about the relative efficacy of group-sponsored litigation. Most important is that groups are no more likely than nongroups to win, at least in U.S. District Courts. Based on this and other results, we draw a number of conclusions about interest group litigation and the direction into which future study might head.

The 1980s witnessed a marked rejuvenation in the study of interest group politics (e.g., Berry 1989; Cigler and Loomis 1986; Salisbury, Heinz, Lauman, and Nelson 1987; Scholzman and Tierney 1986). This new wave of research enriched our understanding of many facets of organizational activity and, concomitantly, of the governmental process. Surely, though, among its most important contributions was expanding the scope of the field to include group involvement in the judiciary. Indeed, the study of interest group litigation has become a fixture on the scholarly agendas of those working in the subfields of pressure group activity and judicial politics.

Some of the more influential work has caused us to reevaluate conventional wisdom in light of fundamental changes in the relationship between legal and democratic subcultures. In the past we were informed that groups rarely, if ever, used the judiciary to achieve their policy objectives (Hakman 1969); we now know that the majority of Supreme Court cases attract the attention of a multitude of pressure groups. Likewise, we have learned that the model of interest group litigation conventionally associated with liberal causes (see Vose 1959), has been adopted and refined by contemporary conservative groups (Epstein 1985). So too, we once thought interest groups participated only in cases decided on the merits; but it is true that they also act as agenda setters, filing *amicus curiae* briefs on *certiorari* (Caldeira and Wright 1988).

This systematic contravention of conventional wisdom is, however, marked by a notable exception. The notion that interest groups are intrepid litigators that rarely lose to nongroup adversaries persists unchallenged and unscathed.[1] That such is the case is hardly surprising: in general those studying group litigation have had difficulty developing viable analytic schema capable of separating the influence of groups from all other known determinants of judicial decisions. As a result, the assumption that groups are invincible players has become an axiomatic component of our understanding of the litigation game.

Given growing interest in group use of the courts to achieve policy goals (for a recent review, see Caldeira and Wright 1988) and a large body of existing, albeit impressionistic, literature suggesting that groups are highly successful players in the litigation game, this void looms large. It is, thus, our purpose to reexamine conventional wisdom about group influence on decisions of the judiciary, specifically on those of U.S. District Courts.

The Literature on the Success of Group Litigators

Conceptualizing and Measuring Success

Any contemplation of the success of litigants in court, from both conceptual and operational standpoints, is bound to be complex. This is true for a number of reasons, the most important of which is that the society of interest group litigators has changed markedly over the past several decades. In the days when Vose (1959) published *Caucasians Only*, many pluralists conceptualized and measured "success" as did he: the ability of groups to see their policy goals etched into law. This was, undoubtedly, adequate and accurate: the few groups that litigated prior to the 1960s generally went to court to win (see Vose 1972). However, as the environment surrounding the federal judiciary has changed, with increasing numbers of groups entering the fray, the motivations for litigation have broadened. Most groups ultimately are concerned with *winning* their cases; yet, they also use the judiciary to achieve other, perhaps subtler, ends, such as gaining publicity for their causes and maintaining their memberships (see Gates and McIntosh 1989).

This alteration has important implications for those studying the success of interest group litigators. Indeed, scholars are now recognizing that the increasing diversity among group goals requires greater sensitivity in their analyses; in particular, that any examination of the "success" of groups in legal forums must carefully articulate the relationship between the research question asked and the underlying measures used to address it. By way of illustration, consider Caldeira and Wright's (1988) research in which they sought to elucidate the role of interest groups in the Supreme Court's agenda-setting process. Because of their particular focus, they contemplated "success" as the ability of interest groups to influence the Court's formulation of its plenary docket through the filing of amicus curiae briefs. In other words, their research focus dictated their measure. To have used another focus, say the effect of groups on case outcomes, would have been to beg the question.

Other examples of the relationship between our research foci and our measures of success abound. For those interested in issues involving the use of courts by politically disadvantaged groups (e.g., Cortner 1968), success might be best conceptualized as the ability of such to gain access to judicial forums (Orren 1976). For Epstein (1985), who studied groups that marched into legal arenas because they viewed them as hostile to their interests, success became a question of whether they provided a counterbalance to competing claims, whether they could "cut their losses." Still others, focusing on how groups use litigation to garner publicity for their causes (O'Connor 1980) or for maintenance (Kobylka 1987), might define success as their ability to foist issues on to the national agenda, to maintain or attract members. By the same token, many scholars (e.g., Vose 1959) have asked whether groups can and do achieve their policy objectives in court. In explicating their responses, these analysts are usually more attuned to court outcomes over the long haul, than in the amount of publicity, and so forth, that groups generate along the way. Finally, for Scheingold (1974) and others who have explored whether legal "wins" necessarily translate into policy victories, those factors explaining litigation outcomes are far less relevant than are issues of compliance and implementation.

This intimate relationship—between the different research questions we ask and the underlying measures we use to answer them—speaks to two interrelated dimensions of our work on interest groups. For one, that we have such an array of options available to us reveals a great deal about the complexity of pluralism in today's legal environment. Groups resort to litigation with myriad objectives in mind: for some, the simple act of gaining publicity for a cause might be sufficient; for others, nothing short of seeing their objectives translated into legal doctrine will suffice. Second, and relatedly, as group use of the courts becomes increasingly complex, we need to be more pointedly conscious of and sensitive to the relationship between the conceptualizations and measures of success we use and the sorts of issues over which we are puzzling.

Our Research Focus: The Invincibility of Interest Group Litigators

It is with this in mind that we take particular care to explicate our research focus and concomitant measure of success. As our introduction reveals, we are interested in a facet, albeit an important one, of the conventional wisdom about interest groups: that they are intrepid litigators that are more successful in achieving their legal goals than their nongroup adversaries.

Our interest in this particular dimension of success emanates from a rather simple concern: this piece of conventional wisdom is among the most deeply entrenched in the literature. Perusal of mainstay works in this area (e.g., Cortner 1968; Greenberg 1977; Vose 1959) easily leads to the conclusion that groups are, virtually, invincible. Later, we shall review some of the justifications for this "wisdom," as well as some of its potential flaws. Suffice it for now, this proposition has yet to be systematically assessed, but has emerged from rich and thick description of specific cases (e.g., Kluger 1976; Manwaring 1962), series of cases (e.g., Sorauf 1976), or types of groups (e.g., O'Connor 1980; Lawrence 1990).

Because our objective is to closely examine the assumption that groups are invincible players in the litigation game, how can we best measure the concept of legal success? In our opinion, a satisfactory approach is to explore actual case outcomes in federal district courts, asking who won and who lost the legal dispute. We recognize that both dimensions of this measure may be troubling. Winning a case may be tangential (perhaps even irrelevant) to the objectives of some groups. Further, the conventional wisdom concentrates on the long-term success of groups in convincing the Supreme Court to adopt certain doctrinal innovations, rather than on their ability to influence lower courts to rule in favor of the specific litigants they are representing.[2] If this is so, the implication of the literature—that groups are unusually successful litigants—may not aptly describe their ability to prevail in one dispute in a federal district court.

Yet, we are convinced that our measure is best suited to address the question we ask. The research forming the assumption of invincibility may be based on things other than federal district court outcomes; yet, *it monotonically informs most of our knowledge about group success before the* *courts.* As a result, actual case outcomes provide an appropriate vehicle by which to examine its virtually unqualified assessment of interest group success in legal forums. At a minimum, testing the literature against lower court outcomes will tell us something about the breadth of group effectiveness in the federal judiciary. It also may suggest that this received wisdom needs to be tempered in light of the legal reality it purports to describe.

Why are Groups Better?: A Look at the Conventional Wisdom

Though the literature on group success in court is rather stark in its conclusion that groups outperform their nonorganized counterparts, it does provide us with some reasonable justifications for that view. Most of these explanations, though, revolve around two premises: groups and private litigants have different objectives and follow different tactics in pursuit of them (see, generally, Casper 1972).

That private counsel and groups possess varying goal structures is undoubtedly true. Simply, private counsel are client oriented; their goal is an immediate court victory. Group attorneys, by contrast, are policy oriented, aiming to create national legal precedent consistent with their objectives. Such motivation often leads groups to prioritize requests for legal assistance—to select for litigation those that maximize their probability of victory. It is only logical to assume, then, that groups will be more successful; after all, as Kobylka (1987) observed, attorneys looking for winners are bound to find them.

The advantages inherent in the unique goal structures of groups are even more attenuated by the tactics they use to achieve them, tactics that may be unfeasible for, or even irrelevant to, the efforts of private counsel. For example, groups appear to be much more attuned to the importance of coalition building than are most private counsel. They often request like-minded interests and/or the U.S. Solicitor General's office to file reinforcing amicus curiae briefs. The former may help the Court to see the greater policy implications of a case (see Barker 1967); the latter is the quintessential "repeat player," the most successful litigator in the federal system (see Krislov 1963; Puro 1971; Segal 1984). Moreover, conventional wisdom suggests that interest groups attempt to sustain their use of the courts over as long a period as possible (O'Connor 1980). This persistence, which makes groups "repeat players," is said to give them significant advantages over private litigants, many of whom are "one shotters" (Galanter 1974). Finally, organizations seem more sensitive than private litigants to the importance of priming the Court even before they enter its corridors: they often inundate law reviews with articles "presenting constitutional justification for their cause," which they later cite in legal briefs (Newland 1959); and they make use of social scientific evidence (see Vose 1958; Lempert and Sanders 1986).

The avalanche of success stories and the strategic advantages thought to account for these successes combine to reinforce notions of group invincibility. Yet, a closer examination of this evidence raises some serious concerns about its validity, concerns that others have raised and with which we share. Most important is that assumptions about interest group success seem to run counter to the conclusions from other studies of judicial behavior. Particularly disconcerting is substantial evidence that the values and attitudes of trial and appellate judges help shape their judicial judgments (Carp and Rowland 1983; Spaeth 1979). If we assume these factors explain court behavior, then to what extent can the presence or absence of groups further influence outcomes?

Second, we have developed our assumptions about group success from case studies of highly visible litigators (i.e., national organizations) involved in important (i.e., constitutional) legal (i.e., Supreme Court) battles. Indeed, organizations possessing substantial resources and commitment to shaping public policy through constitutional adjudication (e.g., ACLU, NAACP LDF) are interesting to scholars precisely because of their highly visible, highly successful attempts to shape policy. But, do studies of NAACP LDF-type groups allow us to generalize about the success of those lesser-known, or those litigating nonconstitutional issues in other judicial arenas?[3]

Finally, with few exceptions (see Olson 1984), the conventional wisdom has been developed around one side of the litigation equation—the group—without considering the adversaries of their legal efforts. An implicit assumption exists within the literature that groups will outmaneuver their opponents. But, as we know, interest groups sometimes find themselves in adversarial relationships with other litigants who have long-term policy goals, substantial resources, and so forth (e.g., Rubin 1987). When interest groups face these participants in court, their advantages at any level of the judiciary may be vitiated. Or, at the very least, it would be almost nonsensical to claim that the status accrued to interest groups would be any greater than that of others, especially the federal government, which possesses significant resources, expertise, and credibility. If organized interests oppose (or are opposed by) the U.S. government, can we really believe that it is the group that will have the legal advantage?

Thus we are left with serious questions about an important piece of conventional wisdom. Are interest group litigators more successful than others? Are they as invincible as some of the literature would lead us to believe?

In the research reported below, we address these questions by comparing the success of group and nongroup litigants in the arenas where most federal disputes are ultimately resolved, the U.S. District Courts. In attempting to do so, we are, of course, cognizant of those risks to which we alluded earlier. And, our discussion of the literature certainly raises another: that the conventional wisdom may rest, at least from a conceptual standpoint, on a rather shaky foundation. Still, we enter our research endeavor with the expectation that groups will be more victorious than other litigants. The balance of the literature, though perhaps overemphasized and even caricatured, suggests that we should not anticipate otherwise.

Analyzing Group Influence on Judicial Decisions: A Research Strategy

Answering the questions we pose requires us to develop a research strategy by which to compare the relative success of groups and nongroups. Yet, exploring the relationship between pressure group politics and ultimate policy outcomes in any political forum is a difficult and complex task. We must consider that all politicos—be they judges, members of Congress, or bureaucrats—have unique cognitive systems that influence the way they frame and evaluate disputes. In short, to accurately assess the impact groups may have on decision making, we must control for the schematic predilections of individual judges. Yet, we cannot sacrifice external validity by subjecting surrogate judges to manipulated stimuli in a laboratory setting. Nor is it reasonable to compare the responses of multiple judges to the same case stimuli in a natural trial setting.

To minimize these inherent problems, we borrow an approach used by psychologists wrestling with the perennial nature-nurture debate. What they did was to invoke a design called "precision matching" (see Babbie 1986; Yinger, et al.

1977) through which they compared the behavior of identical twins separated at birth. Although this level of precision reduced the subject pool, the matching of genetically identical subjects enabled them to attribute behavioral differences to "nurture," not "nature," in a way that would be impossible through more conventional, randomized designs.

Adapting their usage to our inquiry, we can "pair" or "match" cases presenting analogous facts and law to the same judge during the same year. Indeed, the pairs could be comparable in all but one respect: one would be sponsored by an interest group; the other, brought by private counsel. Such a strategy would allow us to control for relevant differences among cases and judges (i.e., stimuli and responses) and thus, we could focus specifically on the potential effect of groups.

To implement this plan, we followed a multistaged data collection strategy. First, we selected several areas of the law on which to focus: employment discrimination, the environment, religion, and the death penalty. These represent issues identified by researchers as containing participation by a range of litigants: private counsel, governments, and interest groups. We then identified all published cases (involving those issues) decided by federal district court judges between 1968 and 1980.[4] Next, we sorted cases of the same general legal area (e.g., religion) by particular issue (e.g., establishment, free exercise), by year, and then by judge. This procedure resulted in an initial list of "pairs"—cases of analogous stimuli—decided by the same judge, the same year.

Then, to determine whether each of our pairs actually contained one group case and one nongroup case, we wrote to all participating attorneys—a necessary step since the *Federal Supplement* rarely lists the affiliation of participating attorneys.[5] In the end we were left with 40 acceptable cases (20 pairs), distributed across four case categories and equally divided between group and nongroup litigants.

To measure the dependent variable, *success,* we determined from the published opinion whether the group or the private counsel prevailed. We then compared the ultimate resolution of group and nongroup cases.

The Appendix details this information for the 40 cases. Before turning to our results, though, we should address an obvious concern about our data: the small number of cases.[6] In doing so, we must be mindful of two considerations. The first is that we began with the universe of published district court cases decided between 1968 and 1980, involving one of the four specified issue areas. This initial pool consisted of thousands of cases from which we selected those meeting a highly specified set of criteria. Only through such an approach could we keep the design pure, free from undue influences. Second, the sort of experimental design we are generally adopting, "precision matching,"[7] is an approach frequently used in other social sciences where analysts are more tolerant of small *n*s. It is nevertheless true that this design results in a more-than-typical reduction in cases (see Nachmias and Nachmias 1987). This deficit, though, has not discouraged its usage; other researchers believe, as we do, that the benefits of the approach (i.e., an increase in comparability) more than compensates for the reduction in cases.

Results

Table 1 explores the conventional wisdom that groups, generally speaking, should prevail in court. As we can see, however, that view remains unsupported by our pairs. Looking first at the aggregated success scores we see that of the 40 cases (20 pairs) groups and nongroups succeed at virtually equal rates. A sign test confirms this observation in a more precise way. This procedure considers

Table 1. The Success of Group and Nongroup Litigants in U.S. District Courts

Litigant	Case Outcome			
	Percent Won	Number of Cases	Percent Lost	Number of Cases
All Groups	40	8	60	12
Nongroups	45	9	55	11

each pair in turn to determine whether significant differences exist on a pair-by-pair basis. Within our dataset, nongroups "beat" groups in 5 of the pairs; groups prevailed in 4; and, they tied (either both winning or losing) in the remaining 11.

Before we dismiss the view of groups as invincible litigators, we should consider another possibility: that the group and nongroup plaintiffs had some effect on each other's ability to win. It could be, for example, that the nongroup dispute may have had a negative impact on the group case with which it was paired. That is, for those pairs containing cases lost by both types of plaintiffs, did the judge decide the nongroup's first? If so, then the group may have been disadvantaged by the precedent set in the nongroup case. The data, though, fail to bear this out: of those seven pairs (in which groups and nongroups lost), the court decided three group cases before the nongroup's and four nongroup's before the group's (see Appendix).[8]

Since the data do not support the conventional wisdom about organizational use of the courts (i.e., the expected advantages of groups *qua* groups, at least in U.S. District Courts, failed to materialize), let us consider a number of factors that might be masking a presumed group effect. It may be true, for example, that "group" is not a monolithic concept, that the interest group litigation model applies only to certain kinds of litigators. This is a reasonable assumption since the literature's portrayal of organizations as dominant players is based primarily, though not fully, on the successful litigation activities of NAACP LDF-type groups.

As displayed in Table 2, we explored this proposition by trichotomizing our litigants into these categories: "national" (e.g., NAACP LDF, ACLU), "local, ad hoc" (self-described community groups generally created for the purpose of bringing one particular suit), and nongroups. At an aggregated level, it again appears that our results controvert conventional wisdom: national litigators do not have a significantly higher success rate than nongroups. They won about 50% of their 17 cases; private litigants also had a success rate of 50%. A pair-by-pair analysis confirms this: national groups and private litigants prevailed over each other in about four cases and tied in the remaining ten.[9]

It also might be that national organiza-

Table 2. A Comparison of Litigants' Success in U.S. District Courts

Litigant	Case Outcome			
	Percent Won	Number of Cases	Percent Lost	Number of Cases
National Group	47	8	53	9
Local/Ad Hoc Group	0	0	100	3
Nongroup	45	9	55	11

Table 3. A Comparison of Litigants' Success in U.S. District Courts by Case Type

Litigant	Nonconstitutional Percent Success	Nonconstitutional Number of Cases	Constitutional Percent Success	Constitutional Number of Cases
National Group	36	11	67	6
Local/Ad Hoc	0	3	—	—
Nongroup	50	14	33	6

tions would perform better in cases involving constitutional issues as opposed to those of statutory and administrative law. This possibility is buttressed by the fact that most studies on which we base our knowledge of group litigation tend to focus on the success of groups litigating constitutional cases, using such as their primary, albeit not only, vehicle for social change.

The data displayed in Table 3, in which we divided the cases into constitutional and nonconstitutional suits, provide some support for this. On the whole national groups won two-thirds of their constitutional cases; nongroups won only one-third. In head-to-head competition, groups beat nongroups twice, never losing to them. Conversely, in nonconstitutional litigation, private counsel triumphed over groups three times.

In short, of the five total cases in which groups lost to nongroups (see Table 1), three involved national groups litigating nonconstitutional issues and two were losses yielded by local groups. In other words, national organizations involved in constitutional cases explain more than one-half of all group victories over nongroups.

Finally, let us consider the courtroom opponents of the group and nongroup litigants. As we previously mentioned, it may be reasonable to suspect that suits in which organizations face the federal government, in particular, bring down their overall success rate. The data depicted in Table 4 provide some support for this expectation. As we can see, all organizations—local and national—perform poorly when pitted against the federal government. They won only one (14%) of the seven suits in which the federal government opposed their efforts. Conversely, private litigants won three of their six cases (50%).

Again, though, if we return to a matching approach, a slightly different picture emerges. In head-to-head competition, organizations and nongroup litigants fared about the same. Of those pairs in which national and nongroups both faced

Table 4. Success of Litigants by Opposition in U.S. District Courts

Litigant	U.S. Government Percent Success	U.S. Government Number of Cases	State/Local Percent Success	State/Local Number of Cases	All Others Percent Success	All Others Number of Cases
National Group	20	5	80	5	43	7
Local/Ad Hoc	0	2	0	1	—	—
Nongroup	50	6	20	5	55	9

the federal government, private litigants beat their organized counterparts in one case and tied three times. Despite appearances, then, nongroups fared no better against the federal government than did groups.

As we can also observe, however, this does not necessarily mean that groups performed better against all other parties. In fact, if we exclude state/local governments from the data (see Table 4), national organizations were no more successful against other litigants than they were against the United States; it was simply their suits against state/local governments that raised their overall score. That is, they won four of the five cases in which they opposed subnational governments compared with but one in five against the federal government and three of seven against other litigants. The matching approach confirms this finding: national groups outperformed nongroups when they faced subnational opponents, winning three, losing none, and tying once.

What, then, can we conclude about the relationship between litigants and their adversaries? Overall, both litigant categories—groups and nongroups—perform about the same against the federal government. Seen in this light, federal opposition gives neither a distinct advantage nor disadvantage over the other. When it comes to subnational opponents, however, national groups do seem to have an edge: both the aggregate scores and the pairing approach indicate that they overmatched such opponents.[10]

Discussion

We systematically explored conventional wisdom concerning the efficacy of groups in court. Using an experimental design in which we paired cases sponsored by groups with those brought by other litigants, we attempted to assess the literature's portrayal of groups as premiere players in the legal game.

Several findings emerge, most of which challenge conventional wisdom about the relative efficacy of group-sponsored litigation. First, differences in success between and among our pairs are negligible: groups are no more likely than nongroups to win in U.S. District Courts. To that extent, the literature's monolithic characterization of groups as "winners" is inaccurate. And, though some distinctions do emerge when we begin to control for the other factors of group type, issue, and opposition, they are less than compelling.

Perhaps the most significant finding of this research was that so many of our pairs resulted in ties. Indeed, but for constitutional cases, more of our matches produced the same outcomes (either both won or lost) than a clear win for any litigant category. In our view, the sheer number of tied outcomes reinforces conventional wisdom about the nature of individual judicial decision making. Faced with similar case stimuli during the same year, district court judges are most likely to rule in the same direction. Given previous studies (e.g., Carp and Rowland 1983), indicating the importance of values and attitudes in shaping judicial outcomes, this is hardly a surprising finding, but it does call into question the ability of groups to affect legal outcomes. In all probability, judges simply will follow their predilection, ideological or otherwise, and place little emphasis on the characteristics of counsel bringing suit.

Naturally, our study has limitations; in particular, because we focused exclusively on U.S. trial courts, we cannot generalize about group efficacy in other judicial arenas.[11] Nor can we specify precisely the causes and correlates of group–nongroup success or the lack thereof.

We can, however, reach some tentative conclusions about the overall study of litigation and the direction into which further research might move. Most important is this: for years, analysts have focused exclusively on successful litigation campaigns, a focus that is rather troublesome because it inevitably leads to the conclusion that groups are, in fact, successful. That this research found otherwise confirms flaws inherent in that approach, and thus leads us to suggest that we must begin to explore litigation losses. Doing so, at all levels of the judiciary, will not only help us disentangle the effects of litigants from all others, it also will inevitably provide us with a richer understanding of the dynamics of judicial decision making.

Appendix: Profiles of Paired Cases

Citation	Issue	Plaintiff	Defendant	District Ct. Outcome
413 F.Supp. 142	Nonconstitutional	National Group	Nongovernmental	Lost
407 F.Supp. 745	Nonconstitutional	Nongroup	Nongovernmental	Lost
441 F.Supp. 881	Nonconstitutional	National Group	Nongovernmental	Lost
436 F.Supp. 1273	Nonconstitutional	Nongroup	State/Local	Lost
441 F.Supp. 846	Nonconstitutional	National Group	Nongovernmental	Won
435 F.Supp. 310	Nonconstitutional	Nongroup	Nongovernmental	Won
430 F.Supp. 227	Nonconstitutional	National Group	Nongovernmental	Lost
428 F.Supp. 156	Nonconstitutional	Nongroup	Nongovernmental	Won
80 F.R.D. 109	Nonconstitutional	National Group	Nongovernmental	Lost
464 F.Supp. 1005	Nonconstitutional	Nongroup	Nongovernmental	Lost
468 F.Supp. 1302	Nonconstitutional	National Group	Federal	Lost
476 F.Supp. 1048	Nonconstitutional	Nongroup	Nongovernmental	Lost
407 F.Supp. 218	Nonconstitutional	National Group	Nongovernmental	Won
421 F.Supp. 519	Nonconstitutional	Nongroup	Nongovernmental	Won
421 F.Supp. 594	Nonconstitutional	National Group	State/Local	Won
422 F.Supp. 61	Nonconstitutional	Nongroup	State/Local	Lost
293 F.Supp. 587	Nonconstitutional	National Group	Nongovernmental	Won
293 F.Supp. 574	Nonconstitutional	Nongroup	Nongovernmental	Lost
509 F.Supp. 1216	Nonconstitutional	National Group	State/Local	Lost
526 F.Supp. 272	Nonconstitutional	Nongroup	Nongovernmental	Won
479 F.Supp. 815	Nonconstitutional	Local Group	Federal	Lost
473 F.Supp. 310	Nonconstitutional	Nongroup	Federal	Won
497 F.Supp. 504	Nonconstitutional	Local Group	Federal	Lost
497 F.Supp. 1377	Nonconstitutional	Nongroup	Federal	Lost
433 F.Supp. 906	Nonconstitutional	Local Group	State/Local	Lost
471 F.Supp. 488	Nonconstitutional	Nongroup	Nongovernmental	Won
481 F.Supp. 397	Nonconstitutional	National Group	Federal	Lost
481 F.Supp. 195	Nonconstitutional	Nongroup	Federal	Won
525 F.Supp. 1150	Constitutional	National Group	State/Local	Won
525 F.Supp. 1045	Constitutional	Nongroup	State/Local	Won
425 F.Supp. 176	Constitutional	National Group	State/Local	Won
441 F.Supp. 312	Constitutional	Nongroup	State/Local	Lost
526 F.Supp. 1271	Constitutional	National Group	Federal	Lost
511 F.Supp. 166	Constitutional	Nongroup	Federal	Lost

APPENDIX (continued)

Citation	Issue	Plaintiff	Defendant	District Ct. Outcome
317 F.Supp. 863	Constitutional	National Group	Federal	Won
318 F.Supp. 1401	Constitutional	Nongroup	Federal	Won
302 F.Supp. 1296	Constitutional	Federal	National Group	Lost
302 F.Supp. 584	Constitutional	Federal	Nongroup	Lost
506 F.Supp. 274	Constitutional	National Group	State/Local	Won
487 F.Supp. 554	Constitutional	Nongroup	State/Local	Lost

Notes

An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 1989 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. This research was funded by a grant from the National Science Foundation, NSF/SES-8711857. We gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Tracey George, Timothy Moriarty, and Bridgette Todd. We also thank Thomas G. Walker and Joseph Kobylka.

1. There have been virtually no attempts to systematically assess the proposition that groups are better players in the litigation game, that is, that they win at greater rates than their nonorganized counterparts. Two excellent studies, however, have examined the efficacy of organizations at other stages in the judicial process. To explore the influence amicus curiae briefs might have on the Court's decision to grant certiorari, Caldeira and Wright (1988) developed a model designed to control for Justices' decisional propensities. Stewart and Sheffield (1987, 780) considered assumptions of group litigation "by examining the impact of litigation by civil rights groups and other concurrent civil rights activity upon the political mobilization of black citizens of Mississippi. . . ." Although both studies find that groups "do matter," neither explored their effect on decisions on the merits.

2. In fact, it may be that groups fully expect to lose in lower courts; and, they enter litigation anticipating they will appeal lower court losses up through the federal ladder.

3. We should also note that recent research has elucidated deficits in the litigation of those "visible" litigators on which much of the conventional wisdom rests. Both Tushnet's (1987) and Wasby's (1984) examinations of the NAACP and NAACP LDF speak to the problematic nature of group litigation. In doing so, they call into question, among other things, conventional conceptualizations of group strategies and success in judicial arenas. For an interesting review of this sort of work, see Wasby, 1988, 155–56.

4. We obtained these cases through *WESTLAW*, a legal information retrieval system containing all opinions published in the *Federal Supplement*.

5. Since we knew we would be dealing, in the end, with a limited number of pairs, we "forced" the response rate to 100%. We did so by sending two more letters to those who initially did not respond, followed by phone calls.

6. We emphasize this point because such designs are quite rare in political science (see Walker and Barrow 1985), and, as a result, the small number of cases might trouble some readers. Beyond what we have already emphasized, it is interesting to note, parenthetically, that this technique has been adopted by Bill James (1987) to estimate the success of major league baseball players. After a player's rookie season, James matches the player's statistics with those of a veteran whose first-year statistics most closely resemble those of the rookie. He then projects for the rookie a career similar to that of the veteran.

7. "Precision matching" is a term used by other social scientists to generally describe the sort of research scheme we are invoking. In the remainder of this note, however, we will refer to it as a "matching" approach, in recognition of the fact that the word "precision" implies something more than what we did. That is, even two cases heard by the same judge, the same year, can vary *significantly* in case stimuli, even if the subject matter is matched more finely.

In a somewhat different but related vein, we acknowledge that our scheme does not explicitly control for an important construct within the literature: that groups look for and attempt to select "winning" cases. Yet, by pairing cases as closely as we could, our approach assumes that interest groups selected the case more apt to evoke a favorable decision. This should bias our results in favor of the group plaintiffs, but in a manner suggested by previous research.

8. Another possibility is that the group dispute may have had a positive impact on the nongroup

case with which it was paired. It could be that the group "primed" the court, flooding it with legal arguments and so forth, that affected the judge's decision in both its case and the nongroup's. Thus, for those pairs in which the judge decided the group case first (and favorably) the nongroup may have benefited from the precedent. If this holds, then we should find that the group case preceded the nongroup one for those pairings won by both types of litigants. This situation (groups and nongroups both winning) arose only four times; but, even so, it was not borne out for two of the four pairs (see Appendix).

9. Another interesting finding depicted in Table 2 is the lack of success of local groups: they failed to win any cases included in our dataset. Yet, for these groups the aggregated data do mask the fact that their nongroup counterparts hardly fared better. Private litigants beat local groups in two cases; both lost the remaining one.

10. This finding corresponds to studies on the Supreme Court (e.g., Epstein and O'Connor 1988) indicating that state governments do not perform as well as their federal counterpart. In recognition of this perceived problem, "lawyers for state and local governments [established] a State and Local Legal Center to assist" attorneys representing subnational governments with their litigation (Wasby 1988, 148). For more on this Center, see Baker and Asperger 1982.

11. Along these same lines, we did not examine the fate of the cases on appeal. To do so would have risked losing the overall design of our research, which hinges on the matching of disputes decided by the same judge, the same year. That is, to retain the integrity of the approach for appellate court litigation, the identical panel would have had to decide both cases contained in the pairs.

References

Babbie, Earl. 1986. *The Practice of Social Research.* 4th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing.

Baker, Stewart A., and James R. Asperger. 1982. "Forward: Toward a Center for State and Local Legal Advocacy." *Catholic University Law Review* 31:367–73.

Barker, Lucius. 1967. "Third Parties in Litigation: A Systematic View of the Judicial Function." *Journal of Politics* 29:41–69.

Berry, Jeffrey. 1989. *The Interest Group Society.* 2d ed. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.

Caldeira, Gregory A., and John R. Wright. 1988. "Interest Groups and Agenda-Setting in the Supreme Court of the United States." *American Political Science Review* 82:1109–27.

Casper, Jonathan. 1972. *Lawyers before the Warren Court.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Carp, Robert A., and C. K. Rowland. 1983. *Policymaking and Politics in the Federal District Courts.* Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.

Cigler, Allan J., and Burdett A. Loomis, eds. 1986. *Interest Group Politics.* 2d ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Cortner, Richard C. 1968. "Strategies and Tactics of Litigants in Constitutional Cases." *Journal of Public Law* 17:287–307.

Epstein, Lee. 1985. *Conservatives in Court.* Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.

Epstein, Lee, and Karen O'Connor. 1988. "States and the U.S. Supreme Court: An Examination of Litigation Outcomes." *Social Science Quarterly* 69:660–74.

Galanter, Marc. 1974. "Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change." *Law & Society Review* 9:95–160.

Gates, John B. and Wayne V. McIntosh. 1989. "The Motivations for Interest Group Litigation." Presented at the annual meeting of the Law & Society Association, Madison, Wisconsin.

Greenberg, Jack. 1977. *Judicial Process and Social Change: Constitutional Litigation.* St. Paul, MN: West Publishing.

Hakman, Nathan. 1969. "The Supreme Court's Political Environment: The Processing of Non-Commercial Litigation." In *Frontiers of Judicial Research,* eds. Joel B. Grossman, and Joseph Tanenhaus. New York: John Wiley.

James, Bill. 1987. *The Bill James Baseball Abstract 1987.* New York: Ballatine Books.

Kluger, Richard. 1976. *Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black Americans' Struggle for Equality.* New York: Alfred Knopf.

Kobylka, Joseph F. 1987. "A Court-Created Context for Group Litigation: Libertarian Groups and Obscenity." *Journal of Politics* 49:1061–78.

Krislov, Samuel. 1963. "The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy." *Yale Law Journal* 72:694–721.

Lawrence, Susan E. 1989. "Legal Services before the Supreme Court." *Judicature* 72:266–73.

Lawrence, Susan E. 1990. *The Poor in Court.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lempert, Richard, and Joseph Sanders. 1986. *An Invitation to Law and Social Science.* New York: Longman.

Manwaring, David. 1962. *Render Unto Caesar: The Flag Salute Controversy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Nachmias, David, and Chava Nachmias. 1987. *Research Methods in the Social Sciences.* New York: St. Martin's.

Newland, Chester A. 1959. "Legal Periodicals and the Supreme Court." *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 3:58–74.

O'Connor, Karen. 1980. *Women's Organizations' Use of the Court.* Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

Olson, Susan. 1984. *Clients and Lawyers.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Orren, Karen. 1976. "Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts." *American Political Science Review* 70:723-41.

Puro, Steven. 1971. "The Role of Amicus Curiae in the United States Supreme Court: 1920-1966." Buffalo, NY: State University of New York. Dissertation.

Rubin, Eva R. 1987. *Abortion, Politics, and the Courts.* Rev. ed. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Salisbury, Robert H., John P. Heinz, Edward O. Lauman, and Robert L. Nelson. 1987. "Who Works with Whom?" *American Political Science Review* 81:1215-34.

Scheingold, Stuart A. 1974. *The Politics of Rights.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Schlozman, Kay Lehman, and John Tierney. 1986. *Organized Interests in American Democracy.* New York: Harper and Row.

Segal, Jeffrey A. 1984. "Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Probabilistically: The Search and Seizure Cases, 1962-1981." *American Political Science Review* 78:891-900.

Sorauf, Frank J. 1976. *The Wall of Separation: Constitutional Politics of Church and State.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Spaeth, Harold J. 1979. *Supreme Court Policy Making.* San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

Stewart, Joseph Jr., and James F. Sheffield, Jr. 1987. "Does Interest Group Litigation Matter? The Case of Black Political Mobilization in Mississippi." *Journal of Politics* 49:780-98.

Tushnet, Mark V. 1987. *The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 1925-1950.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Vose, Clement E. 1958. "Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group Activity." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 319: 20-31.

Vose, Clement E. 1959. *Caucasians Only.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Vose, Clement E. 1972. *Constitutional Change.* Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

Walker, Thomas G., and Deborah J. Barrow. 1985. "The Diversification of the Federal Bench: Policy and Process Ramifications." *Journal of Politics* 47:596-617.

Wasby, Stephen L. 1984. "How Planned is 'Planned' Litigation?" *American Bar Foundation Research Journal* Winter:83-138.

Wasby, Stephen L. 1988. *The Supreme Court in the Federal Judicial System.* 3d ed. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

Yinger, J. Milton, Ikeda Kiyoshi, Frank Laycock, and Stephen J. Kutler. 1977. *Middle Start: An Experiment in the Education Enrichment of Young Adolescents.* London: Cambridge University Press.

Lee Epstein is Associate Professor of Political Science, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275.

C. K. Rowland is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045.

CONTROVERSY

FEMINISM AND LIBERAL THEORY

In her article on "Freedom, Recognition, and Obligation: A Feminist Approach to Political Theory," published in the December 1989 issue of this Review, *Nancy J. Hirschmann argued that a feminist methodology could breathe new and useful life into liberal political theory, relieving it of its structural sexism. In this Controversy, Richard C. Sinopoli takes issue with key claims made by Hirschmann. In turn, Hirschmann elaborates her case.*

In her recent article, "Freedom, Recognition, and Obligation: A Feminist Approach to Political Theory," (1989a) Nancy J. Hirschmann has offered a critique of liberalism and its voluntarist theory of obligation from a feminist perspective. The gist of her argument is that there is a structural gender bias in liberal political thought (at least in the social contract tradition) deriving from a liberal conception of the self as an abstract, atomistic individual choosing principles of justice. This conception in turn leads to an overly voluntaristic theory of political obligation and of social relations as a whole.

Hirschmann holds that there is some relation between this liberal conception of the self and the formation of male identity, although she is not clear about what this relation is. Nonetheless, under her quasi-Freudian assumptions, this relation results from an inevitable gender difference in childrearing. Male babies must separate themselves from their mothers more radically than female babies in order to forge their own identity. An aspect of the boy's struggle for identity is a devaluation of his relation with his mother, even a "belittling" of *"all relationship"* [sic], and a glorification of separateness (p. 1235, emphasis mine). Such a glorification is reflected in the "state-of-nature" vantage point for choosing principles of justice in liberal theory.

This gender bis argument is, of course, only as good as the psychological theory on which it rests. And there is not a consensus in the psychological literature either on whether females and males reason differently regarding morals and, by extension, politics, or on why they do so when gender differences in moral reasoning have been observed.[1] Moreover, if there is a difference between boys and girls in terms of separation from the mother in forming the self, it can only be a difference in degree. Hirschmann provides no evidence as to how far apart women and men are on what must be a continuum, nor does she establish that such differences in a sense of self give rise to fundamentally different political perspectives between genders.[2]

Nonetheless, I do not intend to challenge Hirschmann's psychoanalytic assumptions—with one notable exception: she pushes her psychological theory to the breaking point in claiming not merely that boys must go to greater means to forge a separate identity but that this "escape from the body female" entails a quest for "absolute freedom from [his mother] and from all 'others' " (p. 1235). It is hard to imagine what "absolute freedom" could mean to an infant or how he might effect his wishes. Hirschmann seems intent to draw the gender differences in the formation of the self as starkly as possible even at the cost of plausibility. As one critic of Gilligan noted after observing the considerable overlap between men's and women's responses to Kohlbergian moral dilemmas, "We are not two species: we are two sexes" (Luria 1986).

In any case, there are important problems in Hirschmann's critique of liberalism even if her psychological theory is accepted in full. First, Hirschmann's critique fails to account satisfactorily for the historical record of the emergence of liberalism. Second, she misrepresents liberal thought and politics, in part by confusing its *motivational* appeal with its theoretical justification. Finally, she engages in a most literal version of the genetic fallacy. Liberal institutions are criticized in terms of the psychological dispositions that give rise to them and not in terms of their strengths and weaknesses compared to other fundamental conceptions of the standards by which political communities should be organized.

I must admit, however, to two points of confusion at the outset regarding the nature of the claim Hirschmann is making. First, at times she describes the theoretical importance of her argument in a rather weak way. Thus, she claims that the liberal conception of liberty (and its voluntarist notion of obligation) "seems to cohere with" the "boy's infantile dilemma" or that there is a "resonance" between them (pp. 1232, 1235, 1238). Elsewhere, she claims to be offering *reasons* for a structural gender bias of liberal theory. Unlike other critics of consent theory (e.g., Pateman 1979) she seeks to present a treatment not of symptoms but of the causes of the oft-discussed problems in a liberal theory of political obligation. These causes are the presumption in consent theory of an abstract individualism that is a peculiarly male standpoint and that therefore gives rise to a structural gender bias in liberal theory. It would be helpful to know whether there is merely an interesting seeming coherence, or "resonance," between male childrearing and the liberal theory of obligation or whether there is a causal relation. Hirschmann's more interesting claim is the latter and I will treat this as her considered view.

Second, I am not sure whether I am *meant* to be persuaded by her case or to treat it merely as an expression of a feminist standpoint. Hirschmann claims to be adopting a "feminist standpoint epistemology" that "rejects the idea that epistemology is objective or universal" and holds that it is instead the "product of particular social relations" (p. 1229). Such a view calls into question the validity of any general truth claim. She further holds that "the standpoint of oppressed groups enables them to see more aspects of the social relations that oppress them" (p. 1230). Elsewhere she contends that the psychic development of the self "will shade one's perception and interpretation of truth, or reality" (p. 1232). All this amounts to a kind of weak-kneed Nietzscheanism. Her general position of epistemic relativism is denied as she seems to recognize at least two general truths: that there is such a thing as oppression out of which a privileged standpoint emerges and that there are objective features of social relations to be observed. She then admits truth and even reality claims (even if interpreted differently) into the picture in a manner her standpoint epistemology denies as a possibility. Nonetheless, I will assume that the author intends to persuade those who do not share her standpoint intuitively.

Hirschmann's Critique of Liberalism

If we take Hirschmann to be arguing for a necessary relation between maleness and the liberal "disembedded" self, we face an immediate political theoretical puzzle. This is that the predominant preliberal political theories in the Western tradition, those taught in standard political theory curricula, have two things in common. First, they have been propounded by males from Plato and Aristotle through Augustine and Aquinas; second, they have tended to conceive of society as an organic, functionally differentiated whole. Hirschmann's distinction between male separation and female connectedness runs up against this fact.

What stronger notion of connectedness in politics could we ask for than Aristotle's assertion that a man without a polis must be either a beast or a god? (1981, 6) Not only is the Aristotelian self fully embedded in a set of social relations of family, friendship, and community, but he could not conceive of a worthwhile life outside of these relationships. Much the same can be said, with suitable adaptation, of the Christian Aristotelians in the middle ages. Aquinas, too, adhered to some notion of a "great chain of being" linking humans in light of a common, teleological end.

Hirschmann must not only explain liberalism in light of maleness but must also explain why so many preliberal male political theorists emphasize connectedness over separation. I am not denying that the political thought of Aristotle or Aquinas is patriarchical. The case could be made that they expound merely a different form of gender bias than Hirschmann wants to describe in liberalism. But this is a very different line of argument from the one Hirschmann pursues. It is still a problem that her described verities of male childrearing do so little work in explaining the genesis or fundamental presumptions of the two thousand or so years of Western political thought preceding liberalism.

Could she explain the emergence of liberalism from these preliberal modes of thought in terms of changes in *patterns* of childrearing? Perhaps. There is nothing in the psychological theory on which she relies that would prevent this effort.[3] But her notion of the forging of the self is so deeply biological that it would be hard to admit of much historical variation in it. Its one fundamentally sociological assumption, that of the mother as primary caregiver, would not help us differentiate our cases. Moreover, even if we found fundamental differences in childrearing practices, it would seem more plausible to treat these as caused by, rather than causes of, changes in society at large. For instance, insofar as there has been a move away from the mother as primary caregiver over the last twenty years (a very limited move to be sure), this is likely best explained by such factors as the need for two incomes to maintain a middle-class living standard and a changing perception, brought about in part by the women's movement, about the fairness of dividing up childrearing and wage-earning tasks in traditional ways. One can surmise, absent compelling evidence to the contrary, that the changed childrearing practices, reflect, rather than cause, broader ideological and economic shifts in the society.

There is an equally perplexing difficulty in Hirschmann's understanding of liberal thought itself. Any student of liberalism must struggle in identifying the common threads holding together such a complex and durable fabric of belief. Several points Hirschmann makes, however, do not fit well with any reasonable reconstruction of liberal theory. First, I suggest that she conflates the motivational appeal and the theoretical justification of liberal political institutions.

Implicit in Hirschmann's argument is a sense that men will be more attracted to liberal thought because there is some coherence between the male standpoint and the liberal tendency to view political obligations as voluntary commitments justified in terms of their acceptability to asocial individuals. Men have had the power to enact, and have enacted, these preferences into law. The liberal theory of obligation—and, presumably, liberal societies—are oppressive because they endorse the male standpoint and deny the female standpoint.

Yet if I reconstruct Hirschmann fairly, this is a poor explanation for the appeal liberal principles of justice either had at this philosophy's outset or (I would suggest) have at present. It is widely recognized that liberalism emerged largely out of the religious wars plaguing Great Britain in the seventeenth century (e.g., Ashcraft 1984). Liberal values of tolerance, limited government, and inalienable rights all emerge from an attempt to determine the justifiable limits of state power. A most salient question for Locke and later liberals was when and under what circumstances the state could compel persons to conform to some dominant conception of the good life, religious or otherwise, that they did not share. Social contract reasoning is useful in justifying a liberal polity as it asks what form of political community is acceptable to free and equal rational agents with their own (usually shared) conceptions of the good life and certain fundamental interests that cannot be traded off against the vital interests of others.

It is not evident and, I suspect, not the case at all that early liberal males were liberal because of some inarticulated perception of a coherence between a male standpoint, an atomistic self, and a liberal theory of obligation. Rather, liberalism's appeal derived in large measure from the capacity of the theory to justify the political acceptance of a wide range of relatively autonomous religious and other communities. Early liberals, as well as their successors, recognize that the most connected political communities can also be the most oppressive and that justification of political power requires a disinterested, if not necessarily neutral, vantage point.[4]

Moreover, Lockean liberalism is a much less atomistic theory than Hirschmann implies. She tends to treat what is a political theory in a rather metaphysical way. The state of nature is treated less as a device for choosing principles of political justice than as a sort of masculine state of bliss. Hirschmann writes, "If no relations among people are considered natural, they can only be considered products of agreements" (p. 1234). I think she means that liberals conceive of no social relations as natural. Such a view, she suggests, is required by a concept of liberty as absence of restraint and the "extremely individualist view of consent and choice endemic to consent theory" (pp. 1234–35).

Ignoring for the moment Locke's distinction between liberty and license, it is certainly not the case that he or many (or any?) of his successors treat *all* social relations as products of consent (Locke 1960, 311). Indeed, Locke recognizes a number of natural duties—not the least being those of parents toward children and a universal duty of charity—that do not emerge from consent at all (1960, 205–6, 347). They reside, rather, in Locke's conception of natural law and in his workmanship model, which delimit the treatment that one of God's creatures owes to others (Dunn 1969). Later liberals—not the least being John Rawls—have mirrored Locke in this distinction, though without its theological backing, by distinguishing natural duties from the obligations undertaken by members of a political community (Rawls 1971, 114–17).[5] Clearly, there are wide variations in the conceptions of either natural duties or obligations among liberal thinkers. None I can think of, however, holds as extreme a view of social relations as Hirschmann attributes to liberalism generally.

A last word needs to be said regarding Hirschmann's conception of rights. Rights, she tells us, serve to divide individuals by drawing boundaries between "various individuals' needs, desires, and wants" (p. 1238). I would suggest that rights do not divide but recognize an undeniable division that exists among persons. Rights-based theories recognize that we are distinct persons with needs, wants, and desires and that there are limits to the sacrifices of any of these that a community can ask, whether to advance some common goal or to benefit some person or persons more deserving by some perfectionist criteria.

Women and men can reasonably debate what kind of boundaries are necessary and justified, given what we know about human experience and given contrasting conceptions of liberty, community, and public good. What we cannot do is wish away the problem liberal theory has always attempted to address—how to disagree agreeably in pluralistic communities—in the name of a vague notion of connectedness. If Hirschmann has other political principles to defend, she should defend them. And this requires more than claiming that her standpoint issues in and from superior claims to truth. It certainly requires more than attributing a dubious patrimony to the principles she rejects.

RICHARD C. SINOPOLI

University of California, Davis

The apparent bewilderment about my "Freedom, Recognition and Obligation" (1989a) that Sinopoli's remarks convey can be traced to three fundamental errors he makes in his reading of my work. He claims that I adopt an essentialist view of gender. He dichotomizes my conceptual categories and oversimplifies my reading of liberal obligation theory by utilizing the very structural bias that I critique. Finally, he disregards the point that structural gender bias is structural because it is epistemological.

Essentialism

We may most easily dispense with Sinopoli's charge that the notion of self-identity and gender that I adopt is "inevitable" and "deeply biological." Sinopoli does not indicate where he gets this impression, offering no textual support from my article; but it is a fundamental assumption that guides his essay.[6] In fact, his claim is overtly contradicted by my text. I attribute a large part of the problem of the male model of identity to the fact that "gender is *culturally* an exclusive category" (p. 1230, emphasis added). I identify "individual development as in part the product of created institutions, namely, the social relations of childrearing" (pp. 1231–32). Object relations theory provides "not . . . an essentialist statement about how men and women think" but rather "a theory of power" (p. 1231). Sinopoli's confusion may stem from the fact that this observation is followed by an account of women's relative powerlessness via-à-vis men and why it may be that women's powerlessness in particular is manifested in a voice of care and connection. I attribute this voice not only to powerlessness per se, but to women's responses to that powerlessness in their very human attempts to strive for meaning and integrity in the "activities . . . to which they have been assigned—child care, nurturance, affection" (p. 1231). This recognition of the historical construction of the gendered dimensions of care contradicts an essentialist account of what women are inevitably like.

If I took a biological view of gender, what could be the purpose of using the highly materialist standpoint approach to read object relations theory? Standpoint epistemology is based on experience; if experiences change, so will the resulting standpoint. It is true that some feminist theorists have developed what could be called a feminist standpoint based on biological experience (e.g., O'Brien 1981);

but particularly when viewed in the context of object relations theory, even these need to be understood as culturally mediated (if not constructed) by patriarchy. Sinopoli's charge would make nonsensical the entire point of calling a standpoint "feminist," rather than "female" or "feminine"; men can achieve feminist standpoints (p. 1230; see also Hartsock 1984). But of course, in order for this to happen, men would have to attend to women's experience and theorize *from* that experience.

Indeed, these arguments could be seen as "deeply biological" only if one viewed mother-only childrearing itself as inevitable. Perhaps Sinopoli believes that women are "natural" childrearers and should be restricted to this activity; but I clearly do not share this view. And at this point in the late twentieth century, such beliefs need to be argued and defended rather than merely asserted or assumed.

Perhaps it is this assumption that blinds Sinopoli to my use of terms such as *the boy* or *the girl* as "abstractions that idealize and represent relationships of power" as I expressed it (p. 1231); he thus obscures the significance of my use of object relations theory. This may account for his erroneous conclusion that I am attempting to establish a reductive causal explanation for patriarchy, blaming men, or engaging in theoretical "male-bashing." Feminist standpoint theory does not maintain that men are the problem and women are the solution but rather that the problem is patriarchy and that we all share it. Phrases like *male psychic dependence* do not necessarily refer to the particular pathologies of individual theorists but rather to a much more general epistemological and ontological environment—a "social pathology" if you will—constituted by the cultural, social, political, sexual, economic, and interpersonal structures of the modern liberal era (see also Flax 1983). Methodologically, then, reading object relations in light of standpoint epistemology helps us work through the complex ways in which our categories of analysis are socially constructed. It helps reveal the social and historical forces that go into political theory and into the self-understanding and epistemology of the people who create it.

The point, then, is not to provide a simplistic causal account of liberal theory but rather to understand how the voice of care *is* a voice of powerlessness and to look at some of its specifically gendered dimensions. The rather cartoonlike image of "cause" that informs Sinopoli's complaints distorts the goals of theoretical enterprise and prevents interesting questions from being asked; more ominously, it obliterates entire classes of people from asking them and from bringing in their experiences to effect change in the questions we deem central to philosophy. A feminist standpoint approach allows women's experiences to be brought to bear on our understanding of political theory and can help us see how liberal obligation theory is *premised* on women's exclusion.

The reductive tendencies of his criticisms perhaps explain Sinopoli's mistake in treating psychoanalytic theory and moral psychology—which, particularly as I use them, are *interpretive* theories (see Chodorow 1989, chap. 9, esp. p. 179, and Gilligan 1982, esp. 2)—as empirical "sciences." He thus reads into my work an empirical framework that does not exist and then criticizes me for not succeeding at the tasks required by such a framework. For instance, in response to my discussion of reactive autonomy, Sinopoli says, "It is hard to imagine what 'absolute freedom' could mean to an infant or how he might effect his wishes." On the most basic level, the whole point of reactive autonomy is that it is formed as the male child *leaves* infancy behind; it is with the development of motor skills that the definition of self as not-mother is made possible. *Freedom* in this context is thus defined by the problematic conception of the emerging adult male self as not-mother and not-female. This reactive identity in turn sets the stage for receptivity to later socialization patterns that encode this false freedom, which boys can "effect" quite readily through gender divisions in schools, play patterns, social roles, and even language. These social patterns both assist and further encourage him to see himself as defined in opposition to the mother. So these differences are neither natural nor simple products of socialization but rather attest to the deep effects of socially constructed childrearing relations on basic self-conceptions.

Because of Sinopoli's reductive treatment of these issues, he indefensibly denies that psychology and socialization develop in synergistic fashion. In the (highly unlikely) event that mother-only childrearing were the *only* patriarchal institution that existed in an otherwise sexually egalitarian society, it is very likely that boys and girls could learn to view themselves as *more* (though not totally) equal, just as shared parenting in an otherwise sexist world will have limited success in the face of social messages to children that contradict their initial self-conceptions. This does not mean that shared parenting will not make important inroads against gender inequality; nor does it reduce the significance of mother-only childrearing. If humans are socially constructed, it would be silly to assume that the construction stops at age three; but it would be even sillier to assume that it does not start until that age.

On a deeper level, Sinopoli's puzzlement overlooks a very basic point of psychoanalytic theory, namely, that much of this goes on at the unconscious level. Indeed, as I argue in "Freedom, Recognition and Obligation," this is why I find psychoanalytic theory to provide such value as a symbolic language; the unconscious gains its most important expression at the cultural level, in the symbols and structures that a culture adopts. Social contract theory is one such cultural embodiment of the reaction against the mother. Sinopoli basically dismisses the entire history of psychoanalytic theory, which provides many detailed and highly complex answers to his question. Certainly, the wish to challenge, and even ultimately reject, psychoanalytic theory is legitimate; but if Sinopoli wishes to do this, he needs to accomplish it by stronger means.

Sinopoli's Structural Gender Bias

Sinopoli's apparent confusion in twisting so many aspects of my argument may be attributable to the fact that he takes almost everything out of context: he doesn't understand my use of gender psychology because he reads it out of the context of standpoint epistemology; he doesn't understand my criticisms of liberalism because he reads them out of the context of consent theory; he doesn't understand the idea of connection because he reads it out of the context of political obligation and feminism. Yet he adopts his own, unrecognized context in the process: a context of structural gender bias.

This bias is revealed in his claim that connection has played an important role in ancient theory. As Young has pointed out, the idea of "unity" that ancient Greece required as a precondition for political stability relied on the "expulsion of persons from the civic public in order to maintain its unity" (Young 1987, 63). So women, metics, and slaves were all excluded from political participation in the name of order and stability. Other theorists (Elshtain 1981; Hartsock 1984; Okin 1979) have similarly argued that the so-called community in these theories comes at women's expense; it can be called community only from a patriarchal perspective.[7]

The identification of connection in Locke is similarly problematic. Aside from the fact that I acknowledge the potential in Locke for a more social theory (p. 1233), I reveal this to be a conflicted and contradictory film covering a radical individualism. (And contra Sinopoli, Locke describes parenting relationships as contractual *for fathers*, as children provide "a tacit and scarce avoidable consent to make way for the *Father's Authority and Government*" [*Second Treatise* p. 360, emphasis original]; that he does not describe children's relation to *mothers* as contractual is precisely my point.) While Locke wishes to situate individuals within a social context, namely, civil society, individuals are social only because of a patriarchal God: community consists in relations imposed on men (and women) by the laws of God the Father. Not only does this notion of community fit object relation's interpretive framework of male development,[8] but it also provides a convenient justification for women's subservience to men and their exclusion from politics. While Locke was clearly ambivalent about women, torn between a desire to recognize them as "free and equal" and the Bible's decree that their lot was subservience, the dependence of community on God makes severely problematic any claim that Locke's theory embraces connection. For these connections are not only contrived but sexually oppressive.

This is carried even further when we remember that my focus is political obligation. For these connections are, of course, private. It is Locke's determination to establish consent at the heart of society—and particularly of political obligation—in spite of his patriarchal connection that leads to the public–private split. This split ensures a political community of men at the expense of the political power of women and creates a private community in the patriarchal nuclear family at the expense of the social power of women. Indeed, the only way that consent theory has been able to operate throughout modern history is through the public–private dichotomy. Consent theory requires, for successful implementation, a specific framework (i.e., a public realm totally separate from the private) within which all actions *are* conformable to the model of consent. All things that cannot fit this framework, that is to say, nonconsensual obligations, are consigned to the private realm. Since that is defined as the realm of the inessential, consent theorists do not have to worry about, or even include, such activities or considerations when thinking about and defining obligation.

Consent theory's conceptual inability to allow nonconsensual obligations is thus really a fear and refusal to do so; for the only way it can effectively deny such obligations is to segregate them in the private sphere, assign them to a particular group of people (i.e., women, workers, slaves) and then shut those people off from the light of public day, denying them political voice and hence silencing them and their experiences altogether. While I fully agree that the rejection of patriarchy Locke seeks to achieve is an important historical move, it is disingenuous to ignore that this rejection of patriarchy is in turn premised on patriarchy, on the subjection of women to men (see also Pateman 1988).

Without recognizing the role of God and the public–private dichotomy in *transforming*, rather than rejecting, patriarchy, it *appears* that Locke gives importance to community and connection; but (to paraphrase MacIntyre 1988) whose community? which connection? The history of thought is full of theorists who claim to give priority to community, and some of these are more egalitarian and woman-inclusive than others.[9] But to the degree that theories and communities are themselves premised on exclusion, they can only sustain the definition of community from the perspective of the oppressor.

A feminist notion of connection seeks to be more inclusive and democratic. It is not "vague" at all—nor is a feminist standpoint "intuitive"—unless one ignores women's historical experience or refuses to listen to the voices of powerlessness. As I argue in "Freedom, Recognition and Obligation," it requires mutuality, recognition, reciprocity, attention to context and substance, and priority given to relationship and connection, all of which involve a democratic community such as I describe elsewhere.[10] That project is admittedly well beyond the scope of this response, but Sinopoli's objection again misses the point of my original article, which was not to detail a fully blown feminist political society but to highlight women's systematic exclusion from political obligation theory, to identify that exclusion as a function of structural gender bias, to ask why this bias exists, and to explore how it can be addressed.

The Epistemological Nature of Gender Bias

Sinopoli is forced into these misreadings, I believe, because he entirely misses my most important argument, namely, that structural gender bias is epistemological in character. I make a much more involved argument than the assertion that because men have written political theory, it ignores women.[11] Rather, I build an account of women's exclusion that goes beyond individual intent to understand how those individuals are socially constructed and hence operate in a world of meaning that allows only certain ideas and views to emerge. It is important to recognize that my article treats feminism not just as a political position but as a method that mainstream political theory needs to utilize. In failing to grasp this, Sinopoli makes structural gender bias sound much more conscious—even conspiratorial—than I argue it is. If one sees the world in terms of separation, one does not have to figure out ways to disempower those who view the world in terms of connection; one just plows ahead with one's vision of reality and constructs political concepts from there, as Sinopoli illustrates.

Indeed, Sinopoli proves, rather than challenges my central point: he is so enmeshed in the assumptions of liberal theory that he cannot lodge any sort of criticism outside of that framework, and dismisses out of hand any views that do not share those assumptions. He thus faults me for not adopting the very categories of analysis I contest. For example, Sinopoli claims that I confuse liberalism's motivational appeal with its theoretical justification. The point is precisely that these two are intimately linked. In his closing sentences, he rejects my criticism of rights on the grounds that "rights do not divide, but *recognize* an *undeniable* division that exists among, persons. Rights-based theories *recognize* that we are distinct persons with needs, wants, and desires" (emphasis mine). Here Sinopoli quite obviously combines the two very entities he claims he can keep separate. Simultaneously, he displays how his epistemological bias causes him to miss the point of my argument, which is precisely to challenge such universalistic views as claims by the powerful to subvert the excluded. The acceptance of human separateness as a natural fact that rights discourse does not *create* but merely *recognizes* fits the male model of psychological development as well as any examples I provided in my original article.

But again, these points are epistemological. The observation that rights further divide individuals from one another—that they are defined in opposition to community—does not mean that the idea of right as historically constructed is completely useless or that feminists should chuck it out. Rather, the point is to highlight how we do define it, that this is a culturally constructed definition, and that we can preserve some of the qualities inherent in this definition of right—such as individual desire and choice—without embracing all of it. There are many ways to conceptualize choice, as a standpoint approach suggests. Why has it been defined in *this* way, and *only* this way—that is to say, as a function of universal, natural rights—with other sorts of insights obliterated from public institutions and discourses such as political theory? A feminist standpoint approach suggests that we can relocate choice in its social context to develop a new concept: one that is neither opposed to community nor wholly subsumed in it but works from an understanding of self in relationship, from defining our individuality in the context of communities. What this requires is a critical understanding of how we have conceptualized right; how this concept contains a gender bias; and how, in order to address the *human* imbalance that this gender bias reveals, we need to decenter rights and bring in a notion of responsibility.

It also requires a nondualistic approach to political theory. Sinopoli is obviously confused about standpoint epistemology; he doesn't know whether he is "*meant* to be persuaded" by it—which he connects to its being "true"—or whether it simply advocates indiscriminately allowing more voices in, which he deems relativist. Here again, we have a clear illustration of masculinist epistemology, for he draws this distinction in a dualist, all-or-nothing fashion. Because it must be either true or relative, a feminist standpoint appears incomprehensible.

But the methodological strength of a standpoint approach is precisely its ability to eschew both the false certainty of universal truth and the moral vacuity of atomistic relativism. Sinopoli's implicit demand that there must be one single feminist standpoint before he will be persuaded ignores the complexity, depth, and variety of women's epistemological and political oppression within patriarchy. Feminism, as I use the term, is not a universal ideology. Rather, it is constituted by historically situated positions and perspectives that are influenced by temporal, material dynamics. These dynamics in turn shape individuals' assessments and understandings of their positions. Presumably—indeed, hopefully—feminist standpoints will change as society becomes less patriarchal. For we cannot forget that in the late twentieth century, any feminist standpoint is itself partially informed by patriarchy; we cannot achieve a "pure" feminist society or theory directly from patriarchy because women have been partly constructed *by* patriarchy. The standpoint of care should therefore be seen as a less partial and perverse epistemological framework that will lead, through its critical, theoretical development, to even less partial and perverse feminist standpoints in the future.

Thus, feminist standpoint methodology is not comprehensible in the simplistic manner that Sinopoli suggests. In contrast, my pluralization of the term *feminist standpoints* (p. 1230) encourages us to recognize not only the complexity but also the variety in women's experiences and that this variety is itself empowering: there can be many feminist standpoints. The fact that these standpoints are feminist and derive from the historical experiences of *women*, limits abstract relativism; but this does not mean there is some universal conception of feminism any more than it means there is no way to determine greater and lesser degrees of gender bias.

It is clearly my hope that theorists like Sinopoli will be persuaded by a standpoint argument; but his response provides a perfect example of precisely why it is so important to theorize from feminist standpoints. According to standpoint epistemology, the view of reality afforded by the more oppressed person is less partial and perverse than the view of the more privileged person precisely *because* the nature of privilege is to obscure the ways it exists at others' expense. So while the standpoint of the oppressed is epistemologically superior, it is politically disadvantaged. Thus, though standpoint epistemology seeks to persuade, feminist theorists must also recognize the political reality of political theory: we may fail to persuade *precisely because* of structural gender bias. In this, then, it may have to be enough, at least for now, simply to force the discourse of political theory to allow our voices in. For this provides an entering wedge for feminists to highlight our epistemological exclusion and to pursue our claims for inclusion so that we *can* have more persuasive power. By ignoring this political reality—by setting up a dualistic typology and accepting such dualism as the given for his intellectual reasoning—Sinopoli predetermines his *refusal* to be persuaded: he seeks to make such feminist critiques systematically impossible from the start.

Yet such a position is self-defeating. Men have insights to contribute to feminism. But the definition of such standpoints within the parameters of feminism requires that such experiences be articulated *from the perspective of* women's lives. For instance, Sinopoli's assertions about rights would have to make sense from the perspectives of women and others who have been excluded from, and hurt by, the liberal discourse of rights and not just from the privileged white male perspective that created rights discourse. In this, his defense of liberalism clearly fails. Yet the task of theorizing from others' perspectives should not fall exclusively to feminists, who more obviously have something to gain from such a mutualistic strategy;[12] rather, those in traditionally privileged positions must also take responsibility for such theorizing, critically examining their own beliefs and assumptions. They must do this even though it may appear to threaten and disempower them. For in reality, it empowers us all.

NANCY J. HIRSCHMANN

Cornell University

Notes

Sinopoli thanks Emily Goldman, Larry Peterman, Joseph Sinopoli, and especially Mary Jackman for helpful comments and suggestions. Hirschmann thanks Christine DiStefano, Nancy Hartsock, and Julie Mostov for commenting on an earlier draft of her response.

1. As Hirschmann notes, one of her prime pieces of empirical evidence for a gender difference, Carol Gilligan's *In a Different Voice* (1982), has sparked much debate in the psychological literature. However, she gives little sense of just how contested this question is (Baumrind 1986; Walker 1984, 1986). Walker surveys and reanalyzes data in some 50 studies of moral reasoning. His conclusion, challenged by Baumrind, is that these studies fail to display significant sex differences in moral reasoning when suitable controls for education and occupation are introduced. Gilligan's work has been criticized sharply on methodological grounds not only for omitting such controls but for failing to provide her criteria for coding interview responses as indicative of a "justice" orientation, or "caring" orientation (Greeno and Maccoby 1986; Luria 1986). Hirschmann cites as empirical evidence only Gilligan's work and that of her two former graduate students at the Harvard Graduate School of Education (Johnston 1985; Lyons 1983). Given that an audience of political scientists cannot be expected to be familiar with this literature, it is incumbent on Hirschmann to indicate the considerable extent to which she is building a theoretical edifice on a very shaky empirical foundation. She is, at best, overly selective in her citation of evidence.

2. Even if such evidence were provided, this would not establish Hirschmann's psychoanalytic explanation, particularly as much of the research on gender difference has dealt with adolescents (i.e., people old enough to make learning explanations at least plausible). Indeed, the verification problems for the psychoanalytic explanation of gender differences are formidable, given that this theory attributes a great many perceptions to preverbal infants. Hirschmann places the development of a sense of self at six months of age.

3. In fact, the work of Nancy Chodorow, which provides much of the psychological framework for Hirschmann's piece, is sensitive to historical and cul-

tural differences in practices of childrearing. Chodorow warns against the very sort of universalization and polarization of gender experience that Hirschmann embraces (Chodorow 1989, 100).

4. This is not to say that Lockean liberal tolerance was universal: it did not include Catholics or atheists, for instance. On the controversial issue of neutrality in liberal theory, see Goodin and Reeve 1989.

5. Hirschmann truncates Rawls's account of natural duties by focusing only on the duty of justice, which does reside in some limited sense on consent. The same could not be said of Rawls's account of such general duties as mutual aid or the duty not to harm others.

6. Even more inexplicably, he says that I ignore Chodorow, who "warns against the very sort of universalization and polarization of gender experience" that I "embrace." Sinopoli exactly reverses the case. I completely agree that Chodorow is antiuniversalist but I am in the extreme minority; the commonplace criticisms of Chodorow 1978 are that her theory *is* essentialist, biological, and ahistorical (see Bart 1984; Bordo 1990; DiStefano 1986; Flax 1990; Gottlieb 1984; Harding 1986; Nicholson and Fraser 1990; and Spelman 1988 as only a few examples). Indeed, the newer essays in Chodorow 1989, which Sinopoli cites to support his criticism, were obviously written partly in response to such popular misreadings (see also the exchange between Chodorow, Dinnerstein, and Gottlieb 1984). What is particularly puzzling about his charge is that one of the more controversial aspects of my work is precisely that I take Chodorow's theory much further than she herself explicitly does, to note how we can adopt object relations theory *without* embracing its modernist dangers of "totalization."

7. Hartsock goes further and indeed draws on object relations theory to argue that masculine eros reveals a particularly important and central construction of relationship as domination especially realized in the literature of ancient Greece. Oedipal fears of intimacy, fusion, and loss of self are "memorialized in the construction of the agonal political world of the warrior-hero (and later the citizen) as a world of hostile and threatening others to whom one relates by means of rivalry and competition for dominance" (Hartsock 1984, 252). An explication of ancient theory is, of course, well beyond the intended scope of my original essay.

8. As Pitkin (1984) argues in her study of Machiavelli, overreliance on the father corresponds to a total mistrust of the mother-woman as a result of the boy's differentiation, turn to the father, and positional identification.

9. In my other work, for instance, I have found Hume to be more accessible to a feminist reading (Hirschmann 1989b; see also Baier 1987). Certainly, feminists have found Marx's emphasis on community helpful (Hartsock 1984; Sargent 1981).

10. See Hirschmann n.d., chap. 6. See also Barber 1984, Habermas 1979, and Mansbridge 1983, for similar arguments.

11. Several theorists have highlighted how female political theorists (such as Arendt, Astell, Follet, Wollstoncraft) have long given much greater priority to these issues than have their male counterparts (see Hartsock 1984; Mansbridge 1990; Pateman 1988); but this is not the kind of argument I engage in here.

12. Nor to people of color, lesbians, homosexuals, or other oppressed groups. White feminists, as well, need to theorize from the experiences of women of color and to attend to the voices of women of color more actively and diligently. See Hirschmann n.d., chap. 7.

References

Aristotle. 1981. *The Politics.* Ed. and trans. Ernest Barker. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ashcraft, Richard. 1984. *Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Baier, Annette C. 1987. "Hume, The Women's Moral Theorist?" In *Women and Moral Theory,* eds. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.

Barber, Benjamin. 1984. *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bart, Pauline. 1984. Review of *The Reproduction of Mothering* by Nancy Chodorow. In *Mothering: Essays in Feminist Theory,* ed. Joyce Trebilcott. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allenheld.

Baumrind, Diana. 1986. "Sex Differences in Moral Reasoning: Response to Walker's (1984) Conclusion That There Are None." *Child Development* 57:511–21.

Bordo, Susan. 1990. "Feminism, Postmodernism, and Gender-Skepticism" in *Feminism/Postmodernism,* ed. Linda Nicholson. New York: Routledge.

Chodorow, Nancy. 1978. *The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender.* Berkeley: University of California.

Chodorow, Nancy J. 1989. *Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Chodorow, Nancy J., Dorothy Dinnerstein, and Roger Gottlieb. 1984. "An Exchange: Mothering and the Reproduction of Power." *Socialist Review* 78:121–30.

DiStefano, Christine. 1986. "Dilemmas of Difference: Feminism, Modernity, and Postmodernism." *Women and Politics* 8:1–24.

Dunn, John. 1969. *The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument* *of the "Two Treatises of Government."* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1981. *Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Flax, Jane. 1983. "Political Theory and the Patriarchal Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics." In *Discovering Reality,* eds. Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel.

Flax, Jane. 1990. *Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West.* Berkeley: University of California.

Gilligan, Carol. 1982. *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Goodin, Robert E., and Andrew Reeve, eds. 1989. *Liberal Neutrality.* New York: Routledge.

Gottlieb, Roger. 1984. "Mothering and the Reproduction of Power." *Socialist Review* 77:93–120.

Greeno, Catherine G., and Eleanor E. Maccoby. 1986. "How Different Is the 'Different Voice'?" *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 11:310–16.

Habermas, Jurgen. 1979. *Communication and the Evolution of Society.* Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon.

Harding, Sandra. 1986. *The Science Question in Feminism.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Hartsock, Nancy. 1984. *Money, Sex, and Power: Toward a Feminist Historical Materialism.* Boston: Northeastern University Press.

Hirschmann, Nancy J. 1989a. "Freedom, Recognition, and Obligation: A Feminist Approach to Political Theory." *American Political Science Review* 83:1227–44.

Hirschmann, Nancy J. 1989b. "Hume's Social Thesis' of Obligation." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta.

Hirschmann, Nancy J. N.d. *Rethinking Obligation: A Feminist Method for Political Theory.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Forthcoming.

Johnston, Donna Kay. 1988. "Adolescents' Solutions to Dilemmas in Fables: Two Moral Orientations —Two Problem Solving Strategies." In *Mapping the Moral Domain,* eds. Carol Gilligan, Janie Victoria Ward, and Jill McLean Taylor, with Betty Bardige. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Locke, John. 1960. *Two Treatises of Government.* Ed. Peter Laslett. New York: New American Library.

Luria, Zella. 1986. "A Methodological Critique." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 11:316–21.

Lyons, Nona. 1983. "Two Perspectives on Self, Relationships, and Morality." *Harvard Educational Review* 53:125–45.

MacIntyre, Alisdair. 1988. *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Mansbridge, Jane. 1983. *Beyond Adversary Democracy.* Rev. ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mansbridge, Jane. 1990. "Feminism and Democracy." *American Prospect* 1:126–39.

Nicholson, Linda, and Nancy Fraser. 1990. "Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter between Feminism and Postmodernism." In *Feminism/Postmodernism,* ed. Linda Nicholson. New York: Routledge.

O'Brien, Mary. 1981. *The Politics of Reproduction.* New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Okin, Susan Mahler. 1979. *Women in Western Political Thought.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Pateman, Carole. 1979. *The Problem of Political Obligation: A Critical Analysis of Liberal Theory.* New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Pateman, Carole. 1988. *The Sexual Contract.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Pitkin, Hanna. 1984. *Fortune Is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the Thought of Niccolo Machiavelli.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rawls, John. 1971. *A Theory of Justice.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Sargent, Lydia. 1981. *Women and Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism.* Boston: South End.

Spelman, Elizabeth V. 1988. *Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought.* Boston: Beacon.

Walker, Lawrence. 1984. "Sex Differences in the Development of Moral Reasoning: A Critical Review." *Child Development* 55:667–91.

Walker, Lawrence. 1986. "Sex Differences in the Development of Moral Reasoning: A Rejoinder to Baumrind." *Child Development* 57:522–26.

Young, Iris. 1987. "Impartiality and the Civic Public." In *Feminism As Critique,* ed. Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.

Forthcoming in June

The following articles, research notes, and controversies have been tentatively scheduled for publication in the June 1991 issue:

R. Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange. "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance, 1967–1984."

David Austen-Smith, and Jeffrey Banks. "Monotonicity of Electoral Systems." A research note.

Larry Bartels. "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making: The Reagan Defense Buildup."

Howard Frant, Frances Stokes Berry, and William Berry. "Specifying a Model of State Policy Innovation."

Barbara Geddes. "A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies."

Barbara Heyns, and Ireneusz Bialecki. "Solidernoŝć: Reluctant Vanguard or Makeshift Coalition?"

John R. Hibbing. "Contours of the Modern Congressional Career."

John A. Hird. "The Political Economy of Pork: Project Selection at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers."

Ted Hopf. "Polarity, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War."

J. Scott Johnson, and Leslie Paul Thiele. "Reading Nietzsche and Foucault: A Hermeneutics of Suspicion?" A controversy.

William F. S. Miles, and David Rochefort. "Nationalism Versus Ethnic Identity in Sub-Saharan Africa."

Warren E. Miller. "The Stability of Party Identification, Realignment, and Party Voting: Back to Basics." A research note.

John Orbell. "A 'Cognitive Miser' Theory of Cooperators' Advantage."

Jonathan Pool. "The Official Language Problem."

Erratum

"Making the City Safe for Philosophy: *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 10," by Aristide Tessitore, December 1990, pp. 1251–1262. On page 1255, column 2, lines 1, 19, and 23 *aretō* should be corrected to *aretē*. On page 1257, column 1, line 8, *kratisē* should be corrected to *kratistē*.

REVIEW ESSAY

RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS: TOWARD COMPLEMENTARITY

ELINOR OSTROM
Indiana University

The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order. By Jon Elster. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 311p. $44.50 cloth, $15.95 paper.

Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality. By Jon Elster. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 232p. $12.95 paper.

Political Choice and Social Structure: An Analysis of Actors, Interests, and Rationality. By Barry Hindess. Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar, 1989. 216p. $42.95.

The Common Good: Citizenship, Morality, and Self-Interest. By Bill Jordan. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. 190p. $49.95 cloth, $16.95 paper.

Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. By James G. March and Johan P. Olsen. New York: Free Press. 227p. $24.95.

Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. By George Tsebelis. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. 274p. $28.00.

Empirical methods have been traditionally presented as the foundation on which to build the new political science. Its practitioners studied empirical phenomena in the search for general laws to serve as a basis for a positive science. Economics is a different type of science, based on the power of deductive theories derived from a minimum number of basic assumptions about the individual and how individuals are related to one another and a physical world. It is not easy to integrate these two ways of understanding the complex, multileveled, institutional worlds in which we live. However, a growing number of political scientists have tried to bridge the gap. Rational choice theorists have faced the challenge of explaining the complex workings of most political institutions.

All these books point to the fruitfulness of the encounter between powerful theories for predicting equilibria in tightly specified situations and the empirical world of political science, where some situations are rigid and unchanging while others are fluid and dynamic. These books also highlight the unproductive disputes that can occur when scholars let disciplinary or ideological lenses bound their vision. The books foreshadow what I perceive to be the likely long-term outcome of this intellectual confrontation, namely, that the rational choice approach[1] (1) will undergo progressive reformation and develop as a major analytical tool used by most political scientists and (2) will not be the exclusive analytical tool used by political scientists. Whether this outcome does occur will depend on further confrontation between theory and empirical research and an avoidance of overcommitment to a single mode of analysis.

What one reads in Elster's two books and Tsebelis's *Nested Games* is an effort to push the boundaries of rational choice theories as far as possible to explain empirical phenomena while including a well-developed understanding of institutions and cultural traditions. March and Olsen's *Rediscovering Institutions* stands on multiple pillars to examine both a *logic of consequentiality* (rational choice) and a *logic of appropriateness*. They stress the latter but frequently rely on the former in their effort to bridge multiple approaches. While they do not entirely succeed in their endeavor, the work illustrates the growing interest of political scientists in building these bridges.

These books—and the genuine flowering of work drawing on a rational choice approach to the study of political and social institutions—give us hope that the real breakthroughs in the social sciences may come in political science rather than in the disciplines where commitment to a single approach has almost reached the point of religious dogma. Further, political action based on an empirically informed rational choice theory may generate results that are far different from the "new orthodoxy" criticized so vociferously in Jordan's *Common Good*.

I recommend for reading by most political scientists the books by Elster, Tsebelis, and March and Olsen. In my estimate, the value added by reading Hindess's *Political Choice and Social Structure* and Jordan's book is less obvious. Their works illustrate the current debate among political scientists about the role and usefulness of rational choice theory and the need for a more institutional approach.

Among the many issues raised by these volumes, three are at the core of current debates about the future directions of the discipline: the limits of rational choice theories (1) as tools for normative analysis, (2) as tools for empirical explanation, and (3) the role of history, institutions, and cultural traditions in rational choice explanations of political behavior.

The Limits of Rational Choice Theories in Normative Analysis

Rational choice theories are primarily normative theories. A rational choice theory "tells us what we ought to do in order to achieve our aims as well as possible. It does not, in the standard version, tell us what our aims ought to be" (Elster, *Solomonic Judgements*, 3). In other words, a rational choice theory can be viewed as a "theory of advice" that informs individuals or, potentially, collectivities of individuals, about how best to achieve objectives—whatever these may be.

In this normative role, a theory must treat all individuals as attempting to be rational. By assuming that everyone is rational (i.e., takes actions conforming to those predicted by the theory) a theorist specifies the best strategy that every actor could adopt in situations characterized by particular structures. The concept of an equilibrium requires an assumption that everyone adopts their best strategy as predicted by the theory and that once at equilibrium no actor is unilaterally motivated to adopt another strategy.

Elster argues that all theories of social behavior implicitly assume individual rationality. To engage in any communication or debate is to presume that others are rational. Otherwise, why bother spending time sharing information and arguing? Any effort to try to understand others is an effort to learn about their goals and how they view the opportunities and limits of the settings in which they find themselves. While presuming rationality, Elster also analyzes the limits of rational choice theories in order to understand where they can be used with confidence and where applying a theory is questionable. In contrast, March and Olsen argue that behavior is primarily rule-governed *rather than* consequence-governed and that a logic of appropriateness is the way to theorize about human behavior: "Politics is organized by a logic of appropriateness. Political institutions are collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate action in terms of relations between roles and situations. The process involves determining what the situation is, what role is being fulfilled, and what the obligations of that role in the situation are" (p. 160). March and Olsen further argue that "in our culture we justify the action (appropriately) by a logic of consequentiality" (p. 162). In this view, individuals *justify* choices using a means–ends calculus, rather than conducting means–ends analysis prior to choice. Action is "based on a logic of appropriateness, and justification [is] based on a logic of consequentiality." When rational choice theory is viewed as a source of ex post facto justification but not as a logic of choice, obvious tensions and hypocrisies result.

As an institutional analyst, I can hardly argue with March and Olsen's stress on the importance of rule-governed behavior in all social contexts. Stressing the importance of rules, however, does not require denying the importance of calculated choice by relegating analyses of the reasons for choice to after-the-fact justification of previously taken actions. Rather than conceptualizing rule-governed choice as more important than rational choice, a general approach would attempt to explain how both rules and anticipated consequences affect behavior and outcomes. In a Western cultural context (to use their referent) rules rarely inform individuals as to the exact actions to be taken. Rather, some actions are ruled in (permitted), and others are ruled out (forbidden). Choices made by rule-following individuals are from within the set of permitted actions. In a rule-governed situation, the actions that are ruled out should not (and are not) considered in the logic of choice by most individuals in most circumstances.[2] That is what is meant by *rule-governed.* Choice from among those actions that are ruled in cannot be made on the basis of institutional rules.[3] Choice from within the alternatives allowed by the rules of the game must be understood differently from the determination of what is or is not ruled in. Game theory in extensive form has proved to be a powerful tool in applying a logic of consequentiality to choices within constraints defined by the rules of a game.

A key step in joining the logic of appropriateness with a logic of consequentiality is to accept permitted actions as the "default condition" for rule-governed behavior. When permitted actions are considered to be the default condition, rule-governed behavior is based on actions being permitted until a rule forbids or requires an act. When prohibited actions are considered to be the default condition, rule-governed behavior is based on actions being forbidden until a rule permits or mandates an act. Different default conditions lead to fundamentally different systems of law and to different patterns of behavior within a society. Elster's distinction between a *principle of legality* and a *positive conception of the law* illustrates the differences between these two default conditions. A principle of legality is defined as follows: (1) an individual action is permitted unless there exists a law that expressly and unambiguously forbids it, and (2) state interference is forbidden unless there exists a law that expressly and unambiguously authorizes it; whereas a positive conception of the law is defined as follows: (1) an individual action is permitted if there exists a law that expressly authorizes it, and (2) the state has the right to interfere in all unauthorized actions even if they are not expressly forbidden (*Solomonic Judgements,* 197).

If a positive conception of law is the accepted default condition, March and Olsen's logic of appropriateness is the primary mechanism for individual choice. Once rules are determined, little room for individual initiative is left. A positive conception of the law has been the foundation for social order in many societies in the world. Even in these societies, however, the difficulty of creating a complete and coherent positive conception of the law leaves room in the interstices of the law (and in relationship to covert or illegal behavior) for extensive use of a logic of consequentiality. When a principle of legality is used as the default condition, many fewer situations are narrowly defined by rules and considerable room is left open for consequential thinking after learning the basic rules of the game. Thus, recognizing the importance of rules and social norms is not inconsistent with a rational choice interpretation of individual action within the constraints of a rule-ordered set of relationships. We will return to this theme below.

The Limits of Rational Choice Theories As a Positive Theory

To use rational choice as a theory of advice, one has to use it to predict and explain actions. Thus, the normative aspects of a theory are intricately related to the positive aspects of a theory. If a rational choice theory is indeterminate or inadequate in predicting the behavior of others in particular situations, its only use as a normative theory is in utopian thought. If others do not behave as predicted by the theory or if there are many equilibria predicted, the best strategy to adopt may be unknown or quite different from that recommended by theory. Indeterminacy (lack of a unique equilibrium) and inadequacy (lack of empirical support for predictions) are two limitations on the applicability of rational choice theories to normative and positive analyses extensively explored by Elster and by March and Olsen.

In *Solomonic Judgements* Elster concludes that the "standard version" of rational choice theory is most applicable in choice situations involving one actor or many actors confronting problems of medium size (p. 27). Where there are only a small number of actors and where uncertainty, complexity, nonrecurrence, and duration make for loosely defined problems, this theory is limited in its capacity to predict. Elster does not go as far as March and Olsen, however, in referring to some group processes as having the structures of a "garbage can."

Nonrecognition of the limits of a theory can lead to hyperrationality defined as *"the failure to recognize the failure* of rational-choice theory to yield unique prescriptions or predictions" (*Solomonic Judgements,* 17; emphasis original). Hyperrationality occurs when a scholar (1) tries to eliminate uncertainty in analysis of an inherently uncertain situation; (2) reframes his or her view of a situation to include the dimensions that lead to determinate answers and ignores others that generate indeterminacy; and (3) attempts to assess the best action in each situation rather than "looking for more general rules that cover many similar cases" (p. 26).

As his paradigm case of indeterminacy, Elster devotes Chapter 3 of *Solomonic Judgements* to an analysis of custody disputes where two competent parents are engaged in a protracted conflict. In this inherently indeterminate situation, he argues that one option rarely considered —the use of a lottery to decide custody— may produce better outcomes than a hyperrational investment of substantial resources in attempts to determine the exact benefits and costs of assigning custody to one parent.

In Chapter 4 of *Solomonic Judgements,* Elster extends his criticism of forms of hyperrationality to the faith of many scholars and politicians in comprehensive social engineering. The concept of an identifiable "common good" sought after as a collective objective (argued for with poetic force by Jordan) is given a pretty strong drubbing by Elster. Elster points out that individuals frequently "do not know what they want; or do not know what they know; or fail to do what they have decided to do" (p. 181). But each individual has a will or an ego that attempts to organize the potentially fragmentary parts of that individual: "Societies, by contrast, have no centre" (p. 181). Consequently, trying to view societies through the lens of a unitary actor model can produce grossly counterintuitive results.

The limits of rational choice theories appear not only when the unitary actor model is projected onto societies as a whole but also when narrow models of the theory are used to predict and explain the behavior of real individuals in complex situations. The essential working parts of an individual model of choice involve assumptions made about (1) how actors value outcomes (and the actions leading to these outcomes), (2) how actors acquire and process information, and (3) what formulas are used by actors to select their own strategies. Very specific assumptions about valuation, information, and calculation made in the models used by most rational choice theorists yield useful predictions and explanations in some situations, particularly those most closely resembling a perfectly competitive market allocating highly divisible, easily transferable, privately owned goods with few externalities. Rational choice theories were first developed to explain actions and outcomes in these highly constrained situations constituted by a set of institutions.[4] In situations resembling a spot commodity market, the following frequently used assumptions are relatively good first approximations given that particular institutional setting: an actor (1) can make a complete preference ordering over the alternatives available; (2) has complete information about the relevant data for making this decision; and (3) maximizes personal benefits minus personal costs. Because of the large number of actors, the institutional rules, and the attributes of the goods assumed in the model, an equilibrium outcome (market clearing price and quantity) is likely, and what any actor does will not affect that equilibrium. In such situations, no one can improve the outcome by following advice other than that provided by rational choice theory.

The further from the stark institutional environment of a competitive market or a similarly constraining institution, the more apparent are the limits of a narrowly focused model of rational choice. Assuming complete information when individuals face an extreme lack of information about the relevant strategies and outcomes is not likely to produce as useful explanations of behavior as assuming uncertainty about the exact values and relationship among some variables. Tsebelis demonstrates that it is not necessary to keep the perfect information assumption to make rational choice explanations and that the power of an explanation may increase by assuming uncertainty when that is a strong element of the situation facing actors. Many of the exciting formulations made by rational choice theorists involve the use of learning models and evolutionary models to supplement their understanding of behavior in highly structured and stable situations.

In *Cement of Society*, Elster examines many of these kinds of situations as well as those where a narrow interpretation of rational choice leads theorists to predict highly undesirable outcomes. Elster's effort is to show how rules and norms enable rational individuals to cope more effectively with these situations. Recent works by Fritz Scharpf (both 1990) complement the basic thrust taken by Elster but address the limits of rational choice from the concerns of an empirical scientist wanting to find the most powerful theory to explain empirical phenomena. Scharpf concludes that game-theoretical models can be used to explain the outcomes in many of the games that real actors play.

Tsebelis certainly demonstrates this to be the case in his book.

Jordan, Hindess, and March and Olsen criticize the rational choice approach from the outside and urge alternative approaches. Elster criticizes from the inside and urges complementary approaches. Tsebelis pushes the boundaries of the approach outward and applies it successfully to explain quite complex behavior. These books thus represent a healthy scientific debate about a core issue in political science: How are we to understand human behavior? This is where the great political philosophers began their analyses, and this is where the debate continues into the twenty-first century. The synthesis likely to come from this confrontation will involve a view of human action that is both rule-governed and rational. To be rule-governed, the rational individual must know the rules of the games in which choices are made and how to participate in the crafting of rules to constitute better games. Thus, history, institutions, and cultural traditions will play a more significant role in the evolution of rational choice theories in the future than they have in the past.

History, Institutions, and Cultural Traditions

All of these books stress the importance of history, institutions, and culture. Hindess and Jordan argue that rational choice theory inadequately addresses the context in which individuals make choices. From the perspective of the nineties, some of the earlier work in the rational choice tradition justify this criticism. Tsebelis' book offers substantial evidence that the earlier efforts to develop "institution-free" models are not the only way rational choice theories will be developed and applied in political science. By focusing directly on nested games, Tsebelis examines situations where politicians must play in simultaneous games (e.g., legislative and electoral arenas) or where the game for choosing the rules is played before playing the games in which rules constrain and strategies are chosen. He uses a theory of nested games to explain why British Labour party activists replace their MPs and lead their party to electoral defeat; why Belgian political elites initiate conflict and mobilize large numbers of citizens for particularistic interests; why Belgian institutions have so consistently involved federal principles assigning jurisdiction over different issues to the groups or territorial units that are most concerned about these issues; and why all French political parties (including the Communist) adopt a particular combination of competitive and cooperative strategies within the context of French electoral institutions. All of the above and the many other empirical analyses in the book are explained to a greater or lesser extent in the comparative politics literature using a wide variety of different approaches. What makes Tsebelis' contribution significant is his further development of a rational choice theory to explain such a wide diversity of empirical phenomena that they do not appear on the surface to have a similar underlying explanation. Further, he uses the theory to explain many puzzles that have been left unexplained in previous studies.

Books like these show us that a real convergence is occurring as more political scientists presume that individuals are rational and search for institutional structures to help explain behavior that appears to be irrational upon first inspection. For behavior in repetitive situations where the stakes are high, assuming irrationality leads to an explanation of desperation and an intellectual trap. We learn by confronting failures rather than glossing over them. To offer coherent rational choice explanations of complex institutional behavior, however, requires a deep understanding of the logic of institutions and institutional choice. Thus, rational choice and institutional analysis are likely to be essential complements in the political science of the twenty-first century.

Notes

1. By *rational choice approach, tradition,* or *framework* I mean all work that is based on methodological individualism and assumes that individuals compare expected benefits and costs of actions prior to adopting strategies for action. By *rational choice theories* I mean the more specific assumptions made by a scholar about the type of information, valuation, and calculation involved in individual choice. When I refer to a model of a rational choice theory, I mean a specific formal representation of a theory. Multiple models exist for any theory, and several theories are usually consistent with an approach. The distinction I use between approach, theory, and model is the result of many discussions with Vincent Ostrom and other colleagues at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.

2. The difference between rules devised by humans and physical laws, however, is that rules *can* be broken. Thus, individuals do have to decide whether they wish to follow the rules related to a particular institution or not. When following rules produces better consequences for an individual than not following rules, little calculative effort needs to be devoted to a decision. The key difference between the position that a rational choice theorist would take and that of March and Olsen is that the former presumes that all individuals will at some time be sorely tempted to break some rule due to the very high payoffs that could result. Those who adopt an assumption of universal opportunism posit that only the expected cost of external sanctions keep individuals in line. Both Elster and Tsebelis presume only that individuals can be tempted rather than that individuals do behave in a universally opportunistic manner.

3. Such choices are frequently the result of personal commitments to particular modes of action. The term *rule* is applied by some scholars to personal commitments as well as to socially shared commitments. I prefer to use the term *strategy* for the plan of action that an individual adopts and *rule* for the shared prescriptions with which actions must, must not, or may, be taken.

4. The simple phrase *set of institutions* (assuming law and order) is used as a necessary condition for allowing a market to work. While the phrase is short and simple, the set of institutions creating property rights, monitoring buyers' and sellers' behavior, and enforcing rules is an incredibly complex, multilevel institutional arrangement in which competitive markets are nested.

Elinor Ostrom is Co-Director of Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, and Professor of Political Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405.

BOOK REVIEWS

BOOK REVIEW CONTENTS

DEFENDERS OF THE CONSTITUTION

Walker, Samuel. *In Defense of American Liberties—A History of the ACLU* . . . . . Lee Epstein 251
Swanson, Wayne R. *The Christ Child Goes to Court* . . . . . John Brigham 252
Sosin, J. M. *The Aristocracy of the Long Robe: The Origins of Judicial Review in America* . . . . . Wayne V. McIntosh 253
Downs, Donald Alexander. *The New Politics of Pornography*
  Hawkins, Gordon, and Franklin K. Zimring. *Pornography in a Free Society*
  Randall, Richard S. *Freedom and Taboo: Pornography and the Politics of a Self Divided* . . . . . Susan Gluck Mezey 254
Greene, Kathanne. *Affirmative Action and Principles of Justice* . . . . . Diane E. Wall 256

POLITICAL THEORY

Alford, C. Fred. *Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory: An Account of Politics, Art, and Reason Based on Her Psychoanalytic Theory* . . . . . William R. Caspary 257
Bradshaw, Leah. *Acting and Thinking: The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt*
  Dossa, Shiraz. *The Public Realm and the Public Self: The Political Theory of Hannah Arendt* . . . . . Mary G. Dietz 259
Chalk, Frank, and Kurt Jonassohn. *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies*
  Lifton, Robert Jay, and Eric Markusen. *The Genocidal Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and Nuclear Threat* . . . . . Roger W. Smith 260
Clegg, Stewart R. *Frameworks of Power* . . . . . Sanford F. Schram 262
Coleman, James S. *Foundations of Social Theory* . . . . . J. Donald Moon 263
Dunn, John, ed. *The Economic Limits to Modern Politics* . . . . . Michael Cain 265
Fischer, Frank. *Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise* . . . . . James L. Curtis 266
Goggin, Malcolm L., Ann O. Bowman, James P. Lester, and Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr. *Implementation Theory and Practice: Toward a Third Generation* . . . . . Charles M. Lamb 267
Goldstein, Robert Justin. *Political Censorship of the Arts and the Press in Nineteenth-Century Europe* and *Censorship of Political Caricature in Nineteenth-Century France* . . . . . Steven R. Lefevre 269
Katz, Claudio J. *From Feudalism to Capitalism: Marxian Theories of Class Struggle and Social Change* . . . . . David A. Duquette 270
Mansbridge, Jane J., ed. *Beyond Self-Interest* . . . . . Randall L. Calvert 272
Mathiopoulos, Margarita. *History and Progress: In Search of the European and American Mind* . . . . . Bruce P. Frohnen 273
Martin, Randy. *Performance As a Political Act: The Embodied Self.* . . . . . Timothy J. Lukes 274
Pearce, Frank. *The Radical Durkheim* . . . . . Gary L. Jones 275
Tulloch, Gail. *Mill and Sexual Equality* . . . . . Emily R. Gill 276

Williams, Douglas E. *Truth, Hope, and Power: The Thought of Karl Popper* . . . . Dick W. Olufs 278

AMERICAN POLITICS

Beyle, Thad L., ed. *Gubernatorial Transitions: The 1983 and 1984 Elections* . . . . Paul L. Hain 279
Conlon, Timothy J., Margaret T. Wrightson, and David R. Bean. *Taxing Choices: The Politics of Tax Reform* . . . . James B. Greene, Jr. 280
Cronin, Thomas E. *Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall*
  Schmidt, David S. *Citizen Lawmakers: The Ballot Initiative Revolution* . . . . Robert Benedict 281
Edmonds, Martin. *Armed Services and Society* . . . . Chris C. Demchak 282
Feldman, Martha S. *Order without Design: Information Production and Policy Making* . . . . Dennis J. Palumbo 284
Fried, Lewis F. *Makers of the City* . . . . Charles E. Ellison 285
Fuechtmann, Thomas G. *Steeples and Stacks: Religion and Steel Crisis in Youngstown* . . . . Bruce Nesmith 286
Hatcher, Patrick Lloyd. *The Suicide of an Elite: American Internationalists and Vietnam* . . . . James N. Rosenau 287
Henning, Daniel H., and William R. Mangun. *Managing the Environmental Crisis: Incorporating Competing Values in Natural Resources Administration* . . . . Norman J. Vig 288
Jacob, Herbert. *Silent Revolution: The Transformation of Divorce Law in the United States* . . . . Barbara Atwood 289
Jamieson, Kathleen Hall. *Eloquence in an Electronic Age: The Transformation of Political Speechmaking*
  Abramson, Jeffrey B., F. Christopher Arterton, and Gary R. Orren. *The Electronic Commonwealth: The Impact of New Media Technologies on Democratic Politics* . . . . Jong O. Ra 291
Johnson, William C. *The Politics of Urban Planning* . . . . Andrew Kirby 292
Kenski, Henry C. *Saving the Hidden Treasure: The Evolution of Groundwater Policy* . . . . Zachary Smith 293
Lopach, James J., Margery Hunter Brown, and Richmond L. Clow. *Tribal Government Today: Politics on Montana Indian Reservations* . . . . Anne Merline McCulloch 294
Meltsner, Arnold J. *Rules for Rulers: The Politics of Advice* . . . . Marc Landy 295
Murray, Charles. *In Pursuit: Of Happiness and Good Government*
  Harvey, Philip. *Securing the Right to Employment: Social Welfare Policy and the Unemployed in the United States*
  Lockhart, Charles. *Gaining Ground: Tailoring Social Programs to American Values* . . . . Richard M. Coughlin 296
Nacos, Brigitte Lebens. *The Press, Presidents, and Crises* . . . . Fred I. Greenstein 298
Nardulli, Peter F., James Eisenstein, and Roy B. Flemming. *The Tenor of Justice: Criminal Courts and the Guilty Plea Process* . . . . Adelaide H. Villmoare 299
Pasour, E. C., Jr. *Agriculture and the State: Market Processes and Bureaucracy* . . . . Ross Talbot 300
Strahan, Randall. *New Ways and Means: Reform and Change in a Congressional Committee* . . . . John F. Manley 302

Book Reviews

Tiefer, Charles. *Congressional Practice and Procedure: A Reference, Research, and Legislative Guide* . . . . John Wilkerson 303

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Bianchi, Robert. *Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt* . . . . Laurie Mylroie 304
Brown, Nathan J. *Peasant Politics in Modern Egypt: The Struggle against the State* . . . . Robert Bianchi 305
Castles, Francis G., ed. *The Comparative History of Public Policy* . . . . John Bendix 306
Chodak, Szymon. *The New State: Etatization of Western Societies* . . . . J. Nicholas Ziegler 308
Colburn, Forrest D. *Managing the Commanding Heights: Nicaragua's State Enterprises* . . . . Matthew S. Shugart 309
Dodson, Michael, and Laura Nuzzi O'Shaughnessy. *Nicaragua's Other Revolution: Religious Faith and Political Struggle*
  Foroohar, Manzar. *The Catholic Church and Social Change in Nicaragua* . . . . Scott Mainwaring 310
Granberg, Donald, and Soren Holmberg. *The Political System Matters: Social Psychology and Voting Behavior in Sweden and the United States* . . . . Sven Steinmo 311
Grant, Wyn. *Government and Industry: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S., Canada, and the U.K.*
  Clarke, Harold D., Marianne C. Stewart, and Gary Zuk, eds. *Economic Decline and Political Change: Canada, Great Britain, the United States* . . . . Daniel R. Pearson 312
Gustafson, Thane. *Crisis amid Plenty: The Politics of Soviet Energy under Brezhnev and Gorbachev*
  Rumer, Boris Z. *Soviet Steel: The Challenge of Industrial Modernization in the USSR* . . . . Barbara Ann Chotiner 314
Hennessy, Peter. *Whitehall* . . . . Don K. Price 315
Hintzen, Percy C. *The Costs of Regime Survival: Racial Mobilization, Elite Domination, and Control of the State in Guyana and Trinidad* . . . . Evelyne Huber 317
Hoffmann, Steven A. *India and the China Crisis* . . . . Sudershan Chawla 318
Majone, Giandomenico, ed. *Deregulation or Reregulation? Regulatory Reform in Europe and the United States* . . . . Raymond W. Lawton 319
Martin, Ross M. *Trade Unionism: Purposes and Forms* . . . . Peter Swenson 320
Meléndez, Edgardo. *Puerto Rico's Statehood Movement* . . . . Emilio Pantojas-Garcia 322
Messina, Anthony M. *Race and Party Competition in Britain* . . . . Jessica R. Adolino 323
O'Malley, Padraig. *Biting at the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair*
  Aughey, Arthur. *Under Siege: Ulster Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement* . . . . Charles Townshend 324
Robertson, Myles L. C. *Soviet Policy towards Japan: An Analysis of Trends in the 1970s and 1980s* . . . . Peter Berton 326
Schaeffer, Robert. *Warpaths: The Politics of Partition*
  Sisson, Richard, and Leo E. Rose. *War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh* . . . . Raju G. C. Thomas 327
Scott, Ian. *Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong* . . . . Alan P. L. Liu 329
Slater, David. *Territory and State Power in Latin America: The Peruvian Case* . . . . Cynthia McClintock 330

Stavrakis, Peter J. *Moscow and Greek Communism, 1944–1949* . . . . Constance H. Cole 331

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Cohn, Theodore H. *The International Politics of Agricultural Trade: Canadian-American Relations in a Global Agricultural Context* . . . . H. Wayne Moyer 332
Enloe, Cynthia. *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* . . . . Anne Sisson Runyan 333
Gertcher, Frank L., and William J. Weida. *Beyond Deterrence: The Political Economy of Nuclear Weapons* . . . . Paul R. Viotti 335
Goldfarb, Jeffrey C. *Beyond Glasnost: The Post-Totalitarian Mind* . . . . Charles F. Elliott 336
Haass, Richard N. *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes* . . . . Bruce W. Jentleson 337
Kaufman, Robert Gordon. *Arms Control during the Pre-Nuclear Era: The United States and Naval Limitations between the Two World Wars* . . . . David S. Sorenson 338
Nolan, Janne E. *Guardians of the Arsenal: the Politics of Nuclear Strategy* . . . . John Spanier 339
Norton, Augustus Richard, and Martin H. Greenberg, eds. *The International Relations of the Palestine Liberation Organization*
  Livingstone, Neil C., and David Halevy. *Inside the PLO: Covert Units, Secret Funds, and the War against Israel and the United States* . . . . Mehran Tamadonfar 341
Osherenko, Gail, and Oran R. Young. *The Age of the Arctic: Hot Conflicts and Cold Realities* . . . . Martin Ira Glassner 342
Peterson, J. E. *The Arab Gulf States: Steps toward Political Participation*
  Peterson, Erik R. *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region* . . . . Roger Rieber 343
Stoll, Richard J. *U.S. National Security Policy and the Soviet Union: Persistent Regularities and Extreme Contingencies* . . . . Robert B. McCalla 345

DEFENDERS OF THE CONSTITUTION

In Defense of American Liberties—a History of the ACLU. By Samuel Walker. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. 479p. $24.95.

That scholars find the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) a useful vehicle by which to explore a range of political phenomena is an understatement. Examinations of its activities have told us a great deal about how, why, and to what ends groups use litigation; the evolution of legal doctrine; political tolerance for "unpopular" causes, views, and symbols; and pluralism in all its manifestations.

It may, then, come as a surprise to some that there is a relative paucity of work on the ACLU per se. The number of treatises could virtually be counted on two hands, those of serious scholarly merit on one. Hence, almost any account would be a welcome addition to the literature. Happily, Walker's *In Defense of American Liberties* is not just *any account* but a first-rate treatment of the ACLU's long, complex, and at times stormy history.

Indeed, this book is light-years ahead of any other on the topic for several reasons. One concerns its coverage: it is a most comprehensive examination of the subject. Few of its predecessors sought to chronicle the ACLU's history from its preformative years through the present day; and those that did are now hopelessly out of date or too ideological to be of much value. Yet taking such a longitudinal approach has its obvious benefits. On the one hand, it can provide scholars with insight into how organizations evolve, develop, mature, and change as a result of external and internal pressures. Here, Walker takes us through the ACLU's long odyssey, from its humble origins as an opponent to America's entry into World War I to its role in the 1988 presidential elections as a symbol used by Bush to undermine Dukakis ("My opponent is a card-carrying member of the ACLU"). On the other hand, it can help us to see that organizations often remain true to the values that form the primacy of their missions. The ACLU has been—and probably always will be—at its core dedicated to the defense of liberties, however unpopular be that activity.

Another of the book's assets is Walker's sources: he mines, with great expertise, a vast array of papers and manuscript collections on the group and its members. This was, most assuredly, not an easy task. The records of the ACLU are enormous, as are those of its leaders and attorneys. (Undoubtedly, this is a major, if not *the* major, reason why scholars previously shied away from comprehensive examinations of the group.) He also conducted interviews with those possessing intimate knowledge of the organization and its activities.

Walker's efforts certainly pay off: he treats readers to behind-the-scenes looks into many facets of the group's unique history. Of particular interest is his documentation of the decision-making processes of the ACLU's often less-than-consensual leadership. He provides, in the most painstaking detail, account of the ins and outs of its litigation strategy: how and why it entered some of the most significant cases of the decade, its internal structural decisions (particularly the nationalization of the organization) and its dealings with the political environment—an environment often hostile to it and its aims. Walker makes no attempt to generalize his findings to the deliberations of other organizations; after all, this was not his purpose. Nonetheless, scholars of interest group processes will find this aspect of his work most useful and, I suspect, applicable to similarly configured groups.

Having praised the work, let me note a few cavils or (perhaps more appropriately) *buyer bewares*. In the preface, Walker writes, "Readers have a right to know that I am an active member of the American Civil Liberties Union" and that he could "be fairly described as committed to the goals of the organization." This affinity comes through in spots: sometimes his language is a bit hyperbolic and overly enthusiastic, reading more like an ACLU annual report than a scholarly treatise. Still, on balance, his affiliation with the ACLU does not detract from the merits of the book; nor is he unwilling to critically analyze some of its less attractive historical episodes.

A second quibble is that in his heavy usage of primary sources, Walker sometimes relegates or neglects important secondary sources, which might (or might not) throw a different light on the subject. This tendency seems somewhat greater in his descriptions of the "new civil liberties" (e.g., abortion, women's rights) and less so in earlier parts of the book. But again, it is Walker's use of unique primary sources that constitutes one of the book's greater virtues.

Finally, as with any historical account, one can take issue with what subjects the author chose to stress and what subjects he gave less emphasis to. More than half the book is devoted to the ACLU's formative years through the 1950s. And though these obviously were important ones, they constitute the period best documented by others. I would have preferred just a bit more on some of the newer areas, particularly those in which the ACLU has been a major player and over which internal tensions have *apparently* arisen (e.g., conflicts over the alleged inconsistency between state laws regulating a "minor's" right to abortion and those allowing for the execution of "juveniles").

Overall, though, the book's assets greatly outweigh these relatively minor problems. It is an important work, a "must" purchase for all students of interest group and judicial processes, public law, and U.S. government, more generally. Its utility as a reference tool alone is worth the price: since reading it, not a week has gone by that I have not consulted it for substantive information on the ACLU's history, litigation campaigns, and personnel. I am sure others will find it equally invaluable.

LEE EPSTEIN

Southern Methodist University

The Christ Child Goes to Court. By Wayne R. Swanson. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990. 242p. $27.95.

This study of a Supreme Court case, *Lynch* v. *Donnelly*, follows in the tradition set by Anthony Lewis's *Gideon's Trumpet* (1964), Richard Kluger's *Simple Justice* (1975), and Barbara Craig's *Chadha* (1988). Lewis popularized the genre in 1964 when the Supreme Court was still a fairly mysterious institution. The United States was just becoming familiar with the liberal activism of the Warren period as Lewis wrapped the Marble Temple in the biblical image of Gideon's trumpeting. He also presented institutional life in great detail for the first time.

A decade later, Kluger drew attention to the flow of a case to the High Court in Washington. Although the book was very detailed, we could feel outrage over the degrading reality of segregation, and our attention was directed to the Supreme Court's capacity to set the injustice straight. Craig's book about *Chadha*, turns to the ideological and professional development of the separation-of-powers argument. We are introduced to the constitutional bar, its strategists and its litigators. Chadha gets to stay in the United States, but in comparison with the earlier work we are losing the old confidence that the Court will do what is right.

Swanson tells the story of federal litigation over the church-and-state clause of the First Amendment that "goes all the way to the Supreme Court." The issue is a municipally sponsored nativity scene in Pawtucket, Rhode Island; and the town is the focal point of a struggle between religious forces and the civil liberties community. The author believes that "with the possible exception of the [founding], at no other time in our history has the relationship between government and religion occupied a more important position on our political agenda" (p. ix). Thus, Swanson chose a religion case to write a book for students who told him they had not found enough case study materials available. He succeeds quite ably by richly documenting this case.

In Swanson's framework, the church people are on one side of the controversy and the liberals are on the other. The author admits to a "liberal" position on church–state matters. His analysis is colored by an academic identification with the federal courts that emerged during the Warren period. Through Tocqueville we hear that issues in the United States always get to the law. However, for a decade now, social research on the proverbial litigation explosion has belied Tocqueville's old truism. More often than not, conflicts do not go to court. Tocqueville is a convenient authority for public law scholars, but he is wrong.

Still, we should wonder what it means that *Lynch* v. *Donnelly* garnered the attention of a court that takes only 150 of the countless disagreements arising in the United States each year. And we need to ask what this sort of conflict over religion means for constitutional law. For the answer we can look to our image of the Court as it is represented in the case study. This genre has evolved as the role of these institutions in the culture has changed.

Swanson's presentation of law's institutional life gives us plenty to work with. We have the federal courts, detached but still connected to the local community. We have great documentation from the trial. As Mayor Lynch testifies in defense of the crèche, he draws attention to a traditional U.S. life of simpler times. The ACLU is the intruder, the dark but politically correct challenger. The inevitability of the clash becomes the functional insight of the study; the process becomes the point of the narrative, and it becomes easy to see that we have come a long way from *Gideon's Trumpet.*

In the social sciences, secularization is not new. In an age of religious conflict, one expects to see tugging at the manger. The issue for students of courts and the Constitution is how the institutions weigh in. This means not just what the justices have to say about God but where the courts stand relative to religion. The curious outcome in *Lynch,* Chief Justice Burger's idea that a nativity scene is not religious, is put in context in this book. But it is not only the baby Jesus that gets transformed. We understand the Court better (as we did after the earlier cases), yet right answers are no longer central to the story.

The repercussions from the Pawtucket case are heightened by the way the case study presents courts and the Constitution. A contextualized religion and a contextualized justice are manifested in issues that range from abortion to racist speech and burning flags. The process has become the point, and the case study has taken us from the sacred to the secular in more ways than one.

JOHN BRIGHAM

University of Massachusetts, Amherst

The Aristocracy of the Long Robe: The Origins of Judicial Review in America. By J. M. Sosin. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1989. 359p. $45.00.

With this book, J. M. Sosin adds to our considerable literature on the power of judicial review and joins ranks with those (e.g., Berger and Bickel) who have challenged the validity of that authority. "The exercise of judicial power in the United States was not inevitable," says Sosin; "nor was it the imperative consequence of Anglo-American experience over generations or the compelling logic of ideas" (p. 2). We have heard this before. But *The Aristocracy of the Long Robe* is not just another book advocating strict limits on judicial power.

Sosin's grasp of history is impressive. With him, we time-travel to pre-Magna Carta Britain, where we learn the full detail of skirmishes between kings, lords, parliaments, and judges. For those interested in British history, the account would likely fascinate. For those more concerned with the powers of U.S. judges, however, the chronicle leading up to colonization (which consumes nearly half the book) will seem fairly unprofitable. In fact, what could have been a real strength becomes the author's most significant weakness. He derives almost no leverage from early history for understanding U.S. judicial practice. I kept waiting for it but was left to make the connections myself.

Judicial review is a peculiarly American phenomenon, and the real action of this book begins when the author looks to American experience. I freely admit that I learned a great deal from Sosin's painstaking historical research. He draws a richly detailed picture of the unfolding debate between political factions during the revolutionary and postrevolutionary periods. Obviously, Sosin is not the first commentator to argue that there is no constitutional basis for judicial review. He does, however, do a first-rate job of presenting the ideas of the founders and their contemporaries on the appropriate role for judges in our governing system. It does not matter whether courts have exercised judicial review to protect minority rights against a hostile majority or to protect business and industry from government intrusion. Those issues are for others to tackle. Sosin is interested only in whether there was any agreement from the outset that courts should possess that authority at all.

According to his reading of history, there was only controversy and never consensus; otherwise, the Constitution would not be silent on the matter. Thus, our courts can review the constitutionality of the acts of others in government because John Marshall said it was permissible to do so in a backhanded decision and because a few state high courts were reputed to have done so some years earlier (there were no clear records at the time). Again, this is not an unusual position to take. We do, though, enjoy a particularly robust snapshot of history in getting there.

Sosin takes his analysis a step further than most, however. He questions the authority of the Supreme Court even to interpret the meaning of the Constitution or, in Justice Marshall's words, "to say what the Law is" (*Marbury* v. *Madison).* Again, the Constitution makes no specific provision for this authority; and Sosin suggests that the Court, via Marshall, appropriated it by caveat as well. Thus, he considers it quite presumptuous for Justice Hughes to suggest that "the Constitution is what the judges say it is" (pp. 3–4). Hughes was no doubt being a bit dramatic at the time, but he meant what he said. Few would argue with this reality. Sosin does. Unfortunately, his analysis is weaker on this issue than on judicial review; but he poses a most provocative question. Indeed, I wish he had devoted half his book to an exploration of it, instead of teasing us by simply raising the question. Perhaps he should have jettisoned the chapters on precolonial experience, which add little to the analysis and are never connected clearly to the central issues and looked exclusively at the U.S. roots of judicial power.

WAYNE V. MCINTOSH

University of Maryland

The New Politics of Pornography. By Donald Alexander Downs. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989. 266p. $42.00 cloth; $14.95 paper.

Pornography in a Free Society. By Gordon Hawkins and Franklin K. Zimring. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 236p. $22.95.

Freedom and Taboo: Pornography and the Politics of a Self Divided. By Richard S. Randall. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. 347p. $29.95.

To civil libertarians, any proposal to censor pornography is quickly dismissed as a plot fostered by the moral majority to erode First Amendment freedoms. But recent outrage over live entertainment and record albums suggests that the debate over pornography should be taken far more seriously. Together, these three books on pornography reveal the complexity of the subject and show the existence of a genuine controversy over the extent to which pornographic material should remain unfettered.

Collectively, these books present insights into legal, political, social, and psychological dimensions of pornography. With each author confronting the problem somewhat differently, all show the difficulties of making legal and social policy in the pornography area. The authors' efforts are, to some extent, aimed at helping policy makers overcome an inherent problem: how to legislate in a policy area that has no commonly agreed-upon boundaries. It is revealing that after reading almost a thousand pages on the subject of pornography, I do not have a much clearer idea of a working definition than I had when I relied on Justice Potter Stewart's "I know it when I see it." Policy making is made even more difficult because of the divergence between the latitude allowed by a libertarian legal culture (grounded in First Amendment freedoms) and society's continual attempts to repress pornographic material.

The authors address several common themes in pornography policy making, themes generally familiar to constitutional law and feminist scholars. The books revolve around the conflict between legal license and the majority's discomfort with pornography; the feminist critique of pornography as well as the debate among feminists over the wisdom and desirability of censorship; an assessment of the relationship between pornography and antisocial attitudes and behavior; and proposals for permissible regulation of pornography, including new tests for constitutionality.

Downs's analysis of the events surrounding the attempted passage of the Minneapolis Ordinance and successful passage of the Indianapolis Ordinance will be most familiar to political scientists and legal scholars. Randall is more concerned than the others with the psychological dimensions of pornography and asserts that pornographic images, stemming from what he calls the "pornographic within"—forbidden and repressed sexual and aggressive impulses and wishes—are here to stay. Hawkins and Zimring provide more historicl perspective to the issue of pornography by grounding their discussion in the reports of three national commissions on pornography (the U.S. Commission on Obscenity and Pornography in 1970, the British Home Office Departmental Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship in 1979, and the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography [the Meese Commission] in 1986).

Downs's book revolves around the politics of the feminist attack on pornography. Through the legislative history of the proposed ordinances, he illustrates how feminist leaders Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin rescued the antipornography movement from the moral majority and forged a coalition with these unlikely allies to enact legislation of doubtful constitutionality.

Critical of the radical feminists, Downs proposes his own compromise on pornography. He suggests adding a fourth element to the *Miller* v. *California* test to include violence portrayed in the context of obscene acts as a proscribed category. Because the material would have to fail all four parts of the *Miller* test, it would be less censorial than current law. Like all compromises, his proposal would satisfy neither libertarian nor censor. The more serious problem with Downs's approach is that it leaves too many questions unanswered. After demonstrating the complexity of pornographic policy making, he introduces his new legal test at the end of the book without adequate discussion or justification.

While Downs spends relatively little time dissecting studies showing the harmful effects of pornography, the other authors address this issue more thoroughly. They convincingly demonstrate that harm is mostly illusory and too diverse a concept on which to base content regulation. Randall exhaustively reviews the literature on the relationship between harm and antisocial attitudes and behavior and argues persuasively that evidence on harmful behavior caused by pornography is tenuous. None of these studies demonstrates causality, and research has not sufficiently explored the presence of intervening variables that may confound findings.

Hawkins and Zimring show the inconsistency in the conclusions of the governmental pornography commissions. For example, they contrast the findings of the 1970 commission that there is no evidence that exposure to pornography leads to sex crimes to the conclusions of the 1986 Meese Commission that sexually violent materials lead to antisocial acts. They conclude that the disparity stems from differences in how the evidence was evaluated and weighed rather than differences in data. Their work is strongest, in the second part of the book, when they leave the commission aside and focus on specific problems relating to pornography policy making: the concern over degradation of women and child welfare and pornography.

Examining the feminist critique of pornography, Hawkins and Zimring decry the dehumanization and objectification of women. They also reject the radical feminist approach, however, because they perceive the problem as the larger one of women's role in a sexist society, not just pornography. As women's status improves, they will cease to be portrayed in degrading roles and images.

Randall delves deeply into the literature on harm and begins with the indisputable assertion that it is difficult to measure harm. From a policy perspective, his analysis of the debate over harm is the best part of the book because of the increasing layers of complexity with which he deals with it. Even if pornography is harmful, he says, it must be balanced against a commitment to free speech; if not harmful, however measured, there are still competing considerations of privacy and decency to be concerned about. He also finds that studies linking pornography to antisocial or criminal behavior are inconclusive. Whatever the findings, he asserts that pornography is here to stay because it fulfills our erotic fantasies. He discusses the apparent contradiction between availability of pornography and the public's generally negative reaction to it, concluding that the censorial and libertarian impulses will have to be reconciled because of the current state of mass communications. Randall criticizes the current Supreme Court doctrine as inadequate to deal with psychosocial dimensions of images of pornography. He argues that a new test—using offensiveness as a standard—is preferable because it considers the context and content of the material.

Recognizing the increasing availability of pornography, the three authors discuss pornography policy making as a part of the democratic political process. All agree that society can and should regulate pornographic material. But they also perceive that censorship is not likely to work, nor should it; informal, nongovernmental restraints are more effective and more in keeping with public policy making in a democracy committed to First Amendment values.

These books demonstrate the tension between free expression and society's desire to insulate itself from offensiveness, lewdness, and depictions of violence against women; each shows the state of confusion surrounding pornography policy in the United States. Despite the increasing conservatism of the Supreme Court, the Court has drawn a very narrow circle of permissible censorship, at most allowing local governments to restrict pornographic material through zoning and nuisance laws. Downs proposes a new legal test for obscenity, and Randall proposes refocusing the question to one of offensiveness rather than prurient interest. Hawkins and Zimring do not offer a specific proposal for change; rather, they see the concern over pornography as an outgrowth of its widespread availability. They predict that society will be less exercised over pornography as it adjusts to its presence.

Despite a great many overlapping topics, each book is different; each is well worth reading.

SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY

Loyola University, Chicago

Affirmative Action and Principles of Justice. By Kathanne Greene. New York: Greenwood, 1989. 195p. $37.95.

Affirmative action is a complex and emotionally charged issue. Like the obscenity controversy, it is recalcitrant to U.S. Supreme Court resolution. Litigation over affirmative action employment programs has evolved from the arena of hiring practices to promotions and layoffs and spread from racial classifications to gender and other categories. *Affirmative Action and Principles of Justice* analyzes the Supreme Court cases spanning that range of employment practices but overwhelmingly focuses on racial classifications.

The urgent question nestled in Greene's book is, Do we have a color-blind Constitution? Most of the Supreme Court decisions on affirmative action have been closely split (five to four). Some, such as *Regents of the University of California* v. *Bakke* (1978), are only judgments of the Court (lacking majority agreement on the reasoning behind the vote outcome). Plurality opinions lack policy guidance and highlight the doctrinal conflict among the justices. Competing viewpoints of what affirmative action ought to be and Title VII of the mandates of the 1964 Civil Rights Act exacerbate the difficulty in understanding its validity and the Supreme Court's treatment of that policy. For example, some persons conceptualize affirmative action as "reverse discrimination" and use the *compensatory* paradigm of justice to reject most affirmative action programs, while others perceive it as "alleviating discrimination" and adopt a *redistributive* paradigm to justify it. Greene adequately supports her contention that Title VII can be interpreted in terms of either compensatory or redistributive justice. Her thesis is that since both views can be derived from the legislative history of Title VII, "the distributive justification should be preferred over the compensatory justification since it provides the more sensitive analysis of the principles underlying Title VII" (pp. 170–71).

Affirmative action policy is relevant to the lives of most readers. Greene contributes to a deeper appreciation of the dynamics of the great debate through her exploration and documentation of the competing philosophical principles—original intent versus coherence theory—available to the justices in affirmative action cases. This debate, enlivened by articles from Justice Brennan and Attorney General Meese, is over how Supreme Court justices should interpret statutes and the U.S. Constitution. Original intent theory seeks the framers' intention for a statute in the legislative history of that statute, while the coherence theory searches for political justification of the statute. Whether judges should "follow the law" or "make the law" is the question behind our persistent concern over which jurist is appointed to the Supreme Court, as in the recent replacement for Justice Brennan. This book, perhaps more than any other, dramatizes Brennan's rôle in the Court's attempts to resolve affirmative action issues.

Greene's unique contribution to the literature is her integration of policy analysis with a legal doctrinal analysis in order to incorporate the political, philosophical, and legal dynamics involved in this controversy. Grounded in the normative legal scholar school, the author emphasizes the justices' written justifications in their opinions and the recorded legislative history of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the 1972 amendment to Title VII. This book is quite comprehensive because of her careful chronological detailing of the legislative history of Title VII; early Title VII employment discrimination cases in which the court first defined "discrimination" under the title; and evaluation of the justices' efforts to delineate their position on affirmative action programs, whether mandated or voluntary.

Chapters 2 and 4, particularly, reveal affirmative action political dynamics, such as congressional motivation for the 1972 amendment to Title VII, the philosophy of Reagan's Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under Clarence Thomas, and the impact of the changing composition of the U.S. Supreme Court. Some may be disappointed by the abbreviated coverage of gender discrimination. Readers with pedagogical interests are rewarded with ample and easily obtained excerpts from the case briefs and Justices' court opinions to illustrate the competing positions; lengthy quotations from significant actors in all three branches of government; and a useful listing of court cases cited. Political scientists, legal philosophers and historians, and the general public will find material of value in *Affirmative Action and the Principles of Justice,* although Legal Realists probably will not be convinced by Greene's (p. 168) conclusion that the justice's choice between two competing principles "is not dependent on a justice's ideology or personal values. The choice depends on which justification provides the 'more sensitive or sounder analysis of the underlying moral principles'."

DIANE E. WALL

Mississippi State University

POLITICAL THEORY

Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory: An Account of Politics, Art, and Reason Based on Her Psychoanalytic Theory. By C. Fred Alford. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989. 232p. $25.00.

Alford begins by recasting Marcuse's project in *Eros and Civilization,* replacing Freudian theory with that of Melanie Klein. He goes on to construct a Kleinian theory of society. One advantage of Klein, he asserts, is her view of love as other-regarding and caring. Freudian (and Platonic) eros, Alford argues, is fundamentally selfish. Klein's theory also offers special resources for critique: (1) her resolute engagement with human passions (not Freudian "drives"), especially anger, and (2) her stress on the defense of *splitting*—polarizing images of other people into extremely good nurturing ones and extremely bad destructive ones.

Infants are prone to intense rage, and this arouses great fear about their own destructiveness. Since self-other boundaries are quite vague at this stage, they easily project this rage onto others to relieve their fear. But then the other appears as a terrifying aggressive threat. The child reassures itself with the fantasy of an all-good nurturing protecting other. Thus, we have a split between the extreme good image and extreme bad image. The intensity of its anger and fear prevents the child from integrating these images and perceiving degrees of good and bad in one person. This anger, fear, projecting, and (above all) splitting continue at an unconscious level throughout life, along with more differentiated and reality-oriented functioning. Manifestation of splitting in adults is neither evidence of psychopathology or regression to infancy. It is an inescapable part of adult functioning.

Fear, however, can abate enough—thanks to biological maturation and a reasonably supportive environment—for children to achieve a degree of integration. Loving and angry feelings toward one person can come to coexist, and a perception of others as both caring and hostile can be established. One can then accept that person's otherness and experience an other-regarding love. Because of that love one can feel guilt at one's own destructive impulsive acts and can attempt to make restitution or reparation to the loved one.

Large groups like one's ethnic group or nation are the arena par excellence for splitting. Such groups do not recognize and support our unique individuality, helping us to integrate love and hate. Instead, they intensify our fear, since we cannot know what the others are thinking about us. Paradoxically, the large group offers us a defense through splitting against the same fears that it exacerbates. The much-remarked in-group-versus-out-group antagonism here gains specific explanation in terms of (1) preexisting anxiety, (2) large-group intensification of that anxiety, and (3) the defense mechanism of splitting, which offers a powerful predisposition toward idealized images of one's own group and demonized images of the "enemy." For Alford, a great deal of social structure and interaction can be accounted for in these terms. He is aware, however, of straightforward task groups and of real conflicts of interest.

The Frankfurt school stressed instrumental reason—limiting thought to finding means toward preestablished ends—as the core of the pathology of modern society. According to Alford, they saw instrumental reason as based on literalism—understanding symbols as identical with the thing symbolized. Alford accepts this diagnosis and explains it in Kleinian terms: intellectual curiosity originates in an infant's aggressive appropriative (hence destructive) approach to the world. This in itself is not the problem; it is the fear and defensiveness that aggressiveness arouses in us. This leads to splitting between a rigid literal instrumental reason and a fanciful utopian idealism unconnected to action in the world. The mitigation of anxiety and integration of split images, Alford argues, can lead to a human reason that is neither rigid and literal, nor escapist.

Alford finds an unresolved split in Marcuse's theory of art between immanence and transcendence. In its relation to human suffering, immanent art can only immerse us in our tragic condition and lead to despair. Transcendent art envelops suffering in the formal beauty of its depiction and leads us to escape. Lost in the beauty of art itself we are reconciled to the evil in the world instead of acting to change it. Alford traces this split to Marcuse's commitment to Platonic eros. Eros is concerned above all with the self and pleasure. A Kleinian loving-caring response, however, permits an other-regarding absorption in the object. Thus, the discovery and contemplation of truth becomes part of the function of art, not simply the creation of beautiful form that transcends reality.

Alford writes lucidly, engages central issues for political philosophy, and offers fresh, stimulating insights. The book is a must for those interested in critical theory and in the application of psychoanalytic ideas. I recommend it with some hesitation to those new to these fields, not for any lack of clarity and accessibility but because it is one-sided and dogmatic in its Kleinian orientation. Indeed, I found Alford's insistence that his was the proper, correct, and true interpretation not only irritating but philosophically naive.

Alford insists that love as understood by Klein is unselfish, yet he roots love in an impulse to "repair" the other for fear one no longer will have access to her or his nurturance. He makes a rigid dichotomy between depth psychology and social psychology, the former making the passions the core of personality and individuality, the latter flattening the passions and emphasizing the social construction of the self. Such a dichotomy scarcely does justice to reality. In addition, he does grave injustice to the object relations theory of Winnicott, forcing it into the social psychology category. Alford accepts uncritically the Frankfurt School view that instrumental reason is equivalent to identity thinking—scarcely an accurate account of even the twentieth-century logical empiricist view. He also assumes uncritically that all rational thought is analytical, hence aggressive-destructive. His view of both people and society is highly schematic. Is this a powerful generative scheme that does justice to human richness and individuality or a flattened, dehumanized reduction? He is so absorbed in his own set of questions, concepts, and answers that he shows scant understanding of other enterprises. His criticisms of other psychoanalytically oriented social theorists exhibit this tunnel vision, yet on particular points he is astute and deserves serious attention. Like his Frankfurt School mentors, Alford wants to have his cake and eat it too. He wants to judge psychoanalytic tenets on the basis of his own philosophical postulates and principles. Yet he wishes to claim empirical grounding in clinical evidence for certain psychoanalytic propositions. Methodologically and epistemologically, he is unreflective at best.

WILLIAM R. CASPARY

Washington University

Book Reviews: Political Theory

Acting and Thinking: The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt. By Leah Bradshaw. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989. 162p. $35.00.

The Public Realm and the Public Self: The Political Theory of Hannah Arendt. By Shiraz Dossa. Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1989. 154p. $29.95.

Hannah Arendt once noted that other political theorists strove to unite action and thought. For herself, she confessed, "I don't know any other reconciliation but thought. . . . I think I understood something of action precisely because I looked at it from the outside more or less." Arendt's confession should not obscure the fact that she devoted considerable attention to the problem of thinking, not only in terms of the relationship between the *vita contemplativa* and the *vita activa* but also as a problem within the realm of action itself. Determined though she was not to blur the distinction between thinking and doing, Arendt also proceeded to "think what we are doing" and to philosophize about thinking. Precisely how Arendt came to think about thinking is the focus of Leah Bradshaw's study. Shiraz Dossa is interested in her theory of action, particularly as it bears upon her understanding of politics and the public realm.

Bradshaw's is a bold book, perhaps the most systematic attempt to date to establish the significance of Arendt's study of thinking, *The Life of the Mind* (1978). She views Arendt's final work as the culmination of a "fundamental" shift in focus (p. 62) that began with *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (1963) and marked a "radical break" (p. 68) away from her early "political" writings, especially *The Human Condition* (1958). The shift "from the primacy of action to the primacy of thought" (p. 104) was born of Arendt's recognition that she could not fully account for Eichmann's "thoughtlessness" and the "banality of evil" without exploring thinking and moral considerations in a more systematic way. In addition, Bradshaw writes, "Arendt realized that one could go too far in praising the freedom and unbridled spontaneity of action" (p. 72). As a result, she became convinced that what was necessary for freedom was not action or a public space but "the interior, private activity of reflective thought" (p. 67); this interior region she explored in *The Life of the Mind*. Thus, *Eichmann in Jerusalem* signaled a "divergence" from the arguments of *The Human Condition* (p. 103); and *The Life of the Mind* was "unquestionably an implicit refutation" of it (p. 71).

Bradshaw effectively demonstrates that Arendt's theoretical concerns did shift toward the problem of thinking and a more qualified treatment of action at a demonstrable moment in her career. A sensitive chapter on the problem of evil sketches Arendt's turn to this dimension of the human condition, which, even in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), she had left unexplored. In Bradshaw's penultimate chapter, "The Life of the Mind," she offers a straightforward version of the pell-mell discussion of *thinking, willing,* and *judging* that Arendt presents in her final, "transpolitical" work. Yet, overall, Bradshaw seems less interested in extended textual analysis than in marshaling Arendt's texts to reveal the radical break and the "antipolitical" turn she thinks distinguishes Arendt's political theory as a whole.

The skeptical reader may justifiably wonder whether the "radical break" thesis holds up to scrutiny. Arendt's lasting appreciation for the uniqueness of politics as a realm of distinctive speech and action and her concern for its loss or corruption shine through in her writings before and after *Eichmann: On Revolution* (1963), *Men in Dark Times* (1968), *On Violence* (1970), and *Crises of the Republic* (1972). Even in *The Life of the Mind* (p. 199), she approvingly recalls Montesquieu's use of philosophical freedom as a "backdrop against which political liberty could be more sharply outlined."

Bradshaw also consistently undermines her strong claim—that after *Eichmann,* Arendt abandoned "political" theory, in favor of a weaker but more subtle claim. For example, she notes that Arendt explored thinking "in order to understand how people act politically" (p. 71) and that Arendt had a "lifelong commitment to action" and did not "suddenly give up this preoccupation in her last work" (p. 96). If the first volume of *The Life of the Mind* (thinking) is "removed in spirit" from all of Arendt's earlier works, "willing and judging are much closer to the realm of appearances" (p. 79). These interpretive adjustments are more convincing renderings of Arendt's later attempt to reconsider action in the public realm in light of thinking (and especially judgment) but by no means to reject it altogether.

If Bradshaw finds little politics in Arendt's philosophy, Dossa finds *The Life of the Mind* "irrelevant" to Arendt's political theory (p. 145). Dossa's guiding themes are, at first glance, relatively unremarkable; but in light of Bradshaw's argument they take on significance. Few Arendt scholars will quarrel with his general thesis (that Arendt is a decisively political theorist) or his specific thesis (that the public realm is the key to Arendt's theory) (p. x). The theses serve primarily as springboards for Dossa's account of a by-now-familiar complex of Arendtian concepts: labor, work, and action; *animal laborans* and *homo faber;* public and private; plurality, freedom, and violence. In contrast to Bradshaw, Dossa is less interested in the development of Arendt's theory as a whole than in articulating key aspects of it, especially as rendered in *The Human Condition.* Insofar as Dossa wants to situate Arendt within the tradition of Western political thought, he posits affinities between Arendt and a variety of "epic" theorists from Plato to Marx. But his essay is stronger when he resists excursions into the history of ideas and concentrates upon clarifying Arendt's conceptual inventions and distinctions.

Dossa's explication of the public realm is firmly situated within what might be called the "glory school" of Arendt commentary; he emphasizes the heroic, agonal, and masculine side of her conception of politics, not the (equally evident) republican, plural, communicative side. Nevertheless, he accurately distinguishes freedom as the pivotal principle in Arendt's theorizing (pp. 74-78). Moreover, in the chapter "Morality and Politics," he shows how "politics," understood as the engagement of equals and peers in the public realm, is a powerful *normative* concept in Arendt's political thought. Dossa suggests that this is precisely the standard to which Arendt holds Eichmann responsible; she condemns the war criminal "on the ground of her theory of politics" (p. 138). Dossa elaborates: "Though he failed ultimately as a *human* being, Eichmann failed also as a public citizen, as a member of the realm of plurality" (p. 138). Thus, in stark contrast to Bradshaw, Dossa reads *Eichmann* as Arendt's attempt to flesh out—not refute—the standards implicit in freedom, plurality, speech, and action, concepts introduced in *The Human Condition.*

Because Dossa does not bring the tension between thinking and acting to the foreground of his analysis of Arendt's work, he cannot offer as powerful a reading of her struggle with human thoughtlessness as Bradshaw's. Nor does he appreciate the depth of Arendt's concern for *mental* freedom in the face of the absence of public life. Yet the persistent politicalness of Dossa's interpretation is truer to Arendt's own lifelong theoretical sensibilities. In the end his seemingly unremarkable thesis, not Bradshaw's bold one, better captures the spirit of Arendt's political thought.

MARY G. DIETZ

University of Minnesota

The History of Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies. By Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. 461p. $50.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.

The Genocidal Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and Nuclear Threat. By Robert Jay Lifton and Eric Markusen. New York: Basic Books, 1990. 346p. $22.95.

Genocide has occurred in all periods of history, in many different societies, and for a variety of motives. In the twentieth century alone, it has claimed fifty million lives. Yet it is only in the last decade that the comparative study of genocide has taken place. One therefore welcomes Chalk and Jonassohn's *History and Sociology of Genocide* and Lifton and Markusen's more specialized study, *The Genocidal Mentality.* Yet it is characteristic of this field that scholars talk past each other, define *genocide* in very different terms (e.g., Lifton and Markusen focus on nuclear weapons whereas Chalk and Jonassohn deny that warfare itself [with or without nuclear weapons] is genocide). Moreover, the range of cases they consider, and the period of history they discuss, can differ enormously, making cumulative knowledge difficult if not impossible. In fact, the two books have little in common except the belief that only through understanding why genocide occurs and working toward a change in human consciousness can future genocides be averted. For Lifton and

Markusen, this change involves the development of "species consciousness"; for Chalk and Jonassohn, a rational awareness by citizens of would-be perpetrator states of the tremendous costs of genocide to their own society.

Both studies, in other words, are apolitical, relying upon education rather than various forms of political action or international organization to bring about a less murderous future. Neither of these works, in fact, adequately explores how genocide can be prevented, even though each author sees this as the rationale for the comparative study of genocide. That said, however, there is much to be learned from these sensitive and insightful works.

The Genocidal Mentality attempts both to describe a mind-set that allows one, under certain conditions, to act in ways calculated to kill millions of persons in the name of group security and to explain how a mentality of this sort can develop among decision makers, professional elites, and the general public. Lifton and Markusen see nuclear weapons as inherently genocidal, yet widely supported by a mind-set that has by now become "part of the various structures of society—both routinized and institutionalized" (p. 37).

To illuminate this "ideology" and how weapons designers, strategists, and the public suppress awareness of their potential involvement in causing mass death, the authors explore similar processes in Nazi Germany. They recognize that in many respects the Nazi and nuclear genocides present different situations, but they also see elements that are common: a genocidal ideology that legitimates healing through killing; a near worship of science and technology; heavy participation of professionals in the genocidal system, without which it could not work; vast societal involvement; common psychological mechanisms, such as dissociation and psychic numbing, that protect individuals from experiencing the meaning of their actions; and numerous indifferent bystanders.

Many will reject the comparison as rhetorical, yet given Lifton and Markusen's emphasis on a style of mind, this would be a mistake. Their major accomplishment, in fact, is their detailed study of the socialization of professionals—physicists, weapons designers, strategists, high-ranking officers—into the culture of destruction or, as they label it, the genocidal mentality.

Much broader in scope, *The History and Sociology of Genocide* is a rich, informative, and suggestive study, with numerous case studies from antiquity to the present, accompanied by useful bibliographies. Many of the case studies are excellent, especially those of the American Indians, the Hereros, the Tasmanians, and the Gypsies; less adequate are the materials on the Soviet Union and Cambodia, a distinct loss, since the authors argue that the primary form of genocide in the twentieth century is ideological.

Chalk and Jonassohn build their analytical framework around a new definition of genocide, a typology based upon motive, and a historical analysis of the evolution of genocidal forms and their correlation with particular types of societies.

Genocide, in their view, is "a form of one-sided killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator" (p. 23). This is a useful definition in a field that has lacked a shared concept of what genocide is; but it is not free from difficulty, since the perpetrator's intent must be to eliminate the *whole* group. The authors themselves do not seem quite satisfied with their definition, since they, rightly, describe Burundi and Bangladesh as examples of genocide, neither of which involved an attempt to destroy an entire group. Their definition of genocide needs to reflect this, something that the United Nations convention on genocide does, though otherwise conceptually muddled.

Their typology casts genocides according to the perpetrator's motives; but these, they suggest, correlate with forms of social organization, namely, empires and ideological regimes (concepts, unfortunately, far too broad). In their view, genocides are committed in order (1) "to eliminate a real or potential threat; (2) to spread terror among real or potential enemies; (3) to acquire economic wealth; (4) to implement a belief, theory, or an ideology" (p. 29). The first three types, they argue, are associated with building and maintaining empires and have now largely disappeared. Their victims were usually external to the society of the perpetrator. The fourth type is the major form of genocide in the twentieth century; its victims are mainly citizens of the perpetrator state; and the costs to the perpetrator society of *internal* destruction have been heavy.

Why ideology and the genocide that *some-*

times follows from it should abound in the contemporary period is not, however, something they explain. Motives are important, but one wants to know the circumstances in which they arise and why they are sometimes unleashed on innocent populations and other times held in check. The least adequate pages in the book, unfortunately, are precisely those on the preconditions of genocide.

Finally, it might be suggested that the typology needs another category to cover the situations quite common in the twentieth century that are not ideological but involve a struggle for power that results in genocide. For this and other reasons, the typology presented and the association of forms of genocide with types of societies is misleadingly neat. The truest social theory will reflect the ragged edges of its subject.

These criticisms aside, *The History and Sociology of Genocide* is a highly original and valuable study that will have a major influence on how one teaches, and thinks about, genocide.

ROGER W. SMITH

College of William and Mary

Frameworks of Power. By Stewart R. Clegg. London: Sage, 1989. 272p. $49.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

Given its resilience as a central term for understanding politics, attempts to push for theoretical innovation on the question of power continue unabated. Just when the term seems about to lose its potency, it is resuscitated. With the dissemination of the writings of Michel Foucault in particular, a postmodern reconsideration of modernist approaches to the conceptualization of power becomes a distinctive option. Stewart Clegg's latest venture into the minefields of political sociology attempts to provide just such a theoretical advance.

Relying on a variety of theorists (including Terence Ball, Zygmunt Bauman, and Michel Callon), as well as Foucault, Clegg frames his analysis by suggesting that a modernist perspective has predominated in theories of power beginning with Hobbes and continuing through to the contemporary pluralists, structural Marxists, and Steven Lukes's three-dimensional view of power. From the sovereignty of Hobbes, to Robert Dahl's formal model of power, to the hegemony of Lukes, power is envisioned as a causal and constraining force for ordering society. The structural insistences of modernity predispose a concern about sovereignty, causality, intention, agency, responsibility, interests, ideology, hegemony, morality, and other issues endemic to a modernist perspective that have saturated debates over power.

Yet, this Hobbesian modernist tradition of power marginalizes an alternative Machiavellian and postmodern perspective on power. Clegg shows how Machiavelli offers a counterpoint to Hobbes in a way that foreshadows a more postmodern approach to the problem of power. Hobbes sought to legislate an architectonic perspective that saw power mechanistically as a causal force that could be put in service of sovereignty to unify society. Machiavelli, however, interpreted power more strategically as dispersed among a diversity of contingent practices and less amenable to universalization.

Clegg relies on this perspective to review critically the twists and turns in the debate over power in political and sociological literature. He deftly adumbrates the debates among pluralists and elitists on theory, method, and evidence. He gives most stress, however, to what he sees as two critical theoretical issues. First, he finds unsatisfactory attempts to locate the source and responsibility for power in the distinction between agency and intention on the one hand and structure and disposition on the other. His postmodern analysis of power leads to a rejection of pluralists' emphasis on a causal view of power, Lukes's three-dimensional view of power as a dialectic of agency and structure, and Anthony Giddens's structuration theory on the duality of structure and agency. For Clegg, agency has most often inappropriately got the upper hand. Second, he rejects these efforts as mired in a modernist structural view that sees power as largely a negative constraint to the neglect of a postmodern, poststructural view that sees power as a positive productive force. Power is less about all-encompassing forces that lead to the repression of real needs and suppression of real interests than it is about the proliferation of a variety of institutional, individuated, and localized practices for the production of need and imputation of interests. The macropolitics of sovereignty is dissolved into the micropolitics of disciplinary practices.

Out of these postmodern musings, Clegg articulates his theory of "circuits of power." Clegg relies on his own writings and those of other organizational theorists to suggest that power is best seen as neither strictly the episodic power of agency, the dispositional institutional power embedded in rules and practices, or the facilitative structural power of a dominating system. Instead, these are levels in circuits of power, which serve as "obligatory passage points" through which actors must move in order to realize their ends. In such a perspective, agency survives, but it is not limited to individuals. People have interests but they are strategically determined by how one is positioned in an organizational field or network of relations. Power is inscribed in the rules, practices and media of social action in ways that enable as well as constrain. Identity, membership, and meaning get fixed as actors pass through the obligatory passage points in any organized activity be it science or civil society. Political change is produced by an "organizational outflanking" whereby networks enroll actors by translating their interests in terms of the countergroups' professed objectives.

This book constitutes a worthwhile attempt to pose a poststructural alternative to the major theoretical debates on power. In some respects, however, it represents what might be an emerging paradigmatic contradiction for poststructural writing. While professing to eschew all-encompassing universalizing theory for an understanding of the specific practices of power, *Frameworks of Power* concludes by offering another abstract theory of power. The ongoing preoccupation with how to understand power once again relegates the contingent practices of power themselves to the background. Nonetheless, *Frameworks of Power* is an excellent text for familiarizing students with the power debate in its latest incarnation.

SANFORD F. SCHRAM

Macalester College

Foundations of Social Theory. By James S. Coleman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990. 993p. $39.50.

For many years the rational choice research program has been one of the most vibrant and progressive programs in the social sciences. This program explains social phenomena by showing how they result from the rational choices of individuals seeking to maximize the satisfactions they realize from their actions, given the structural and other constraints on the range of options they face. Coleman's massive and enormously impressive work is offered as a systematization and restatement of this program. Much of the work draws on contemporary economic theory, sometimes applying it to noneconomic phenomena, sometimes restating and integrating the findings of economists.

The first four parts of the work provide an informal exposition of the theory, beginning with elementary concepts and relations (action, exchange, rights, authority), basic structures of action (exchange systems, authority systems, norms, social capital), an analysis of corporate actors, and finally an account of "modern society." The last part, almost three hundred pages, provides a rigorous statement of many of these ideas in a mathematical form. The last section is, in some ways, less general than the first, because of the need to make simplifying assumptions in order to make the mathematics tractable; but the construction of mathematical models enables the derivation of many nonobvious results and a precise and rigorous statement of many of the theory's findings.

At first glance, one might be puzzled by the use of the term *foundations* in the title, since the book does not deal in any real depth with many of the metatheoretical issues about the nature of social science that one might expect—particularly issues about the meaningful character of human action or the foundation and basis of value judgments and their role in social research. Moreover, it appears to lack a substantive focus for the first several hundred pages, as discrete topics are taken up in succession but without an overall argument clearly emerging. It is only after some five hundred pages that we discover that the author intends to provide a theory that is broadly critical, in the sense that it can be used to inform social practice in such a way as to enable us democratically to create the collective conditions under which we live and that the central concern of the theory is to provide a diagnosis and analysis of modern society. Coleman sees "a long-term historical development in which the primordial, natural environment is replaced by a purposively constructed one" (p. 552). Unlike previous forms of society, in which social structures are built upon personal ties among specified individuals, modern societies are dominated by corporate actors defined by relationships among social positions, where individuals simultaneously occupy a number of such positions in different structures. This decline in relationships that link "whole persons" to each other enables us to realize a number of important values, but it also gives rise to certain problems, particularly relating to the "nurturing of the next generation" and temptations to free-ride on the efforts of others in various areas of social life. It is in this context that Coleman calls for "a new social science" to provide "a foundation and superstructure of knowledge to aid in constructing the future" (p. 651). But it is vital, Coleman argues, that this social science not be the handmaiden of corporate or state elites, a bias that characterizes existing structures of social science research in which the power over funds and the dissemination of research of government and other corporate actors can deprive ordinary persons of their ability to influence policy decisions. It is in this sense that Coleman offers his work as a "foundation" of social theory: it sets out the problems we must solve and provides us with (some of) the tools we need to solve them; but it does not actually attempt to solve them.

Given its scope and ambition, this work invites comparison with Habermas' *Theory of Communicative Action* (1984). Like Habermas, Coleman begins with a theory of action and seeks to develop an account of modernity in which the idea of rationality figures prominently. But where Habermas has a complex theory of action, distinguishing among four different types or aspects of action, and the correspondingly different ways in which they involve judgments of rationality, Coleman focuses entirely on what Habermas calls strategic action and rationality. This economy serves him well in permitting him to develop a complex set of explanatory accounts of a vast range of social processes and to set out a series of testable generalizations. And his diagnosis of the processes and problems characteristic of modern society is readily comprehensible. However, his narrow conception of action and rationality weakens the critical dimension of his theory. While calling for a kind of social science that can provide the knowledge necessary to enable people democratically to create social structures that will reflect their needs and interests, he has very little to say about what these needs and interests are or how we might go about thinking about such questions. This is an obvious limitation of the purposive model of rationality, a model that takes the ends of action as given and analyzes choices in terms of how they advance these ends. To his credit, Coleman recognizes this problem; and in an interesting and suggestive discussion of the "self" he discusses how we might analyze the choice of ends or interests in terms of this model. But in the end this discussion is unsatisfactory, as it has been for every theorist since Hobbes who has restricted his or her work to this paradigm.

The inadequacy of the conception of "interests" in this framework shows up in a certain tension in how the author develops his explanatory accounts of social phenomena. He argues persuasively for a general model of explanation, one that begins with a set of social (or macro) conditions and asks how they affect the incentives and options available to individual actors—a microlevel issue. Using a rational choice framework, their responses are then predicted; and he returns to the macrolevel by examining how these individual actions will combine to produce a societal effect. This schema, it would appear, necessarily presupposes a historical context: each stage of this process is implicitly located in time relative to other stages. Nonetheless, a significant proportion of the work is based on what we might call state-of-nature theorizing. For example, in analyzing the rise of corporate actors, he attempts to show how they can be explained and justified in terms of the "initial" rights of natural persons. This reflects Coleman's normative concerns; as he puts it, "Only by starting conceptually from a point where all sovereignty rests with individual persons is it possible to see just how well their ultimate interests are realized by any existing social system" (p. 531). However, the idea of "ultimate interests" is not well defined in this framework, as interests change with changing social conditions. In the case at hand, the interests of natural persons that (together with other social conditions) lead to the creation of corporate actors at a particular point in time, could be quite different from the interests of the people who come to constitute the society dominated by corporate actors. Given Coleman's objective of developing a social theory that can enable actors to create the social structures in which they will live, the absence of an adequate theory of interests or values is a serious weakness. But even if it fails to achieve its objective fully, one could hardly ask for a richer or more impressive development of one essential component of a social theory adequate to the task of "constructing the future."

J. DONALD MOON

Wesleyan University

The Economic Limits to Modern Politics. Edited by John Dunn Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 226p. $29.95.

Scholars of political economy are well aware of many different types of economic limits to modern politics and modern political analysis. Most of us can readily find economic limits that affect the political behaviors of individuals or groups, as well as limits that affect the structure and function of political institutions. In addition to these limits, the subject of economic limits appears in positive and normative theories of politics, social choice, and applied game theory. Yet precisely because there are so many different types of economic limits manifesting themselves in very different kinds of political phenomena, which can be analyzed from extremely different theoretical perspectives, it becomes imperative for an author to further clarify the subject matter presupposed by "the economic limits to modern politics."

Unfortunately I did not find much further clarification of either the topic or its subject matter in the editor's introduction. As a result, this collection of articles does not appear to be unified by a single, well-defined, central theme. Several articles in the volume do possess merits of their own, independent of the collection, especially John Pocock's excellent historical analysis, "The Political Limits to Premodern Economics." Because several essays approach the quality of Pocock's article, I found the sum of some parts greater than the sum of the whole.

This volume contains an introduction and six separate essays or chapters. Roughly, two-thirds of the book is by John Dunn and Istvan Hont while one-third is by John Pocock, Frank Hahn, and Robert Keohane.

Although each of the six articles are related, very broadly, to the study of political economy or international political economy, each author emphasizes very different issues within political economy, often touching on diverse literatures in social science, philosophy, history, and economics. Because these articles emphasize different issues and because Dunn fails to provide the reader with much guidance in his introduction, simple generalizations about what is contained in this edited volume are apt to be misleading. For example, in the first chapter Dunn investigates historical themes in contemporary political theory and considers how these themes, in their modern manifestations, affect our practical understanding of the politics of contemporary nation-states. However, the emphasis shifts considerably in the next two chapters, away from topics in modern political theory to topics in the history of political economy.

Luckily, this shift in emphasis does not detract from the two strongest chapters, by Hont and Pocock. In chapter 2, Hont provides a very interesting review of several important seventeenth-century political thinkers, such as William Temple, Charles Davenant, and Henry Martyn. Besides showing the depth of thought possessed by these theorists, his article provides important insights into the roots of Adam Smith's *laissez faire* market policies. As Hont illustrates, these thinkers were among the first modern political theorists to understand the significance of foreign trade to the military and domestic security of the new commercial societies then emerging in Europe.

The true gem in Dunn's volume is Pocock's chapter 3. Pocock explores the political limits to premodern economics by examining what premodern societies had to say on the subject. "In many ways these premodern people," Pocock writes, "lived in a mental world unlike ours, in which what mattered was not setting economic limits to politics or political limits to economics, but practical and theoretical concerns structured in quite different ways" (p. 122). Pocock goes on to discuss important details of these different "mental worlds," relating them throughout to our contemporary understanding of classical political economy. I found Pocock's essay to be an excellent piece of historical scholarship, which most political economists will find both useful and instructive, regardless of their theoretical predilections.

The emphasis of the final three chapters again shifts—this time away from historical issues to more contemporary topics in political economy. In chapter 4, Hahn discusses general theoretical issues related to understanding feasible mixes of individual liberties and market capitalism, with greater degrees of egalitarian commitments. Although Hahn covers some well-trodden ground, his essay is modest, clear, and instructive. In chapter 5, Keohane defends a particular strand of liberalism from critics in international relations who, in his view, underestimate the importance of some aspects of liberalism to theories of international political economy. In the final chapter, Dunn discusses general theoretical elements necessary for constructing modern political theories of institutions.

Political scientists who read this book may be favorably impressed by several articles; however, those acquainted with various literatures in political economy are apt to be perplexed by at least two separate aspects. First, Dunn's book is unsuccessful in clearly delineating a particular subject matter in political economy. The result probably will leave most readers bewildered by the overwhelming generality of the subject presupposed by "the economic limits to modern politics." Second, the topic itself invites confusion because it incorrectly frames major questions in political economy. For example, by asking what the economic limits to modern politics consists of, theorists are forced to identify and distinguish economic limits from political limits. But the study of political economy has shown that it really makes no sense to ask whether or not some phenomena are truly economic or truly political, since the distinction between economic and political attributes of social events is often a useful, conventional distinction but probably not the best starting point for research into the workings of actual political economies.

MICHAEL CAIN

University of Maryland

Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise. By Frank Fischer. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990. 387p. $39.95.

Discussion of democracy and expertise is often unsatisfactory because authors focus narrowly on the imperatives of either technical knowledge or democratic politics. Consequently, Frank Fischer's recent effort to confront the necessity of both the popular input of democracy and the specialized input of experts for modern government is especially valuable. The problem, of course, is incorporating expertise into a democratic political system without undermining citizen participation and the representation of citizens by legislators.

Fischer examines the historical and theoretical foundations of technocracy to set up his critique of two contemporary manifestations: organization theory and policy science. In each of these areas professional practitioners present value-free science and technical training as an alternative to politics, an arena inevitably dominated by clashing interests and the ill-informed. Their claim to legitimacy rests on the contention that they have no ideology and consequently represent a neutral source of truth; decision making becomes a matter of technical analysis rather than conflict and compromise. Fischer exposes the fallacy in this claim by identifying a technocratic ideology and exploring its implications for administration and policy analysis. He contends that the technocrat is not apolitical nor politics eliminated; rather, democratic politics is replaced by the politics of expertise. This point is the linchpin of Fischer's analysis; for if technocracy has political content, establishing the role of expertise in politics requires a normative argument about how decisions should be made, not a methodological argument for technical superiority.

Locating a place for expertise in democratic politics requires no less than a fundamental rethinking of its conceptual foundations. Technocracy rests on a constricted version of rationality; rather than seeing their efforts as *a* contribution to rational decision making, administrators and policy analysts believe that their contribution *is* rational decision making. From this perspective all other concerns represent the unfortunate and irrational political influences that lead to less-than-optimal policies. Fischer argues, however, that technical rationality is only one component of a rational process for making political decisions and is not obviously superior to, for example, the moral concerns of the citizenry. What is needed is a postpositivist social science that eschews reductionistic rationality in favor of an open-ended exploration of social phenomena. Fischer calls upon the broader conception of rationality developed by Jürgen Habermas to suggest a "framework"—really more of a goal—for the new administrative and policy professionals: *participatory research.* In the last section of the book an intriguing but not entirely satisfying strategy for making policy research and administration more of an inclusive dialogue, rather than a technical domain, is developed.

Fischer provides a convincing argument that current technocracy is inconsistent with democracy. When the critique gives way to prescription, however, a potential dilemma must be confronted: modern politics may require both democracy and expertise, but that does not guarantee that they are compatible. Fischer assumes that it is possible for technical knowledge to be incorporated into democratic politics and proceeds toward his goal: a description of a "framework of an alternative methodological orientation for managerial and policy expertise" (p. 355). This cautious approach raises both some interesting suggestions for applied social science and some questions about the ability of participatory research to reconcile democracy and technocracy. In the final chapter Fischer's emphasis is on recasting the relationship between expert and client, but is this the relationship that is critical for democracy? Is methodology the sole source of the antidemocratic elements of technocracy, or are there structural factors embedded in the current organization of the political system? Is participatory research something that can be integrated into actual policy making and administration, or is this level of sophistication inevitably limited to the academy?

Questions like these are the ultimate results of a penetrating study of an important topic. Fischer's strength in this volume is the wide scope of literature he draws upon, enabling him to tie together the disparate strands of an issue that cuts across many traditional disciplines and the academic and political worlds. His argument leaves the reader wishing for more, especially more detail on how participatory research could be done and what its effects might be. Fischer's critique has established the foundations for serious discussion on the role of expertise in a democracy, and he has uncovered some questions that deserve further study and action.

JAMES L. CURTIS

Pennsylvania State University

Implementation Theory and Practice: Toward a Third Generation. By Malcolm L. Goggin, Ann O. Bowman, James P. Lester, and Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Little, Brown, 1990. 230p. $13.50 paper.

In this ambitious and distinctive undertaking, Goggin, Bowman, Lester, and O'Toole seek to provide a bridge between what they call second- and third-generation scholarship in the field of public policy implementation. First-generation research was characterized by pioneering but largely atheoretical case studies such as Pressman and Wildavsky's *Implementation* (1973). Second-generation research, such as Ripley and Franklin's *Bureaucracy and Policy Implementation* (1982) and Mazmanian and Sabatier's *Implementation and Public Policy* (1983), is best-known for developing analytical frameworks to navigate research into and through the complexities of carrying out policy.

Goggin, Bowman, Lester, and O'Toole optimistically assert that the time is ripe for more scientific studies of implementation. The focus of third-generation research, they say, will be on theory testing rather than theory construction. It will be concerned with explaining variations in implementation across policies, time, and governmental units and will attempt to predict future implementation behavior. The authors believe that during the next decade the study of public policy "will very likely be defined by its focus on implementation. The nineties are likely to be the *implementation* *era"* (p. 9). Whether this proves true or not, the authors argue that their book is a "halfway house" between second- and third-generation scholarship (p. 203).

Given time, the volume should assist in bridging past and future research. Yet, for the present, it more clearly accomplishes other objectives. First, the authors provide a good synthesis of some of the most important theoretical and empirical studies on policy implementation published through the late 1980s. This synthesis is useful for scholars, students, and practitioners alike. But like other books and articles that integrate the findings of a large body of research, at times it reads like a laundry list of traits associated with various aspects of policy execution. Despite its utility, the authors' exhaustive inventory of propositions may overwhelm some readers—especially the uninitiated.

The authors develop a model of the implementation process. Their communications model of intergovernmental policy implementation integrates into one framework most of the concerns and variables of the top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation while stressing the dynamics of state and intergovernmental implementation. In light of the changing face of U.S. politics during the Reagan–Bush era, as state policy actors have exercised more independence from Washington, greater emphasis on state and intergovernmental implementation is needed.

The model indicates that implementation in the states is influenced by a combination of inducements and constraints from the federal, state, and local levels; by state decisional outcomes; and by a state's capacity to act. Exactly how implementation proceeds in specific policy areas is dependent on the interaction of these elements of the model. Because the fifty states obviously possess distinct policy agendas, state responses to different inducements and constraints, for example, will necessarily vary over policy area and time. In their model the authors reject the success-failure dichotomy for evaluating implementation, substituting the notion of periodic assessments, since effectiveness of implementation may change over time. The model also includes a feedback process that permits policy redesign. The principal components of the model provide the means for organizing the book and for integrating past studies.

Goggin and his colleagues demonstrate how the model works by presenting the findings of their own research on the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, the Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, and the Clean Water Act of 1972. Relying on data collected through surveys, interviews, and other sources, their findings on the effectuation of hazardous waste disposal policy, family planning services policy, and water pollution policy is laced throughout the book. Their quantitative cross-policy comparisons are often instructive and insightful, and they successfully illuminate how different implementation styles and schemes vary among the fifty states. The mixture of findings from past research as well as their own, highlights and underscores the intricacy of the process of carrying out policy, the types of formidable obstacles encountered, and why policy implementation often goes awry.

This is a well-informed, well-written book that is worthy of study. In the final analysis, four leading students of public policy implementation have sought to accomplish some highly worthwhile objectives. They have carried out those objectives in a professional, creative, intelligent manner. The authors have probably attempted to accomplish too much in one slim volume, and third-generation scholarship may still be a number of years into the future. Most undergraduates will soon be lost in such a volume, crammed with detailed information about specific policies, a plethora of propositions on implementation, and technical concepts of public policy analysis. But the product of their efforts will nevertheless be recognized and used by scholars and graduate students specializing in public policy.

CHARLES M. LAMB

State University of New York, Buffalo

Book Reviews: Political Theory

Political Censorship of the Arts and the Press in Nineteenth-Century Europe. By Robert Justin Goldstein. New York: St. Martin's, 1989. 232p. $35.00.

Censorship of Political Caricature in Nineteenth-Century France. By Robert Justin Goldstein. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1989. 293p. $28.00 cloth, $18.50 paper.

Over the course of his recent publications, Robert Justin Goldstein has narrowed his study of nineteenth-century Europe. In his earlier *Political Repression in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (1983), Goldstein undertook an ambitious survey of the full range of government suppression, from limits on the franchise to restrictions on trade unionism. In these two new volumes Goldstein slices his task progressively thinner, first analyzing political censorship of the press, theater, caricature, opera, and the cinema (still a project of daunting scope) and finally spotlighting French censorship of caricature.

Throughout, Goldstein's argument is that the contest over political censorship reached its zenith in the nineteenth-century. Urbanization, rising literacy in a politically attentive middle class, and technical developments in lithography and press production, generated among elites a demand for censorship not felt earlier when politics was the playground of a small political class. *Political Censorship* will interest political scientists most, not so much for its analysis of censorship in any particular country as for its overview of censorship laws and mechanisms. Goldstein paints a portrait of a gradual tapering off of restrictions on the media, first on the press and later on theater and cinema, with sharp fluctuations between permissiveness and repression depending upon who held power.

Until late in the century, press censorship was a common coin of European politics. Goldstein inventories a variety of restraining techniques: government licensing of printers and booksellers, prior restraint of newspapers by state boards, and postpublication seizure and prosecution of offending journalists. This last technique of after-the-fact seizure had the advantage of freeing government censors from blame should they inadvertently authorize publication of offending material. It also forced publishers to become their own censors, lest by publishing illicit materials they incur bankrupting fines. Security bonds, forfeited in the event of press law violation, restricted the ideological scope of journals in circulation. Notes Goldstein, these constraints fluctuated; in France, security bonds were down after the 1830 July revolution, up again under Louis Philippe. Always, vagueness in the statutes had chilling effects. The 1819 Karlsbad Decrees forbade printed matter that was "inimical to the maintenance of peace and quiet in Germany"; an 1812 Swedish law permitted the king to suppress any newspaper "imperilling the public safety."

At best, however, authorities were only partially successful in clamping down on the press, even in Metternich's Austria and czarist Russia. Creative journalists adopted Aesopian language and code phrases to criticize regimes. And ever present was the popular allure of the proscribed. In the words of James Branston,

> Can statutes keep the British press in awe
> When that sells best, that's most against the law?

While press censorship was variously eliminated prior to World War I, Goldstein finds that curbs on the theater and opera persisted well into the twentieth century. Political content in theatrical presentation provoked special fears. Not only was theater accessible to a public of miscellaneous ages, allegiances and levels of literacy, but stage presentations and music added an inflammatory element to the material. Recalling that the theater and opera were often forums where social issues of the day were examined, Goldstein shows that in Vienna, where the theater was sort of a parliament in abstentia, play censorship eliminated topics from the public agenda. Theater licenses and state monopolies commonly screened what was performed. Routinely, state censors edited playwrights' work. Actor Stanislavski tells of his difficulty remembering, while performing Ibsen's *An Enemy of the People* to an audience salted with government spies, which parts of the much-edited text he could utter.

The cinema burst upon the popular scene comparatively late, when official fear over the political content of media was subsiding. Still, as Goldstein's too-brief chapter explains, virtually every country in Europe censored films in the years immediately before 1914.

Most often, the laws reflected worries about immoral and criminal behavior depicted on the screen; but France for a while did outlaw political films about the Dreyfus Affair, and Eisenstein's classic *Potemkin* (1925) was banned in England for a time.

For his *Censorship of Political Caricature in Nineteenth-Century France,* Goldstein has combed through an incredible number of French and English sources. Numerous plates depicting the work of André Gill, Alfred le Petit and other "masters of the crayon" richly illustrate the text. Expanding on the theme of the above book, he argues that caricature drew the special ire of authorities because caricatures invariably cast officials in a bad light. At best, they were made to look ridiculous. *La Caricature* and other journals were so successful in lampooning pear-shaped King Louis-Philippe, that *les poires* were scrawled on walls all over Paris. But perhaps the most familiar character of all was that of a shriveled "Madame Anastasie," the hated personification of censorship, wielding a huge pair of scissors.

Caricatures cut through the barriers of illiteracy to strike a passionate chord in anyone who could interpret a drawing. Goldstein is less successful in demonstrating that political cartoons eroded support for the regimes that they targeted, but without question they were audacious. An 1834 *La Caricature* issue shows Louis-Philippe fleeing, knife in hand, after assassinating French liberty. Caricature reached a fine art by the 1870s, quickly to decline, ironically, at a time when press freedoms were at a high. Goldstein attributes the demise to lackluster political personalities and rising consensus over republicanism in the Third Republic.

Keeping in mind that Goldstein's forte is censorship in the print media rather than in the performing arts, these volumes add a welcome comparative and historical dimension to our knowledge of civil liberties.

STEPHEN R. LEFEVRE

University of Texas, Tyler

From Feudalism to Capitalism: Marxian Theories of Class Struggle and Social Change. By Claudio J. Katz. Contributions in Political Science no. 239, ed. Bernard K. Johnpoll. New York: Greenwood, 1989. 197p. $39.95.

This book is one of a number of recent studies in Marx's conception of history that emphasize empirical historiography. In addition, it provides critical examination of certain well-known interpretations of Marx, as well as criticism of some of Marx's own historical analyses. Although it relies very heavily on the research of other historians and historically oriented Marxologists (e.g., Perry Anderson, Marc Bloch, A. B. Hibbert, Christopher Hill, Rodney Hilton, and E. P. Thompson), Katz's work is original in the way it attempts to shed light on certain problems in the theory and practice of Marx's historiography.

According to Katz, a major problem in Marx is his oscillation between two principles of explanation that give rise to opposing versions of historical materialism: "The one ascribes the fundamental cause of social development to technological progress, the other to class struggle" (p. 2). The technological interpretation—which holds that the level of development of a society's productive forces causally determines the nature of the economic relations of production and the legal and political superstructure—defines social class in terms of its function of enhancing productivity in its allocations of labor power and productive resources. Alternatively, the class struggle interpretation, which explains the level and rate of productive development in reference to the nature of class relations, defines social class in terms of its mode of extraction of surplus labor. While the former interpretation reduces the *logic of exploitation* to the *logic of production,* the latter view keeps these distinct. According to Katz, the conception of history as the history of class struggle corresponds more closely with Marx's most consistent definition of class as a mode of exploitation.

In his introduction, Katz says that both of the above versions of historical materialism are inadequate and that he will attempt to give a reconstruction of Marx's theory of history that though not articulated by Marx, is "faithful to his intentions" (p. 3). This reconstruction, which reworks Marx's categories, is called the *logic of qualitative transformations;* and it is offered as a better alternative to the two predominant interpretations. This claim is somewhat misleading, however, for it turns out that the reconstruction is, in effect, a revision of the class struggle interpretation. In chapter 2, "The Dynamics of Qualitative Social Transformation," Katz does a theoretical comparison of the class struggle and technological interpretations with a defense of the former as against the latter. Subsequently, in his chapters on the history of the feudal mode of production and the transition to capitalism, Katz attempts to show how the historical record and Marx's own empirical historiography support the class struggle conception of history.

Katz's reconceptualization of the theory of class struggle occurs at the point where he finds that Marx oversimplifies the character of class struggle with his pure model of class dichotomy. For example, the feudal mode of production cannot be understood simply in terms of the dynamics in the relation of lords and serfs (struggle between appropriating and producing classes), which more or less resolved itself by the fourteenth century, but also must take account of the relation between the new gentry and the aristocracy (struggle between appropriating classes), which did not resolve itself until the seventeenth century (at least in England). Moreover, the outcome of the struggle between feudal lords and peasantry was not a transformation to a qualitatively new society and economy but, instead, social and economic stagnation. Qualitative change was to be the accomplishment of a new class, the bourgeoisie, only after it was able to throw off feudal ownership relations. Katz concludes generally from his examination of the feudal crisis in Western Europe—and apparently in opposition to Marx—that "there is no intrinsic dynamic impelling the type of class struggle grounded in the relationship of surplus extraction toward social revolution" (p. 78).

As against the technological theory of historical change, Katz argues that the historical record shows that social and economic changes in feudalism were not primarily the result of the requirements of technological development but were rather the result of attempts to maintain positions of power regarding the control and distribution of surplus labor. Indeed, the primitive accumulation of capital by merchants was not a response to the prior needs of technological development but rather occurred from within the framework of the feudal relations of class domination, which emphasized appropriation of surplus labor without improvement in the forces of production. It is only through the struggle between merchants and craftsmen that the feudal order gives way and that small producers, as a result of changes in the system of property, are able to accumulate capital for the development of industry.

Katz argues not only that feudal class relations systematically impeded optimal productive development and led to a crisis causing a regression in society's forces of production, but that eventual development of these forces only followed the *prior* changes in class relations. Whether these circumstances, of themselves, marshal evidence against the technological interpretation, however, is doubtful; for at one point Katz acknowledges that, as according to G. A. Cohen (*Karl Marx's Theory of History,* Princeton, 1978), the explanatory primacy of the forces of production rests on their ability to explain the relations of production *functionally,* which "depends on the existence of a 'feedback' mechanism whereby the forces select relations of production with the propensity to promote optimal productive development" (p. 33; cf. G. A. Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History* [1978]). But if this is the case, the fact that the priority in times of change in class structure shifts to productive innovations is irrelevant as a criticism of the technological thesis; for the functional construal is that changes in relations of control and property will indeed promote technological advances, but only because the need for these advances call forth the former changes. Katz seems to neglect to take into adequate account that the thesis of the primacy of the productive forces is in part premised on the thesis of the endogenous tendency of these forces to develop, which in turn depends on certain observations about the overall course of history as well as assumptions about human rationality in the context of material scarcity. A successful refutation of the technological view of historical change will need to appeal to more than the particular motives of classes in their relations of struggle: it will need to address the broader teleological perspective, which attributes certain tendencies to human nature that transcend class consciousness at any particular moment in history. Still, the author's defense of the class struggle interpretation places historical agency squarely in the hands of human beings, which has much to recommend it if one is inclined to view history nondeterministically.

Overall, despite some deficiencies, Katz's book is good reading and helpful for framing some important problems in interpretations on Marx's theory of history. A most valuable aspect of the work for me was the exercise of conjoining theoretical concepts with historical research for the purpose of testing their applicability to actual history.

DAVID A. DUQUETTE

St. Norbert College

Beyond Self-Interest. Edited by Jane J. Mansbridge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. 402p. $55.00 cloth, $15.95 paper.

"The essays in this book constitute a manifesto . . . reject[ing] the increasingly prevalent notion that human behavior is based on self-interest, narrowly conceived" (p. ix). This edited volume compiles various views rejecting self-interest theories about politics and other aspects of social life. Its highly readable chapters include surveys of multiple articles from ongoing series of studies as well as adaptations of recent books in the area. For anyone interested in self-interest theories of politics, pro or con, this will be a most useful volume.

As a manifesto, however, the book falls somewhat short. One expects a book with this title to identify specifically the self-interest model in question and to offer a clear vision as to how we go beyond it, but this one does neither. It aims too often at various specialized normative and positive theories based, sometimes loosely, on self-interest. And even when the aim is accurate, the articles launch faulty replacements for self-interest, relying, with one notable exception, upon numerous alternative motivations unsupported by sufficient theories.

In her introductory chapter, Jane Mansbridge sweeps pluralism and behavioralism, along with public choice theories broadly defined, under the rubric of " 'adversary' democracy, founded on both conflict and self-interest" (p. 3). She gives a Kuhnian account of crisis in this approach, making no mention of the separate "scientific revolution" that each of those separate approaches claimed to represent against the others and against previous manifestations of her own. Nobody ever wants to be accused of "normal science."

The subsequent chapters proceed to debunk various versions of self-interest theories; as in the introductory chapter, the targets of these critiques are all over the map. David Sears and Carolyn Funk attack the interpretation of public opinion in terms of "objective" self-interest, but they assign the varying tastes and beliefs of voters to the realm of "symbolic" attitudes unrelated to self-interest. Paul Quirk suggests that since pure interest group capture theory cannot explain the deregulation of airlines, trucking, and telecommunications, we must abandon self-interest theories of policy making altogether in favor of a "politics of ideas." Cass Sunstein argues against a normative view of American constitutional law that would legitimize the pure interplay of special interest groups. Virginia Held advocates an alternative to the regnant conception of social cohesion, which is supposedly based on analogies with economic contracts. These arguments cannot claim to necessitate rejection of self-interest theories generally.

Few of the contributions to this volume distinguish between myopic self-interest theories, in which individuals seek purely their short-run self-interest in any situation, and what one might call "sophisticated" self-interest theories, based on strategic repeated interaction of selfish individuals. The clearest exceptions are two chapters, one by Jon Elster and one by Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson. Elster, after giving a concise and accurate explanation of sophisticated self-interest theories, dismisses them too easily as explanations for several of his examples of seemingly selfless behavior. This is really the nearest thing to a common methodology in this volume: some well-known behavior patterns are adduced, and the claim is made, without argument, that self-interest could never account for it. Then other motives are suggested instead, but no successful argument is given to explain where such motivations come from. Christopher Jencks suggests that selfless motivations can be explained through some process of "cultural selection" (p. 64) but offers no mechanism whereby cultural selection could overcome genetic selection.

This is where the Boyd and Richerson article stands out. Noting from the outset that "cooperation is maladaptive from a genetic point of view" (p. 114), it proceeds to examine ecological conditions under which "cultural selection" could support social cooperation among self-interested individuals. The basic condition identified is that habitats must vary in the extent to which they reward cooperative subpopulations. Although this result may be problematic in a real world whose behavior patterns are more complex than just cooperative or noncooperative, at least Boyd and Richerson have done the job of motivating habitual cooperation by individuals. And their model is fundamentally self-interest-driven: it never appeals to basic assumptions about human affections or psychological drives.

Many of the contributors to this volume, when they speak of attempts to account for seemingly selfless behavior, refer to some rational choice theorists' efforts to portray "preferences" that involve duty, love, empathy, and so on. The authors here rightly note that such an exercise can never constitute a proper explanation for cooperative social behavior. The same is true, however, of unsupported assertions about human motivations outside the rational choice approach. None of the contributions here refers to any study capable of distinguishing nonselfish basic motivations from sophisticated self-interest. The approach of Boyd and Richerson still represents the best hope for rigorous models that go beyond self-interest in the narrow sense.

RANDALL L. CALVERT

University of Rochester

History and Progress: In Search of the European and American Mind. By Margarita Mathiopoulos. New York: Praeger, 1989. 460p. $49.95.

Despite its subtitle, the main purpose of *History and Progress* is to explain the dynamics (and importance) of American politics to Europeans, Germans in particular. Mathiopoulos' work, here translated from the German, thus falls within a tradition the height of which was reached in Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America.* And this work reminds one of Tocqueville's for reasons beyond the relationship between author and subject.

The most interesting and useful portions of *History and Progress* are those which deal directly with varying notions of progress in modern European, and particularly in American, thought and practice. As Tocqueville chose to use an extremely broad definition of democracy (essentially, equality) in order to discuss its often conflicting manifestations in the American community, so Mathiopoulos utilizes an extremely broad definition of progress (essentially, the optimistic pursuit of social improvement) in order to analyze differing meanings and levels of acceptance of what she sees as the driving force of modern politics. Through an intelligent, voluminously documented, and well-constructed set of historical narratives, (albeit somewhat derivative of Hofstadter and Huntington), Mathiopoulos shows that progress has increasingly come to mean continuing movement toward greater equality of rights and conditions.

Mathiopoulos also shares with Tocqueville a desire to forge a middle path between the extremisms of the time. For Tocqueville, of course, these extremisms were the drive for absolute equality and the desire for a reestablishment of the system of the Old Regime. According to Mathiopoulos, dangers come from utopianisms of Left and Right: both Marxists and conservatives subvert the practical pursuit of compromise and incremental improvement in the interests of an unobtainable and undesirable earthly paradise.

Tocqueville dealt with his adversaries in a civil manner even when he disdained them; but Mathiopoulos at times becomes intemperate in her attacks on those she deems dangerous, particularly the Puritans (whom she terms "fanatical") and intellectual conservatives, including Strauss and Voegelin (who were, in her view, basically "un-American" and unimportant [p. 277]). Such incivility is particularly inappropriate given Mathiopoulos' clear lack of knowledge concerning the history or content of the views she dismisses. To take one particularly indicative example, Mathiopoulos asserts, in a two-page summary of medieval Christendom, that the "static conception of the here and now" supposedly characterizing the Middle Ages was broken down thanks to "increasing doubt as to the extent of papal infallibility" (p. 11). In fact, the doctrine of papal infallibility developed over a number of centuries, finally gaining official sanction in the nineteenth century—amid political machinations (August Hasler, *Wie der Papst Unsehldarwerde* [1979]). Mathiopoulos' discussion of premodern conceptions of progress amounts to a curt dismissal of the (essentially unexamined) classical and medieval views in favor of her own modern, materialist reading.

Mathiopoulos spends most of her time discussing progress rather than history, her explicit intention being to argue for further egalitarian innovations and for a United States of Europe that would provide the unity of spirit and purpose necessary to solve problems such as pollution, potentially dangerous new technologies, and the need for greater equality. There are elements of an interesting historiographical discussion (suffering somewhat from the lack of any sustained conceptual discussion of the key terms involved) concerning the differing readings of the progressive traditions of Europe and America (each progressive movement basing its arguments on the idea that its goal is to put into practice the ideals of the nation). But Mathiopoulos fails to explore the effects of "progressive" readings of historical ideals and institutions—readings that may alter fundamentally the beliefs and practices she asserts stabilize the pursuit of "social justice."

Mathiopoulos' work is in large part a gloss on Samuel P. Huntington's *American Politics* (1981). She accepts without question Huntington's notion of cycles of "creedal passion periods" during which citizens' heightened concern with bringing mutually conflicting ideals to reality causes political upheaval. The conflicts between values such as democracy (which demands mass public participation) and individualism (which demands a weak state), for Mathiopoulos, leads to progress—the pragmatic pursuit of material and social equality.

What Mathiopoulos fails to consider is the possibility that a people may retain key words without maintaining key concepts. Mathiopoulos fails to note the creative tension between the religious forces she disdains (save for their secular throw-offs) and the practical political concerns she so values. The utopianisms of this century and the last owe much—according to Voegelin, Strauss, and other thinkers dismissed by Mathiopoulos—to the severing of ties between the practical and the transcendent. The overt materialism of contemporary politics and much contemporary utopianism reflect the loss of historical moorings lamented even by "practical" thinkers of Mathiopoulos' stripe such as Daniel Bell (*Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* [1976]).

BRUCE P. FROHNEN

Cornell College

Performance As a Political Act: The Embodied Self. By Randy Martin. New York: Bergin and Garvey, 1990. 211p. $45.00.

That Elizabeth Taylor can mount a multimillion dollar campaign for her new fragrance, "Passion," is not, for Randy Martin, just another sign that nothing is immune from the eviscerating onslaught of commercialization. Rather there are at least two more hopeful lessons to draw from such bombardment. The first lesson is that these obnoxious and pervasive commoditizations of our bodies betray a powerful and more authentic sentient foundation. The second lesson is that with the rise of disposable income and the shift from production to consumption in the postscarce capitalist environment, there will be ever more exotic fragrances and thus ever more chances to stir up the targets at whom the products and their ads are admittedly so clumsily and simply aimed.

Thus, according to Martin, the body is staging a comeback, after many years of sometimes brutal repression. Martin, although confining his discussion to the modern industrial era and its wake, includes a captivating if not original discussion of the profitable but suffocating conditioning to a "reasonable," nonsensual existence. The theme and hope of the book is that the conditioning is no longer effective and that long-repressed sensuality can help in the political struggle for its own release. Because of their undeniable linkages to the body, to an energetic and intimate community, and to an audience, the performance arts take responsibility for encouraging the body's more exciting and enriching possibilities. Martin (albeit with nary a mention of Kant) holds that the performance arts are more likely to invoke *abstraction* than *signification*, meaning that while signification dwells in the pristine vacuum of conceptual exchange, abstraction demands a subjective, sentient projection ("desire") into the fray.

But what, precisely, is "the body," what are its precise links to the performance arts, and precisely how are the performance arts to become political? A problem with this book is that it defines and discusses its most crucial elements by addressing what they aren't more than what they are. The "body," for instance is not just emotion without substance; yet it is not "mere flesh." It is not, we are reassured, the easily digested fodder of the voracious word and sterile linguistic signification (contra Roland Barthes, among others). Nor is the body a primordial essence, unaffected by society, that Nietzsche and a strain of phenomenology would have it. It is neither immutable nor repressible. What, then, is it?

Likewise, performance that is truly political is not bulimia or anorexia, which are isolated nonsocial bodily rebellions. It is not Living Theater, where conformity to an idealized alternative suffocates the body. It is not a sit-in, which exchanges movement and dialogue for spectacle. It is not dance, which is too oblique. And it is not the *Mystery-Bouffe* of Meyerhold, which failed to articulate a "method" of performance to challenge Stanislavsky's. While Martin spends inordinate time discussing the tax problems of Living Theater's Beck and Malina, he fails to join his discussion of various performances (including a full chapter describing his own involvement in a dance company) with sufficient analytical transitions, much less a satisfying analytical framework.

Yet Martin is to be congratulated (and to some extent excused), because he has undertaken so ambitious and so heuristic a project. Careful examinations of the relationship of art to politics are rare (especially by political scientists; alas, Martin is a sociologist), notwithstanding occasional outlandish claims made by practitioners stricken with paroxysms of irrelevance and guilt. Clearly, Martin brings to his study a deep and long-standing personal familiarity with performance art, along with an impressive schooling in contemporary social philosophy. He is less prepared to tie his expertise to a clear and thorough political analysis. The project is worthy and, with any luck, will spawn rewarding sequels.

TIMOTHY J. LUKES

Santa Clara University

The Radical Durkheim. By Frank Pearce. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989. 232p. $44.95 cloth, $15.95 paper.

Emile Durkheim, along with his contemporary, Max Weber, ranks as one of the founding fathers of modern sociology. Many historians of the subject have deemed Durkheim's contribution to have been greater in that it was mainly through his efforts that the discipline of sociology gained recognition as a distinct and legitimate field of study in the academic world. In fact, in his advocacy of sociology Durkheim became quite imperialistic, seeing it as the key discipline among the social sciences and arguing that any study of the relationship between the individual and what he called social solidarity had to be "social."

In promoting sociology Durkheim urged that it inaugurate concrete sociological studies, forego abstract debates about its possibilities, and avoid the cosmological formulations characteristic of August Comte and his followers, which he found wanting and which had brought the emerging discipline to a state of disrepute. Any sociology worthy of the name, he maintained, had to be established on the more solid ground of empirical fact. In pursuit of his vision of sociology Durkheim carried out a series of original and pioneering studies—most notably, *The Division of Labour in Society* (1893), *Suicide*, (1897), and *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1912)—that laid out a distinctive Durkheimian method and worldview that is still influential in sociology and social anthropology. He outlined the method for accomplishing those studies in his *Rules of Sociological Method* (1895), a work in which he developed the case for a social science that was absolutely objective and free of any nonscientific influences.

Not surprisingly, Durkheim's work has become standard fare in treatments of the history of sociology and sociological thought: no self-respecting history of the subject could justify omitting him. But except for those concerned with methodological issues, Durkheim's work has previously occasioned little interest among political scientists in general and virtually none among students of political theory. When his work has been noted by students of politics, it has been for his contributions to sociology and not for the formulation of a "political" theory. Yet, latent in Durkheim's work is a political theory of no little consequence. It is precisely this aspect of Durkheim's work that Frank Pearce (though himself a sociologist) seeks to explicate and develop in his ground-breaking *The Radical Durkheim.*

Pearce begins by noting that he is a "committed socialist" who "believes that Marxism is the most fruitful of all socialist and sociological discourses" (pp. xiii–xiv). He also makes it clear that his intended audience is primarily other Marxist or, more broadly, socialist sociologists. Obviously, then, the work is best construed as a contribution to contemporary socialist discourse. Pearce's first task is to make Durkheim relevant; that is, given "the generally hostile relationship between sociology and Marxism," what possible interest could the work of such an allegedly positivistic and conservative writer hold for those engaged in socialist discourse? In answering this question, Pearce develops two themes that form the main argument of the book. First, the "somewhat dogmatic and unimaginative way" in which Durkheim's concepts have been received, particularly by those on the left, has resulted in the failure to grasp the truly "radical implications" of those concepts. Second, a "retheorized" Durkheim provides an excellent vehicle for critiquing and reconstituting socialist, or Marxist, thought on more realistic grounds. By developing these two themes Pearce is able to make clear Durkheim's contribution to political theory and, perhaps more importantly, to make an important contribution of his own.

After briefly reviewing Durkheim's epistemology and sociology, that is, his method, Pearce devotes the middle chapters of the book to an examination of the substantive doctrines that emerge in Durkheim's major works. While all of the essential ingredients of a political theory are to be found there—a theory of the nature, origin, and development of society; a conception of human nature and its relation to the social body; and a theory of the state—they are presented incoherently and their implications are unrealized. Nevertheless, a reconstituted or retheorized Durkheim "has much to say about the characteristics of a *feasible* democratic socialist society, on where some kind of organic solidarity might truly be possible" (p. 159). Perhaps the most important insight to be gained from a political reading of Durkheim, Pearce concludes, is that "juridical relations—i.e., the existence of structures of rights and obligations and modes of attributing responsibility to individuals and collectivities, that is, a state—are an endemic feature of any society" (p. 186). Thus, an adequate socialist theory must recognize the inevitability of the continued presence of the state. The final two chapters are devoted to sketching out just such a theory.

On the whole, Pearce's effort is successful and should be of interest to political theorists of all stripes, nonsocialist as well as socialist. He makes a reasonably convincing case for the notion that there is an original and valuable political theory present in Durkheim's work—one that should certainly awaken an interest in Durkheim as a political theorist. His fusion of Durkheimian concepts and Marxist theory produces an account of state and society and what they could and should become that is both insightful and thought-provoking.

GARY L. JONES

University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Mill and Sexual Equality. By Gail Tulloch. Boulder: Lynn Rienner, 1989. 212p. $26.50.

Tulloch sets out to demonstrate that Mill's *Subjection of Women* is neither an aberration nor "a mere grace-note" (p. xi) to the Mill corpus. On the contrary, it is both source and exemplar of a liberal feminism that was central to Mill's life and work, and its concerns are relevant today.

Part 1 is a detailed analysis of *The Subjection of Women.* Tulloch recognizes "an inherent tension in the essay between advocacy of sexual equality in the realm of civic rights for women, and a simultaneously held implicit acceptance of traditional sex roles" (p. 13) in the home for married women. Like Mary Shanley

("Marital Slavery and Friendship" *Political Theory* 9:241–42), however, Tulloch holds that Mill's advocacy of sexual equality was a fundamental principle, whereas his "views on traditional sex roles were personal opinions . . . which might be modified or abandoned if experience proved them wrong" (p. 14). Although he sometimes comes close to endorsing feminine stereotypes when these function as virtues or advantages, Mill's epistemology is essentially agnostic: only experience will suffice to reveal woman's true nature. Yet he ultimately believes that civic equality plus companionate marriage will reveal the androgynous and developmental nature of *all* human beings.

Part 2 demonstrates the continuity and strength of Mill's liberal feminism, revealing that in many forums he was an activist for sexual equality. Part 3 continues the discussion of Mill's conception of human nature, particularly of the tension between his environmentalism and his own convictions about the absence of natural differences: "If whatever we are is the product of environmental forces, then how can the distinction [between natural and artificial] possibly be made? And why criticize one set of environmental influences as 'distorting'?" (p. 132). From an exploration of *Utilitarianism, On Liberty,* and *Representative Government,* Tulloch attributes to Mill "a positive, *eudaimonistic* or self-realisation sense of liberty" as central to his conception of happiness: "What individuals wish for themselves . . . ought to be the result of national reflection and experimentation. Only slaves or conformists can be content with a life in which their individual needs and capacities are repressed" (p. 141). Ultimately, this conviction justifies more thoroughgoing interference in family life than has been the case in most liberal states; that is, "If one takes liberty seriously, state intervention may well be required to secure its conditions" (p. 161).

Part 4 is an application of Mill's liberal feminist principles in a modern context. Far from having failed, Tulloch argues that Mill's principles have never been fully implemented. Not only formal equality of opportunity but "strong, real substantive equality of access" (p. 184) is necessary to counter the constraining influence of custom and to buttress the meritocratic principle of careers open to talents that Tulloch believes essential to Mill's vision. Affirmative action ("aimed at redressing anomalies, removing unfair disadvantages, and preventing the perpetuation of a sexually discriminatory status quo") is acceptable for similar reasons, but reverse discrimination ("characterised by an emphasis on quotas to be achieved, and hence an emphasis on groups rather than individuals") is not (p. 190). She concludes that the use of affirmative action plus certeris paribus discrimination—or "using sex or race as a tie-breaking bonus factor, other things being equal" (p. 193)—will, when fully implemented, bring about Millian sexual equality. Since such a coordinated approach has not been tried in the past, "logically, therefore, it cannot be said to have failed" (p. 194).

This book's strongest point lies in Tulloch's effort to integrate *The Subjection of Women* into the rest of the Mill corpus, especially in her specific consideration of Mill's other works. I find two weaknesses, however. First, because of the book's organization, Tulloch in a number of instances repeats points she has previously made, word for word, including quotations from Mill. Since she first examines *The Subjection of Women* before amplifying in later chapters on some of its themes, one might expect this. However, the work would have unfolded more smoothly for the reader if she had adapted a unified treatment of Mill's conception of human nature, for example, instead of returning several times to each theme. Second, the reader may detect a bifurcation between her stated objective and her conclusions. She aims to demonstrate that Mill's liberal feminist principles are more far-reaching than they might first appear, as in her discussion of permissible state intervention. The reader is then surprised to come upon her distinction in the last chapter between affirmative action and reverse discrimination and her firm conviction that the latter is un-Millian. After all, she has stated that Mill's views as to specific customs or policies are personal opinions, modifiable if experience so dictates. One would like to know more about the basis for her distinctions between what is in accordance with Mill's principles and what is not. On the other hand, Tulloch does acknowledge that if affirmative action plus ceteris paribus discrimination is not sufficient to effect sexual equality, she would have to change her position and call for reverse discrimination, though she believes that this will prove unnecessary (p. 198). Overall, this book contributes to our understanding of Mill's liberalism and its implications.

EMILY R. GILL

Bradley University

Truth, Hope, and Power: The Thought of Karl Popper. By Douglas E. Williams. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989. 187p. $35.00.

Williams presents a unified view of Karl Popper's work. He finds unity in the moral dimension of Popper's thinking, beginning before his first published works on the philosophy of science and continuing through his work in political philosophy and later works on evolution and psychology. Popper's work "is best understood as an attempt to conserve liberalism in the face of tremendous challenges to the traditional bases of its intellectual confidence and political optimism" (p. 9).

Popper's work continues to evoke strong responses among philosophers and social scientists. Williams briefly reviews this work and remains determined not to choose up sides. Instead, he seeks to present Popper's work by adequately identifying Popper's own meaning (p. viii) and directing criticism to problems of clarity, consistency, and sufficiency.

Williams argues that Popper's works defend the vision and ideals of the Enlightenment, of the "rational possibility of progress in mind and civil society alike" (p. 27). His middle chapters argue that Popper's epistemology and approach to science are aimed at the orderly growth of knowledge. Such orderly growth depends on acceptance of standards of rational criticism, which both "create the dignity of the individual man" and allow "rational and imaginative analysis of the consequences of proposed solutions" to scientific and political problems (pp. 50, 60). As part of this argument chapter 6 offers a critical appraisal of Popper's treatment of Karl Mannheim. Williams argues that Popper misinterpreted Mannheim on several counts and that "this potential rapproachment" between the two thinkers "lets us appreciate the unique role and problematic of language in social and political analysis" (p. 121).

Chapter 7, "Conserving Liberalism," is the most explicit treatment of the political themes contained in Popper's *Open Society and Its Enemies.* Williams presents Popper's argument as "a powerful rhetorical, moral, and methodological defence of individualism and liberal democracy against some of the best-known justifications of collectivism and utopianism in the Western tradition—those of Plato, Hegel, and Marx" (p. 145). An important ingredient in Williams's interpretation is Popper's own experience in visiting Britain during the 1930s; the comparison with the strife of Vienna was profound.

While, for Popper, truth is found in the consequences of applying tentative theories (his "error elimination"), Williams argues that Popper's view of logic is too limited for practical problem solving or for studies of morality and values (pp. 82, 115). Popper's liberalism is limited by a "negative and abstract conception of community" that "cannot provide a basis for a full-blown political theory" (pp. 177, 180). One particular difficulty is Popper's treatment of institutions, particularly the bureaucratic organization of rationality that in Williams's view, presents a serious problem for the "open societies" of the West (pp. 163, 184).

Williams points out that a more systematic work on Popper's political theory is needed and that no thorough account of his formative years, prior to the publication of *Logik der Forschung* is available. Graduate students and advanced undergraduates should find Williams's book the most complete and accessible treatment of Popper's work. The book should be welcomed as an important contribution to critical works on Popper.

DICK W. OLUFS

Pacific Lutheran University

AMERICAN POLITICS

Gubernatorial Transitions: The 1983 and 1984 Elections. Edited by Thad L. Beyle. Durham: Duke University Press, 1989. 344p. $42.50.

This excellent volume is a high-quality extension of Beyle's earlier work on gubernatorial transitions. Detailed case studies of eight states' gubernatorial transitions are accompanied by a chapter in which the editor summarizes the insights of these and earlier transition studies, analyzes the cost of gubernatorial campaigns and some of the consequences of high campaign costs, and offers advice to incoming governors-elect and departing incumbents on ensuring a smooth transition or a difficult one. Also included are an evaluation of incumbent succession, a discussion of the importance of a governor's relations with the lieutenant governor, and a discussion of possible ways new governors can maintain the momentum of their campaigns while also protecting their options for the future. The individual case studies are of uniform good quality and will prove useful historical snapshots in their respective states. They are of special value to students of comparative state politics in that, with minor deviations, the case studies follow a common outline.

The brief and intense transition period between election and inauguration often structures much of a new governor's first term and greatly affects his or her chances of success. A smooth transition is of great importance to the incoming governor and to the state. Yet in most hard-fought campaigns little time, money, or energy is available for considering the transition. After the election, the governor-elect faces a flood of demands for decisions, all important and most needing making within sixty days or so. A state budget must be prepared before the legislature meets. Key personnel must be selected, balancing individual competence, interest group expectations, geographic and party faction considerations, personal obligations, and friendship. Responsibilities must be delegated. Relationships with other public officials and the news media must receive attention. A policy agenda for the new administration must be set, establishing priorities for early action on some issues while structuring others for decision and action later.

The National Governor's Association (NGA) assists governors-elect in managing the transition; but the transition remains a political process and varies by state and by year as personalities, fiscal realities, and salient issues vary. Still, new governors value the New Governors Seminar (taught by incumbent governors) and the written materials provided by the NGA.

Gubernatorial transitions seem, on balance, to go more smoothly now than in the not-so-distant past. In part this is because of the work of the NGA; in part it is because many states now provide office space and transition funds for the governor-elect during the period between the election and the inauguration.

The factors that seem to subvert a smooth early transition are not surprising. An upset defeat of an incumbent seeking reelection, strong ideological differences between the incumbent and the governor-elect, personality clashes, a particularly nasty election campaign, and ordinary partisan differences can all lead to a rough transition.

To the extent one considers the governor's first legislative session to be the second phase of his or her transition into office, numerous pitfalls await. If, as in Kentucky, the state's official revenue estimate is revised sharply downward as the legislative session begins, difficulties are likely to ensue; and even a smooth initial transition is unlikely to prevent turbulance. In a state with a two-year gubernatorial term, a poor initial performance with the legislature leaves the new governor little opportunity to recover. In contrast, governors with four-year terms have the time to recover from a poor start, as did Governor Gardner of Washington. Governors-elect will continue to have difficulty making all the needed decisions by inauguration day, but these studies suggest that in many states the process would be greatly enhanced by additional transition funding.

PAUL L. HAIN

Corpus Christi State University

Taxing Choices: The Politics of Tax Reform. By Timothy J. Conlon, Margaret T. Wrightson, and David R. Bean. Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1990. 275p. $14.95 paper.

The Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 reversed many trends in tax policy making with its reduction of loopholes, simplified rate schedule, and 25-billion-dollar-a-year increase in corporate taxes. This major revision of the tax code challenged assumptions about the tax policy process as well as theories about nonincremental policy change. An area of policy making in which well-organized interests generally had their way with an open, decentralized process, taxation seemed the least likely target for "good" policy. Yet in 1986 reforms that conformed with the professional standards of equity and neutrality emerged if not unscathed, at least still recognizable from the attacks of loophole lobbyists, the attempts of legislators to protect their own tax expenditure initiatives, and the indifference and skepticism of taxpayers.

Taxing Choices is an excellent case study of a complex policy process in an important issue area, which addresses broader academic questions about the nature of policy change in our current state of apparent institutional disarray. The authors make a persuasive argument for understanding the TRA as a type of nonincremental change generally overlooked in models of the policy process that focus on such overworked variables as interest groups and political parties. They present the object of their study as an example of the "new politics of reform," driven by ideas, professional staff, and policy entrepreneurs.

All of the authors have staff experience on Capitol Hill; Conlon and Wrightson participated in the tax reform process as Senate staff. The study benefits from the more than 70 interviews they conducted, as well from their understanding of the role of egos and intellects in the operation of the congressional pecking order. Conlon, Wrightson, and Beam have produced an exhaustive study of the passage of the TRA that admirably preserves the complexity of a process influenced by ideology, interests, and institutions as well as personalities, professionalism, and chance.

To preempt a possible Democratic initiative, Ronald Reagan proposed a "study" of fundamental tax reform during the 1984 presidential campaign. From this humble beginning, the project of a major overhaul of the federal revenue system seemed to take on a life of its own. Secret executive branch brainstorming produced Treasury I, a first draft of an administration reform plan embodying almost exclusively the equity and efficiency norms of accountants and lawyers, a formula guaranteed to clash with the more pragmatic concerns of elected officials.

Rate reduction and simplification would be purchased by closing loopholes and would result in a shift of $25 billion a year to the corporate income tax. The benefits of tax reform would be widely dispersed, and the costs would be borne by those whose exemptions and deductions were evidence of established influence in the tax legislative process. Nevertheless, with the help of a reform-minded press, the essential ingredient of even uninformed and sporadic presidential endorsement and the influence of congressional leaders who found that their institutional concerns coincided with the goals of policy entrepreneurs, key legislators, and staff snatched tax reform from the jaws of many apparent defeats. The authors conclude that "there are features of contemporary American politics that *do* facilitate far-reaching policy change . . . [and] can turn existing policy on its head (p. 258).

As heartening as the victory over lobbyists may have been to some participant-observers, however, the reforms were not as radical as they may have appeared at the time. Existing tax policy was not "turned on its head." The Tax Reform Act generated no new revenue at a time of exploding federal deficits. It created no new sources of revenue and eliminated no established ones. The real accomplishment of clearing away older loopholes may have merely made possible a new round of incrementalism for a new set of tax expenditure beneficiaries.

It is significant that millions of low-income citizens were removed from the tax roles. And although some theories suggest that the corporate income tax may be shifted to wage-earners, the $25 billion a year moved from individuals to corporations was a significant alteration of recent trends. However, these reversals of the first Reagan administration's tax policies actually restored the federal revenue system to a shape not unlike that before the supply side raid on the Treasury. In 1981 accelerated depreciation and investment credits granted tax advantages to declining heavy industries and commercial real estate, diverting investment from knowledge-based enterprises. The TRA reduced these distortions. The progressivity of federal taxes—including Social Security contributions—dropped from the late seventies through the mid-eighties. The TRA arrested that trend, but the system remains less progressive than before.

In light of the damage to equity and efficiency done in the early eighties, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 may be remarkable less as an example of radical reform than as a restoration of professional influence and traditional bipartisan legislative concerns to the federal tax code. When Ronald Reagan enthusiastically signed it into law, major elements of his original legislative victories were officially repudiated.

JAMES B. GREENE, JR.

University of Houston

Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall. By Thomas E. Cronin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. 289p. $25.00.

Citizen Lawmakers: The Ballot Initiative Revolution. By David S. Schmidt. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989. 345p. $25.00.

One theme among some theorists studying participatory democracy is the need for more active and continuous involvement of citizens with government, the concept Benjamin Barber has termed "strong democracy." Two recent volumes reexamine a mechanism that early advocates believed would deliver many of the benefits of a strong democracy: the use of the instruments of direct democracy at the state level. David Schmidt, who directs a clearinghouse for information on initiative and referenda procedures and campaigns, focuses on ballot measures initiated by citizens; while, as Thomas Cronin's subtitle suggests, his focus is on all three instruments: the initiative, referendum, and recall.

Schmidt, maintaining the optimistic outlook of the activist, contends that "the lesson of the Ballot Initiative Revolution for all Americans, is that ordinary individuals . . . can change this nation's laws to make government more accountable" (pp. ix–x). As illustrations, citizen lawmakers such as Ed Koupal (founder of the People's Lobby in California) and Roger Telschow (whose Initiative America campaign resulted in ballot measures on similar issues' appearing in a number of states) are profiled. The activists battled considerable odds to bring such issues as tax reform, nuclear power plant limitations, and a nuclear weapons freeze to the ballot box. The second part of the volume is more of a guide or handbook for activists about the process, containing material ranging from campaign tactics for initiatives to the historical development of initiatives in the states.

Thomas Cronin's central theme is an emphasis upon the middle ground between advocate Schmidt and critics stressing the virtues of representative government. Both advocates and critics have overstated their cases. At the state level, Cronin contends the "initiative, referendum, and recall have been no more of a threat to the representative principle than has judicial review or the executive veto" (p. 196). Of the three central arguments made against the process—lack of voter competence, the impact on minority rights, and the role of money—Cronin expresses the greatest concern over the last factor. A recent Supreme Court ruling has restricted state attempts to limit spending levels.

Given the potential problems with direct legislation, Cronin advocates a series of reforms to protect against abuses. The emphasis is on incremental changes—and then only when changes can be adopted to fit a state's size, political culture, and so on. Where the process is not used, states should give careful consideration to its adoption. The mechanism should only be employed when "glaring deficiencies" are evident in governmental practices. His concluding chapter advocates "sensible democracy"—a description of the hybrid that exists with a representative system at the national level and both representative and direct democracy at the state level.

Schmidt and Cronin differ on the adoption of a national initiative and referendum process. Schmidt remains, on the whole, favorable to the process; while Cronin contends that problems found at the state level (such as the relationship between spending levels and the outcomes of ballot propositions) would be magnified at the national level.

Those searching for theoretical development of the subject must look elsewhere. Sections of both books contain descriptive analyses of the origins of the direct legislation processes, while Cronin's development of a "sensible democracy" model provides little room for theorizing. As to data, Cronin contributes a Gallup poll of national opinion commissioned for the volume and has uncovered previously unpublished studies of the process at the state level. The data for Schmidt's chapters is taken largely from newspaper accounts or personal interviews. His own role as participant-observer in some of the campaigns described is unclear. Where social scientists have conducted research, the literature is often not referred to; and in one instance his findings go against the grain of current research. In discussing the role of money in ballot proposition campaigns, Schmidt determines that between 1976 and 1984, money was the decisive factor in only about one-eighth of the initiative campaigns. Cronin, reflecting the literature on the subject, finds "big money" has about a 25% success rate in initiating ballot propositions but a 75% chance of defeating propositions.

Two central contributions of the Cronin volume are the depth of coverage, and the meticulously evenhanded treatment of the direct legislation process. The recall device and its effect on government have been insufficiently investigated, and Cronin's study provides the basis for future work on the subject. An example of the balanced approach to the process occurs in the discussion of citizen competence to decide laws directly. Cronin demonstrates the ability of citizens to think seriously about the issues but notes the "competence and rationality levels of both (voters and the legislature) can stand improvement" (p. 89). While the recipe for incremental changes will disappoint those seeking additional avenues for citizen participation, his insistance that shortcomings in the use of direct legislation be corrected before its use becomes more widespread is well founded. Viable proposals that recognize variations among the states are put forward to accomplish this goal.

Schmidt's case studies on campaigning for initiatives provide an overview of many issues but incomplete coverage of several major topics. A national initiative, for example, is given scant coverage; and the problems with such a procedure are noted in three pages. The chapters on citizen activists could be a useful contribution to the literature on grassroots organizing and policy change. However, by presenting the activists largely in heroic and populist terms, Schmidt provides an incomplete picture. Group theorists have emphasized that organizations with participatory goals often have oligarchical command structures. Only a very astute reader would notice that Ed Koupal ran the People's Lobby as a "virtual dictator" or that Koupal, after pressure to form a governing board, would instruct it (pre-Al Haig): "Between campaigns this is a democracy. But once we've decided on a course of action, I'm in charge" (p. 51). What is not adequately discussed are the roles that personality and organizational structure can have upon the ability of groups to influence ballot measures and thus public policy over the long term. Schmidt notes only in passing that the demise of the People's Lobby occurred shortly after Koupal's death; similarly non-indigenous grassroots organizations set up by Initiative America in other states did not survive the activists' departure.

The Cronin volume in particular is carefully researched, simply written, and deserves wide reading. The Schmidt work will primarily be of interest to the personal and historical side of direct legislation.

ROBERT BENEDICT

University of Utah

Armed Services and Society. By Martin Edmonds. Boulder: Westview, 1990. 226p. $29.00 paper.

This book has two broad themes. The first is that despite the apparent ideological victory of democracy and capitalism, armed forces will still be important in post-Cold War societies and therefore worthy of study. The second is to offer a way to approach the issue that is clear, comprehensive, and integrated. By using a variation on Easton's systems theory and breadth of experience, Martin Edmonds intends this book to provide an ameliorative to excessive academic specialization and disdain for the study of militaries on the one hand and to student confusion in the study of national security on the other.

Edmonds offers a theory about the formulation of national security that organizes much of the conceptual muddle about the subject. He argues that national security is both a value and a function emerging from the tangled political-military interactions and that these two outputs are often confused or misunderstood by both the novice and the players themselves. Using a systems analysis model, he maps the complicated interactions of the inputs, components, and outputs of a national security system into a structure that is useful for clarifying discussion. The multitude of societal as well as organizational demands and actors are integrated graphically and compactly into the operational and nonoperational aspects of the national security system, a synthesis that is thought-provoking and clear.

Reinvigorating the term *civil-military relations*, the book emphasizes the interdisciplinary nature of national security studies, arguing that this topic should not be viewed as narrow or esoteric. Rather, such studies need to be built on an extensive intellectual synthesis across diverse literatures. This reminder is essential for a post–Cold War era, in which it is widely assumed that both wars and armed forces will shortly be marginal issues. The progressive narrowing of the civil-military relations literature over the last 15 years into a focus on military coups in emerging states encourages this view, especially among academics. Edmonds argues, however, that all societies have armed organizations to face internal and external threats and that with or without a Cold War, these organizations are intrinsically important to the society. In an era that is considering Fukuyama's argument that democracy has won the ideological war for all time and Mueller's thesis that modern democracies have lost the taste for war, this point needs to be made to both students and scholars. Creditable, wide-ranging studies of the national security system are necessary to understand the political system, whether an overweening threat looms on the horizon or not. And these studies are properly researched in civil-military relations.

In the more advanced scholar's library, this book will fill the niche dedicated to accessible and compact reviews of the literature on various aspects of civil-military relations. While Edmonds excels in demonstrating his considerable expertise in the organizations of defense, the book is also useful in raising issues often forgotten when out of academic fashion: civil disobedience, accountability, and the military industrial complex. Chapter 4 on civil military relations and chapter 9 on the military in the Third World offer particularly comprehensive discussions and well-constructed bibliographies. In addition, a good bit of the literature cited comes from British authors whose works are likely to be less well known in the United States. These offer new or overlooked ideas and opportunities.

Edmonds's book also has some fine pedagogic properties and compares favorably with other well-used texts on national security in several key aspects. The graphic presentation enables the student more easily to position issues and actors involved with national security and avoid confusion. If students consulted Edmonds's model, they would be somewhat painlessly reminded of the multitude of factors that could be considered when explaining a particular outcome. More modesty in student conclusions is only one possible benefit here. The book is also decomposable, a desirable attribute for undergraduate classes. The chapters range from a discussion of the ubiquity of a civil-military relationship to four case studies of important issues and can be grouped or used singly. Furthermore, each comes with a useful and manageable set of references that would provide any student or rusty scholar a good background on the topics of the chapter.

Finally, since this book is intended as a teaching tool for British students, more observations need to be made. For younger students, chapters 2 and 3 will be daunting. Here Edmonds often uses a more typically British rhetorical style that leads the reader *to* conclusions rather than *from* them. Similarly, some of his extensive discussions of why one term is preferable to another in his work may need to be put into methodological context for the younger student.

This book succeeds in forging links between the disparate literatures on national security and civil-military relations. It makes the case that, properly speaking, the scholar studies the dynamics of the national security system in the field of civil-military relations. Edmonds demonstrates that these topics can and should be integrated to produce both coherence and cross-fertilization in a broader, more interdisciplinary field of study. Furthermore, the issues will continue to demand intellectual vigor indefinitely. This book not only addresses that requirement but also offers a way to transmit that understanding to students.

CHRIS C. DEMCHAK

United States Military Academy

Order without Design: Information Production and Policy Making. By Martha S. Feldman. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989. 201p. $29.50 cloth, $9.95 paper.

With illuminating insights, Feldman explains the role of bureaucratic analysis in policy making and sheds much light on policy making in general. Using the National Energy Transportation Study as her main case, Feldman describes how bureaucratic analysts produced a report for Congress that was not used directly in decision making. This, she says, is typical of the paradox that analysts face. They know their reports will not get used, yet they work hard to produce them. This can demoralize them if they want policy makers to pay attention to their suggestions and think of their work in terms of producing solutions for policy problems (the rational model). But if they adopt an interpretive perspective, their role, though much less glamorous, is less likely to lead to frustration.

The interpretive perspective is an extension of the "garbage can" model of Cohen, March, and Olsen and of the loosely coupled system of Weick (which Feldman says are essentially the same). In order to understand how this applies to information production and the role of information in organizational decisions and actions, she distinguishes between *uncertainty* and *ambiguity*. Information can help in the former but not the latter because there are no right or wrong answers in ambiguous situations. For example, information can help resolve the question of the rate of spread of AIDS but not the question of whether government should provide medical care for everyone. In the latter, the answer depends on the process of interpretation, which "includes discussions of what is relevant as well as what values to give the many relevant features of the question" (p. 5). Information is not *irrelevant* in this process, for it is important to know alternative conceptions of the issue and points of similarity and differences in interpretation. But, as Majone says in *Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process* (1989), facts alone are not sufficient to resolve issues in policy making. And since uncertainty and ambiguity exist side by side in all policy making, interpretation of the facts is unavoidable.

Feldman describes the different interpretations that the Departments of Transportation and Energy had of the financial condition of the railroads and how bureaucratic analysts developed a consensual interpretation out of them. Because the analysts had to bridge the differences between the departments, they were not happy with the results: the constraints of their work invariably produce results they are not happy with. Nevertheless, their work is valuable because the information they produce and disseminate helps shape perceptions about the issues and in this way influences policy. In accord with Carol Weiss's notion of conceptual versus instrumental use of evaluations, Feldman believes that bureaucratic analysis is used. Consequently, it supports the gradual development of understandings and interpretation of issues.

The interpretive perspective is changing the way we do policy analysis and view the policy-making process. For example, Lance deHaven-Smith's *Philosophical Critiques of Policy Analysis* (1988) shows how the same set of facts can be interpreted quite differently depending on the theory one approaches the data with. Egon Guba and Yvonne Lincoln's *Fourth Generation Evaluation* (1989) argues that in doing evaluations of programs there is no "reality" out there to be discovered but only different perspectives and interpretations of program outcomes. Dvora Yanow writes: "Using interpretive logic, implementation analysis is no longer the search for a factual essence of the implementation problem. . . . Multiple meanings, multiple interpretations coexist, like the many facets of a cubist portrait" (in *Implementation and the Policy Process*, ed. Palumbo and Calista [1990], 221).

The interpretive perspective is based on hermeneutics and phenomenology. It is replacing the rational model of decision making and positivist ontology and epistemology. Whether or not it becomes the wave of the future, it will no doubt play a greater role in policy analysis and evaluation. Feldman does a splendid job of applying it in this book. The major flaw is that the analysis is devoid of a sense of power and politics. Feldman recognizes that the constraints under which bureaucratic analysts work create incentives that "favor some perspectives over others" (p. 117). The bias is that they are "primarily bound by the interests of the organizations in which they work" (p. 146). But organizations are not unitary entities. There is conflict and disagreement among units and people in organizations. Moreover, we know that there are interests and groups *outside* the bureaucratic agencies; and these have an impact on the interests and interpretations of the agencies. Surely, bureaucratic interests are not the only ones that fashion interpretations of policy issues. It would have made this excellent work even better to have brought this in.

The title of the book seems a bit enigmatic at first glance. It is explained by Feldman's comparison of the dissemination of information that results from bureaucratic analysis with the price system as described by Hayek. The information is disseminated to people who need it through "serving the ends of individuals who contribute to it," not by conscious design (p. 143). Thus, we get order without design. That still leaves open the question of whether some people or groups benefit more than others in the process of bureaucratic analysis, as is the case with the price system. Unfortunately, Feldman doesn't tell us if the "order" that results is fair, good, or just. However, Feldman does a fine job of shedding new light on policy making and the role that bureaucratic analysts play in the process.

DENNIS J. PALUMBO

Arizona State University

Makers of the City. By Lewis F. Fried. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990. 244p. $30.00.

In recent years, a "law and literature" movement has developed in the fields of law and legal studies. This book can be read as a call for a comparable discourse in "politics and literature," a kind of "political theory by other means." Fried's principal claim is that literary works more accurately portray the human—and political—significance of the U.S. city and the social construction of urban meanings than do the social and policy sciences and the urban professions that draw on them. He proposes construction of the city through a rhetoric that shares some of the concerns of classical political theory rather than through the tropes of quantification, physical form, control, and technical efficiency. Committed to reading the city as a text, Fried urges a discourse on the human purposes and values of the city—the nature of the good life and of individual and collective enactments that join an informing past and our chosen future.

Most of Fried's book is an exploration of what he identifies as the common literary enterprise of Jacob Riis, Lewis Mumford, James T. Farrell, and Paul Goodman—a belief in the value of, and a commitment to, a communalizing city. Fried finds three common themes in their work: (1) the city is an artifice—citizens, like writers, create the city as the self engages the world, with neither conduct nor meaning fixed but open to experiment and change; (2) the city must be restored to its human uses, offering, as a community and equitable culture, a renewal of civility; (3) its democratic promise is the construction of a shared rational experience that educates and enlarges human nature, so that the democratic city joins the true self and the good society.

Makers of the City has several shortcomings. First, although the turn to literary analysis of the city and politics is provocative and not without justification, Fried suggests little about the appropriate methodologies for such a discourse. This enables him to reject virtually all contemporary work in U.S. urbanism, even as his models include an historian and a social-critic-cum-utopian-planner. Second, Fried fails to articulate his own theoretical orientation clearly. One must find his notion of a democratic city between the lines, where questioning and defense of the argument and consideration of its problems are muted. Third, Fried thus loses the differences and contradictions of *how* these writers invent the city. He does not adequately explore the possibility that at least two of the writers fail to distance their visions from the dominant antiurban features of U.S. culture and belief.

Riis and Mumford appear to have envisioned harmonious communities that were a reaction against, rather than realizable in, the modern city. Riis associated the corruption of the city with poverty and tenements and with everything that made him uneasy, namely, social disorder, diversity, population density, the foreign element, the unreligious, women's new roles, vice, and political machines. He sought to impose religious and rural values on the city. It would become a fraternal Christian community, nurtured by property, cohesive family life, and the harmony that derives from sameness.

Mumford was equally critical of the modern city, in ways not unlike Rousseau. His city was the story of human symbolic powers. His orientation was toward organically balanced communities, regionalism and local democracy, the restoration of human wholeness in self and community, and the appeal of nature and limitations of size associated with the garden city. Rejecting industrial capitalist uses of the city, Mumford welcomed urban planning and design as the application of social intelligence to the creation of a democratic city.

Goodman and Farrell, however, were less likely to invoke the idea of community as a weapon against the city. Goodman's city was a community rooted in the heritage of place, free association, and a civic culture. Committed to local democratic self-management, he believed that urban public life could be personally satisfying. His utopian, or postcapitalist, planning ideas rested on the human capacity for sociability, the desirability of conflict, the humanizing character of art, and the openness of an educative city to change. Yet Goodman, too, tended to collapse the self and community, to integrate work and leisure, and city and country, as if the self could experience life undivided and painlessly.

Farrell's city was itself the experience of society, an enlarging experience that took one outside the self. He rejected parochial social constructions—of neighborhood, religion, race, ethnicity, and class—that produced isolated communities and closed lives and reduced politics to territory. The democratic city was a collective project constituted by an engagement with difference, a commitment to civility, an instinct for change, and a recognition of the contingency of urban experience. It was an alien place with an open future, where individuals struggled for dignity, cooperated, and made moral choices.

What Fried demonstrates is that all four writers—Goodman and Farrell perhaps somewhat better than Riis or Mumford—define fundamental political questions of a democratic city: What shall the arrangements of living be? How can we constitute cities that simultaneously educate and humanize us and our children? Fried's analysis will therefore be useful to those interested in doing political theory and/or urban politics "by other means."

CHARLES E. ELLISON

University of Cincinnati

Steeples and Stacks: Religion and Steel Crisis in Youngstown. By Thomas G. Feuchtmann. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 308p. $39.50.

In the 1970s, Arend Lijphart argued for the use of case studies in comparative politics. In the absence of an overarching paradigm, it was thought that accumulation of detailed case studies would provide the fuel for building larger theories.

Something along those lines may be occurring in religion and politics, which for the past 10 years has been a burgeoning subfield of U.S. politics. Grand theories have yet to be developed; but religious interest groups have been examined as grassroots protests (e.g., antiabortion), electoral forces (white evangelicals), and Washington lobbies (National Council of Churches).

In this book, Fuechtmann shows religious groups in yet another role, that of local policy makers. He describes the formation of an interfaith coalition of religious leaders to respond to the 1977 closing of the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Corporation's Campbell works, as well as the resulting economic dislocations in that part of eastern Ohio. Initially formed to articulate moral issues and support the responses of other actors, the coalition found itself—when other actors failed to respond at all—trying to engineer the reopening of the plant. This effort met with failure in 1979 when their application for a federal urban development action grant was rejected by the Economic Development Administration.

The goal of the book is to be a "tentative theoretical case study," examining both the interaction between religion and politics and local community action in the face of economic crisis. He argues that the religious coalition contributed a moral perspective no other political actors were willing to address but failed to deal adequately with practical questions of economic management and public policy. In developing the case, he draws on policy analysis, social movement theory, and sociological research concerning community crises.

Ultimately, *Steeples and Stacks* focuses on the geographic setting and the coalition's activity; hence, it is long on detail and short on theory. Nevertheless, it does provide some suggestive ideas for future theory development. How do religious groups attain and sustain political legitimacy? The Youngstown coalition never could convince business or labor that they could bring their project off. Can religious leaders undertake economic advocacy without being coopted either by workers or technocrats? Cooptation was not a problem in Youngstown; rather, the coalition's failure to develop networks of support and expertise proved fatal. Finally, how are policy-minded clergy able to compromise and otherwise "play politics" in order to achieve policy goals while at the same time preserving their moral and spiritual leadership roles? At several points of the story, these two roles proved hard to reconcile.

The contribution of this work to political science consists in its describing how general questions like these were answered in the specific case of Youngstown. Unfortunately, Fuechtmann could have addressed theoretical issues more explicitly and extensively than he did. But both teachers and researchers of religion and politics will find that the story of the Youngstown coalition provides plenty of grist for their own theoretical mills.

BRUCE NESMITH

Coe College

The Suicide of an Elite: American Internationalists and Vietnam. By Patrick Lloyd Hatcher. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990. 429p. $35.00.

Despite a misleading title, ambiguous themes, and a deceptive style (and in some ways because of these qualities), this is an engaging and provocative book. At one level it is yet another inquiry into how and why the United States failed in Vietnam; at a more encompassing level it is a challenging probe into what happens when industrial Western states and rural oriental societies clash and seek to control each other. In the former context, drawing on oral histories and correspondence in presidential libraries as well as prior studies, it covers much of the same ground as is found in Halberstam's *Best and the Brightest* (1969) and Gelb and Betts's *Irony of Vietnam* (1979) and concludes that the U.S. fought and lost the war "for many reasons," no one of which is viewed as sufficient and all of which are conceived to have been necessary. In the latter, broader context the book draws on the observations of such figures as Reinhold Niebuhr, Abraham Maslow, T. S. Eliot, V. S. Naipaul, Henry Adams, Shakespeare, John Locke, and Thomas Hobbes and ranges across a vast array of comparative, historical, organizational, economic, psychological, and philosophical materials to elevate the Vietnam conflict into a cultural clash of seismic proportions. It is the often unexpected and seemingly random (but never entirely far-fetched) infusion of this larger perspective that renders Hatcher's analysis engaging and provocative, impressing the reader with connections not previously recognized and leaving one ever-anticipatory of what may be the next twist and turn in the analysis.

Until one gets accustomed to these infusions, however, they seem more like intrusions, annoying diversions that rely on ambiguous metaphors and unfamiliar labels that excessively confound the historical narratives and the social-scientific formulations. Perhaps the most conspicuous of these is the book's title. Borrowing a phrase once voiced by Raymond Aron, Hatcher does not specify what he means by "the suicide of an elite." Certainly, it does not refer to either the collapse of the Ngo regime in South Vietnam or the demise of Lyndon Johnson's presidency, two sequences of events that could reasonably be seen as suicidal. If anything, it would seem to be a metaphor for either the breakdown of consensus in the United States or for the loss of the Vietnam War by the United States.

Nor is it clear who constitute the *elites* alleged to be suicidal. Hatcher repeatedly refers to them as *internationalists* and as "Lockeans" who sought to bring John Locke's notions of democracy to Vietnam (in contrast to their Soviet counterparts, the "Leninists," who sought to impose Lenin's industrialism on Vietnam); but aside from this Lockean-Leninist competition, the internationalists are not seen as having to confront opposition until domestic groups become disaffected with the war in the late 1960s. There are a couple of brief and unelaborated references to *unilateralists* (though on p. 6 it is implied they were *isolationists*), but these seem peripheral and Hatcher does not otherwise differentiate the internationalists from any other group. Nor are they seen as organized or as conspiratorial. They were, rather, an "eclectic group" who "stressed merit over birth on bank account" (p. viii). It turns out, in short, that the elite of the book's title are those who held appointed or elected office during the 1960s.

At the same time the Lockeans were not united in their contest with the Leninists, with their basic split involving the Whigs ("who emphasized political reform" in Vietnam) and the Tories ("who emphasized economic reform"), each of which was further divided between the *maximalists* (who were ready to extend the use of military force) and the *minimalists* (who preferred to employ diplomatic means). A further split is drawn between *high* and *low* Tories (pp. 238–39), the difference here being (I think) between high-level political appointees and low-level bureaucrats. This array of new labels is justified on the grounds that existing designations (such as the hawk–dove and liberal–conservative distinctions) are insufficient as well as needlessly biased, but they come at the cost of needless confusion: "A split occurred in Tory ranks—maximalists were willing to work with Whig minimalists for a limited land-reform program and minimalist Tories opposed it" (p. 238). And this confusion is compounded by the presence of, among others, the *maximalist technocrats, local Alexander Hamiltons, Atlanticists, Lockean reorderers,* and *Lockean pragmatists* contesting *Leninist opportunitists* (pp. 197, 239–40, 242, 257).

Nor are individuals spared Hatcher's relentless tendency to employ unique labels. Seemingly unable to refer to key actors simply by their name or position, he refers to John Kennedy as "the presidential sailor from Hyannisport," Eisenhower as "the Republican oracle at Gettysburg," Dean Acheson as "the quintessential Tory internationalist," Johnson as "a congenital Tory," Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., as the "New England Brahmin," William Westmoreland as the "South Carolina Brahmin," Maxwell Taylor as "the ideal Camelot general," John Foster Dulles and Joseph McCarthy as "rhetorician and hunter," Douglas MacArthur as "America's Cromwell in Asia," Robert McNamara as "Camelot's star knight," and a "Lockean reörderer" rather than a "Clausewitzian pessimist," Douglas Dillon as "the Yankee aristocrat" who was succeeded as Secretary of the Treasury by Henry Fowler, "the cavalier aristocrat," and so on (pp. 46, 49–50, 54, 57, 145, 172–73, 189, 241, 276–77).

Organizations are also the focus of this terminological binge. He describes the Council of Foreign Relations as "a Hudson River cure for Potomac River fever," the U.S. Information Agency as "an organization for persuasion," the Central Intelligence Agency as "an organization for preemption," and "a neo-Leninist organization" constructed by the internationalists, the Agency for International Development as "the Tory agency for global reordering" consisting of "Yankee public philanthropists," and so on (pp. 48, 58, 176, 193).

It is surely doubtful that Hatcher intended for his readers to get caught up by his deceptive style at the expense of following his substantive reasoning. But I for one found myself diverted from what was otherwise a provocative book.

JAMES N. ROSENAU

University of Southern California

Managing the Environmental Crisis: Incorporating Competing Values in Natural Resource Administration. By Daniel H. Henning and William R. Mangun. Durham: Duke University Press, 1989. 377p. $48.50 cloth, $18.95 paper.

Environmental administration has long been conceived as the science of managing natural resources to maximize human benefits. In this insightful volume, Daniel Henning and William Mangun remind us that it is not nature that needs managing, but rather "people's behavior relative 'to' natural resources" (p. 6). As such, the kinds of human values that are built into the administrative process are critically important in shaping the outcomes. The authors suggest that many of the traditional utilitarian resource management doctrines ingrained in single-mission agencies are obsolete and need to be reoriented around a broader, more holistic range of values that emphasize long-term ecological sustainability.

Henning and Mangun eschew any particular theory of administration in favor of a comprehensive "reform" perspective that emphasizes the value components in decision making. (They also draw on their extensive experience in international forestry research and government administration.) The book summarizes much of the critical literature on public administration and resource management, including classic studies by Herbert Kaufman and Philip Foss, as well as more recent works by environmental scholars such as Rosenbaum, Culhane, Pirages, and Caldwell. What emerges is a familiar picture of fragmented, disorganized, narrow-minded, and underfunded environmental administration that is still largely dominated by short-term economic interest and political expediency.

The authors are at their best in explaining the intricacies and practical consequences of such doctrines as "multiple-use" forestry management and the failures of traditional soil conservation and mining practices to protect the environment. They present an often detailed picture of land and resource degradation that recent legislation requiring environmental impact assessment and comprehensive management planning is only beginning to reverse. Repeatedly, they lament the fact that there are few policies and institutional mechanisms that address the interrelatedness of natural systems; and many suggestions are made for improving policy coordination.

The book covers an interesting array of topics. In addition to the central focus on renewable resource management (forests, range, water, and fish and wildlife), nonrenewable resources (soil and minerals), and outdoor recreation and wilderness policy, there are chapters on energy policy, pollution control, and urban and regional planning. The discussion of domestic problems often spills over into global issues such as desertification and deforestation, and there is a final chapter on international environmental administration.

A weakness in the writing style is excessive reliance on quotations from other authors in an apparent effort to touch all bases. There is also a penchant for numbered lists of points without adequate discussion. A more substantive shortcoming is that the book does not cover several of the major controversies of the late 1980s, notably the battle over old-growth logging in the Pacific Northwest and the fight for revision of the Clean Air Act. Acid rain is discussed, but there is little on the larger international debate over global climate change. The economic and social dimensions of these and other policy conflicts could have been explored in greater depth. Some of the data on pollution control are also a bit old. Finally, there is no reference to the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future*, although the book refers to earlier documents such as *Global 2000* and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources' *World Conservation Strategy* (a summary of which is included in the appendix).

Nevertheless, this is a comprehensive, informed, and thoughtful volume that will serve as an excellent text on natural resource issues for undergraduate public administration and environmental policy courses while also providing a more enlightened perspective for graduate management training. The book includes useful tables listing major environmental legislation and characteristics of environmental organizations and an extensive glossary of terms.

NORMAN J. VIG

Carleton College

Silent Revolution: The Transformation of Divorce Law in the United States. By Herbert Jacob. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1988. 209p.

In the 1970s and 1980s, state legislatures across the United States radically altered the existing statutory law governing divorce, property division, alimony, and child custody. All states moved to some form of no-fault divorce, many states adopted the standard of equitable division of property at divorce and minimized the role of alimony, and about half the states authorized the novel award of "joint custody" for divorcing parents. These changes in formal law, while indisputably profound, occurred without fanfare and generally without significant public debate.

In *Silent Revolution: The Transformation of Divorce Law in the United States,* Herbert Jacob seeks to explain the noiselessness of the revolution in family law. The central question he addresses is how such radical statutory changes could have received approval nationwide in a relatively short time period without visible conflict and controversy. In answering that question, he posits two models of public policy making: *conflictual* and *routine.* Conflictual policy making, representing the more conventional view of the policy process, is characterized by public controversy. Proposals that undergo the conflictual policy-making process are often advertised as dramatic departures from existing practices and may be on the agendas of highly visible social movements. Routine policy making, in contrast, seeks the path of least resistance. By focusing on questions of technical complexity, according to Jacob, routine policy makers seek to restrict consideration of their reforms to narrow interest groups. They minimize, rather than inflate, a particular proposal's advertised impact. Jacob explains that routine policy makers often emphasize "the compatibility of their proposal with existing law and practice" (p. 12).

Jacob suggests that the changes in U.S. divorce law can be best understood as examples of routine public policy making. Jacob's documentation of that claim includes extremely well researched accounts of the changes in divorce law in several states and of the drafting and promulgation of the influential Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Describing divorce law reforms in a variety of contexts, Jacob shows how major statutory changes were frequently engineered by a small group of "legal experts" who downplayed the significance of their proposals. The move in various states to a no-fault standard of "irreconciliable differences" or "marital breakdown," for example, received little public notice and caused little public controversy. Jacob explains the lack of public controversy, in part, by pointing to the conservative nature of the goals proclaimed by the reformers. Because the existing fault-based grounds for divorce, such as mental cruelty, were frequently the subject of fraudulent or collusive manipulation by divorcing spouses, one of the selling points of the no-fault proposals was that the new standard would simply bring the law into consonance with practice.

At times Jacob seems almost angry at the reformers for having achieved their ends without controversy; the critical edge in his descriptions may be distracting to some readers. He describes the California group, for example, as having "forged its radical proposals" under "a cloak of obscurity," and as having "clothed its report in pro-family vocabulary" (p. 54).

Although Jacob's analysis of divorce reform as routine policy making is provocative, he may have overlooked or underestimated other factors contributing to the relative ease with which statutory changes were passed in the last two decades. For example, he categorizes as routine policy making the endorsement by many state legislatures of gender-neutral standards in property division, spousal support, and child custody. He does not mention, however, that federal and state courts began striking down gender preferences in state divorce law in the 1970s under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Some of the statutory changes Jacob describes as routine policy formation may have been matters of constitutional compulsion or at least heavily influenced by the new constitutional climate. Similarly, he deemphasizes the "time is ripe" argument as an explanation for the changes in divorce law, largely because such an explanation cannot be empirically tested. As others have shown, however, the changing social construct of the family surely informs all attempts by the state to regulate family life.

Jacob suggests that reforms accomplished through routine policy making may lead to unexpected consequences because of the lack of public debate and broad participation. This insight, as well as his proposed scheme for evaluating political reforms, are important contributions to the literature on policy making. Nevertheless, his analysis of the unexpected consequences of divorce reform is disappointing. He disputes the conclusions reached by others that divorce reform has had a disparate economic impact on women. Although he has more fully argued his position elsewhere, his arguments in this book are only briefly presented and remain unconvincing.

The single unexpected consequence of divorce reform that seems to bother Jacob most is an increased state intervention in the family. Indeed, in the final sentence of the book, he direly predicts that the new divorce laws will allow the state to "breach the privacy of an increasing number of American homes" (p. 173). Jacob's vision of state intervention seems incomplete. Under the older fault-based system of divorce, the state intruded on private lives by prohibiting divorce altogether or by forcing spouses to allege marital misconduct. Under the new laws, that pervasive coercion by the state does not exist. Moreover, Jacob does not focus on today's increased private ordering among divorcing spouses. Party autonomy, in the form of prenuptial agreements, is much more likely to be tolerated under current law than under the fault-based regimes of 20 years past.

Unlike other studies of the evolution of modern family law, Jacob's analysis does not provide new insights into the economic consequences of divorce, the international context of divorce reform in Western nations, or the philosophical underpinnings of family law policy. Instead, Jacob's book contributes primarily to our knowledge of the actual political processes that led to the statutory changes governing divorce in the last two decades. As such, it is a valuable resource for political scientists interested in agenda setting and the formalization of social policy.

BARBARA ATWOOD

University of Arizona

Eloquence in an Electronic Age: The Transformation of Political Speechmaking. By Kathleen Hall Jamieson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. 301p. $24.95.

The Electronic Commonwealth: The Impact of New Media Technologies on Democratic Politics. By Jeffrey B. Abramson, F. Christopher Arterton, and Gary R. Orren. New York: Basic Books, 1988. 331p. $21.95.

Much of the recent literature on media and politics seems as impressive in its crafted analysis of the media's techniques as it is careless in inferring the implications of the media for politics. Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Jeffrey B. Abramson and his colleagues have come out with two timely and stimulating books that encourage us to think seriously about the ramifications the media has for the democratic process.

With charm and wit Jamieson's *Eloquence in an Electronic Age* chronicles a fascinating history of the evolution of political rhetoric from the means of reaching the public to a way of influencing an audience. From the days of Demosthenes and Cicero to the nineteenth-century speeches of Webster, Sumner, Clay, and Lincoln and the Churchill and Roosevelt period, a conspiracy among the media, audiences, and speechmakers has culminated in Reagan's televised histrionics. Political dialogue has been radically transformed, she argues, from reasoned conversation into personalized, self-disclosive, and autobiographical discourse; and speechmaking has become a collaborative and intimate act. Television is the chief culprit, promoting the sentiment that has overwhelmed the rationality.

Reagan's asset as the great communicator, according to the author, rested mainly on his parochial vision of the prowess of the electronic media. His sensitivity to the balance between hotness and coolness, the indispensable value of feigned spontaneity, and the disproportionate impact of catchy phrases and painfully rehearsed insouciance—all of this, and more, from his thespian repertoire heavily contributed to the success of his upbeat notes despite the contradictory and even absent data.

Jamieson's book is mainly an analysis of how a Reagan makes it in today's politics—his electoral success and subsequent expansion and retention of popular support—and what kind of concrete role television plays in aiding and abetting his vacuous politics, divorcing stories from truths and thought from the act of speaking. Along the way, she presents us with a set of gripping and colorful details that account for the success of redefined eloquence, what Richard Sennett calls "the tyranny of privacy." The inferential leap she makes from this point to an explanation of how a communicator becomes and remains a great president hinges on an important assumption she makes about the U.S. voter. "In voter decisions," she writes, "the candidate's character is now more central than his or her stands on issues and party identifications" (p. viii). But the final word on this score from the literature on voting is not in yet.

While it is true that recent presidential elections reflect the growing importance of candidate evaluations, neither a candidate's cosmetic packaging, accomplished in part through the modern-day version of eloquence, nor the candidate evaluation is free of issues and party identification. Bodies of evidence carefully assembled by Gregory Markus, Philip Converse, Benjamin Page, Calvin Jones, Arthur Miller, Donald Kinder, and Robert Abelson (among others) suggest that while candidate evaluation often emerges as the most immediate determinant of vote, it consists of a complex of underlying factors, including issues and party identification, that have a reciprocal relationship. Miller and his associates have recently argued that candidate voting has a rational foundation and that it ought not to be viewed as "idiosyncratic responses to superficial criteria." Furthermore, it is not clear whether voting for a candidate who is completely independent of party identification, (if possible), would be all that irrational. After all, the Massachusetts ballot (versus the Indiana ballot) is often considered to be an inducement for more issue-based—and hence more rational—voting. All this may call for a less pessimistic appraisal of the *consequences* of transformed eloquence. Nevertheless, Jamieson makes an interesting and important contribution to the descriptive and analytic details about the paucity of substance in today's political rhetoric, placed in a rich historical context.

The Electronic Commonwealth is different in style and scope but similar in its attempt to analyze the impact of media on politics. It is by far the most comprehensive look at the variety of media, ranging from relatively new sources (e.g., personal computers, satellites, videocassette recorders, cable television, and even subscription television) to more familiar conventional ones (e.g., radio and television). Their analysis moves from more general effects—increasingly pervasive information access, greater consumer control over media, increasing speed of transmission, and developing capacity for interactive functions—to specifically political impacts. In their treatment of technology, the authors are more concretely faithful to, and thorough about politics as well. A schematic analytic framework at the outset presents three systems: plebiscitary, communitarian, and pluralist democracy.

Well informed by history and theory, the authors present a wealth of data in relating the present technologies to the process of governing, citizen participation, elections, freedom of press, and policy making. The last chapter goes one step further to extrapolate the impact of emerging technologies on the future of U.S. democracy. Throughout, the authors engage in a balanced (neither overly pessimistic nor optimistic), clear-sighted treatment of the issue, which (among other things) questions what the novelty of the media technologies do to the *new* audiences and how it shapes a new set of expectations about our system. The authors remind us of the futility of using an absolute, fixed norm to evaluate the government-citizen relationship. Instead, they instruct us to recognize the extent to which a given political theory is in part informed by the empirical reading of the people in their changing environment.

Mencken's proverbial "As compared to what?" is sufficiently incorporated in the authors' tripartite investigation of the media, the audiences, and politics today. Unlike Mencken and Jamieson, however, *The Electronic Commonwealth* makes pedestrian reading in stylistic terms—perhaps not too unfair a trade-off for a comprehensive, systematic presentation of the question at hand. It certainly makes a substantial contribution to our thinking about the systemic impact of the media technologies now and in the days to come. Both volumes will be excellent reading for advanced students of politics.

JONG O. RA

Hollins College

The Politics of Urban Planning. By William C. Johnson. New York: Paragon, 1989. 272p. $29.95 cloth, $15.95 paper.

While urban politics remains the precocious stepchild within political science, the study of the urban-planning process continues to generate a steady stream of monographs. This volume by William Johnson attempts to unite the fields by providing a bridge between the two. He self-consciously employs three perspectives: a Madisonian one on politics, a Howardian one on the planning process (after Ebenezer Howard, who promoted the Garden City movement in Victorian England), and a Rawlsian perspective on social justice.

There is much to recommend in Johnson's approach. In particular, he employs a useful didactic style based upon five case studies: the Poletown Cadillac plant; growth control in San Diego; low-income housing provision in Warren, New Jersey; inner city decay in the South Bronx; and public transportation in the San Francisco Bay Area. These are introduced at the outset and recur throughout the book. Unfortunately, these case studies also are the problem with the book: it falls somewhere between the status of a text on the one hand and a critical overview of the planning process on the other. Each case study is rather brief and is distributed over the whole volume; nor is there any closure on the stories that are told, so that it will be hard for students to synthesize the cases.

For the researcher with an interest in the urban question, the book has some relevance; for example, Johnson makes some telling points about U.S. urban history, which is frequently overlooked. Nor is there any doubt that the issues he examines are germane to the process of urban development. However, the book does not tax the specialist, containing, as it does, too many definitions and simple overviews that ultimately distract more than they edify. Johnson tells a one-dimensional tale, and there are some significant gaps in the literature invoked. I am surprised to see no mention of the work of Manuel Castells, David Harvey, John Forester, Ira Katznelson, or Brian Berry or the recent work of Harvey Molotch, Joe Feagin, or Ed Soja. In large measure, the book disappoints the specialist and misleads the tourist in that it does not connect the process of urban conflict fully to either the social and economic changes taking place within the capitalist city or the continual unfolding of the capitalist state apparatus. The city and the struggles that are located there seem to be abstracted from the bitter changes that mark the postmodern economic landscape. There are few reminders here of the changes that are taking place within the labor market as massive deskilling takes place, as finance capital ousts manufacturing capital, and as the state abdicates responsibility for more and more social programs. At the very least, this has contributed to the spatial transformation of the U.S. city in the last three decades, as population decentralization and jurisdictional fragmentation has created a crazy quilt of diverse cities, rather than single metropolitan blocks. Johnson has little to say on these shifts, which may represent the view from the Twin Cities; it is, though, hardly irrelevant to the case studies he presents or to the majority of U.S. cities.

In short, this is an acceptable book for use in small classes where the instructor can work closely with students to explore the basics of the planning and development process. The annotated bibliography and glossary, along with discussion questions at the end of each chapter, will be found useful in such settings. In other situations, an alternative book (Forester's *Planning in the Face of Power* [1989] comes immediately to mind) will be more useful.

ANDREW KIRBY

University of Arizona

Saving the Hidden Treasure: The Evolution of Groundwater Policy. By Henry C. Kenski. Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1990. 159p. $19.95 cloth, $12.95 paper.

This is a welcome addition to the literature on groundwater resources. Groundwater provides drinking water to roughly half of the nation's population and is a major source of supply for agriculture. All 50 states have groundwater quality problems; and some, primarily in parts of the Southwest, have depleted groundwater available for profitable farming. Yet while water politics has been a regular subject of concern of political scientists for at least 30 years, groundwater has received very little attention.

The stated objective of the book, as the title suggests, is to examine "the evolution of policy on groundwater" (p. 1). The book, however, is less ambitious than that. Kenski does not examine the evolution of groundwater policy in a historical sense. What he does is provide us with a concise descriptive analysis of the nature of groundwater, types of pollution, citizen and business involvement in groundwater policy formation, state and federal laws governing the protection of groundwater, and an examination of the political and social factors affecting the governmental response to groundwater pollution problems. In each of these areas the book is rich with examples of pollution problems and provides good short summaries of previous research. Kenski concludes his analysis with the observation that "groundwater contamination is a serious problem, but not a crisis. Efforts to address it and promote policy change are affected by the role of science and technology, and the scope and magnitude of the problem, but are hampered by the current emphasis on fiscal constraint, the fragmentation of governmental authority, the narrow and segmented policy approach, and how the issue is defined" (p. 148).

A major strength of the work is its interdisciplinary approach to the topic. Too often in policy research political scientists (or economists or sociologists) get mired in the methodological and paradigmatic assumptions of their home disciplines. As a result, the contributions of other disciplines are ignored or downplayed and the resulting analysis is either too narrow to be of any interest to any but the converted (i.e., those who share the author's orientation) or too narrow to have any utility for policy makers. Kenski has drawn on the work of a wide variety of natural and social scientists in his research for this book. The result is a work that will be useful for scholars, lay people, and policy makers.

Although the number of political scientists active in groundwater research is growing, there are very few other books by political scientists in this area. Zachary Smith's recently published *Groundwater in the West* (1989) covers much of the same territory within the context of the politics, law, and policy in the nineteen Western states. *Saving the Hidden Treasure*, however, does a better job than anything else on the market at summarizing the institutional, political, and physical problems of groundwater protection for those with no prior knowledge of groundwater issues. It will be a useful supplement for courses in environmental and natural resources policy and is recommended for those interested in environmental policy who need an introduction to groundwater management problems.

ZACHARY SMITH

Northern Arizona University

Tribal Government Today: Politics on Montana Indian Reservations. By James J. Lopach, Margery Hunter Brown, and Richmond L. Clow. Boulder: Westview, 1990. 193p. $28.50.

Little has been written by political scientists about Native American politics; even less has been written on tribal government. The authors are very straightforward in stating their research objectives and limitations. This book is a case study analysis of the present state of 10 tribal governments on seven Montana reservations. It addresses the question of how far each of these tribes has progressed toward achieving self-government and economic sufficiency. The right of aboriginal sovereignty is never questioned. The authors assume that self-determination and self-government go hand in hand. Therefore, each tribe is analyzed in its approach to politics as well as the economic underpinnings for successful self-government. Unfortunately, the right of a tribe to govern itself does not always correspond to its ability. It is around the latter point that the book revolves.

The authors do not purport to generalize their findings from the 10 tribes studied to all 488 federally recognized Indian tribes or even to all reservations. Nevertheless, the reader begins to sense the commonalities of reservation politics and the debilitating effects of the federal government's paternalism as each chapter unfolds. Like V. O. Key's *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (1949), these regional case studies give insights into the historical and cultural roots of tribal behavior and lay a foundation for future research in Indian politics. This is not to say that the work reaches the quality level of Key. It does not. There is an unevenness in the writing and in the rigor of the chapters. Some chapters give the reader a good sense of the traditional cultural patterns that continue to drive reservation politics, others do not.

One of the better case studies involves the Crow reservation. According to the authors, Crow politics arise out of a historically "quarrelsome disposition" and a religion based on the "all-sufficiency of personal revelations" (p. 59). Together they combine to create "a radically democratic form of government . . . [known] for the personal advantage it permits" (p. 61). For those who follow Native American litigation, this chapter helps to explain why this tribe seems anxious to rush into court.

On the other hand, the discussion concerning the Assiniboine and the Gros Ventre tribes of the Fort Belknap Reservation is overly sparse. The chapter subtitle, "The Reality of Poverty," reflects the analysis. The authors seem to have been overwhelmed by the isolation and dire economic conditions of the reservation (70% unemployment) and have let that environment incapacitate their writing as much as it incapacitates the reservation inhabitants.

It is the attention to cultural background as well as historical circumstances that provides the unique contribution of this book. The non-Indian reader begins to sense the familial qualities of tribal politics where family feuds and band allegiance combine with patronage and bureaucracy to create groups of traditional elites who at times resort to conducting meetings in the tribal language in order to insulate their power as well as preserve their native culture.

The methodology used in this study involved conversations with selected tribal leaders and other reservation elites. By adopting this approach, the authors were able to get a better sense of what was happening on the reservation than any anonymous random sample survey could do. Because of the latent suspicion that most Indians still feel toward the white man, few Indians are willing to talk openly about their community unless a personal relationship has been established with the researcher. Unfortunately, that inherent suspicion prevents the sophisticated comparative analysis that is vitally needed in this area.

Despite its limitations, this work begins to provide the necessary foundation for further research on tribal government. Native Americans are emerging from the pages of Western history as the newest partners in the evolving structure of U.S. federalism. As Indian tribes struggle to establish the basic foundations for self-rule, they are faced with the same issues that have vexed political theorists since the ancient Greeks—how to structure a government of free people that works. The Blackfeet expressed this longing in the preamble to their proposed 1974 constitution: "We arise, refreshed with due strength, declaring to all men that we shall form a new government, a new way of life, recapturing our pride and our dignity and fostering our culture and our heritage. . . . We wish to make sure that our people will continue to live here, that they will have their own government to help them and that they will be a good people" (p. 51).

ANNE MERLINE MCCULLOCH

Columbia College

Rules for Rulers: The Politics of Advice. By Arnold J. Meltsner. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990. 187p. $24.95.

Although it may feel lonely at the top, leadership is *not* a solitary activity. The leader of all but the smallest organization is intimately involved with a team of advisers. Arnold Meltsner's wise and perceptive book examines the politics of this relationship. To succeed as an advisee, the ruler must exercise the same great qualities of statesmanship that he or she exerts in other political arenas—prudence, decisiveness, judiciousness, and (when necessary) ruthlessness.

Meltsner's goal is to provide rulers with a set of simple rules to follow as they set about obtaining advice. Recognizing the dramatic character of advisement, he views it as one would a play. He treats each of its aspects—entrance, presentation, reaction, and exit—as a separate scene. He tries to help the ruler recognize the particular dramatic qualities of each scene and act appropriately.

The key issues posed by entrance concern who to cast as advisers and who to listen to when. In selecting advisers, he urges the ruler to balance the claims of loyalty with those of expertise and to keep the inner circle small.

To ensure the best presentation of advice, the ruler must give his advisors the proper cues. Although, in principle, all rulers want the truth, they must recognize that their ability to obtain it is decisively influenced by subtle, and even unintended, aspects of their behavior. Advisers revel in remaining in the good graces of the ruler. If the ruler reacts harshly to them when they give bad news, they will dispense less of it. The ruler who relishes the details of policy proposals will be buried in paperwork. The exercise of great self-awareness and self-control is required to ensure that advisors will feel free to tell not what the ruler wants to hear but what he or she needs to know.

To react appropriately to advice, rulers must critically examine its accuracy, timeliness, appropriateness, and robustness. Meltsner calls this "calibration." To calibrate well, the ruler must again display a high degree of self-mastery. The ruler must resist many temptations, the greatest being to react to the adviser rather than the advice, to substitute feelings about the source for a dispassionate assessment of the information itself.

The exit scene is the most difficult for rulers to play. Despite the awesome power they hold, most rulers find it very difficult to face up to the unpleasantness involved in firing a close adviser who may also be a friend. Therefore, advisers who do not serve the best interest of the ruler often hang on too long. Meltsner urges the ruler to face up to the need to fire those who are either disloyal or inept.

Like any really good adviser, Meltsner is intent upon dispensing unpleasant truths. The strength of the book lies in the great medicinal value of the bitter pills he asks rulers to swallow. If they applied his maxims, they would indeed be better off. Its limitation is the generic character of those maxims. They are meant to apply to all rulers, yet one learns little about why some rulers are able to accept them and others are not. Students of leadership can best build on Meltsner's keen insights by intensely scrutinizing specific advisor–advisee relationships. Such study should shed light on the qualities of political character that enable some rulers to enrich their rule through the encouragement of a wise and forceful team of advisers while others sap their otherwise great powers because of the venality and/or stupidity of those whose ideas and opinions they rely on.

MARC LANDY

Boston College

In Pursuit: Of Happiness and Good Government. By Charles Murray. New York: Touchstone Books, and Simon and Schuster, 1988. 341p. $19.45 cloth, $9.95 paper.

Securing the Right to Employment: Social Welfare Policy and the Unemployed in the United States. By Philip Harvey. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. 146p. $25.00.

Gaining Ground: Tailoring Social Programs to American Values. By Charles Lockhart. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. 213p. $30.00.

One indicator of the exceptional character of the U.S. welfare state is the diversity of policy prescriptions offered in the name of popular reform. These three books on social policy offer a case in point. Each author seeks to justify his reform agenda in terms of putative core values and fundamental principles of U.S. political culture. Each interprets these values and principles differently, however, leading toward disparate readings of the problem at hand, and divergent prescriptions for policy reform.

Charles Murray's *In Pursuit* takes his bold critique of U.S. social welfare policy presented in *Losing Ground* (1984) a step further: here not only programs for the poor but government action of nearly every sort aimed at social reform is examined and found wanting. Murray builds his analysis around the contrast between *public man,* whom he views as "resourceful and dangerous," with *private man,* who is resourceful but benign. Murray's general thesis is that voluntary efforts organized and supported at the community level are naturally and necessarily more responsive to individual needs and desires. His vision of the good and just society is one in which small congregations of individuals (Murray invokes Edmund Burke's term, "little platoons") pursue actions deemed essential to the pursuit of happiness free from the stifling and corrupting influence of government.

For inspiration Murray draws upon libertarian notions of individual freedom and traditional conceptions of morality, such as family and civic virtue. To these he adds a dash of psychological theory based on the work of Abraham Maslow and others. Murray pays little heed to the possible contradiction among these elements, nor does he attach much importance to the fact that many of the government policies and programs he would seek to eliminate are widely perceived as legitimate and worthwhile. The call for renewed grassroots efforts to address the problems afflicting U.S. communities is certainly unobjectionable, but it is difficult to envision a large-scale, immensely complex modern society organized primarily along these lines. Murray's discussion of substantive issues is highly selective, and much attention is devoted to a single issue—the prospects for improving public education. Of the bulk of programs making up the modern welfare state, Murray says only, "If we look to Western Europe for a picture of our future . . . then we may look forward to more and more trouble being taken out of more and more things" (p. 269). I suspect that only those already predisposed to view "taking the trouble out of things" as inherently undesirable will find Murray's proposals for reform attractive.

If Murray underestimates the important functions of, and broad demands for, an active state, Philip Harvey leans in the opposite direction. Harvey links a proposal for a full-employment policy in the United States with current international developments in human rights. He makes an energetic case for guaranteeing employment through federally sponsored public works and job training programs, adducing a wealth of data indicating that a large-scale national effort to guarantee employment at above-poverty wages is feasible in budgetary terms—although it would cost more than the combined expenditures for public assistance, unemployment insurance, and related programs now in place. The cornerstone of his argument is that such an expansion of employment guarantees is consistent with the work ethic and so would be strongly supported by the U.S. public.

It is true that the U.S. public pays considerable homage to the work ethic; and while Harvey is probably correct about the popular support that an expanded jobs program would enjoy, he is sanguine about the pitfalls a massive new government program would need to contend with in the United States of the 1990s: for example, the underlying mistrust of government that paradoxically co-exists with popular demands for government action; or the seeming limitless potential for corruption and perversion of well-intentioned programs, epitomized by the current savings-and-loan fiasco. Harvey cites the experience of New Deal work programs, principally the Works Progress Administration and Public Works Administration, as evidence that massive public employment programs can be successfully undertaken. His positive reassessment of the much-maligned Depression-era work programs is well taken, but he gives little indication where the United States of the 1990s will find contemporary leaders of the caliber of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins to make such a grand scheme work.

Harvey's employment guarantee proposal is strikingly similar to Sweden's active labor market policy, and his analysis would have benefited from closer attention to the Swedish case. While Sweden has succeeded in implementing full employment as a result of government policies, it has done so under the confluence of conditions absent from the U.S. case (a strong labor movement, a dominant Social Democratic party, a small homogeneous population, and no permanently disadvantaged underclass) and has not been without problems of its own. The question, then, is not only whether the United States is willing to consider a full-employment policy along the lines Harvey suggests or not, but whether it could implement such a policy successfully.

Gaining Ground presents a more cautious assessment of the prospects for social policy reform. As the title suggests, Charles Lockhart's program for tailoring social programs to U.S. values is partly a response to Murray's *Losing Ground.* Both politically and in substantive terms, Lockhart's proposals fall somewhere between Harvey's state activism and Murray's pastoral utopia. Of the three books reviewed here, *Gaining Ground* advances the most systematic and detailed analysis of the value underpinnings of the U.S. political culture, capturing its complexity and internal contradictions. Lockhart makes a persuasive case for the existence of socioeconomic rights, while at the same time acknowledging that these rights, like other rights, are neither absolute nor free from conflict with competing claims and values. He concludes that policies based on individual contribution in paid employment in return for a claim on benefits would achieve the best fit between the broad distribution of socioeconomic rights and the practical limits imposed by U.S. core values.

Lockhart's emphasis on employment is similar to Harvey's, but his proposals to expand work opportunities are less extensive and form only part of his agenda for reform. Concretely, Lockhart would replace public assistance programs with a social-insurance-based system similar to Social Security, including a child allowance component. He would also make universal health insurance available, along similar insurance-based lines as the current Medicare program, while limiting the autonomy of service providers. These reforms may be moderate by comparison to existing schemes in many other industrialized societies, but in the U.S. context they would call for a thoroughgoing reform of social policy.

The employment-based "investments" approach Lockhart proposes may not fully satisfy either liberals who are suspicious of work requirements in welfare or conservatives who oppose any expansion of benefits. This is probably as it should be, since Lockhart's proposals are centrist in nature, specifically designed to maximize popular appeal. A crucial question is what chance any significant reform of social policy has of actually being enacted under present conditions. The answer, I suspect, hinges on how U.S. values might be changed—or at least reinterpreted in a fundamental way—by dynamic and effective leadership of a kind that has been conspicuously absent from the U.S. political scene in recent decades.

The divergent perspectives and proposals contained in these books suggest that as a nation we have not yet agreed on where we want our social policies to go. And they provide few clues about where the political leadership will come from to get us there.

RICHARD M. COUGHLIN

University of New Mexico

The Press, Presidents, and Crises. By Brigitte Lebens Nacos. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. 228p. $32.50.

If an extraterrestrial Tocqueville undertook an account of late-twentieth-century U.S. politics, its book probably would ignore much of what is obligatory in U.S. government textbooks but examine in depth a nongovernmental institution that is central to governance—the mass media. In a world of earthbound non-Tocquevilles, the role of the media in the political process remains understudied; thus, the very impulse that leads to a work such as Brigitte Lebens Nacos's *The Press, Presidents, and Crises* is welcome.

Nacos reports a content analysis of how the *New York Times, Washington Post,* and *Chicago Tribune* treated the president in six episodes she defines as crises: the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), the American intervention in the Dominican Republic (1965), the Detroit riot of 1967, the Three Mile Island accident (1979), the attempt on Ronald Reagan's life (1981), and the invasion of Grenada (1983). Drawing on a laborious quantitative content analysis and qualitative reading of news coverage and editorials, she asks questions such as the following: Did the press cover presidents more stringently after the 1968–72 "watershed" of intense controversy over Vietnam and Watergate than before? Did it exhibit the rally-round-the-flag pattern of presidential support that John Mueller first recognized as characteristic of international crises? Was this effect evident in domestic crises? Did the three newspapers give more space in their news columns to sources that agreed with their editorial policy than to those that disagreed?

Nacos has analyzed her data and written her book in a way that makes it difficult for her (and the reader) to answer these questions with much subtlety or precision. After a brief introduction summarizing literature on the press and politics and a cursory account of the methodology of the study, there are six chapters on the individual crises, each of them organized around analyses of editorial opinion and news content in four phases of crisis: the period leading up to it, an "acute" period, a "lingering" period, and the period immediately after. Nacos describes but does not quantify the content of the editorials. She presents quantitative data for each crisis phase on, for example, whether news coverage drew on pro- or antiadministration sources or neutral sources, whether these sources were domestic or foreign, and whether they were members of the administration or of Congress.

The case presentations are laborious, repetitive, and poorly written. Lost in thickets of branches and twigs, the reader yearns for the forest. To the extent that Nacos pulls her observations together and interprets them, she does so mainly in brief chapter summaries and in a seven-and-a-half-page final chapter. Because she presents 80-odd percentage distribution tables in 24 separate places (four phases times six crises) but does not pull the statistics together with summary measures or measures of association, it is difficult to ascertain patterns in her findings or to evaluate the patterns that she reports. Even paging back and reviewing the tables will not do the job, because Nacos's characterizations of editorial opinion are in the text.

This said, the book yields some interesting findings. Those on change over time are least persuasive. Nacos may be correct in concluding that press coverage of presidents (at least in episodes of the sort she studies) has not become more stringent since Vietnam and Watergate, but the cases she chose to study are skewed in the direction of such a finding. The three cases from the early period were intrinsically controversial; and those from the later period, as they unfolded, were either not likely to reflect unfavorably on the president (Three Mile Island) or likely to get him favorable coverage (the attempted assassination of Reagan and Grenada—as the latter unfolded).

Nacos's findings on rally-round-the-president effects are instructive, although more so about elite behavior than about the media. She found that public discourse during the acute phases of all of the three domestic crises and two of the three international crises was overwhelmingly propresident. The exception was the invasion of Grenada, which evoked criticism until it became evident that the event was redounding to Reagan's benefit. As Nacos perceptively observes, quoting Richard Brody, rallying round the president is not caused by the press but by members of Congress and other elites' running for cover.

Finally, in a finding that *is* about an independent press effect, Nacos reports consistent, if often complex, associations between the editorial positions of the three newspapers and the skew in the sources they quoted in news stories. (The most striking bias was on the part of the *Chicago Tribune* in the 1960s, when that newspaper was still an organ of the far Right.) Nacos's speculation that most such imbalances are not deliberate but result from selective recruitment to newspapers of journalists who share their editors' views, cannot be documented by a content analysis. That observation does suggest an important further step that future studies of the press might take—that of going beyond study of press content to direct observation of the determinants of that content in the newsroom, a site that a modern Tocqueville free of terrestrial biases would no doubt consider as important for the political analyst as the halls of Congress, the chambers of the Supreme Court, or the West Wing of the White House.

FRED I. GREENSTEIN

Princeton University

The Tenor of Justice: Criminal Courts and the Guilty Plea Process. By Peter F. Nardulli, James Eisenstein, and Roy B. Flemming. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988. 469p. $39.95.

This book undertakes a massive project in analyzing data generated on criminal courts and the guilty plea process from nine different counties in three sections of the United States. The data speak to the environmental factors (socioeconomic and political characteristics), contextual factors (courthouse community and the court infrastructure), and individual factors (judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys) involved in guilty pleas and the sentences resulting from this process. After methodical, quantitative data analysis the authors conclude that (1) little bargaining occurs in the plea process (note the absence of *bargaining* from their title), (2) individual players have minimal impact on case outcomes, (3) routine dominates, and (4) bureaucratic justice is the norm. Their perspective, accordingly, squares with what they call the consensus rather than the concessions model of the guilty plea process.

The "tenor of justice" is, in the authors' view, reasonably fair. Bias and favoritism do not by and large play a role in the guilty plea process. Judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys individually and together exercise little discretion or arbitrariness; and class, gender, and race of defendants have no measurable effect on case outcomes. Since the authors think the system operates well, their recommendations for reform are modest. They do call for a more integrated plea system (p. 382) where firm offers, including sentences, are made early in the plea process and where all players, including judges, have a role.

The book offers a remarkably honest assessment of the data and tests performed on the data. The authors take meticulous care in explaining the strengths and weaknesses of their data so that future scholars can understand what is and is not worth duplicating from their study. They advocate cumulative social science, where researchers build on the designs, data, and analysis of those who have preceded them. In the end they speak to social scientists interested in criminal courts, discouraging "a preoccupation with 'variance explained' models of case outcomes" (because there is little variance to explain in such a routinized system) and encouraging study of "differences in norms across court communities" (p. 383). This encouragement reflects their thinking about sources of variance as well as their inability to address in any depth many of the environmental characteristics of the court communities they studied.

Their project, however, is cumbersome at best, with an often seemingly unwieldy amount of data and analysis. The authors are so close to their information that they are unable to back away from it to give the reader a clear perspective on their general arguments. We look continually at the trees, but it takes some work to see the forest. The analysis would have been clearer—and the arguments better brought into relief—by more consideration of the now-extensive political science and interdisciplinary literature that informs this area of study. A discussion of relevant studies would have made certain questions and concerns more salient and enabled the reader better to situate their arguments in this field. Chapter 7, "Fairness, Criminal Courts, and the Guilty Plea Process," which does address the scholarship to some extent, defines the issues and debates surrounding them more successfully than other chapters.

In not contending with many of the questions and debates within the field, the authors fail to give their work as full a theoretical context as they might have. It could be argued that studying criminal courts in nine counties is already demanding enough as it is. Still, there is a theoretical barrenness here, despite their discussions about conceptual foundations of the study and their claims of "theoretical amplification" (p. 21). One wants to know more about how they came to evaluate various questions and issues, and how their fellow scholars influenced their thinking.

Despite the breadth of their analysis, certain perspectives on issues they raise, like what constitutes justice in pleas, are missing. The authors ignore the more philosophical literature on justice and the voices of victim and defendant. Rarely are these voices attended to in the criminal courts literature; but in a discussion about whose views of justice should be taken into account in the plea process, surely these nonprofessional voices merit some attention. In offering an "integrated approach" that seeks to be broadly inclusive, the authors might have incorporated the perspectives of victims and defendants, whose views of the justice of the routines of the plea process might have been quite different from prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and the authors themselves. So, while this analysis on the plea process is more broad-ranging than many, some perspectives remain absent.

ADELAIDE H. VILLMOARE

Vassar College

Agriculture and the State: Market Processes and Bureaucracy. By E. C. Pasour, Jr. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1990. 258p. $39.95 cloth, $19.95 paper.

The author views the U.S. farm economy from a particular intellectual perspective, that is, the world of Adam Smith and F. A. Hayek. In political vernacular: that government is best which governs least the U.S. farm and food economy.

Pasour sets his analysis in a public choice framework: "the use of economic principles to explain political decisions" (p. 47). In a calculated-self-interest nutshell: voters cast individual ballots for what is presumed to be their economic advantage; political candidates employ seductive rhetoric in the search for votes; legislators advocate and sponsor public farm programs that will hopefully enable them to be reelected; the White House would prefer not to be harassed by costly farm programs but may succumb to expensive programs for farm commodities if the election calendar and political fence mending necessitate taking that course of action: and the bureaucracy (namely, the U.S. Department of Agriculture) will continue to grow in a somewhat inverse ratio with the continuously dwindling numbers of farmers.

As Pasour observes, "During the Great Depression a host of action programs involving price supports, credit subsidies, export subsidies, subsidized food distribution, crop insurance, and conservation were launched to deal with the economic chaos in U.S. agriculture" (p. 79). However, he is unpersuaded that this "economic chaos" was caused by a failure of the competitive market economy. Indeed, there were market imperfections; but a principal cause (in his view) was, even in the late 1920s and early 1930s, too much government—high taxes, high tariffs, and the political manipulation of wage, price, and monetary policies.

These economic misunderstandings led to political manipulation by powerful farmer interest groups in pursuance, they claimed, of the "public" or "national" interest. This resulted in national policies that were, in reality, directed toward "income redistribution" favoring large-scale farmers in that the price support policies were based primarily on how much of the commodity was produced. His public-interest-versus-income-redistribution argument is certainly open to debate, but it should not be quickly discarded.

I have considerable difficulty in constructing a balanced review of this study because Pasour delves into almost every national policy concerning agriculture and food (though he gives short shrift to nutrition policies, and his discussion is limited on the impact of the environmental interest groups on the current agricultural policy process.) In 20 short chapters, he does give the reader a considerable number of challenging criticisms of current farm policies. However, his analyses are often so controversial, and offered with such succinctness, that one is often skeptical of, if not downright in opposition to, his conclusions. For example, concerning agricultural conservation practices, Pasour suggests that "the problem of soil erosion has been exaggerated. Indeed, there is evidence that the problem of soil erosion has declined and that the quality of soil resources in the United States has improved over time" (p. 211). For another example, relative to federal agricultural research and extension activities, he is "skeptical" about the high estimated rates of return from publicly funded agricultural research and extension policies and programs and claims that governments (national and state) "can best encourage research investment by defining and enforcing property rights so that privately funded research can be profitably undertaken" (pp. 224–25). Indeed, this study is rich in policy evaluations and recommendations that are wide open to criticism.

Pasour represents a coterie of economic analysts who conclude, in his words, that "government can make its greatest contribution to the stability of U.S. agriculture by reducing trade restrictions, and perhaps most important, by adopting noninflationary monetary and fiscal policies" (p. 179; see also pp. 182, 245). These are haunting shadows of heresy to the agrarian populists of yesterday and today, but this line of advice seems to have become almost conventional wisdom among contemporary agricultural economists. Pasour is a fervent advocate of individual property rights and voluntary economic transactions and concludes his study with a proposition that is highly predictable and sharply debatable: "The objective of public policy affecting agriculture should be the development of an institutional framework that provides the maximum scope for individual choice" (p. 249).

This book would be an ideal choice as one basic source for a joint seminar composed of seniors majoring in political science and economics who desire to probe deeply into the myriad of complex interactions—ideal and real, domestic and international—that prevail within the policy process in U.S. agriculture. Not long ago McGeorge Bundy expounded brilliantly, "Economics is more important than politics, *except when it is not* ("The Inevitability of the Unexpected," in *U.S. Interest and*

Global Natural Resources, ed. Emery N. Castle and Kent A. Price [1983], 131). We (economists, in particular!) need a much better understanding of when it is and when it is not.

ROSS TALBOT

Iowa State University

New Ways and Means: Reform and Change in a Congressional Committee. By Randall Strahan. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1990. 218p. $29.95.

Politics, great political philosophers tell us, is fundamentally about class: who gets and keeps most of what there is to get and keep. Given this, one might expect that class would serve as a unifying concept for political science the way supply, demand, and choice serve economics; sadly, the opposite is the case. When political scientists are not denying class, they ignore it. Only Marxists insist on the truth of what thinkers from Aristotle through Burke, Locke, Rousseau, and Madison presuppose: politics absent class makes as much sense as physics absent matter.

These comments may seem a strange opening to a review of a book on a congressional committee, but the literature on Congress, as is true of political science generally, is acutely and adversely affected by a crippling aversion to class. Inevitably, even the best work on Congress, such as Strahan's study of the House Committee on Ways and Means, lacks a focus tieing it to questions about the U.S. political economy. As a result, this book is of great parochial interest to congressional scholars but misses an opportunity to contribute to a general understanding of politics.

Congressionalists spend their professional lives subjecting Congress to ever finer scrutiny. In this, congressionalists are not unique. Political science resembles more a loose collection of separate cults than a coherent, focused discipline. But the ills of the whole may be seen with special clarity in the examination of the part.

For all of Strahan's excellent recounting of the changes that have occurred in and around Ways and Means over the past 25 years, this study is better at describing change than explaining it. The failure is not so much Strahan's as the field's in which he works. Congressional scholars have long been better at case studies and piecemeal theorizing than at generalization.

Theoretically, the literature on Congress asks such questions as whether Congress is better understood through David Mayhew's view of legislators as rational actors seeking to maximize reelection chances or Richard Fenno's more complex emphasis on power, prestige, and public policy making. Strahan takes seriously Joseph Cooper's conceptual formulation of Congress as operating within fixed parameters and responding to such situational variables as environmental demands. Regarding individual leaders, the theoretical discussion centers around debates over the relative emphasis to place on personal qualities or contextual factors.

Within such limits, Strahan finds Fenno's approach superior to Mayhew's, calls for more attention to personal qualities of leaders, and offers informative chapters on the politics of House reform, taxation, and committee leadership.

In the end, however, *New Ways and Means* succumbs to the theoretical limitations of the genre of which it is part. This is especially regrettable in the case of Ways and Means because this committee deals preeminently with class issues: taxes, social security, welfare, trade. The vacuity of fixating on internal congressional concerns at the expense of broader issues is well-illustrated in the ironic 1981 commentary of the late Richard P. Conlon (a staff man who played a key role in the events described here) on the fleeting significance of the 1970s House reforms: "Today, thanks to the reforms, House Democrats have the tools to deal with a chairman or any other member who obstructs the party program. Unfortunately we no longer have much of a program to obstruct" (p. 174). Conlon's insight suggests that in the future scholars of Congress might give greater attention to larger issues than the fascinating but ephemeral minutiae of life on Capitol Hill.

JOHN F. MANLEY

Stanford University

Congressional Practice and Procedure: A Reference, Research, and Legislative Guide. By Charles Tiefer. Westport: Greenwood, 1989. 1,046p. $95.00.

This is an ambitious book. Recognizing that previous treatments of congressional procedure have been either collections of rules and precedents or general readers, Charles Tiefer proposes "a full length treatise attempting to explore the interaction of formal procedures and informal practices" for policy making in Congress. In general, Tiefer has done an admirable job of accomplishing what he proposes.

Congressional Practice and Procedure fills two gaps in the contemporary literature on congressional procedure. First, this is the most detailed *and* comprehensive work on congressional procedure that I am aware of. Other works are either as detailed but limited to particular aspects of the legislative process or as comprehensive but less detailed. Second, in this book on procedure, norms of behavior receive as much attention as do codified rules and precedents. Tiefer's central theme is that it is as important to understand informal but institutionalized practices as it is to understand formal rules, when attempting to understand the legislative process.

Congressional Practice and Procedure is organized in a way that makes it a useful reference for students of the legislative process. The first chapter examines theoretical explanations for the existence of procedure, as well as the foundations and history of congressional procedure. The remaining chapters are arranged generally by common research topics, including the committee system, organizing the chambers, floor proceedings, conference proceedings, budgeting, and appropriations. Each chapter begins with an overview and brief history of the topic, and the text itself is supplemented with abundant notes that include clarifying examples and additional references.

As mentioned, a central contribution of this book is the author's emphasis on examining how formal procedures are applied in practice. This emphasis is of potential value to congressional scholars for two reasons. First, it makes the book more valuable as a reference for making sense of complicated legislative proceedings. For example, if, while examining a debate in the *Congressional Record,* one became interested in the parliamentary significance of a point of order, a reading of the House or Senate *Manual* would indicate that in both chambers points of order are decided by the presiding officer but may be appealed to the chamber as a whole. A reading of Oleszek's *Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process* (1984) would uncover no reference at all to points of order and only a brief reference to the fact that procedural motions are sometimes used to provide "political cover" to members on controversial issues.

Tiefer not only discusses points of order; he also contrasts the rules described in the *Manuals* with how those rules are applied *in practice.* In the House of Representatives, the Speaker "rarely refers points of order for a vote of the House, and is rarely appealed from, as appeals invariably fail" (p. 198). The last successful appeal, Tiefer notes, appears to have occurred in 1927. However, in the Senate, "quite a few points [of order] get appealed"; and "while the rules continue to require the chair to uphold points of order, Senators feel free to vote on appeals without regarding so much those weak rules as with regard to the popularity of the underlying legislation" (pp. 513–14).

Second, this emphasis on practices as well as formal rules suggests that in addition to its value as a reference, *Congressional Practice and Procedure* may also be of value to students interested in understanding the maintenance of legislative institutions. Many long-standing rules and precedents are effectively irrelevant to congressional policy making. Other rules, in contrast, are strictly adhered to even when they clearly frustrate the policy preferences of majorities. Tiefer is aware of this issue of understanding why and when institutions are maintained. In chapter 1, he asks, "Does congressional procedure exist?" After concluding that it does, he goes on to discuss possible reasons why party majorities adhere to rules when they are inconvenient. In addition to the more traditional explanations for institutional maintenance (stability, legitimacy, protection of minority rights, etc.), Tiefer suggests that the weak party system in Congress creates incentives for members of the majority party to maintain rules that make it possible for majorities not including the leadership to win occasionally. Throughout the remainder of the book, the origins and the evolution of the application of particular rules are examined in terms of the functions they serve for legislators.

Naturally, a work with such strengths has limitations. The most obvious drawback of attempting to be both comprehensive and detailed is the length of this book (1,046 pages). For someone who is interested in learning about congressional procedure generally, Olezek (289 pages) is a much better place to start. Another limitation of this book is that despite its length, *Congressional Practice and Procedure* is not as detailed as scholars examining particular aspects of the legislative process might desire. This should not be very surprising. There are tomes on budgeting that by themselves are several hundred pages long. It is unreasonable to expect similar detail in a 65-page chapter. For students of legislative politics interested in more detail than is provided by Olezek, *Congressional Practice and Procedure* offers what might be called "desktop" comprehensiveness.

JOHN WILKERSON

University of Washington

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt. By Robert Bianchi. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 268p. $34.95.

Through an examination of modern Egypt Robert Bianchi seeks to expose corporatism as "a false remedy for the ills of 'unruly' society" (p. 206). For Bianchi, corporatism is a pervasive phenomenon, partly because of the "discipline of political science, where corporatism has been vastly oversold" (p. 222). Yet Bianchi's position is not entirely clear. He also provides a qualified defense of corporatism, arguing that "it can give rise to broad, nationalist countercoalitions demanding greater social justice, democracy, and cultural integrity" (p. 32).

The apparent contradiction can be resolved if Bianchi has in mind more than one type of corporatism. In the Egyptian case that would be the populist nationalism of Gamal Abdel Nasser as opposed to the rule of Anwar Sadat. (Egypt's current president Hosni Mubarak stands in between.) Thus, Nasser's corporatism arguably energized the associations that represented the interests of the lower and middle classes. For example, he promised easily accessible low-cost education, including university education, and guarantees of lifetime employment for university graduates. When his successor, Anwar Sadat, sought to change policy, including introducing more rationality into Egypt's economic system as Western financial institutions had demanded, the strength of Nasserist associations helped prevent the abrupt withdrawal of many concessions granted to the less prosperous elements of society. Thus, the legacy of Nasserist corporatism promoted social justice, while Sadat's brand of corporatism is an example of the "false remedy" Bianchi criticizes.

But what were Nasser's actual accomplishments? Could Egypt have sustained a highly subsidized welfare state without either the deterioration of the concessions provided to the population or their formal abrogation by the government? What was the relationship between Nasser's and Sadat's policies? Can the varying forms of Egyptian corporatism be understood in isolation from the changing circumstance of the country? When Nasser seized power in 1952, Egypt had a positive sterling balance and the territorial integrity of the state remained unviolated. When Sadat succeeded Nasser in 1970, the country was bankrupt and a significant part of Egyptian territory was under foreign occupation. Would Nasser have followed more Sadatist policies in Sadat's circumstances, and would Sadat have been more Nasserist in Nasser's circumstances? Since Bianchi limits himself exclusively to the question of Egypt's associational life, he does not address these broader issues.

At any rate, whether under Nasser or Sadat, corporatism for Bianchi is, at best, a problematic phenomenon. Why does it exist? Bianchi's answer is that it is largely the choice of "fairly autonomous elites" in which "unbounded personal ambition" plays a central role (p. 222). That answer may seem insufficient. The author might have dwelt more on a critical period—Nasser's abolition of political parties and the effort to replace them with the accelerated expansion of state-sponsored associations. Was the tremendous boost Nasser gave Egyptian corporatism one of the answers to the problems that he—a lieutenant colonel who seized power in a narrowly based military coup—faced in running the country?

Finally, one might ask about the significance of corporatism in Egypt and in the three other cases that constitute the concluding comparative chapter. The reader does not really get an adequate definition of corporatism or the corporatist state, as the definition is relegated to a note. Is Egypt really a corporatist state, or are other aspects of political life of much greater significance? Bianchi attributes the revolution in Iran to failed corporatism. Does that not perhaps stretch conventional usage of the term?

Although there are problems with *Unruly Corporatism*, it is the first and only book-length account of intermediary groups in Egyptian society. Bianchi has used his intimate knowledge of the country to accumulate a wealth of information not available elsewhere. The book covers the century since the British occupation of Egypt began—what is conventionally called modern Egypt. It succeeds well in illustrating continuities and avoids the mistake of presenting the Nasserist era as a radical break with the past. The book is detailed and thorough, covering practically all aspects of associational life in Egypt, from the Islamic opposition to the middle-class professional unions. Those interested in the general phenomenon of corporatism, the question of intermediate associations, or this aspect of Egyptian society will find the book highly valuable.

LAURIE MYLROIE

Harvard University

Peasant Politics in Modern Egypt: The Struggle against the State. By Nathan J. Brown. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. 280p. $28.50.

This is a well-researched historical survey of various forms of collective action among the Egyptian peasantry from the British occupation in 1882 to the Free Officers' Revolution of 1952. The principle sources are Egyptian newspapers, British and U.S. diplomatic reports and accounts of contemporary observers in English and Arabic. Several hundred descriptions of peasant behavior are classified and examined under four categories: atomistic action (attacks against the person or property of landlords, estate managers, foreigners, village notables, and government officials); communal action (village riots, strikes, and land occupations); legal and institutional action (voting, party activity, and petitioning); and revolts (the Urabi Rebellion of 1882 and the Nationalist Revolution of 1919).

The major objective of the book is to refute stereotypes that portray Egypt's peasants either as passive victims who were infinitely tolerant of oppression or as incipient revolutionaries ready to erupt at the first sign of cracks in the system. The author argues that the peasantry carried on a continuous, low-level struggle against threats to their livelihood, initiating countless incidents of retribution and protest with a political import that went far beyond petty criminality while falling far short of a nationwide, mass movement. By and large, this is a balanced and sensible treatment that makes the best of slender evidence generated mostly by urban and foreign observers who had little knowledge of, or sympathy for, the people they were so quick to judge.

The sheer volume and variety of reported incidents should demolish any lingering myths about the supposed fatalism and political ineptitude of Egyptian peasants. This alone is an important and refreshing contribution. Unfortunately, that contribution is seriously diluted by the author's attachment to the dubious belief that peasants possessed a uniform and unchanging worldview that circumscribed nearly all of their efforts at collective action within very narrow limits. By advancing a subjective, psychocultural explanation of peasant behavior that cannot be substantiated or refuted by his own evidence, the author ironically preserves a good deal of the unflattering mythology that he seeks to destroy.

At first, the author stresses the compatibility of political economy and moral economy approaches, stating his intention to combine them in a nondeterministic manner. However, this theoretical eclecticism quickly gives way to a powerful endorsement of the moral economy perspective as a superior explanation for virtually every aspect of the Egyptian data. Peasants' shared values are presented as the overriding factor accounting for their level and type of political activity regardless of differences in the agricultural economy, the social structure, the degree of state penetration, the quality of local leadership, and the extent of exposure to national political organizations. Similarly, variations between geographic regions and historical periods are pronounced insignificant. The imputed peasant political culture is not only determinative but seamless and timeless as well.

The author contends that the very worldview that triggered peasants' political activity also prevented it from amounting to much in the long run. He describes that worldview as based on a flexible web of mutual obligations that bound cultivators to landlords, moneylenders and officials who implicitly agreed never to undermine peasant subsistence. When that tacit contract was broken, the most common peasant response was to vent their moral outrage at the particular local personalities considered responsible for upsetting the natural social order. Typically, this was limited to "atomistic action," that is, physical assaults by individuals and small groups that would be covered up by a conspiracy of silence. Less frequently, the scope of protests might expand into "communal action" when kinsmen and neighbors openly joined a victim of injustice, but most of these incidents were easily suppressed and had no impact beyond the village itself.

Hence, the overwhelming majority of examples of peasant collective action hardly seem worthy of the name. Peasants are pictured as eternally out of touch with the political mainstream. Organized and sustained political activity always seems to pass them by, especially if it has national implications. Peasant participation in elections, party politics, petition drives and revolutions is described as superficial or as instigated by rural elites who manipulated the masses to advance their own interests. Egypt's cooperative movement, one of the oldest in the non-Western world, is barely mentioned. The anti-imperialist struggles of 1882 and 1919 are described as though the nationalist movement had only feeble roots in the countryside.

Despite its avowed challenge to the erroneous image of the ignorant and inscrutable *fellah,* this book reaffirms many long-standing stereotypes. In the end, the peasant's moral economy permits him only the most rudimentary, unplanned, and unorganized forms of collective action. His expressions of outrage are personal, retributive, and innately conservative. They are flashes in the pan without consequence beyond his immediate environment. He cannot represent himself or even find ways to support those who might seek an alliance with him. Worse still, his most bitter and enduring enmity is reserved for the state, the one institution that might be able to ameliorate his condition but which he views as inherently alien, extractive, and exploitative. The icon of the Egyptian peasant that emerges from this sort of moral economy approach may be more appealing than the one we inherited from the colonial literature, but it is an icon nonetheless.

ROBERT BIANCHI

University of Chicago

The Comparative History of Public Policy. Edited by Francis G. Castles. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 340p. $45.00.

Comparative policy analysis has been successful, it is claimed here, in establishing an "inventory of hypotheses" with whose help one can attempt to explain policy outcomes in democratic capitalist states. Yet cross-national quantitative analysis only establishes systematic association: given outcomes of the welfare state, for example, are associated with a few independent variables that have relatively low explanatory power. To get beyond this impasse, this volume takes the approach of asking what is distinctive or puzzling about the public policy profile of particular countries. The authors in this collection were to discuss linkages and trade-offs between aspects of macroeconomic and welfare state policy, but the agenda was to use a historical approach.

This is a large, difficult, commendable undertaking. The use of history is certainly not writ large in comparative political studies, and it certainly is not the usual fare for result-oriented public policy school curricula. Castles adopts a somewhat defensive tone in the introduction to justify this approach, but he needn't: there is clearly a greater need for historical focus if the peculiarities in public policy outcomes are to be understood.

The focus on distinctiveness also offers an oblique approach to reexamine corporatist claims. T. J. Pempel's thesis of Japanese "creative conservatism"; Manfred Schmidt's assertion that "what is distinctive about West Germany's public policy is that it has ceased to be dramatically distinctive" (p. 57); or Göran Therborn's use of Albert Hirschman's exit, voice, and loyalty scheme to explain why we may have been rather misled about the Dutch case as compared to the Swedish—all provide details and interpretations that make us reconsider these cases. Not the least of the goals of this book lies in its attempt to restore to comparative policy analysis the focus on how, why, and to what effect government policies are developed—the justification that Heidenheimer, Heclo, and Adams offered in *Comparative Public Policy: The Politics of Social Choice in Europe and America* (1975).

But the book has some major flaws. One problem lies in the choice of nations. Israel and Australia do not often figure in comparative policy studies and are distinctive for that reason alone quite apart from other considerations. U.S. exceptionalism particularly in welfare policies has often been noted. But what justifies claiming England, Germany, Sweden, and Holland to be distinctive? Aren't they among the exemplars of what is "standard"? The criteria for inclusion here seems somewhat arbitrary—Manfred Schmidt's thesis for Germany indicates a certain casting about in an attempt to find distinctiveness—and indicates a volume driven by cases rather than theory. Since inflation and unemployment are taken as one benchmark for comparison (p. 60), why not include the "anomalies" of Ireland or Switzerland? One wishes the authors had taken Dogan and Pelassy's admonitions about how to compare nations a little more to heart.

Indeed, the comparative approach (as so often happens in comparative politics) here once again becomes the examination of individual foreign governments. Comparative public policy *ought* to mean measuring one country's policy output against that of others (that this can be done descriptively and historically has been ably demonstrated by historical sociologists). But the only exception in this volume (as well as the most intriguing chapter) is provided by Therborn on Holland and Sweden. It certainly would not seem that after only 15 years a restoration of comparative method is needed: if anything, there are far too few attempts to make even full-length binary comparison along the lines of what Hugh Heclo did for Britain and Sweden or Gary Freeman has done for Britain and France. The historical approach used here also has little consistency, and perhaps it should not be used if distinctiveness is the point; but there is a problem of depth when some cases conscientiously reach back into the nineteenth century while others only seem to include the 1960s and 1970s. The writing is also dense and apparently directed at specialists of the given country.

This volume suffers from having high, laudable goals at the outset that perhaps by the very cases and methods chosen cannot really be met. Distinctiveness as a theme reinforces the single-country-study method despite all attempts to emphasize macroeconomic determinants, but it becomes almost the antithesis of the empirically based hypotheses that Castles appears to have previously favored, since one cannot isolate further independent variables with any consistency this way. Comparative history needs to have more of both history and genuine comparison than is presented here; and the role of ideas, religion, the policy-versus-politics issues, and the state-society theories could all strengthen the arguments about the origins of distinctiveness, as well, of course, as the origins of similarities. If one goes the historical route, it would seem prudent to examine the conclusions which others have drawn from it also.

JOHN BENDIX

Lewis and Clark College

The New State: Etatization of Western Societies. By Szymon Chodak. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989. $35.00.

This volume offers an interpretive essay on societal and political development in the Western democracies. Couching his discussion in classical sociological theory, Szymon Chodak plots an ambitious trajectory. He argues that the processes of differentiation and specialization have proceeded beyond the transition from traditional to modern societies and that we have therefore begun another fundamental change, which he calls *etatization* (pp. 7, 22, 275).

The concept of etatization elaborates the author's 1973 work on societal development. In that work, Chodak relied on the notion of organizational interdependence to compare different theories of secular societal change. In the present book, the author argues that a new level of interdependence among state and societal organizations is tantamount to the etatization of society. Some of the changes included under the concept of etatization include the multiplication of state functions; the imposition of monopoly control by the state over economic management and education; the emergence of two-sector mixed economies; a transformation of the stratification structure; the spread of a bureaucratic mentality; and a change in the conflict structure of society (p. 13). Although these constituent processes occur differently in each case, the overall evolution produces "a more state-controlled and state-regulated society" (p. 9).

The most interesting part of the argument concerns the state's expanding role in economic management. In the United States, the state exercises managerial responsibility through direct and indirect regulation; whereas in Western Europe, the state exercises its role through direct equity participation in a mixed economy. The argument is intriguing in that it puts the market-oriented policies of the Reagan and Thatcher governments into a wide comparative perspective. By including empirical chapters on the United States, Canada, and Japan, as well as Western Europe, the authors brings together a great deal of material. The analysis is, however, marred by the absence of clear criteria for selecting evidence. Although the discussion rests on qualitative institutional developments, the reader still needs to know how evidence is selected and what kind of evidence might qualify or falsify the thesis. It is, for example, puzzling when the author discusses the movement toward privatization in the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy, and West Germany but insists that the reduction of the state-owned sector does not signify a reversal of etatization (p. 149). In other places, evidence is presented in such broad terms that it is difficult to know precisely what is being asserted. For instance, the author states that West European industries on average invested much more in research and development than their counterparts in the United States and Japan. Yet, OECD statistics for the early 1980s show that industry-financed research and development in the United States and Japan (measured as a proportion of gross domestic product) exceeded the corresponding figures for Western Europe as a whole as well as for each of the individual OECD countries except Sweden, Switzerland, and West Germany (Tables 4 and 6).

The most questionable aspect of the argument concerns levels of analysis. Chodak implies that changes in state-society relations can be explained by changes that operate at the same level of analysis. As political scientists have focused increasingly on the state, however, they have consistently recognized that its evolution is shaped through exogenous as well as endogenous processes. A number of scholars (perhaps most notably Gourevitch and Cameron) have shown specific links from international dynamics to observed variations in state-society relations. Chodak makes frequent references to the worldwide economic environment in which states act, but nowhere does he crystallize these reflections or give them a place in his explanation for etatization. Thus, when he discusses Cameron's 1978 article on the public sector, he does not grapple with the central claim that the public sector expands as a function of the openness of the economy (p. 139). As a result, Chodak neglects an important rival explanation: that etatization is simply an instrumental response to increased international interdependence rather than a fundamentally new stage in societal development.

Chodak also addresses the changes in value orientation that accompany etatization, but his remarks on this topic are more suggestive than definitive. After reviewing the literature on postmaterialist values, he concludes that individuals, while guided increasingly by private goals, paradoxically have greater expectations that the state will help them reach those goals (pp. 247, 268).

Given the breadth of the subject, it is not surprising that the author has raised more questions than he has answered. This book holds out the promise that country-specific varieties of organizational interdependence can be known and explained. By so doing, it points to a broad and abundant territory for further study.

J. NICHOLAS ZIEGLER

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Managing the Commanding Heights: Nicaragua's State Enterprises. By Forrest D. Colburn. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. 151p. $25.00.

This short book is essential reading for anyone interested in the failures of the Sandinista (FSLN) revolution, especially in light of the FSLN's stunning electoral defeat in February 1990. The book was prepared well before the electoral process got underway—indeed, there is no mention of the electoral process (even that of 1984) in the book. Since Colburn is therefore speaking of a revolution in his view well on the way to consolidation of political power, his book is a key contribution to the (limited) literature on postrevolutionary regimes.

The central task of the book is to explain why state enterprises in the "commanding heights" of the economy—principally export agriculture—proved to be so economically irrational. One of the book's strengths is that it does not fall into a mold that so often weakens analyses of socialist revolutions, that of overemphasizing "structural" constraints. Indeed, the focus of the book is on the considerable freedom of action that state elites have, despite obvious constraints that circumscribe that freedom. The book therefore fits into the general category of rational choice and particularly has resonances of Robert Bates's works on African states.

Elites take certain actions but could have taken others; and for an understanding of those actions, one should look first to political considerations rather than economic constraints. Colburn identifies four principal purposes of state enterprises: (1) to be the "vanguard" of the economy and its transformation toward socialism; (2) to provide an implied threat against other enterprises that remain private (saying to them, in effect, "Produce or lose it"; (3) to be outposts of the state itself; (4) to provide a source of patronage for rewarding supporters.

Of these purposes, note that most of them are preeminently political. The takeover of important sectors of the economy is a key part of the revolutionary elite's strategy for consolidating political control. Indeed, Colburn quotes an aide's confidential comment to one of the FSLN commanders that "the state decided to keep the land for political purposes" rather than fulfilling one of its revolutionary slogans, "Land to the people" (p. 43).

Largely as a result of the multiple political as well as economic purposes of that state sector, directors of the enterprises face cross pressures. They are supposed to be efficient but also, as servants of a "popular revolution," must be socially and politically responsible. They must cooperate with the political leadership that oversees their region. With conflicting demands, Colburn indicates, the rational outcome is to be unprofitable.

Illustrations of the rationality of unprofitableness in postrevolutionary Nicaragua abound in the book, the central part of which consists of case studies of three differently situated state enterprises. The basic conclusion, however, is that economic efficiency is basically a "public good," the benefits of which do not necessarily accrue to the enterprise itself but are more diffused. Meeting political demands, however, brings immediate and specific benefits to specific actors.

While a strategy of relying on state enterprises to manage the commanding heights is common in revolutionary dictatorships (and Colburn all too briefly reviews the experiences of China, Cuba, Ethiopia, and Mozambique), more recent events suggest that the political benefits of state control do not extend to more liberal, democratic settings. As Colburn indicates, taking his cue from a statement by FSLN commander Jaime Wheelock, Marxism–

Leninism provides a rationale for an elite to entrench itself in power.

At this point, Colburn missed an opportunity to link his analysis of economic institutions with the broader political institutions that were developing at the time of his research. Already in place was an incipient liberal institutional structure based upon elections. When the pressures of the counterrevolutionary war—which Colburn does not hold responsible for the basic economic pitfalls of the revolution, which were clear even before the war became critical (see his *Post-Revolutionary Nicaragua* [1986])—led to a liberalized and widely monitored electoral campaign, the FSLN lost decisively. This result hardly appears surprising when one understands Colburn's explication of the FSLN's political rationales. The FSLN's record also suggests that the FSLN's future as a political party in a democratic regime is not good.

Finally, it is unfortunate that Colburn did not pay more than very brief attention to possible other revolutionary strategies that might have worked better in the long run. He does suggest that emphasizing the commanding heights "may be unwise" (p. 132). However, had he considered the broader political-institutional context (as well as exploring the FSLN's international priorities), he might have been drawn to the conclusion that FSLN leaders could have consolidated their position within a postrevolutionary *democracy* by maintaining the essence of the anti-Somoza alliance rather than pursuing the aggrandizement of their own power.

MATTHEW S. SHUGART

University of California, San Diego

Nicaragua's Other Revolution: Religious Faith and Political Struggle. By Michael Dodson and Laura Nuzzi O'Shaughnessy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990. 279p. $39.95 cloth, $12.95 paper.

The Catholic Church and Social Change in Nicaragua. By Manzar Foroohar. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989. 262p. $39.95 cloth, $12.95 paper.

These two books add to the extensive literature on the relationship between religion and politics in revolutionary Nicaragua. Dodson and O'Shaughnessy's interesting study concentrates on the years of Sandinista rule, especially 1979–1986, and includes some attention to the Protestant churches, while Foroohar's book focuses primarily on the period of revolutionary struggle in the 1970s and is restricted to the Catholic Church. The former is theoretically and comparatively more ambitious and provides interesting new empirical data; the latter does not add much to the literature.

Dodson and O'Shaughnessy's book is divided into three parts, the first of which discusses religion and modern democratic revolutions. The authors point out some of the interesting singularities of the Nicaraguan case, particularly contrasting it to earlier revolutions in Mexico and Cuba, which were viscerally anticlerical. Every major leftist revolution from Marx's time until 1979, when the Sandinistas took power, was anticlerical. In contrast, despite tensions between the church and the Sandinista government, many committed Catholics actively supported the FSLN government, and some even participated in it. Moreover, notwithstanding some Sandinista actions against the church, the Sandinistas made efforts to cultivate the support of religious leaders and activists. Part 1 also provides background information on the Central American crisis, makes an overdrawn comparison of the linkages between religion and revolution in Nicaragua and the much earlier cases of England and the United States, and compares patterns of political development in the United States and Latin America. This part of the book is excessively scattered.

Part 2 discusses the process of ecclesiastical change in Latin America, focusing on the period beginning with the pontificate of John XXIII (1958–63). One chapter concentrates on Nicaragua, but the other two are more general. The material is well presented but contains little new information or analysis.

Unquestionably the best part of the book, part 3 provides a detailed analysis of the interaction between religious groups and the state under Sandinista rule between 1979 and 1986, during which time the church was one of the most important actors in an extraordinarily charged political conflict. The authors provide a detailed portrait of the logic of different actors, accounting for the intense escalation of hostilities between progressive grassroots groups supportive of the government and the bishops, who for the most part opposed the Sandinistas. They also carefully show how a situation that seemed to offer hope for reasonably harmonious relations between a revolutionary government and the Catholic hierarchy in July 1979 quickly deteriorated in the 1980s.

The authors are sympathetic to the Sandinistas; but their account is not apologetic, as they go to pains to convey the logics and perceptions of the different actors involved in the escalating hostilities. Based on extensive research in Nicaragua, as well as a solid grasp of the comparative and theoretical literature on religion and politics, the analysis is a welcome contribution. One only wishes they had spent more time analyzing the Nicaraguan case and trimmed the more general and less original material on developments in Latin American Catholicism as a whole.

Foroohar's *Catholic Church and Social Change in Nicaragua* provides a historical overview of the political role of the Catholic Church, focusing especially on the 1970s. It is a solid but unexceptional account that does not contribute much to previous publications. The analysis of the Sandinistas is somewhat apologetic, and the author does not wholly convey the complex dilemmas that made this case so interesting.

SCOTT MAINWARING

University of Notre Dame

The Political System Matters: Social Psychology and Voting Behavior in Sweden and the United States. By Donald Granberg and Soren Holmberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 254p. $49.50.

Although it falls short on one of its major promises, this book remains a goldmine of information and insight. It is the product of a somewhat unusual collaboration between a U.S. social psychologist and a Swedish political scientist. Its major significance is its contribution to our understanding of the operation of social psychological processes within two quite different political systems. The authors correctly argue that both political scientists and social psychologists too often take the political system for granted and even "act and write *as if* the political system did *not* matter" (p. 1). The central task of the book, then, is to test the proposition that there are systematic differences in a wide set of politically relevant social psychological variables that can in turn be related to the different political systems. Specifically, the authors seek to explore differences in (1) attitudes or preferences, (2) perceptions people have about political phenomena, (3) expectations people have about the future, and (4) political behavior.

In this highly detailed, sophisticated, and careful work the authors show us time and time again that there are important differences in attitudes, perceptions and behavior of citizens in Sweden and the United States. The implications of Granberg and Holmberg's findings are impressive and should be of interest to any student of modern democracy. For example, Swedish voters tend to be more ideologically consistent and stable than U.S. voters, but Swedish voters are no more likely to have clear and/or accurate perceptions of candidates or parties' views than their U.S. counterparts. Still, Swedish voters' attitudes and perceptions are more likely to be in alignment with the parties they support than U.S. voters, and the voters who are most likely to switch support for one party or candidate to another in the United States are the least attentive and knowledgeable about politics, while in Sweden those who are most likely to switch votes from one party to another tend to be rather sophisticated and knowledgeable political actors.

These and the many other significant differences discovered by Granberg and Holmberg cry out for explanations. Why are Swedes consistently more "rational" voters and citizens than their U.S. counterparts? Is this a product of differing political cultures in a Hartzian sense or of differing political institutional structures and the consequent choices or incentives they present to the public? Unfortunately, this book does not offer us much insight into these questions. The central problem for the book, then, is that it promises more than it delivers. The authors repeatedly remind the reader that their larger ambition is to see whether the political system "matters." But the book does not really give us much insight into the question of whether these differences are *a consequence of* or *the cause of* the different political systems.

The authors explicitly tell us that the book is not concerned with differences in policymaking processes or with policy outcomes. But how, one must ask, can a book answer the question of whether the "political system matters" without addressing these issues? What, indeed, do the authors mean by *the political system?* For example, Granberg and Holmberg demonstrate that left-right ideology is more coherent, meaningful, and salient in Sweden than in the United States; but they do not tell us why. While the reader can construct an explanation for these differences (and I would use differences in party structures as a central hypothesis), there is unfortunately little in this book that can help the reader draw these conclusions. We are left in this case (as with many others) with a tremendously interesting finding but very thin explanations for a causal relationship between these findings and "the political system."

Still, this book teaches us a great deal about real citizens in real democracies that single-country studies cannot hope to teach us. Due to the dominance of the United States in the field of public opinion survey research, there has been little systematic effort to examine some of the core assumptions about citizens that the United States–centered research has uncovered. It is entirely possible that many of the attitudes and behavior that supposedly reflect citizens in mass democracies are in fact peculiar to U.S. citizens. If this is true, then some of the many problems that have been identified for U.S. citizens and their relationship to political issues, parties, and candidates are more the result of unique political institutions and less a problem of democracy in general. The implications are clear: instead of complaining about the ignorance, inconsistency, and apathy of the U.S. public, and marvelling at how our political system works despite the flaws in our citizenry, perhaps political scientists should pay closer attention to how political institutions can either encourage or discourage greater attentiveness consistency, and commitment.

The Political System Matters should be of broad interest to those who have little special affection for either U.S. or Swedish public opinion per se. The book does an excellent job of allowing the reader to use its data to ask interesting and important questions about the nature of the democratic process and the role citizens play in that process. While one might hope that a book with this title would push some of these questions a bit further, the book does offer a superb start toward more systematic analyses of this obviously important and remarkably underexplored question.

SVEN STEINMO

University of Colorado, Boulder

Government and Industry: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S., Canada, and the U.K. By Wyn Grant. Brookfield, VT: Gower, 1989. 303p. $44.95.

Economic Decline and Political Change: Canada, Great Britain, the United States. Edited by Harold D. Clarke, Marianne C. Stewart, and Gary Zuk. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989. 290p. $39.95.

Political economic treatments of the United States, Canada, and Britain have become more popular in the last few years, partly because of the broadly similar ideological styles that marked the Reagan, Mulroney, and Thatcher governments and partly because among advanced industrial states they are most often identified as falling at the pluralist end of the pluralist-corporatist spectrum. Each of these volumes explores different aspects of political economy in Britain, the United States, and Canada.

Grant's volume is a very useful, concise survey of industrial policy in the three countries. Grant sets out to examine the institutions of governance that handle government-industry relations, how business interests are represented, the blurring of state-civil lines, and how industrial policy has developed—all with an eye to shedding light on the issue of whether sectoral or national characteristics are more important in determining the shape of government-industry relations. He pursues these issues through three country chapters and three sectoral chapters covering six cases (dairying, forestry, chemicals, steel, electricity, and long-distance passenger railways). He concludes that the respective roles of government and industry in rulemaking to deal with sectoral problems hinge upon the degree to which an industry is capable of self-governance. Where an industry is well-organized, all three governments are likely to allow company-led solutions to policy problems. Where a sector is ill organized and government is compelled to settle the issue, the sector is dealt with in terms of national policy paths—the policy approaches that a government is historically predisposed toward using.

It is regrettable that Grant does not do a case on an emerging industry. An extended treatment of how each country deals with sunrise industries would have greatly expanded the volume's appeal by connecting his work to the burgeoning literature on national competitiveness. It also would have made for an interesting way to compare national policy paths. In an emerging industry one would expect to find little in the way of industry organization. Do we therefore find similar stories of government taking the lead in dealing with industry problems as in established industries? Are such emergent industries a separate case, handled differently in some way? These would have been interesting issues to explore.

Economic Decline and Political Change is a somewhat odd mix. The title suggests that it will be heavily comparative when in fact only two essays are explicitly comparative. Five other essays focus on a single country, and three are thematic. Grant does a much better job (admittedly, with different issues) of providing a balanced, explicit comparison of the United States, Great Britain, and Canada. One thing the edited volume's essays share is a uniformly high quality of writing, in which both editors and authors may take pride.

The strength of *Economic Decline and Political Change* lies in its economic-electoral cycle essays. The policy-oriented essays by Norman Thomas (fiscal stress in Britain, Canada, and the United States), Paul Whitely (monetarism in Britain and the United States), and Henry Kenski (economic policy from Carter to Reagan) are all interesting; but they do not fit particularly well together or contribute to the dialogue that runs throughout the other pieces in the book.

The editors use William L. Miller's essay to lead off the book's economic-electoral cycles section. This was an excellent choice. Miller critically reviews the arguments connecting economic performance to political performance, and this essay should be read by anyone interested in comparative political economy. He casts doubt on some of the more sophisticated, high-tech analyses done in this area, noting that regardless of how powerful the computer used, all of this work is crippled by the low quality of data available to researchers. He calls on colleagues to move away from models of economic performance and toward a model of political debate. It is the *perception* of economic performance—a perception shaped by the media and politicians, not economic performance per se—that leads to popular political reactions. To push this new model forward will require a concerted effort to develop a higher quality of data, especially time series content analyses of the media and new measures of public reaction.

Miller's review of the field prepares readers to evaluate the subsequent essays and grapple with the differences among them. For example, some authors focus on individual-based (egocentric) evaluations of economic performance, one focuses on group-class evaluations, while still others bring in national (sociotropic) evaluations. Each cites a long list of literature that validates its approach to the exclusion of others. Because the volume's effect is to highlight the differing approaches in this area, it would make a very useful book in graduate seminars on advanced industrial nations or comparative political economy.

Grant gives one a sense of policy continuity throughout the postwar era. He tends to emphasize the evolution of policies and events. As a result, there is little sense of the dramatic change that came with the rise of conservative reform governments, especially in the nature of political economic debate.

The edited volume's title promises to highlight change in these countries, but the authors who do address policy issues cannot seem to agree on whether the oil shock of 1973 or the rise of conservative reformers is the turning point in political economic life. This lack of a common perspective detracts from the book's coherence.

Neither volume breaks new ground. Yet both are well written and well conceived, making solid contributions to our understanding of political economy in the United States, Canada, and Britain.

DANIEL R. PEARSON

University of Washington

Crisis amid Plenty: The Politics of Soviet Energy under Brezhnev and Gorbachev. By Thane Gustafson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. 387p. $29.95.

Soviet Steel: The Challenge of Industrial Modernization in the USSR. By Boris Z. Rumer. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989. 260p. $29.95.

Two examinations of production sectors essential to the functioning of the Soviet economy yield their reader an enhanced understanding of the operations of the political system of the USSR. Boris Rumer, who once presided there over the Department of Economics and Investment at the National Institute of the Construction Industry, surveys the ferrous metallurgy branch. A political scientist, Thane Gustafson, discusses the oil and natural gas industries. Both studies cover developments not only under Leonid Brezhnev and Mikhail Gorbachev but also during the administrations of Konstantin Chernenko and Yuri Andropov. Therefore, the authors have a basis upon which to assess the prospects of recent reforms for success as well as the achievements and failures of a significant part of the past.

Gustafson and Rumer underpin their analysis with voluminous quantitative data and much other factual information, such as the product mixes of particular steel mills or the characteristics of specific oil and gas fields. In *Soviet Steel,* Rumer discusses operations from the finding and exploitation of iron ore deposits through the casting and rolling of various steel forms for provision to factories and construction sites. *Crisis amid Plenty* treats gas and petroleum exploration, production, and transportation—along with the sales of commodities outside the USSR and with industries supporting work in the oil and gas fields and pipeline construction. As a result, the reader may develop a better understanding of those environments within which managers, officials, and politicians make and implement decisions. He or she gains a surer grasp of constraints, problems, and opportunities facing policy makers and administrators and learns more about some kinds of information available to such individuals. Delineated are the structures and processes through which those responsible for, or connected with, the economic branches relate to one another. Beyond specialists in communist and postcommunist political economy and decision making, scholars wishing to compare Soviet public policy with that of states that have not had communist systems should find the material presented in *Crisis amid Plenty* and *Soviet Steel* valuable. Investigators of local politics in the steel-, petroleum- and gas-producing regions should also be assisted.

Using a case study form of analysis provides Rumer with the material for a devastating indictment of economic management by the form of planning that developed with Soviet industrialization and for illustration of the reasons for which many reformers favor some form of marketization. Particularly telling are the discussions of the way the Soviet central planning system has contributed to waste and hoarding in various stages of ferrous metallurgy production. Strikingly effective to a political scientist reading *Soviet Steel* is Rumer's delineation of the whole subsystem of bureaucratic bargaining engendered by the compilation and administration of the plan. He adumbrates a variety of different types of interactions and thus helps to demonstrate kinds of politicoeconomic resources that have been, or are likely to be, changed by alterations in how Soviet enterprises, ministries, and economic mechanisms function. Such resources could be used to further personal and political—as well as economic—ends. Consequently, Rumer's discussion seems to remind his reader that resistance to market-oriented restructuring may have broader bases and more complicated causes than generally credited. Also, Rumer's exploration of the functioning of enterprises under the traditional central planning helps to illuminate familiar practices and experiences: his description of operating practices, staffing, and materials stockpiling invites reassessment of national campaigns and local interventions aimed at utilizing "reserves." He also documents an unusual effort made, while the *sovnarkhoz* system existed, to determine excess capacity.

While Gustafson, too, indicates contributions of the economic system to difficulties in the oil and gas industries, *Crisis amid Plenty* is above all an extended analysis of policy making under Brezhnev and his successors. As such, the volume (especially chapter 9, on theory building) makes an important contribution. Offered are an entire series of concepts and propositions about the framework and participants in the decisional process and their behavior. Gustafson also develops a number of insights about the nature of the Brezhnevian political system and of reform politics under Gorbachev. Particularly significant—in view of the apparent growth of Communist party capabilities to intervene in economic activities and of the emphasis since 1985 on substantially reducing the party's economic role—is the preeminence of state organizations in an arena that was the site of top-priority campaigns and a principal beneficiary of resource allocations. Arresting, too, is Gustafson's finding that the major cleavages and conflicts in the petroleum-natural gas sector occurred between such "vertically-integrated" governmental organizations, which seemed to receive relatively little interagency coordination (p. 297). Indeed, he notes that the Tiumen Obkom muted its performance as "area coordinator." Jerry F. Hough demonstrated that provincial party committees played such roles for decades vis-a-vis a wide spectrum of industrial organizations (*Soviet Prefects* [1969], 203). Still other behavior by agencies in the oil and gas sectors contravenes assumptions grounded in studies not just of Soviet bureaucratic politics but also of other countries, including the United States: ministries strove with one another to forestall expansion of their organizational responsibilities. If such patterns of activity were found in other policy spheres as well, the resulting political fragmentation may have facilitated Gorbachevian coalition building. However, the behavior described might also suggest that if Gorbachev's attempt to direct society through legislatures and executive governmental bodies is to be successful, their responsiveness to effective interest-aggregating organizations might be important.

Crisis amid Plenty develops a variety of other thought-provoking and useful propositions, but Gustafson's formulation of continuities in the reform impulse from Brezhnev to Gorbachev seems to be particularly significant: he notes that official iteration—under the former—of concepts discussed or underlying policy since 1985 is to be distinguished from the elaboration of programs for action. The volume's analysis indicates that successful enactment and implementation represent yet further hurdles for innovation. Hence, the analyst should discriminate precisely what constitutes continuity.

BARBARA ANN CHOTINER

University of Alabama

Whitehall. By Peter Hennessy. New York: Free Press, 1989. 851p. $35.00.

Whitehall, widely acclaimed in Britain as the best book in recent years on the British civil service, is a remarkable combination of journalistic reporting and scholarly analysis of a key aspect of British government that has aroused U.S. controversy for nearly a century.

In the late nineteenth century, political corruption in the United States made many scholarly U.S. observers of the civil service wonder whether in order to improve it we had to imitate the British political system of a unified executive responsible to the legislature and shield the career service from party patronage. But now, in his analysis, Hennessy leans in the opposite direction, critical of the British civil service and admiring many of the features of its U.S. counterpart. He has been influenced by the U.S. domination of many of the recent scholarly sources of information about Whitehall and by his own admiration for some features of U.S. government.

The British system, he believes, has been greatly weakened by the loss of its empire, making Whitehall's main job the orderly management of decline. This is a distressing challenge, as the top British career service is still based on an educational system dominated by the classical universities, whose training was appreciated for the "superior docility" it instilled in its graduates (p. 725) and was for the modern era less effective than the scientific and technical education that dominated the French and German universities and research institutions.

Whitehall still admires the quality of the British service in that it shares the virtues of Plato's "guardians" except that it admits only an indirect responsibility to the public. The channel of responsibility, Hennessy notes, is by no means entirely to a partisan cabinet. In some ways it runs directly to the Crown. The Civil Service Commission, which examines and recruits the original entrants to the higher service (the administrative class), is accountable only to the Crown; and in various ways the top civil service partly evades orders from the cabinet in order (on subjects like intelligence reports and party campaign platforms) to protect the unity of the system.

In more fundamental ways the confidential accountability of the civil service through a unified cabinet to the Parliament has been changing. The cabinet does much of its business through a system of cabinet committees, most of whose titles and jobs are kept secret. The House of Commons has established a number of Parliamentary committees, which the prime minister refuses to permit to question civil servants on policy issues. And the cabinet itself now drifts in the direction of letting the prime minister dominate its proceedings through various inner staff arrangements (such as Thatcher's Economic Seminar) that evade the control of other cabinet members or of the cabinet secretary.

Hennessy notes various ways in which Whitehall has been responding to the challenges posed by a planet that is shrinking with interconnections multiplying among the nations (p. 406). One major effort was made in 1968 by the study commission that produced the Fulton Report: the main points it attacked were the excessive amateurism of the administrative class of policy advisers, its lack of managerial competence or experience, and its failure to have an independent Civil Service Department for its control. Much the same diagnosis was supported later by consultants from private business brought in by prime ministers. Lord Rothschild and Lord Rayner argued that the narrow departmental assignments of civil servants made them less useful in dealing with the major issues of an urban and technological society, but their efforts to help develop remedies were hamstrung by the refusal of the cabinet and Treasury to permit them to propose changes in the organization and managerial methods of government.

An alternative approach was to call for help from "the Great and the Good" by the creation of temporary royal commissions or commissions of inquiry made up of eminent private citizens—again a useful supplement to full-time officials, but one that could not reorganize the machinery of government.

Hennessy does not share the belief that Thatcher's effort to exert more selective influence over the appointment of her top civil service officers was motivated by party patronage. It was clear that she did not like the members of the top service, but for more defensible reasons. As Hennessy puts it, she dominated Whitehall but failed to reform it (p. 682)—a task somewhat beyond her capacity and one that must await another Lloyd George.

Hennessy concludes with his own prescriptions for change. One category includes some of those ideas that correspond to the old Fulton Committee Report, and to the more admirable aspects of U.S. practice: he recommends much less secrecy, more emphasis on management skills, a service including far more scientists and professionals through career interchange with other institutions in society, and more concentration on complex, long-term issues rather than on the parliamentary policy issues of the day. A second category includes proposals of a new kind to emphasize parliamentary responsibility. He wants officials to be able to complain to an ombudsman, who would have the regular support of the parliamentary select committees. His influence would be heightened by the creation of a management board reporting to Parliament separately from the Treasury and the cabinet secretary. The whole system would be subject to review by a National Audit Office, making reports to the public.

Finally, he demonstrates his sensitivity to British political reality by saying that any such reforms could work only if they should "capture the Prime Minister's heart and mind," not merely receive her passive assent. And he shows his commitment to British political tradition by proposing that these reforms need not be prescribed by statutes or legislation, much less by a written constitution, but should depend on the understanding and assent of those political leaders who are willing to share the burdens of political responsibility.

Whitehall combines the broad range of the best quality of journalism with a depth of understanding of constitutional and political issues and is warmly recommended.

Don K. Price

Harvard University

Book Reviews: Comparative Politics

The Costs of Regime Survival: Racial Mobilization, Elite Domination and Control of the State in Guyana and Trinidad. By Percy C. Hintzen. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 240p. $49.50.

The central concern of this book is the impact of economic and political structures characteristic of postcolonial, dependent, racially heterogeneous societies on the strategies pursued by political elites to obtain and maintain state power. These strategies have high costs with regard to the interests of society in general and the lower classes in particular in economic development and a broad sharing of the fruits of economic progress. Hintzen demonstrates how in both Guyana and Trinidad the politics of decolonization shifted from an initial phase characterized by radical nationalist mobilization based on multiracial alliances between the middle and working classes to a phase characterized by deradicalization and the predominance of middle-class parties appealing for lower-class support on the basis of race rather than class.

Hintzen shows how the emergence of racially based politics was rooted in colonial practices. The location of different racial groups in specific economic and social positions and the introduction of political representation according to the British model of constituency organization laid the bases for racially based politics. Due to the segregation of racial groups in specific occupations, industry- and job-specific trade unions became racially exclusive; and due to the residential segregation of racial groups, constituencies tended to have a lopsided racial composition. Lower-class-based radical mobilization was important for the nationalist movement to push the British toward concessions for greater self-government; but once the process of decolonization was under way, concerns on the part of British and U.S. interests as well as the local dominant classes over who would inherit political power worked against radical movements and instead rewarded political leaders who managed to tone down lower-class demands for social and economic change. The alternative to class interests open to those leaders for appeals for popular support were communal interests. That international actors were of crucial importance becomes clear, for instance, in the support by the British for the redrawing of constituency boundaries to ensure electoral majorities for the procapitalist, African-based People's National Movement. In Guyana a combination of U.S., British, and local-upper-class pressures effected major institutional change in the form of the introduction of proportional representation to oust the radical Marxist, Indian-based People's Progressive Party and bring the moderate reformist, African-based People's National Congress under Burnham to power. In both cases, mobilization based on racial appeals provided the leaders with the ideological room for maneuver to appease foreign and local economic elite interests until independence had been granted. After independence, the keys to remaining in power were a combination of racial appeals for lower-class support with skillful manipulation of ideology, patronage, and coercion to coopt strategic elites, appease economically powerful internal and external interests, cement middle-class support, and neutralize elite and mass opposition.

Hintzen's study breaks new ground by providing a careful comparative-historical analysis of politics in two Caribbean countries. There are good case studies of individual countries (which Hintzen cites) but none is systematically comparative or has such a clear theoretical focus. Methodologically, he pursues the strategy of parallel demonstration, emphasizing the similarities in the political elites' manipulation of patronage, racial appeals, ideology, control, and coercion. Due to differences in the social and political structures of the two countries, these strategies resulted in different economic systems and regime forms, in capitalism and formal democracy in Trinidad and state socialism and authoritarianism in Guyana, but in both cases they enabled the incumbents to hold on to power for more than two decades while imposing costs on their societies in the form of waste of resources and neglect of mass welfare. Other authors in case studies of Caribbean politics have stressed the importance of patronage and clientelism, ideology, and race; but none has compared the operation of these strategies in the wider political context, showing how they were fashioned in response to constraints from domestic and international political and economic actors or demonstrating the ultimate social and political costs of these strategies.

The argument is very clearly and convincingly laid out, and the analysis is well supported with evidence. The evidence includes a large number of interviews with political, business, and bureaucratic elites in the two countries, selected on the basis of a combination of the positional and reputational method. A particular strength of this fine book is the attention given to the interaction between internal and external forces shaping the strategies and survival chances of the regimes. The book makes a real contribution to our understanding of politics in Trinidad and Guyana, as well as to our general understanding of the dynamics of politics in postcolonial, dependent, racially heterogeneous societies. It certainly takes its place among the 10 best books on Caribbean politics.

EVELYNE HUBER

Northwestern University

India and the China Crisis. By Steven A. Hoffmann. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. 324p. $39.95.

The Sino-Indian war of 1962, over the boundary dispute, was the subject of several books written in the aftermath of the conflict. While authors such as Dorothy Woodman, P. C. Chakravarti, and B. N. Mullik in their accounts tended to portray India as a victim of Chinese expansionist tendencies, it was Neville Maxwell's study of the war (1970) that fueled a major controversy. Maxwell provided the opposite perspective, maintaining that China was provoked into the war through miscalculation and arrogance on the part of India's policy makers. Hoffmann, in this case study of India's decision making during 1959-63, takes a fresh look at the episode and attempts to bridge the gap between the two conflicting opinions. Through close scrutiny of the role of a select group of decision makers (and the decision mechanism employed) during the precrisis period, the war, and the postwar period, he answers such questions as, How did rising stress affect the information-processing capabilities of decision makers and the consultants who served them? How did decision makers consult with advisers and with one another? and How did decision makers and their consultants perform in perceiving alternative strategies and actions and in choosing among them?

What makes this study impressive is the author's painstaking research that supports his conclusions. In addition to the primary source materials researched in India, England, and the United States during 1983-86, Hoffmann also conducted extensive interviews with Indian officials, military officers, and political leaders in the 1980s, uncovering information that was previously unavailable. He also had access to newly available documentary records and memoirs, such as S. Gopal's multivolume official biography of Nehru.

Despite the reservations Nehru, as the first prime minister and foreign minister of independent India, entertained about China in the aftermath of China's occupation of Tibet in 1950, Defense Minister Krishna Menon, high officials in the Ministry of External Affairs and he believed that a friendly Sino-Indian relationship could be forged if Tibet was not allowed to become a barrier and attempts were made to ensure the acceptance of communist China's membership in the community of nations on the world scene (p. 54). In pursuit of this approach India signed a trade agreement with China in April 1954, which included the touted five principles that later became a landmark of India's foreign policy. Sino-Indian relations were most friendly during the years 1954-59.

The Tibetan revolt in March 1959, the granting of political asylum to the Dalai Lama by India, a chain of border incidents, and a clash between Sino-Indian troops in October 1959 brought about a radical change in attitudes on both sides. It pushed the boundary dispute issue, which was recognized before but never given major significance, into the open. Protracted negotiations only resulted in introducing an element of rigidity in positions held by the two sides and ultimately led to war.

Nehru now perceived China as arrogant, revolutionary, and unsatisfied and an expansionist power on an aggressive path: "Thus, his (Nehru's) image of China was that of a 'hostile' country, predisposed to harm India on the strength of deep-seated emotions. The border dispute was but a surface manifestation of fundamental Chinese motives" (p. 55).

China's views of India at this point were reflected in articles and editorials appearing in Chinese press. In May 1959 *Peking Review* published an article stating: "The Indian big bourgeoisie maintains links with imperialism. . . . That is why . . . it more or less . . . reflects certain influences of the imperialist policy of intervention . . . and is attempting to maintain certain legacies from the British colonialist rulers" (p. 60).

Hoffmann reveals that, unbeknown to India, the CIA had started a major program of assisting the Tibetan resistance movement and used Indian territory in 1956. But the Chinese believed that it was the Indian government that was supporting the Tibetan émigré and foreign-agent activity along the Indian border—all denials by India notwithstanding.

Hoffmann contends that another factor that made it difficult for the two sides to reconcile their differences was a basic set of attitudes and beliefs the leaders of the two nations held about the border itself. Nehru passionately believed that since the Indian nation had existed long before the arrival of the British, India's traditional and customary boundaries had long existed and had evolved naturally. Whereas Peking's post-1959 approach was based on the belief that the territorial jurisdiction of China extended to the boundaries that were under her control when a powerful government existed at the center. The McMahon line drawn by the British at a time when central authority in China was weak, therefore, held no credence for the strong communist regime of China. Says the author: "After 1959 China's determination to delimit new *strategic* borders, using both diplomatic and military methods, would conflict sharply with India's post-1947 determination to have historic borders. The two conceptions of proper border delimitation have never been reconciled" (p. 30). The result was that at a critical point the Chinese failed to recognize an opportunity to achieve a negotiated settlement; and a key policy adopted by the Indian side in November 1961, labeled "forward policy," was flawed. While Nehru dismissed the "border psychology" of the Chinese, convinced that the Chinese were bent on expansionist policies, China never understood the psychological dimension of India's handling of the border dispute (pp. 113–14).

A significant portion of the volume is devoted to a critical examination of the crisis management process on the Indian side as it unfolded between 1959 and 1963. The author meticulously examines the character of the decisions made in the prewar period during the war itself, and in the postcrisis period. He pins down the principal decision makers and the circle of advisors involved in the process. He explores the background and the belief systems of the major participants and the influence each one cast on the decisions made. While he identifies Nehru and Menon as the key players, the narrative clearly establishes the preeminent role played by Nehru in the whole affair. The penetrating analysis provided by Hoffmann leads him to remark, "A study of India's role in the India–China conflict helps us to become mindful of how easily normal behavior by a nation's decision-makers can lead to tragedy" (p. 270).

This volume is an important contribution to a fuller understanding of the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the process of decision making. Written in clear and precise language with plenty of information and in-depth analysis, it is a must reading for students and specialists of India's and China's foreign policy.

SUDERSHAN CHAWLA

California State University, Long Beach

Deregulation or Reregulation? Regulatory Reform in Europe and the United States. Edited by Giandomenico Majone. New York: St. Martin's, 1990. 262p. $39.95.

Majone's book of readings is well organized, and each author's work directly and independently addresses a common theme. Majone has written an excellent introductory chapter that synthesizes several distinct academic topics that have not been previously integrated or evaluated before. Regulation and economic regulation are concepts that have quite different meanings and intellectual heritages in America and in Europe. Accordingly, deregulation and reregulation may have different implications for academics and practitioners depending upon which continent they received their training. Regulation has not traditionally been examined from a comparative perspective except by advocates of particular policy positions, so Majone's work should fill an important gap in the regulatory literature.

The European perspective tends to identify regulation with the whole realm of governance, legislation, and social control versus the U.S. meaning of the control by a public agency over activities of nongovernmental actors that are generally considered socially desirable. The U.S. approach, Majone argues, is to wait for market failure and then engage in agency-based regulation; whereas the European approach has traditionally been to nationalize or provide services directly by governmental units rather than rely on market forces. The European perspective owes its roots to the great deflation of 1873–96 and to subsequent economic crises. As both Europe and America are undergoing regulatory reform in a number of different arenas, his intent is to examine and strengthen the intellectual foundations of both approaches so that valid and useful research can be conducted on the complex regulatory issues surrounding the 1992 European economic integration.

In summing up the data presented and the viewpoints of the authors, Majone concludes that total deregulation never occurs; what happens instead is a combination of deregulation and *re*regulation. In the United States the deregulation of AT&T by the Federal Communications Commission was accompanied by a new form of regulation, incentive regulation or price caps, and continued commission overseeing. In Great Britain the denationalization and privatization of the governmental agency supplying telephone service resulted in a situation where entry of other telecommunications firms is allowed, price caps are used to set certain rates, and the regulatory overseeing is supplied by the Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL). Thus, while starting from different institutional bases the deregulation and reregulation activities in Europe and America have many similar outcomes and common problems.

The integration of the economic and political dimensions of regulation in a comparative policy analysis is the principal contribution of this book. The authors display an astute awareness of those instances where political institutions and concepts are transferable. For example, in one chapter Stoetzer shows that the deregulation of prices of scheduled flights should have a smaller impact in Europe than it has had in the United States because a much larger portion of European air traffic is by chartered flights, which are not price-regulated. Chapters by Joerges and Kaufer point out the limitations of certain European regulatory concepts, assess the appropriateness of the U.S. agency-based regulatory model, and identify possible alternative regulatory models suitable for an economically integrated Europe. The evenhanded and insightful treatment of both continent's institutions and intellectual constructs will make this work very useful on both sides of the Atlantic.

It is rare to find a book of edited readings that does so many things so well. The overview by Majone is superb, and the individual readings focus directly on the differences in regulatory concepts and institutions. Majone's book is highly recommended for those interested in a better understanding of regulation and in the comparative study of political institutions.

RAYMOND W. LAWTON

Ohio State University

Trade Unionism: Purposes and Forms. By Ross M. Martin. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. 296p. $55.00.

Ross Martin presents an elegant and crisply written typological study of trade unionism, whose diverse terrain has never been so accessibly mapped. Use of Martin's nomenclature merits consideration by all comparative labor specialists. In spite of its comprehensiveness, the book is concise enough to be read in its entirety as an introduction to the field. It will also prove useful as a reference resource.

Actually, Martin presents two typologies. Part 1, "Purposes," categorizes unions according to the functions and interests they should serve according to modern ideologists. In highly readable discussions, never bogging down in detail, he includes pluralists and syndicalists of various stripes who value unions as politically autonomous "industrial regulators" and "social emancipators." Martin's authoritarians are a motley bunch of Fabians, fascists, Peronists, African socialists, and communists who share ambitions to harness and spur rather than protect or emancipate workers. For the "organicists" Martin rounds up the usual popes and a congregation of Christian socialists like R. H. Tawney and Richard Ely envisioning unions as morally integrative forces.

For Marxist-Leninists, who see unions as the instruments of revolutionary parties, Martin concentrates on the twists and subtleties in Lenin's views. Justifying the category name "Marxist-Leninist," Martin summarily endorses Lenin's view that Marx did not really mean what he said against the alignment of unions and parties, as it was "inspired by the specific exigencies of German politics in 1869." In his letter to Haman, for example, Marx said that association with parties means giving unions a "death blow," closing them down as "schools of socialism." More substantiation of Lenin's dismissal would have been merited, entailing mention of the authoritarian Ferdinand Lassalle, who rejected strikes on Malthusian grounds and engaged unions as transmission belts for the ideas Marx scorned in his "Critique of the Gotha Program." Martin's discussion of Lenin's postrevolutionary views is thoroughly enlightening, however, in showing, for example, that Lenin allowed unions some autonomy backed by the right to strike for protection against "bureaucratic distortions."

Part 2, "Forms," presents another fivefold typology, distinguishing national union confederations in terms of their actual relations with parties and states. The key categories are *party-ancillary* (with discussions of India, France, Italy, Belgium, Venezuela, the Netherlands, and South Africa), *state-ancillary* (USSR, China, Yugoslavia, Tanzania, and Mexico), and *autonomous* (illustrated by a dozen, mostly European union movements). Though generally valuable, these discussions neglect to analyze practices of party-ancillary unions like political strikes and electoral mobilization. Martin devotes uneven attention to state-ancillary unions' service as welfare agencies and overlooks their importance as patronage machinery.

Two smaller categories of *state-surrogate* and *party-surrogate* movements occasion discussions of exotica like Israel's Histadrut, a confederation that is also a major employer in practically all economic sectors. It once organized a militia and is now, as "state within a state," delivering a vast range of social welfare services. As "party surrogates," Poland's Solidarity was the stand-in for a suppressed Catholic-Nationalist-Labor opposition party. As "dominant partners," Japan's Sohyo and Domei fall somewhat awkwardly in the same category, since they provide most of the organization for two weak socialist parties lacking a mass base.

With two concluding theoretical chapters Martin tries to explain some of the variations among and within union confederations. He proposes, somewhat unsurprisingly, that the power and purposes of outsiders determine whether unions become arms of states and parties or remain autonomous. But having agreed that unions left alone limit themselves "spontaneously" (Lenin) to apolitical "home-grown" (Selig Perlman) objectives, Martin neglects to analyze how parties so easily harness unions to broader purposes.

Martin's most serious omission follows from his neglect of employers as another important external force along with parties and states. In a note, he does endorse Hugh Clegg's argument that employer organization and attitudes toward collective bargaining explain the large variation among unions in the "autonomous" category. One is only tantalized with the idea that unions submit to employers as they gain autonomy from parties. Did, for example, Italian employers play a role in encouraging the temporary fusion and partisan autonomy of unions in the late 1970s and early 1980s?

Overlooking employers and focusing only on national-level structures, Martin therefore neglects "company" ("management-ancillary"?) unions, a category perhaps suiting Japan's private sector unions more comfortably than "party surrogate." (Would the Histadrut be a "management surrogate"?) Likewise, part 1 might have mentioned employers and their intellectual allies who espoused company unions. Finally, Martin should have discussed how employers often "recognize" unions to employ them as instruments of market control (e.g., for "taking wages out of competition") and, worse, deform them into instruments of illegal market advantage (through sweetheart contracts and bid rigging). Bringing in employers for completeness, Martin would probably have to abandon the simple typology and array unions along multidimensional continua.

PETER SWENSON

University of Pennsylvania

Puerto Rico's Statehood Movement. By Edgardo Meléndez. New York: Greenwood, 1988. 208p. $37.95.

Edgardo Meléndez' study is a meticulous piece of research on the social basis of the political movement that seeks to make Puerto Rico the fifty-first state of the union. It is both an important contribution to the study of Puerto Rican politics and a timely contribution to the current national debate on the Puerto Rican status question.

Within the field of political sociology, this book is a well-documented interpretive historical study of the statehood movement in Puerto Rico from the late nineteenth century to the present. Meléndez argues that the movement has evolved in consonance with its changing class basis. In its earlier stages (between the late nineteenth century and the midtwenties) the movement represented the progressive republican positions of urban professionals, sugargrowers and organized labor vis-à-vis the monarchic tendencies of the coffeegrowers and the traditional middle class (p. 36). Later, from the midtwenties to the midsixties, after much internal strife, it became a conservative movement dominated by the wealthy local elite, headed by the Puerto Rican sugar barons (p. 69). After the midsixties, under the leadership of the local industrial bourgeoisie and the new middle classes, the movement regained its progressive slant appealing in a populist tone to the working classes and the urban poor (pp. 100ff.).

Ideologically, the movement underwent significant transformations. From the pro-Americanization positions of the earlier days, it evolved into a view of "creole statehood"; that is, Puerto Rico would remain a Spanish-speaking, culturally Hispanic state.

What is interesting and new about Meléndez' perspective is that he does not reduce the statehood movement to a monolithic entity. He reveals its diverse class character and contradictions, explaining the many statehood parties' splits, alliances, and reorganizations in this light. He also attempts to dispel simplistic misconceptions about those supporting statehood as being mere assimilationists or would-be U.S. citizens. He clearly argues that the statehood movement is rooted in political, social, and economic factors, combined differently at different periods in history.

The main weakness of the book—common in interpretive historical studies—is the absence of both a clear theoretical framework and discussion of the theoretical implications of the study to the theory of political movements. Clearly, Meléndez' argument is that political movements are grounded in class conflict and that changes in class conflict—grounded in the political economy of a country—propel changes in political movements. To his credit, Meléndez sees these changes as responding to local, as well as external, circumstances rather than following any predetermined logic of the economic structure or international events.

I found, however, that the absence of a clearer theoretical framework hindered a more precise analysis of the class basis of the movement and its political project. For example, his analysis of the later stage of the movement as reformist and quasi-populist, led by the industrial bourgeoisie first and a sector of the middle classes later, left me wanting an analysis of the different fractions of the local bourgeoisie and the middle classes. I have some disagreements with the characterization of New Progressive Party (PNP) leader Luis A. Ferré as typifying the local industrial bourgeoisie. I believe tht Ferré characterizes a new fraction of the local bourgeoisie that is best classified as the internationalized fraction of the local bourgeoisie. Meléndez argues that the local industrial bourgeoisie's discontent with the Popular Democratic Party (PPD) policy of attracting U.S. capital led it to support statehood. Yet he does not ponder adequately the question of why this fraction of the local bourgeoisie did not turn to independence (pp. 95–100). Likewise, Meléndez' analysis of the ascent of Carlos Romero Barceló as leader of the PNP in 1974 may have been better characterized by analyzing it in the context of the ascent of a new petty bourgeoisie as a key social force in the country. Instead Meléndez sees Romero's leadership as the result of the ascent of the bourgeois and "intermediate social sectors" (p. 159). Yet the opposition PPD leadership could also be characterized as integrated by bourgeois and intermediate local sectors. This lack of a clear theoretical framework then leads to a characterization of the politics of these two PNP leaders (Ferré and Romero) as the "politics of redemption" versus the "politics of equality"—which may be an adequate characterization of the specifically ideological dimension of the statehood program under both leaders but obscures the larger issues of class differences.

From the perspective of policy analysis, the book provides important insights into a key aspect of Puerto Rico-United States relations. In recent years Puerto Rico's status of commonwealth, an unprecedented form of territorial status within the U.S. constitutional system, has become a major issue in U.S. foreign and territorial policy. U.S. officials refuse to call Puerto Rico a colony, while the rest of the world believes it is nothing but a colony. Yet regardless of who is right or wrong on this issue, Puerto Rico's current status has become a source of political embarrassment in international politics and a major drain on the federal budget that provides over six billion dollars a year in transfer payments to sustain a standard of living in the island that is lower than the United States' but higher than Latin America's. The status debate has intensified since 1989 when President Bush endorsed legislation to provide for a plebiscite that would allow Puerto Ricans to decide whether they want to become an independent nation, become the fifty-first state of the union, or remain a commonwealth.

Although Meléndez' book is not written in the framework of policy analysis, it puts in perspective the basis and implications of the statehood option. Any U.S. policy maker who reads this book will come to the conclusion that statehood means different things to different people. The last two chapters of the book clearly imply that Puerto Rico would be unique in two ways: it would be a Spanish-speaking, culturally Hispanic state; and it would also be a welfare state, since the mass support for statehood comes from the poor, who believe that statehood means increased welfare payments. Statehood may be just the alternative to migration.

In spite of some minor weaknesses, the book is the first comprehensive attempt to explain the statehood movement from a scholarly perspective. Meléndez does a fine job of presenting an objective and thoroughly documented analysis of the social basis and evolution of Puerto Rico's statehood movement. This book will become required reading for students of U.S. government, political sociology, and policy analysts.

EMILIO PANTOJAS-GARCIA

University of Illinois, Chicago

Race and Party Competition in Britain. By Anthony M. Messina. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 200p. $44.00.

Scholars studying race in Britain have long bemoaned the failure of political scientists to provide theoretical accounts of stability and change in the nature of racial politics in Britain in the postwar era. Much of the existing scholarship in this area is descriptive and atheoretical and has failed to relate the politics of race to British politics in general. Most political analyses of race in Britain consider racial politics as if they occur in a vacuum, that is, as if they are neither affected by larger political currents nor capable of influencing the British political process.

This book differs from earlier scholarship on the politics of race in Britain on both counts: first, it seeks *explanation* in political science theory. It is not a descriptive political history but is theoretically motivated and serves an explanatory function. The author sets out to explain the race-related motivations of the Conservative and Labour parties, the strategies they employed to keep racial issues off the national political agenda, and the consequences of these actions, both for racial politics and for British politics overall. These explanations are sought within the general context of the Conservative and Labour parties' competition for votes and political office since the 1950s.

This explanatory context further distinguishes this study from earlier work on British racial politics. In order to understand postwar racial politics, the author assigns a fundamental role to existing theories about the workings of party competition in Britain: "Few significant public policy areas can be fruitfully studied, or the larger postwar course of affairs in Britain adequately comprehended, without reference to the postwar political competition of the Conservative and Labour parties" (p. 4). He argues that the actions of the Conservative and Labour parties with respect to race since the 1950s have been a function of the postwar political consensus between the two parties to keep a variety of controversial issues off the political agenda. Thus, the politics of race and racial policy making are not seen as some aberration of British politics unrelated to, or unaffected by, other political events but rather as a function of the "normal" workings of the British party system in the postwar period.

The book is organized into three parts: the first section consists of a discussion of the evolution and implementation of the parties' racial consensus. The author considers the motivations for the parties' depoliticization of race and the specific strategies they employed to keep race off the political agenda. (Denying race was a salient political issue, enacting anti-immigration legislation, imposing tough immigration controls, and creating racial "buffers.") One particular incarnation of the racial "buffer" strategy, the local Community Relations Council, is examined. The role of these local councils in preventing the political mobilization of people of color and diffusing racial issues is assessed on the basis of data collected by the author through a mail survey and personal interviews. The author considers how the national pattern of depoliticization has manifested itself in local politics through a case study of party competition and ethnic minority representation in Ealing Borough.

In the second section of the book, the effects of the postwar suspension of debate on racial matters are considered in a brief examination of the mobilization and activities of antiracist forces such as the National Front and the Anti-Nazi League. The final segment of the book considers the effects of the collapse of the politics of consensus on British racial politics. The author discusses indicators of the breakdown of the racial consensus on the basis of evidence gathered from MPs and party elites. He examines the effects of renewed party competition on racial issues, focusing on the politicial mobilization of ethnic minorities and their demands for greater representation within the Labour party (as articulated through the Black Sections movement). In the final chapter of the book, the author reaffirms the significance of the major parties' postwar political consensus for explaining the politics of race and considers the implications of the renewal of party competition for the nature of British racial politics, and British politics in general, in the future.

This study does not necessarily break new ground in characterizing the postwar politics of race in Britain. A consistent argument running through *existing* scholarship on racial politics in Britain is that (1) the major parties agreed in the late 1950s to depoliticize racial issues, (2) they consistently kept these issues off the political agenda until the middle 1970s (through the use of immigration control and antidiscrimination legislation and the creation of racial "buffering" institutions), and (3) since the late 1970s racial issues have increased in their political salience. This book essentially plays this argument out again, supporting it with more contemporary examples and evidence. (It in particular reiterates the work of Ira Katznelson's *Black Men, White Cities* [1976], where this argument was first introduced.) However, it is consequential because it goes on to explain the motivations behind the depoliticization of race and to analyze the effects of the parties' neglect and eventual repoliticization of this policy area. In addition, the author identifies this controversial issue area as one of a number that fell victim to the politics of consensus and positions the politics of race within a more general argument about the centrality of parties for understanding British politics.

Overall, this work will be of interest not only to students of British racial politics but also to those with a more general interest in the effects of Britain's postwar political consensus and its demise during the Thatcher era. It is in particular a welcome step in terms of improving the methodological orientation of political science research on race in Britain.

JESSICA R. ADOLINO

Ohio State University

Biting at the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair. By Padraig O'Malley. Boston: Beacon, 1990. 330p. $22.95.

Under Siege: Ulster Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement. By Arthur Aughey. New York: St. Martin's, 1989. 214p. $35.00.

These two serious books set out to make sense of two seismic moments in the recent experience of Northern Ireland. Although their angles of approach are markedly different, they both compel us to try to evaluate the vernacular historical notion of "turning points" in the political process. Padraig O'Malley's decision to chronicle the grim epic of the Republican hunger strikes of 1980–81 was one that few academics would make. The task would seem to require either the rashness of the journalist or the sensitivity of the poet. O'Malley has a touch of both, but the heart of his approach is a humane level-headedness in the face of awful evidence. As in his much-acclaimed earlier book *The Uncivil Wars,* he uses a mass of interview material (with 123 people, of whom all but 15 are named) and seems to have talked with every significant participant, the only major exception being the chaplain of the Maze/Long Kesh prison, Father Tom Toner. Like its predecessor, this book is stronger on empathy than on analysis (and none the worse for that, perhaps). It is most intense in the final interview, with the vice-principal of the Stella Maris School, Rathcoole. Twenty of its students, of whom Bobby Sands was one, had so far died in the conflict. Setting out all their passport photographs on the desk, O'Malley writes, "we sit there in silence, the two of us, in the fading light of the winter afternoon, the waste of it all overwhelming. There is nothing left to say." It is a tribute to O'Malley's transparent honesty that there is not a trace of bathos in this predictable but nonetheless imposing scene.

The core of O'Malley's book is a meticulous chronicle of the "dirty protest" that followed the government's withdrawal of "special category" status for Republican prisoners and turned at last into the final agony of serial hunger strikes. It is hard to imagine that this essentially commemorative task could be better performed: the somber tone of this book is the right retrospective on events that once held out to Republicans the tantalizing possibility of decisive victory. O'Malley patiently unravels the individual and organizational motives of the strikers and shows them to be painfully confused. But he himself cannot assign responsibility for the deaths. As he ranges round the contending parties, he finds them all wanting in vision and understanding. Sometimes the apparent triviality of the hunger strikers' aims indicates that a modicum of flexibility on the government's part could have secured a compromise: instead he finds a fatal mixture of rectitude and complacency, "chronic post-colonial hubris."

At other points he voices the outsider's bafflement at the hermetic mental universe of the Republicans ("a galaxy of patriot-ghosts imploding in their imaginations"), whose murderous perfectionism spurns any practical politics. Occasionally he draws on the hypotheses of social psychologists or of oracular philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre; but these provide not so much explanations of his evidence as cultural echoes, like his pungent quotations (of which his title is one) from Yeats. And always there is the sense of "entrapment," of people "caught inextricably in the web of their tragic history," as F. S. L. Lyons wrote in 1979. Thus, the funerals of the hunger strikers "bonded the IRA to its community; each death eliciting forgiveness for the mistaken operations that has resulted in the deaths of innocent Catholics; pardon for the brutalities it inflicted on its own, for making the community hostage to its aspirations" (p. 158). Once or twice he even speaks of "the tribe." For poignant detail, it is hard to beat O'Malley's story of Cardinal O'Fiaich puzzling over the result of Bobby Sands's effort to render his unyieldingly British surname into Irish.

Perhaps the saddest political consequence of the prison strikes was their reinforcement of the fundamental cultural-constitutional antagonism in Ireland. In tracing Protestant-unionist reactions, O'Malley shows how the two "communities" are worlds apart. The "dirty protest" was utterly incomprehensible to people like the unionist leader who asked, "If cleanliness is next to godliness, then to whom are these men close?" The idea that the state could be responsible for these suicides could find no purchase among Protestants, for whom the equivocations of the Catholic hierarchy merely confirmed their complicity in terrorism.

The eventual negotiation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 could only be perceived in zero-sum terms as a nationalist victory and a breach of the Protestant constitution. In *Under Siege* Arthur Aughey minces no words in his denunciation of the agreement, but he believes that it can be destroyed by progressive rather than atavistic unionist principles. This intensely polemical book will probably baffle any readers who look to it for a clear account of unionist resistance to the agreement, but it is a striking and perhaps significant exception to what many observers (Aughey himself included) have seen as the "political inarticulateness of contemporary unionism." Aughey's aim is to repair the damage that he sees as having been done by the wasted opportunity of the task force report *An End to Drift* and to show that "there is some life in the Union yet." He does this by a sustained advocacy of full integration of Northern Ireland into the United Kingdom, a project that is often dismissed as the unionist equivalent of Republican impossibilism.

Aughey contends that the central value of unionism is commitment to the abstract notion of the state, as against the concrete, culture-laden myth of the nation. What they need is not less of the British state (i.e., devolution) but more of it; in particular, they need British party politics. Few will dispute Aughey's argument that a major step toward "normalization" would be taken if the various unionist and nationalist parties were replaced by Conservatives and Labour (not to mention Greens). But he underrates the importance of the fact that the absence of the mainland parties from Northern Ireland was not the result of their unilateral decision: they were driven out. Admittedly, they connived at their eviction thereafter, but in this connivance lies the essence of the abnormality of the United Kingdom. To say that citizens are thereby deprived of a primary civil right is to state a political theorem rather than to grasp political reality. Aughey's argumentative technique ranges from dismissing views he disapproves of as "misuse of the terms of political science" to fairly nasty characterization (of Irish nationalism as "Bord Failte kitsch" or of Garret Fitzgerald "bumbling incoherently about his Protestant mother"). As with Enoch Powell, his sometimes shocking lapses into invective are bound to damage his chances of achieving his Powellite aim of "bringing the parliament of the United Kingdom back to its true principles." His less spectacular but more insidious habit of denouncing arguments he dislikes as "distorting our political language" is unlikely to appeal to political scientists either. This said, anyone who reads this book will gain a heightened awareness of the gulf that separates the unionist view of the agreement from the views of its creators, and will be less likely to hold out unreal hopes of any constitutional resolution within the framework of the two islands.

CHARLES TOWNSHEND

University of Keele

Soviet Policy towards Japan: An Analysis of Trends in the 1970s and 1980s. By Myles L. C. Robertson. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 234p. $39.50.

This work focuses on Soviet policies toward Japan and Soviet perceptions of Soviet-Japanese relations in all its political, economic (especially fisheries), and military-strategic aspects. The book's strength is its systematic coverage of the Soviet writings on Japan, as well as on broader issues such as trade with advanced capitalist countries, war (nuclear and conventional), the "correlation of forces," naval strategy, and so on. The author looks at Soviet relations with Japan from the perspective of Soviet views toward the West and examines Soviet images of Japan as a member of the capitalist bloc, as a Pacific power, and as a nation-state. He should be commended for placing Soviet-Japanese relations within the context of two triangles: Moscow-Tokyo-Peking and Moscow-Tokyo-Washington, rounding out the relationship among Northeast Asia's four powers. The study is well documented, with only rare absences of source citation.

Robertson is right on the mark when he notes that "Soviet commentary on Japan (let alone any real analysis) is both superficial and repetitive" (p. 26) and "does not provide an impressive picture of Soviet expertise on Japan" (p. 143). A good point is that "the central issue of Soviet-Japanese relations came to be an obsession on the part of both nations with the military equation in north east Asia" (p. 33) but also that in Northeast Asia "intimidation has not worked as a policy for the Soviets" (p. 88).

The author makes a valid point in stating that it is curious that a nation such as Japan, which is conscious of the importance of rank or formal status, should put itself constantly in the position of being "outranked" in negotiations by the Soviets (p. 160). And of course, while many Japanese prime ministers have traveled to Moscow, a Soviet Party general secretary (or president) has yet to make the trip to Tokyo.

The author claims in his preface that the work covers the period from the early 1970s to 1987, with an emphasis on the latter 1970s to 1985. In fact, most of the research seems to have been based on 1983 and 1984 sources (including interviews conducted in Moscow in late 1984), with very little attempt made to update the work through 1987. This is most unfortunate, since Gorbachev came to power in March 1985 and began to make significant changes in Soviet policy in Asia.

It is also very frustrating to look at table after table (there are 27) and find that most of them end in 1979 or the 1981–83 period. Surely it would have been easy to update the important trade statistics through the first half of 1987. It also seems negligent for a book published in 1988 to give party strengths in the Japanese National Diet as of December 1984 (ignoring the extremely important Lower House elections in 1986).

A serious lapse is Robertson's statement that Japan and the Soviet Union are still technically at war (p. 129); the state of war automatically came to an end with the signing of the Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration in 1956. The author speculates that the Japanese circumvention of U.S. sanctions over Afghanistan might have been the result of the influence of a "pro-Soviet lobby" within the business community (p. 48). Actually, Japanese business interests (just as those of the U.S. agricultural community) coincide with Soviet interest for more trade. There is no need to look for a "pro-Soviet lobby."

I would question the author's assertion that Soviet-Japanese trade "appears of immense value" (p. 59); in fact, he himself admits that economic ties were "more shallow and subject to variance" (p. 187). Robertson states that "the Soviets have tried to avoid purposely taking action that fuels the undercurrents of nationalism" (p. 145), yet it is hard to believe that the Soviets did not understand that militarizing the disputed northern islands would foster nationalism in Japan.

A few minor points: Tokyo-Osaka is not one region (p. 84), but two distinct regions of Kanto and Kansai; an Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto axis (p. 110) is a geographical impossibility; Heilongjiang is not a coastal province; "Kuda Tolkaiut Iaponiiu" should have been translated as "Where Is Japan Being Pushed?" rather than "Where Is Japan Heading?"

The style is often convoluted or cute: "For these reasons the Soviet-Japanese relationship was not necessary, ineluctable, inevitable, inextricable or unavoidable" (p. 80). The British International Studies Association (responsible for the Cambridge Studies in International Relations) and the Cambridge University Press should be criticized for having allowed this work to be published without requiring updating. The book also suffers from insufficient proofreading (I counted over two dozen errors and typos), and the one-and-a-half page index is grossly inadequate for a book of over two hundred pages. Robertson's study is an important and useful contribution and should have been better presented.

PETER BERTON

University of Southern California

Warpaths: The Politics of Partition. By Robert Schaeffer. New York: Hill and Wang, 1990. 306p. $22.95.

War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh. By Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. 338p. $39.95.

The legacy of political tensions, civilian violence and interstate wars arising from the "partitions" of various countries in the aftermath of World War II and/or the end of British colonial rule constitute the themes of these two books. Robert Schaeffer examines the problems from a historical and cross-national perspective. Schaeffer's concerns are twofold: the nature and consequences of partitions in general (including the politics of divided countries such as Germany, Korea, China, and Vietnam) and the more specific cases of Ireland, Palestine and India. Richard Sisson and Leo Rose first discuss the politics surrounding the separation of Pakistan from India in 1947 at the end of the British Raj and then focus on the political conditions and the sequence of events that led to the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971.

Both books (*Warpaths* in particular) rely on historical methods. However, the greater part of the *War and Secession* study is the outcome of extensive and meticulous interviewing conducted by the authors in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, supplemented by interviews in Washington. Indeed, the extent and depth of the interviewing process in this study has unearthed a vast array of information regarding the politics that led to the creation of Bangladesh. Nearly every major decision maker involved in the political crisis was interviewed except, of course, those who had already met natural or unnatural deaths before the authors got to the subcontinent. Prominent among those who had died were two of the main actors: Prime Minister Sheik Mujibur Rahman of Bangladesh, the leader and hero of the independence struggle, who was killed in a military coup that overthrew his Awami League government; and President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the Pakistan People's party leader whose government was overthrown similarly in a military coup. Bhutto was later hanged by the military strongman, Zia ul-Haq.

In contrast to the Sisson and Rose study of the breakup of Pakistan, the Schaeffer study takes a somewhat grand—perhaps grandiose—approach in analyzing the problems of partition and wars in different parts of the globe. While both studies are highly readable and exciting, the professional backgrounds of the authors are reflected in the nature of their analyses. Schaeffer is a journalist and generalist. Sisson and Rose are academics and specialists in the area of South Asian politics—Sisson in its domestic, and Rose in its international, politics. Where Sisson and Rose's views are carefully documented, Schaeffer's work abounds in personal intuitions and judgments. While I agree with most of his general observations, they are likely to be challenged by other scholars, and even protested by Irish Protestants, Zionists, and Pakistanis. Certainly, the British are not likely to react favorably to his judgment that they were mainly to blame for the partitions of Ireland, Palestine, and India; that such partitions were avoidable; and that they have since brought grief and bloodshed to the peoples of these territories.

In both books, the use of the terms *partitions* and *secessions* to describe the territorial divisions of countries and regions are problematic. Ireland, British India, and the British mandate of Palestine were "partitioned" (according to Schaeffer), while Bangladesh "seceded" from Pakistan (according to Sisson and Rose). If the creation of Pakistan in 1947 (the separation of the smaller part from the greater part of India) constituted a case of partition, it is not clear why the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 (the separation of the larger part from the smaller part of Pakistan) warrants the term *secession*. As a matter of fact, the creation of Pakistan was registered by the United Nations as a case of secession, since India inherited the membership of British India while Pakistan had to apply for admission to the UN body. Perhaps partitions occur when a foreign ruling power withdraws from a particular territory, leaving it divided; while secessions occur when a province of an independent country decides to withdraw from the union. If so, then Irish independence must be considered a case of secession even if the northern part remained with Britain, although Schaeffer terms it a partition. In the case of Palestine, it would appear to be more a case of parceling out a portion of what had become Arab territory over the centuries to European Jews in the aftermath of the holocaust in Europe in order to fulfill Jewish needs to regain their emotional, ancestral homeland. However, Palestine comes closest to the concept of political and territorial partitions.

Schaeffer draws some unusual and controversial parallels among his three case studies. He claims that the British usually supported and fostered the minority group against the majority group in Ireland, Palestine, and India. In each of these three cases, there was a tendency to support that religious group that was perceived to be closest or most understandable to the British themselves, that is to say, Protestants against Catholics, Jews against Muslims, and Muslims against Hindus. Although such observations make for fascinating reading, it may also prove to be somewhat simplistic and even misleading.

Schaeffer's more limited efforts to examine the partitions of Germany, Korea, Vietnam, and China (assuming that Communist China and Taiwan constitute a case of a divided state) appear tangential to his three main case studies. Perhaps these were the real partitions of the post–World War II era. Unlike Ireland, Palestine, and India, where the problems are rooted in religious conflicts, these partitions were the outcomes of ideological conflicts and great power rivalries and provided some of the core issues of the Cold War. There is little point, however, in staking out the contrasts because the conditions and politics of the two groups of states are fundamentally different. On balance, *Warpaths* is a useful and highly provocative book and perhaps the first to make a worldwide study of partitions. And Schaeffer is obviously right in arguing that partitions, far from resolving conflict, only produce newer and more deadly conflict issues that lead to war.

Sisson and Rose's *War and Secession* is a remarkable book of a different vein. It combines academic scholarship in South Asian history and politics with the skills of novelists weaving together a thriller without the dialogue. As the events, perceptions, misperceptions, and decisions of the Bangladesh crisis are traced in Islamabad, Dhaka, and New Delhi, the reader can feel the tensions mount and sense the catastrophe that would soon follow. Through their interviews, Sisson and Rose establish the political miscalculations of the Pakistani military regime of President Yahya Khan goaded on by the fiery Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto that eventually led to the two irreversible disasters of 1971. The first disaster was the outbreak of the Bengali rebellion against Punjabi domination and exploitation in East Pakistan in March 1971 that seemed to foreclose forever political reconciliation and compromise between the two wings of Pakistan. The second disaster arose partly from Pakistani overconfidence in the martial capabilities of the Muslim over the Hindu, resulting in the defeat of Pakistani military forces during the two-week Indo-Pakistani war of December 1971.

In *War and Secession*, Sisson and Rose have undertaken an impressive reconstruction of domestic, regional and international policy making as they were formulated not only in Islamabad, Dhaka, and New Delhi but also in Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. The book provides the reader with a detailed exposition of the political decision-making process over the Bangladesh issue, together with a broader and long-term analysis of the domestic and international politics of the Indian subcontinent. This is easily one of the better and more balanced books to have appeared on the subject in recent years.

RAJU G. C. THOMAS

Marquette University

Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong. By Ian Scott. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989. 480p. $35.00.

Domestic and external politics in China in the second half of the 1980s was marked by two ironies. The Tiananmen massacre of June 1989 and the subsequent rise of the hardliners in Beijing is the first irony because in the 1970s China spearheaded radical changes but 10 years later is the one left behind other communist states. The second irony is that while the peripheral states of the Soviet Union are resurrecting their national independence, China is actively taking over the hitherto independent peripheral states of Hong Kong, Macao, and, more remotely, Taiwan.

Ian Scott is concerned with the fate of Hong Kong, both in the present transitional stage and after the Chinese communist takeover in 1997. His main thesis is that due to a deep crisis of legitimacy, the government of Hong Kong is unlikely to govern the city effectively both now and, after 1997, as a special regional authority under Chinese suzerainty. Scott sees a crisis of legitimacy in the Hong Kong government's unwillingness to incorporate input from the new middle class in policy making, particularly in negotiating with China on Hong Kong's status after 1997.

This is not an analytically rigorous work. There are no explicitly and specifically stated propositions, operationalization of concepts, or presentation of proofs. Rather, the book is a history of Hong Kong from its beginning in the 1840s to the present. The chief strength of the book is its clear and succinct presentation of Hong Kong's history, which Scott skillfully divides into seven periods, each with a distinct line of development.

There are, however, two fundamental problems. The first concerns the substance of the legitimacy crisis. Scott does not discuss in a substantial way either of the two new social groups in Hong Kong—the middle class and working class—that are supposedly the roots of the crisis. He also ignores entirely the intellectual establishment on the island. There is no evidence that Scott ever conducted any interviews there.

Second, Scott's thesis of a legitimacy crisis is not very meaningful in the context of the Hong Kong government. The British never desired to establish a genuine political community on the island (in contrast with, for example, the British policy toward Singapore after the war). Hence, legitimacy consideration lacks a proper object. After 1997, Hong Kong will become part of the People's Republic, so Beijing is the proper target for legitimacy consideration. That Scott applies the concept of legitimacy crisis to Hong Kong is primarily due to his personal preference of seeing Hong Kong remain politically separate from China.

Scott does not discuss the real issues that have long-range consequences for Hong Kong, such as the possibility of regionalization of Chinese politics and economy in mainland China. Hong Kong might make a significant contribution to this endeavor, thus helping it to maintain a degree of its own unique identity.

ALAN P. L. LIU

University of California, Santa Barbara

Territory and State Power in Latin America: The Peruvian Case. By David Slater. New York: St. Martin's, 1989. 273p. $39.95.

The discipline of political science has long been the richer for its openness to concepts and data drawn from other disciplines. In this book, geographer David Slater incorporates perspectives not only from political science but also from economics and sociology in an effort to enhance regional analysis in Third World nations.

The primary goal of the study is to develop a new approach to regional analysis. Heretofore, Slater believes, "regional analysis" has tended to mean merely insights drawn from scholarly work on one region of a nation rather than examination of spatial trends in the country as a whole. Also, Slater argues, in conventional regional analysis the interrelationships between the economy, the state, and civil society are neglected. In his new regional analysis, grounded in neo-Marxism, Slater proposes to focus on three themes: "the spatial unevenness of capitalist development," "the spatial effects of state interventionism," and the "development of regional social movements." These, interacting together, comprise the "regional problematic" (p. 21).

Slater proceeds to explore the regional problematic in Peru during four different time periods. In the belief that the key tendencies of capitalist development vary by historical period, Slater emphasizes different issues for each period. For the first period, 1919–40, the focus is upon the influx of foreign investment during the government of Augusto Leguía and the political reaction against Leguía's policies in two important regional capitals. For the second period, 1940–68, the focus is upon the expansion of capitalism in highlands agriculture and the extent to which this expansion resulted in outmigration from the rural highlands and, more generally, urbanization. The public investment projects of the military government are the central theme for the 1968–80 era. For the 1980–84 period of elected government, Slater emphasizes that amid economic crisis, regionalist social movements increased.

Although many of Slater's data sets have been published in somewhat similar form previously, he has drawn up numerous maps on which key components of the data sets are beautifully illustrated. The figure entitled "Structure of the Space-Economy, Peru 1980" (p. 183) is especially useful; and variants upon it would be excellent for introductory and advanced understanding of any country.

While Slater is undoubtedly correct that key regional issues vary according to historical period, his decision to view the "regional problematic" from different angles at different eras is troublesome. No data set is consistent over more than any one period, not to mention the entire 65 years. Accordingly, Slater cannot draw any conclusions about trends in spatial unevenness, the state's spatial policies, or regional social movements.

Other shortcomings mar the book. Rather than refer to one primary body of scholarly literature throughout the study, Slater raises, and then drops, the names of hosts of scholars, and the result is something of a theoretical mélange. Also, although the book was published in 1989, the account takes us only through 1984; hence, some pertinent topics (in particular Alan García's regionalization policy) are not discussed.

Overall, Slater's ambitious study raises the level of scholarly debate about regional analysis. The work is provocative, introducing new concepts and questions. It is not, however (as the author acknowledges) definitive. A definitive study of "territory and state power in Latin America" would consider a greater variety of independent variables (in particular, in my view, actual geography) and would be more comparative across Latin American countries.

CYNTHIA MCCLINTOCK

George Washington University

Moscow and Greek Communism: 1944–1949. By Peter J. Stavrakis. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989. $28.95.

Peter Stavrakis creates a valuable resource for historians and political scientists alike in detailing the relationships of the Greek Communist party (KKE) and Moscow at the close of World War II. Within the six-year time frame, he considers three periods in detail, tracing the fluctuations and ambiguities of Soviet policy and the adaptations in the policies of the KKE. Stavrakis emphasizes the flexibility of Soviet foreign policy within an uncertain international environment. His argument stresses the willingness of the Soviets to sacrifice the success of the KKE in the Greek Civil War to Soviet priorities. The author ranks "strategic factors," especially Soviet maneuvering with the United States and Britain, as more important in explaining Soviet foreign policy changes than events within Greece, within the Soviet elite, or between Tito and Stalin over Balkan politics. Stavrakis adopts the KKE view that the most important single variable in Soviet foreign policy of the 1944–49 period is Stalin.

Stavrakis claims to have written the first objective *history* of the Greek Civil War. There is no argument over the importance of a thoroughly documented case study of the Greek Civil War to a much-needed reassessment of events that contributed to U.S. Cold War biases. The author's claim to objectivity and his methodology are not compatible with mainstream analysis in political science, whether or not the study would be considered "objective" history.

The author draws upon U.S. National Archive records and Greek sources to provide previously unpublished details on the dilemmas of the KKE. From the information on the KKE, he infers the content and intent of Soviet foreign policy. In a political science approach, one would consider the gap between the rhetorical policy of the USSR and the policy as implemented. Stavrakis' focus on the impact of Soviet policy on the KKE precludes consideration of the weight of events on Soviet policy makers and capabilities. While Stalin was, no doubt, the most important decision maker in the eyes of the KKE elites, the converse is more difficult to accept. From 1944 to 1949, Soviet elites confronted numerous and onerous domestic and foreign policy problems more immediate and monumental than the question of Soviet policy toward the KKE. Particularly in the environment in which the Soviets, as Stavrakis claimed, prioritized strategic factors, one would suspect that Soviet communications to the KKE would provide less than an objective view of Soviet intentions. The archives, in Stavrakis' deft hands, do enlighten us on the Greek situation but are only an inferential source for the more general content and intentions of Soviet foreign policy of the 1944–49 period.

Stavrakis does weigh evidence from various perspectives on the duality of Soviet foreign policy goals in the middle years of this period. His conceptualizations of Soviet objectives as "prudent expansionism" and of KKE policies as "gradualism" do avoid the stereotypical dichotomies of Cold War and revisionist histories. Such judicious and commendable analysis does not remove the particular viewpoint that derives from the author's emphasis on KKE interests and his explication of archival materials on Greek interests. Indeed, one strength of the study is just this presentation of a point of view long neglected by analysts interested in discussing the Greek Civil War as if it had occurred primarily to illuminate superpower competition.

Such a book as Amikam Nachmani's *International Intervention in the Greek Civil War* (1990), detailing the role of the United Nations and its observer mission in the conflict, would have a greater claim to "objectivity." The definition of the topic would support a claim to describe the events of the Greek Civil War without identification with any of the participants in the conflict. The Greek point of view certainly is partisan, however justifiably so.

Methodologically, Stavrakis relies on "path analysis," as an addition to historical narrative. The additional rigor of the analysis is much to be commended. The absence of Soviet archives on USSR involvement in Greece makes the path analysis incomplete. Stavrakis must infer from the record of communications and the behaviors of Greek and Balkan communists what the original content of Soviet policies were. He, then, infers from assumed Soviet policies what Soviet intentions were. This is necessary in light of the lack of primary sources. The method is risky, however, given the high probability that *some* observed behaviors of Greek and Balkan communists were *un*intended results of Soviet policy. Consideration of the weight of events on the Kremlin during these years suggests that the Soviets could ill afford to devote the resources necessary to avoid unintended results. For example, Zbigniew Brzezinski's *Soviet Bloc* (1967) documents several incidences of unintended consequences of Soviet policies in the Balkan states in the 1944–49 period.

In contrast, consider Vinod Aggarwal's use of path analysis in his study of the development of the multifiber arrangement in his *Liberal Protectionism* (1985). Aggarwal is able to trace the various points of view expressed prior to a series of sequential agreements, to compare rhetorical policy with published policy, and to contrast published policy with actual behaviors of several signatories. He is not compelled (as Stavrakis is) to infer the intentions of a major actor. Aggarwal can trace the uninterrupted path of a series of policy decisions—a more suitable use of the method.

The Stavrakis book is a very valuable source of information on the goals of the KKE and the behaviors of the states involved in the Greek Civil War. It provides a perspective that has been omitted for far too long. The differences between Stavrakis' claims for historical methods and political scientists' claims for methodology ought not deter readers of this journal from benefiting from Stavrakis' carefully documented study.

CONSTANCE H. COLE

Saint Mary's College of California

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The International Politics of Agricultural Trade: Canadian-American Relations in a Global Agricultural Context. By Theodore H. Cohn. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1990. 267p. $36.95.

This book attempts successfully to close gaps in the literature on Canadian-American relations and in the international relations literature on food and agriculture by analyzing the interplay between the United States and Canada on international agricultural trade issues from the 1950s to the 1980s. This interplay is important because of the centrality of the United States and Canada in the international food regime, their interdependence and their reliance on agricultural exports. The author first examines the evolving relationship and the organizational setting, then discusses U.S. and Canadian actions on international pricing arrangements, surplus disposal measures, export credits, and agricultural trade barriers. The analysis tries to explain bilateral conflict and cooperation, the strategies that Canada and the United States have used to achieve their agricultural trade objectives, and whether these objectives have been achieved. The explanatory variables are divided into an environmental category (U.S. balance of payments, relative economic size, and bilateral interdependence) and an agricultural category (supply in the world market, relative size of agricultural economies and strength of the agricultural trade regime).

Cohn, building from the analysis of Keohane and Nye in *Power and Interdependence,* argues that agriculture is an area of growing interdependence between the two countries and that increasing interdependence has resulted in increasing conflict, with both countries strengthening their efforts to find cooperative solutions through such mechanisms as increased consultations and the recently concluded bilateral Free Trade Agreement. The author shows that conflict is most serious when surpluses exist on the market. The United States, which dominates the world agricultural trade market, tends to act unilaterally, creating hardships that Canada generally seeks to redress through diplomatic channels. The weak agricultural trade regime of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) exacerbates disputes and promotes bilateral solutions. The recent emergence of the European Community as an aggressive competitor to the United States and Canada in international markets has led both countries to work together in the Uruguay Round to apply GATT rules more strictly to agricultural trade. The book shows that Canada and the United States have generally pursued similar trade objectives (maintaining or increasing market share, exporting commodities at remunerative prices, maintaining or achieving a favorable agricultural trade balance, limiting imports of supplementary agricultural products) but that the emphases have been different and have changed over time. Both nations have experienced increasing difficulty achieving their trade objectives in the 1980s.

The principal strength of this book is that it carefully provides a very interesting and almost encyclopedic account of the evolution of the U.S.-Canadian agricultural relationship since 1950, which will be very useful to students and scholars interested generally in how Canada and the United States get along in the world. It will also be a useful reference work for some time to come for those who study the international politics of food and agriculture, given the central role that Canada and the United States play in international agricultural trade.

The work's principal weakness is that the introductory chapter, though it discusses both independent and dependent variables, never really develops a set of hypotheses for the author to test in his later chapters. Thus, the reader goes through most of the book without a very good idea of what the author is attempting to accomplish in his analysis. It is only in the concluding chapter that one gets a good sense of how the independent variables are important for explaining conflict and cooperation between the United States and Canada. Still, the descriptive strength overshadows the analytical weakness. This is an important, well-written book.

H. WAYNE MOYER

Grinnell College

Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. By Cynthia Enloe. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. 244p. $35.00 cloth, $10.95 paper.

European tourists and Caribbean chambermaids in resort hotels, U.S. military wives and Filipino prostitutes on military bases, Sri Lankan domestic workers in U.S. homes, Mexican women garmentworkers in export-processing zones, British diplomatic wives, Thai mail-order brides, Carmen Miranda, and Fawn Hall—these are among the typically invisible international political actors who, according to Cynthia Enloe in this groundbreaking work, grease the wheels of world politics. Enlarging on the feminist axiom that "the personal is political," Enloe creatively and convincingly argues that not only is the personal international, but also "the international is personal." Women's (and men's) daily lives are shaped by global economic forces and state interactions; but even more significantly, the conduct of international commerce and foreign affairs depends upon women's "private" relations with men. Whether as wives, daughters, mothers, secretaries, maids, prostitutes, or sweatshop workers, women not only perform often unremunerated or poorly paid sexual, emotional, and physical labor for individual men but also for multinational corporations, international organizations, foreign ministries, and militaries. Similar to her thesis in *Does Khaki Become You? The Militarisation of Women's Lives* (1983), in which she explores how militaries rely on women, as either feminized or dehumanized objects, to sustain their masculinist ideologies, recruits, operations, and adventurism, Enloe insists that the bifurcation of gender identities into masculine and feminine, unequal gender relations, and the resulting invisibility of women in international politics has allowed male-dominated states and corporations to maintain global hierarchies with relative impunity.

Women, however, are not just victims of international politics, Enloe hastens to point out. Few women occupy seats of power, but many more are in middle management positions in foreign policy establishments and international organizations. In response to sexist practices in these institutions, such groups as the Women's Action Organization in the U.S. state department and the Ad Hoc Group on Equal Rights for Women in the United Nations have been organized by women to increase their numbers and better their working conditions and chances for advancement. Outside of these middle- and upper-class foreign and international policy establishments, we find Greenham and other peace camp women maintaining almost a decade-long presence on the perimeter of military bases to protest the deployment of nuclear weapons as well as Mexican women garmentworkers blockading a sewing machine factory after many of their coworkers perished in the rubble left by the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City because the owners and the army chose to save equipment, not workers.

In fact, as Enloe reveals, there has been a long history of women's resistance to being exploited by states and corporations. However, this does not mean that women have a natural solidarity with each other in these varied struggles. Enloe's examples are very carefully presented to show that First World and Third World women are often working at cross purposes as in the case of white, middle-class, North American career women hiring poor Sri Lankan women immigrants to care for their children. This privatized arrangement has given North American women more options than housewifery and does provide Sri Lankan women with greater income than they could make at home while also helping Sri Lanka to earn the foreign exchange these women send home. Nevertheless, it ensures that child care will continue to remain the private responsibility of women in North America, reinforces class and race inequalities between First World women employers and Third World women employees, allows Sri Lanka to continue to export its women's labor rather than create decent jobs for them at home, and feeds into the global economic hierarchy that keeps Third World countries poor so they can provide a steady source of cheap labor for First World countries. Thus, the maintenance of these structural inequalities makes it difficult for women to find common cause in world politics.

It is women, however, who have made it possible for men to find common cause—whether as diplomatic wives serving intimate dinners to statesmen so they can develop trust in their otherwise hostile world of realpolitik or as women nationalists serving as symbols of national purity and unity. Indeed, assigning women to these roles, Enloe argues, has allowed men to appropriate and masculinize such concepts as nationalism, sovereignty, security, and risk. For example, a masculinized nation "when it was most unified, most altruistic—will be a community in which women sacrificed their desires for the sake of the male-led collective" (p. 63), thus curtailing any discussion among women about what their aspirations might be. Similarly, a masculinized approach to international finance forces countries into debt and women onto the margins of the global economy as adventure-seeking bankers revel in making risky investments in the competitive world they have fashioned. Unfortunately, Enloe does not take this theoretical analysis much further in terms of its implications for realist or neorealist paradigms in international relations, nor does she suggest how these concepts might be demasculinized or reconstructed. However, in her intriguing chapter entitled "Carmen Miranda on My Mind," she does explore how the masculinist United Fruit Company was able to feminize its image, hiding its imperialist ventures in banana republics from U.S. women consumers behind the safe and sprightly visage of a Hollywood-contrived Latin American market woman.

Bananas, Beaches, and Bases offers a refreshing, insightful, and critical departure from conventional, top-down treatments of international politics. At a time when there is a need to explore the complex interplay of cultural, social, economic, and political forces in the face of the bankruptcy of modernist and masculinist ideologies, orders, and institutions as well as the enormity of global problems, this contemporary feminist reading of world politics makes eminent sense.

ANNE SISSON RUNYAN

State University of New York, Potsdam

Beyond Deterrence: The Political Economy of Nuclear Weapons. By Frank L. Gertcher and William J. Weida. Boulder: Westview, 1990. 362p. $42.50.

This important book combines political and economic perspectives on defense but does not offer a political-economic theory that would take us "beyond deterrence." While there is reference to a transition or shift in emphasis from nuclear to conventional forces, the authors do not take us beyond current definitions of deterrence. Nor do they suggest alternatives to deterrence as a principal concept that underlies much of U.S. defense policy.

A particular strength in the book is the third part in which the authors treat the economic part of political economy. This is not surprising, since both co-authors are economists. Other parts of the book are excellent descriptively on military capabilities—nuclear and non-nuclear, offensive and defensive. The authors certainly have done their homework in providing extensive detail on space-related and other high-technology systems. (See their chapters on levels of capability and evolving technologies.) The authors' discussion on nuclear proliferation is also worth reading.

Gertcher and Weida reveal their orientation clearly in one passage when they argue that "economic strategies determine the various ways in which national resources can be used," thus linking "economic and military objectives." Indeed, they assert that "economic policy *is* defense policy" (p. 309, emphasis mine)! Beyond this tendency to understate the relative importance of political factors, they are also inclined to give more weight to domestic considerations than to external factors. (See, e.g., the discussion on the causes of arms races, pp. 293–96.)

The authors repeat the usual assertion that nuclear weapons are "cheap" in relation to the cost of conventional forces (p. 172). While this may be true of individual weapons, it overlooks the enormous costs of delivery systems. The point is tangential to their main argument, however, which is advocacy of "a carefully managed transition from an offense-dominant deterrent to a defense-dominant deterrent, coupled with reductions in strategic nuclear weapons" (p. 145).

Although they admit it is an economic relation that "has yet to be proved," Gertcher and Weida nevertheless offer the prediction that force posture decisions between offense and defense will be driven by an economic criterion such that "the amount of deterrence gained per dollar spent on defense is greater than the amount of deterrence gained per dollar on offense" (p. 133). Operationalizing this criterion as a practical guide to decision makers, whatever may be its merit to economists, is enormously difficult. Moreover, it overlooks a larger number of strategic and political considerations that necessarily are part of the defense decision-making calculus.

Although the authors have avoided terms such as *industrial policy* (much less *central planning),* they do call for a greater government role in coordinating the allocation of national resources for security or defense purposes. They see a role to be played by a new mechanism similar to that of the Federal Reserve Board, which coordinates monetary policy for the economy as a whole.

Their proposal is worth serious consideration. Because defense is so large a part of the overall U.S. economy and because the government plays so large a role in the defense sector, Defense Department expenditures necessarily have enormous implications for the economy as a whole. While this is well understood, the degree of central attention to these externalities is relatively smaller in the United States than in other democracies to include, among others, Japan, Germany, and France. Japan's MITI, for example, produces an annual white paper on objectives or goals for the economy that is the result of extensive discussion and consensus building between government and industry. As one of my colleagues has suggested, the white paper is not so much directive as it is a reflection of the collective rationality of government and industry leaders. This is what Gertcher and Weida seem to have in mind.

Defense is, after all, the one sector of the economy in the United States in which government planning has legitimacy; however, this is done primarily by the Department of Defense itself and does not necessarily take into account effects outside of the defense sector. The authors would have "a high-level, nonpartisan group" take on the job of evaluating "how the entire U.S. stock of resources can be used most efficiently." The Department of Defense would be left "to make the lower level allocation decisions that it is best qualified to handle" (pp. 315–16). The authors also argue that "the U.S. should always pay for defense as it is used," an admonition to avoid debt and to recognize when there is a "consumption sacrifice necessary to attain a given level of defense spending" (p. 311).

In their discussion of World War II and the development of air power doctrine, the authors note the Allied objective of "breaking the will of an enemy to wage war" (p. 62). In their discussion, more attention might have been paid to the postwar bombing survey that raised serious question about such an objective. Indeed, there has been a return to a perhaps-more-traditional view that targeting ought to be directed toward destroying or substantially weakening an enemy's war-making capability, *not* the will of its people. Not only is this focus on military targets more defensible on military grounds; but it is also somewhat less problematic morally, depending, of course, on weapons used and the degree of collateral death and destruction wrought. Beyond moral considerations, confining scarce ordnance to targets of military value is also consistent with the economy of force principle.

The authors do not always define terms easily understood by the specialist but not immediately clear to the general reader or to many students taking graduate and undergraduate courses. Thus, the meanings of *decapitation, escalation dominance, active and passive defenses,* and numerous other defense concepts should have been included in a glossary or at least defined in the context of their use. The book nevertheless has great applicability in international relations and security courses. Unfortunately, the publisher's pricing puts this important volume out of reach of many students.

The authors did most of the work on this manuscript prior to the events of 1989 and 1990. The tone of their commentary on U.S.-Soviet competition no doubt would be softened were they writing today. Nevertheless, the questions they raise and the principal arguments they make continue to have relevance in current debates. It is a substantial contribution to the defense policy literature.

PAUL R. VIOTTI

United States Air Force Academy

Beyond Glasnost: The Post-Totalitarian Mind. By Jeffrey C. Goldfarb. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989. 248p. $24.95.

Jeffrey Goldfarb's work is an excellent study of the nature of the totalitarian mind. His contribution is most timely as Eastern Europe and even the USSR now move into a post-totalitarian political era. Goldfarb's frequent trips to Poland and his extensive contacts with Polish intellectuals there and at his academic base in this country (the New School for Social Research) considerably enrich his study. He has effectively utilized a deep interest in the ideas of Hannah Arendt on the nature, origins, and persistence of totalitarianism in the twentieth century. He stresses that her "great accomplishment was to bring onto center stage the uniqueness of totalitarianism." Goldfarb elaborates on Arendt and argues that totalitarian culture is a necessary precondition for the existence of a totalitarian political order. A large portion of his book deals with political culture in East Central Europe—how totalitarian political culture arose there and how it is being "deconstructed." His analysis is particularly effective in its sympathetic portrayal of such outstanding East European writers as the Czechs Milan Kundera and Vaclav Havel and, above all, the Pole Adam Michnik. Goldfarb's thesis is that East European intellectuals such as these point the way beyond totalitarian culture. In the chapter "Autonomous Politics" he produces an impressive exposition of Michnik's balanced reflections on Pilsudski and Roman Dmowski. Goldfarb's argument about the importance of the East European intellectuals was supported by the 1990 address to the U.S. Congress by Havel, now president of Czechoslovakia; Havel's speech attained Lincolnesque stature.

In his study Goldfarb puts much emphasis on the uniqueness of the twentieth-century phenomenon of totalitarianism. He relies considerably on the arguments of Hannah Arendt and George Orwell (especially in his discussion of totalitarianism's symbiotic relationship to "Newspeak"). He perhaps might have mentioned the older classic, Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski's *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (1965), especially since the junior author of that pioneering effort is a Polish-American and an important academic and national security figure in fields touching directly upon Goldfarb's study. The author notes the arguments of those who minimize the distinctive quality of totalitarianism (such as Herbert J. Spiro) but does not find their reasoning convincing. Rather he believes that twentieth-century European history decrees the opposite. He devotes most of his attention to East European and Soviet *cultural* totalitarianism. His analysis includes considerable discussion of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, although he does not mention that Russian writer's famous article "Live Not According to the Lie!"—whose thesis is virtually identical to a major part of Goldfarb's argument.

At the beginning of his book Goldfarb raises the important issue of whether there is a "totalitarian certainty" in Marx himself. He returns to this controversial question in his final chapter and argues that Marx insisted on "totalistic" solutions to human problems and thereby denied the validity of pluralism. The author notes that not all Marxists are Stalinists but that there is a commonality between them. The great Polish émigré philosopher Leszek Kolakowski, noted in this study, has correctly insisted that a compulsive insistence upon "unity" is a common thread in Marx and Stalin (and, we might note, in the new Soviet neo-Stalinist political group "Unity" led by Nina Andreyeva).

As anyone involved in studying and writing about the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the Gorbachev era knows, whatever is put down on paper is all too soon out of date. The rate of political change in this region has been accelerating at breathtaking speed. Goldfarb's analysis, although written before the momentous changes in Eastern Europe during fall and winter 1989–90, is still timely and relevant. His cautioning remarks on the Soviet polity under Gorbachev should now be somewhat less cautious. But even at present it is too early to dismiss as irrelevant the Soviets' totalitarian past, although this Stalinist legacy is one that Gorbachev now feels freer to attack (since his significant but not total victory over the conservatives at the Twenty-eighth Party Congress).

Goldfarb's book is well reasoned and full of valuable insights. His insistence on the *uniqueness* of the totalitarian horror of the twentieth century seems sound from the perspective of the century's last decade. It is precisely this totalitarian political culture that has now been almost completely cast aside in Eastern Europe and, one hopes, is being relegated to the "scrap heap of history" in the USSR itself.

CHARLES F. ELLIOTT

George Washington University

Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes. By Richard N. Haass. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. 184p. $22.50.

Richard Haass's book is a useful dose of realism countering tendencies in U.S. foreign policy (its study as well as its making) toward what might be called perceptual and prescriptive idealism.

By perceptual idealism I mean the sense (as it is often put) that peace is "breaking out all over," that war is becoming obsolete, that victory in the Cold War is ours to be declared with finality and totality. Haass's study, however, is a sobering reminder about the conflicts that remain "unending," notwithstanding the fall of the Berlin Wall, the liberation of Eastern Europe and perestroika in Soviet foreign policy. Indeed, while dramatic breakthroughs have been made since the book's publication in one region (South Africa), two others (India–Pakistan, the Middle East) have recently shown disturbing rumblings of possible war.

By prescriptive idealism I mean the dual sense—rooted in the longstanding Wilsonian tradition of peacemaking—that American foreign policy has a mission and that with enough effort all problems have rational and programmatic solutions. Here Haass rightly urges that regional conflicts need be approached in "the larger context" (p. 8) of their own history and their own indigenously complex political dynamics rather than just in the narrow and overly instrumental terms of agendas for negotiation and point plans for peace.

The reality, Haass argues, is that at the present point in time many of these conflicts are problems without solutions; that is, in terms drawn from the work of I. William Zartman, they are not *ripe* for resolution. He delineates four criteria for ripeness: a shared perception of the desirability of an accord, effective leadership among the principal parties to the conflict, the possibility of domestic consensus within the principal parties, and a mutually acceptable negotiating process (pp. 27-29). When these conditions are not present, the optimal strategy for the United States is said to be conflict management and not major peace initiatives.

There is some definite wisdom to this policy advice. It is neither isolationist retreat nor missionary zeal. Policy attention remains warranted at minimum to help ensure that history in these regions, far from ending, does not repeat itself. But U.S. presidents should base any major initiatives on solid and thorough analysis of the nature of the conflict, as well as on realistic assessments of the prospects for success. (Given Haass's position as senior staff on the National Security Council, this is advice that has a direct channel into the Bush administration.)

But while the logic of ripening in itself is strong, in Haass's version one gets more of a sense of the costs and risks averted by avoiding flawed diplomatic initiatives than of those potentially incurred by the possibilities of *rotting*. There is an implicit assumption in his arguments that more is to be lost by attempting too much too soon than by doing too little too late. But as any scientist or farmer knows, the ripening process is always vulnerable to rotting. Hostile forces (extremists and aggressors in the political world) may attack and leave the political conflict in worse condition tomorrow than today.

Time thus may not always be on the side of the peacemakers. In the Middle East, for example, with the passage of time (say, since 1978–79) the conflict appears to have rotted far more than ripened. In the wake of additional years of more acts of terrorism perpetrated by the PLO, more Israeli settlements built on the West Bank, more polarization on both sides and more children socialized into hatred, resolving this conflict is more difficult today than yesterday—and likely will become even more difficult tomorrow.

In South Africa, on the other hand, the ripening has proceeded far more rapidly than Haass's assessment predicted. His *go slow* prescription is based on his opposition to the economic sanctions imposed by Congress in 1986 ("certainly not the answer," p. 111) and on his assessments of the African National Congress as "in danger of becoming more a symbol of resistance than its core" (p. 103) and of a rightward shift in Afrikaner politics that would constrain F. W. de Klerk from "much more than modest gestures" (p. 112) toward Nelson Mandela.

The realism Haass prescribes thus also has its limits. Ripening often needs more of a proactive approach than he proposes, to speed the process sufficiently to outpace the risk of rotting. Accurate policy analysis is also essential, such that assessments of local political realities avoid undue pessimism no less than overoptimism.

How to achieve these, of course, is open both to political debate and intellectual development, processes to which this book makes an important contribution.

BRUCE W. JENTLESON

University of California, Davis

Arms Control during the Pre-Nuclear Era: The United States and Naval Limitations between the Two World Wars. By Robert Gordon Kaufman. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. 289p. $40.00.

The last serious efforts at naval arms control happened more than 50 years ago, and Robert Kaufman's study of the naval conferences of the 1920s and 1930s underscores the difficulties that would probably arise once more if naval forces are subjected to arms control efforts. Kaufman aptly chronicles the Washington naval conference of 1921–22 and the two subsequent London naval conferences of the 1930s in an effort to understand why arms control failed to stem the naval buildups prior to World War II. Kaufman uses three themes to explain the disappointing consequences of these conferences: the impact of domestic politics, the unrealistic expectations of the participants (particularly the U.S. participants), and the difficulty of reconciling arms control means with political ends.

The key nations in these naval talks (the United States, Great Britain, and Japan) entered into the proceedings with differing objectives. The United States and Britain, feeling the combined impacts of fiscal pressures and the political power of their respective peace movements, saw arms limitation as a way to save money and prevent wars resulting from arms races. Japan, on the other hand, sought recognition as an emerging Asian power and hoped to limit U.S. and British naval forces to a size that would not challenge Japan's rising power in Asia.

According to Kaufman, the United States and Britain had a common interest in limiting Japanese naval power in the Pacific, but their ability to accomplish this was hampered by Anglo-American disagreements and by domestic confrontations within their respective nations over naval arms limits. The Japanese, at the same time, enjoyed the benefits of a relatively closed political system that minimized internal political opposition to their treaty agreements. In the end, though, none of the agreements granted Japan the parity it sought with the United States and Britain; consequently Japan abrogated all her naval treaty obligations during the second London naval conference in 1936, precipitating the naval buildup by all powers that preceded World War II.

Kaufman is at his best in detailing the conference preparations and proceedings, revealing what must have been a considerable amount of archival research time. He might have gone further, though, in exploring British and Japanese primary sources, especially since his coverage of the Japanese approaches to naval limitations is somewhat scanty compared to his portrayal of the U.S. approaches. (The pertinent Japanese documents are now in the Library of Congress.) His chapters on "confounded expectations" are also valuable, reminding readers that U.S. idealism in particular can result in thwarted hopes when not tempered with a dash of realism. Kaufman notes, for example, that U.S. negotiators never insisted on verification measures, relying on the "good will" of the parties not to surreptitiously break the agreements. Such hopes were quickly frustrated when the Japanese systematically violated the agreements they had signed, but the U.S. response was only to complain to the Japanese that their naval attachés had no access to information on Japanese shipbuilding.

There are limits to Kaufman's book. His effort to tie arms control and naval doctrine falls short, largely because he is never clear about what he means by *doctrine* and does not provide a complete discussion of what U.S. naval doctrine was, other than to mention War Plan Orange and the influence of Mahan. Sometimes *doctrine* seems to be confused with force levels, as in Kaufman's discussion of the impact of the 1922 Washington Treaty on U.S. naval forces. At other times, *doctrine* becomes simply the force levels that U.S. Navy leaders wanted; but whether these force aspirations represented doctrinal requirements or navy bureaucratic interests is not specified.

Kaufman also missed an opportunity to consider more the potential lessons from naval limits in the pre-World War II period to the modern era, despite noting the importance of such comparisons in his introductions. Two pages at the end is not enough; and Kaufman could have expanded his comparison of open and closed societies to U.S.-Soviet arms control and provided more discussion on the perils of weak arms control verification regimes.

These limits aside, Kaufman has written a useful book on an important period for arms control, and his book does in some ways go beyond the standard literature of the period. It should be read especially by anybody who might be tempted to propose naval arms control again.

DAVID S. SORENSON

Denison University

Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy. By Janne E. Nolan. New York: Basic Books, 1989. 320p. $21.95.

The end of the Cold War in 1989 has come none too soon, since, according to the author, the United States is in danger of losing control over its nuclear arsenal. Throughout the many changes of nuclear strategy from Truman's NSC 68 to Reagan's Peace Shield, the military, because it has been responsible for operational planning, has been preoccupied with nuclear war fighting rather than deterrence. By contrast, the civilian policy makers have emphasized declaratory doctrines such as assured destruction to calm a public fearful of nuclear war that such a war would not occur or, if it occurred, would not be suicidal. Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative was thus a particularly shrewd move. The bulk of Nolan's book focuses on SDI, its origins essentially in domestic politics and the administration's efforts to use SDI not only to quiet public opinion but to hide the huge counterforce offensive buildup from public scrutiny.

Nolan argues that presidents and Congress have not appreciated the powerful influence of these nuclear war plans. They have also not understood the extent to which these plans constrain the politically responsible officials' ability to define force levels for deterrence and arms reduction efforts that are "required" to change the nation's nuclear posture. Nolan points out that separation of the declaratory and operational sides of strategic policy means that U.S. political leaders have blatantly neglected their constitutional responsibility. Nolan ends her analysis with several suggestions for a decision-making process that would be more representative of the country's objectives and that would subject nuclear war plans to more opportunities for political, as well as technical, judgments by the president and Congress.

This emphasis on the declaratory-operational gap of nuclear strategy certainly emerges more strongly in this book than in such other fine analyses as Gregg Herken's *Counsels of War* (1985) or Lawrence Freedman's *Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (1983). Things would appear not to have changed much since the days of the Schlieffen Plan, which, while technically brilliant, left Germany's political leaders in 1914 no options, thus transforming a Balkan crisis into a European conflagration. Military organizations jealously guard their autonomy from "political interference" and "micromanagement." But other accounts suggest that the United States' postwar political leaders, unlike Germany's, have been knowledgeable about nuclear arms, technological developments, and the implications these held for strategy and policy. Robert McNamara, James Schlesinger, and Harold Brown have not been willing to allow the military to determine strategy; they expected to have a say in target selections in order to give presidents options in a crisis. It is unclear what evidence suggests that their efforts to deal with the dilemmas of nuclear deterrence were merely cynical efforts to manipulate public opinion. In any case, SDI would appear to be a poor example to emphasize, since it was essentially a research agenda. During the time Nolan examines, the administration could hardly be expected to curtail deployment, acquisitions, or planning in deference to some future defensively oriented strategy.

Nolan, however, is probably correct that civilians do not fully comprehend war plans. Psychologically, presidents do not want to "think about the unthinkable," preferring to believe that nuclear war will not occur or that nuclear reality can be escaped by fanciful schemes—hence the possible chasm between the military (whose operational plans are not concerned with options that their superiors may need) and civilians (who understand too little about the contingency plans that until 1989 they might have had to implement). Nolan is right in underlining that the latter's ignorance is irresponsible. In a crisis, U.S. leaders might, like Germany's leaders in 1914, discover that they do not have the options that they thought they had. They then would have to fall back on Strategic Air Command's prepackaged plans for waging an all-out war, thus abdicating their control over policy.

Yet whatever the possible dangers of this schism, U.S. political leaders cannot really be faulted for negligence of their constitutional responsibility, for they have remained fully in charge of the conduct of foreign policy and crisis management. They long ago accepted what McGeorge Bundy has called "existential deterrence." Rejecting the options they supposedly had or the strategic superiority they presumably enjoyed until the late 1960s, they have instinctively accepted the existence of mutual assured destruction as a fact. The result has been a restraint in the exercise of power when the adversary was the Soviet Union. While, undoubtedly, presidents and their advisers could have benefited from knowledge of past crisis management and U.S. war plans, they have, since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, focused on crisis prevention. Moreover, they have used arms control to shape war plans. Although Nolan and others dismiss the SALT process as merely codifying the arms competition, it disconnected the defensive and offensive arms races and established equal ceilings for both superpowers. SALT III was always intended to lower these ceilings radically, as START I is likely to do with a 50% reduction of destabilizing ICBMs and lesser cuts in slow-flying recallable bombers. START II will, if the present momentum of superpower cooperation continues, presumably seek further deep cuts and elimination of multiwarheaded ICBMs. Such sizable cuts and shifts to bomber forces will permit the president and his advisers to drastically reshape U.S. military policy.

JOHN SPANIER

University of Florida

The International Relations of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Edited by Augustus Richard Norton and Martin H. Greenberg. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989. 233p. $34.95.

Inside the PLO: Covert Units, Secret Funds, and the War against Israel and the United States. By Neil C. Livingstone and David Halevy. New York: Morrow, 1990. 335p. $21.95.

Much has been written about the PLO and its activities, but there are not many solid scholarly works that comprehensively examine the origins of this organization, its structure, the scope of its activities, and its historical evolution. In the recent literature on international terrorism, the PLO is basically treated as another terrorist organization, and little attention is paid to the extensive and complex governmental functions that it performs. These studies, therefore, tend to paint an oversimplified and misleading picture of the goals and strategies of the Palestinian nationalist movement and the PLO. More comprehensive and systematic studies of this movement generally tend to treat the PLO as the organizational tool of the Palestinian nationalist movement with extensive political, military, social, and economic activities. These studies not only address the structure, role, and developments of the organization but also examine the PLO's role in, and impacts upon, the broader socio-economic and political issues in the Middle East.

These books exemplify these two distinct approaches to the study of the PLO and the Palestinian movement. *Inside the PLO* focuses on the terrorist activities of the organization and fails to deal with broad issues systematically. In contrast, *International Relations of the Palestine Liberation Organization* examines the organization in the context of the Palestinian nationalist movement and, thus, more successfully addresses broader political, military, and economic issues. Neither of the books, however, relies upon any specific conceptual and theoretical frameworks; nor do their assessments of the PLO and its operations greatly contribute to the growing theoretical literature on liberation movements and international terrorism. It is not to suggest that such discussions as the economics of the PLO could not give us a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of these types of organizations.

The International Relations of the Palestine Liberation Organization is an informative collection of essays that systematically, comprehensively, and objectively study the PLO as a transnational actor representing the nationalist sentiments of Palestinians. Cognizant of the ideological, political, and organizational diversity of this movement (with the exception of chapter 7), the book presents an impressive analysis of the main tendencies within the organization and their impact upon its foreign relations. The main focus, however, is on the intricate sources, dynamics, and developments of the PLO's relations with such global and regional powers as the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the Arab states, Iran, and Latin America. These relationships, the authors contend, are generally governed by pragmatism and reciprocal interests–exploitation rather than by ideologism. For the PLO, these interests are mainly defined in terms of political, military, economic, and moral support for the Palestinian causes and opposition to Israel and its policies. While ideological and cultural affinities have often played a role in shaping some states' relationships with the PLO, practical considerations have ultimately determined the directions of these relations. These considerations are nowhere more evident than in the complex web of the PLO–Arab states–Iran relationships. "Auditing the PLO" (chapter 8) is an informative assessment of the financial resources and responsibilities of the organization, but it does not adequately discuss the importance of the economic dimension of the PLO's overall international relations.

According to its authors, *Inside the PLO* attempts to overcome the present deficiency in understanding the history, leadership, goals, and operations of the PLO. However, this volume—essentially a poorly documented work with limited, if any, scholarly value—is preoccupied with sensationalism and subjective observations that reinforce the old myths of terrorism. The book is long on descriptive biographies and operational details and short on analysis of the complexities of the Palestinian movement and its historical evolution. The authors' examination of the role of personalities and the ideological and structural diversity of the PLO and other Palestinian organizations is informative but unnecessarily redundant and overly sensational. Their historical assessment of the movement is sketchy and disregards the pragmatism of the mainstream Palestinians in the choice of their goals and strategies. Even the useful and detailed discussion of the PLO's finances has led to the simplistic, if not erroneous, conclusion that Arafat's source of legitimacy and power is primarily economic-financial (pp. 184-85).

Overly preoccupied with operational details and leaders' personal traits, the book fails to address the broader political questions that are currently being debated, including the causes of Palestinian terrorism, the long-term policy implications of moderation on the part of some Palestinians, and the effective policy responses to the ongoing dispute between the moderates and radicals. A systematic and objective treatment of these questions, as found in *The International Relations of the Palestine Liberation Organization*, could conceivably facilitate a better understanding of the operational details covered in *Inside the PLO.*

MEHRAN TAMADONFAR

University of Nevada, Las Vegas

The Age of the Arctic: Hot Conflicts and Cold Realities. By Gail Osherenko and Oran R. Young. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 316p. $59.50.

The authors, husband and wife, are already well known in the fields of conflict resolution and Arctic affairs. Their expertise makes this a fine study of conflict and conflict resolution in the Arctic.

The book's nine chapters are grouped into three parts. Part 1 consists of one short chapter of background material on the conflicts currently centering on the Arctic. Part 2 contains four chapters covering strategic, industrial, native, and environmental interests. Part 3 focuses in one chapter on the conflicts in the region and in three chapters on potential methods of resolving the conflicts through private, governmental, and international initiatives.

This study differs from most of the other recent books on the Arctic. It is much more comprehensive, for example. Most current books focus on one or two topics, such as exploration, geostrategy, native peoples, maritime boundary problems, mineral resources, development strategies, and so on. The authors have selected for analysis four distinct but clearly interrelated matters. Second, their emphasis is less on the situations themselves than on conflict, illustrating their analysis with Arctic case studies. As they say in their preface, "Without judging the costs or benefits of social conflict, we seek to alert people to the pervasiveness of conflict and to provide analytic tools that will help those engaged in conflict not only to improve their comprehension of the circumstances they face but also to enhance their ability to deal with conflict constructively" (p. xiii).

The number and variety of illustrations is unusual. The maps could all have benefited from the services of a skilled cartographer, but the photographs are generally of high quality and do enhance the text considerably. Several were taken in Canada and Alaska by Gail Osherenko. The notes are also unusually helpful. Most of them contain useful information and in some cases are quite lengthy. There is no bibliography, but numerous references are included in the 479 notes placed at the ends of the parts.

The chapters laying out the issues of security, economic development, native interests and the environment are most informative and quite balanced. A variety of viewpoints are presented and straightforwardly summarized in the conclusions. They demonstrate a clear understanding of the region, its peoples, and its problems.

Chapter 6 analyzes Arctic issues in general, pointing out their unique characteristics as well as their patterns, classifying them as allocative, distributive, and jurisdictional issues and as cross-polity, cross-cultural, and core value conflicts. Methods for resolving the conflicts include minimizing conflict, market mechanisms, private bargaining, public negotiation, litigation, and legislation. These themes are considered in great detail in the remaining chapters. The authors have realistic expectations for solutions, but they remain optimistic: "Given the circumstances prevailing in the Arctic today, we should not expect the emergence of anything resembling the comprehensive regime for Antarctica set forth in the Antarctic Treaty in 1959. Even so, there are opportunities to devise functionally specific arrangements in the Arctic" (p. 268). An epilogue of 11 pages dated May 1989 describes a number of new developments. The authors note that the issues they discussed have become more prominent but are still hopeful that techniques are being developed to deal with them effectively.

This is a fine, informed, well-written book that deserves the attention of everyone interested in international affairs and in conflict resolution. It would probably not make a satisfactory textbook; but it would be a fine supplement to a basic text, a good reference book, and an introduction to the themes for the general reader.

Martin Ira Glassner

Southern Connecticut State University

The Arab Gulf States: Steps toward Political Participation. By J. E. Peterson. New York: Praeger, 1988. 155p. $13.95.

The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region. By Erik R. Peterson. Boulder: Westview, 1988. 346p. $45.00.

These two books describe the same region and the same group of states but from different perspectives. The authors (who bear the same surname) of both have assembled a wealth of information that has previously been difficult to obtain in one place. However, despite their different perspectives and objectives, the authors do focus on a common problem—the tensions produced by the rapid petroleum-driven modernization of a group of states whose social and political systems were once bound by tribalism and familial authority structures. The authors, therefore, address the Gulf States' special problems of political modernization and adaptation to the dynamic conditions of international society.

The authors of both books have parallel approaches applying essentially Western models of political participation and regional integration to the issues of the Gulf region. Both books begin with extensive compilations of background material on the Gulf states that are of considerable scholarly value and essential to understanding the arguments that follow. The authors' approaches do differ in some respects. J. E. Peterson uses the historical section of *The Arab Gulf States* to introduce the reader to his theoretical perspective. Eric R. Peterson, on the other hand, integrates much of his theoretical outlook with his substantive discussion of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Each of these methods has advantages for handling this complex subject. In *The Gulf Cooperation Council* the separation of organizational theory from discussions of regional and national development helps the author to illuminate his arguments.

J. E. Peterson's *Arab Gulf States* focuses upon "an examination of political participation in these six monarchies, all members of the . . . GCC, concentrating on the background to popular demands for representation and the regimes' establishment of national councils" (p. 2). The author approaches this task by meticulously describing previous attempts to develop systems of political participation in Kuwait (chap. 2), Bahrain (chap. 3), and Qatur, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman (chap. 4).

His opening chapter concentrates upon a general discussion of the conflict within states that (with the exception of Saudi Arabia) date their formal independence from the mid post-World War II period. The author's discussion of the struggle between the traditional and contemporary bases of governmental legitimacy is impressive. Material modernization was brought about by an extraordinary transfer of wealth to the area consequent to the development of petroleum resources causing its systems of government to change. Chapters 2-4 contain extremely thorough discussions of the conflicts inherent in the modernization of these traditional societies.

Erik R. Peterson's *Gulf Cooperation Council* follows the initial development of background material with an examination of the Gulf Cooperation Council, one of the most carefully researched and thoroughly documented descriptions of a regional international governmental organization that I have recently seen.

Beginning with an interesting discussion of the Gulf Cooperation Council's "ideological foundations and objectives," he continues with a description of the organization's institutional and procedural mechanisms. This section serves as the foundation for a three-part discussion of the development of GCC functions focusing on political and economic "integration" and security cooperation.

He treats the GCC as both an international governmental organization, using conventional terms of analysis such as *integration* and *supranationalism* (chap. 6), and as a vehicle for Arab unity (p. 94). The latter, he suggests would eventually result from the development of the GCC into a "confederal framework" (p. 101). He seems to present a contrasting view of the feasibility of consensus building, however, by asserting that the onset of the Gulf War was the most important factor in the formation of the GCC (p. 23).

Despite (or perhaps because of) the wealth of information contained in these books, both works present the reader with subtle variations of the same fundamental problem. In both studies, the authors apply modern Western political principles and contemporary analytical paradigms to domestic developments within the six GCC countries and to their attempts to develop an effective regional organization. This approach has some conceptual difficulties as both authors point out, even though the GCC states are politically important and possess the material attributes of contemporary nation-states, they have only recently emerged from the premodern traditions of tribalism and clan-dominated autocratic rule.

The problem surfaces in *The Arab Gulf States* by way of J. E. Peterson's emphasis upon the development of "political participation" within a group of states where decision making" is the preserve of an extremely small elite" (pp. 16-17). This, in spite of what he describes as an emphasis upon constitutional development (p. 3) and institutionalization during the post-traditional period (p. 6). The result of the application of democratic models to traditional societies emerges as a somewhat unsettling ambiguity. That he is aware of this ambiguity and the political tension it reflects is obvious from his succinct assessment of the GCC states' politics:

> It is a fair question to ask whether the GCC states can accept, or tolerate, constructive dissent, let alone democracy. The nostalgic and mythologized argument that they possess a "tribal" or "social" democracy becomes increasingly specious as traditional ways disappear. Nevertheless, the opposite arguments—that these monarchical regimes are anachronistic, repressive, and autocratic—is belied by their commitment to socioeconomic development and by their citizenry's *apparent* belief in their legitimacy. They are, however, authoritarian, and the acceptance of such tradition based authoritarianism in a post-traditional era is likely to diminish as the societies grow and change (p. 22, emphasis mine).

The reader is left to determine whether the functions of the Gulf states' national councils are authoritative political processes or essentially rhetorical exercises—and therefore whether Peterson is actually describing a process of political change as well as economic revolution.

Erik R. Peterson's discussion presents the reader with similar conceptual ambiguities. He analyzes the GCC's structure and organizational and political processes according to theories derived from the literature on international organizations (especially the European Community) in modern industrial states. For example, the application of the term *integration* (defined in this context as "a state of affairs or a process involving the combination of separate economies into larger economic regions") to the GCC economic process might be more useful to the reader if it were accompanied by an analysis of the adaptability of some of the principal concepts guiding modern international organization theory to a regional group of newly independent countries dominated by traditional monarchies that jealously guard their recently acquired sovereign status. "Positive" and "negative" integration, for example, would be more useful in this context if supplemented by discussion of the applicability of "trade diversion" and "trade creation" to an organization of single-product states that are also engaged in cooperative ventures (OPEC and OAPEC) meant to secure the price of petroleum against erosion within the world market. Moreover, the "supranational" elements of "integration" within the GCC involving transfers of sovereignty (p. 101) conflict with the author's notation of the severe limitation placed upon the secretariat general's attempts to "secure compliance to the various agreements among the GCC member states" (p. 157).

He raises the serious questions concerning the effectiveness of common market mechanisms within this region during its present stage of development. He constantly (and correctly) points to the contradiction between the adoption of sophisticated organizational mechanisms (often imitating the European Community) and the economic results that have been achieved through their application. Therefore, the reader has a right to ask whether the GCC member states have progressed enough to promote free trade and the cooperation necessary "to make the GCC into 'one solid economic entity' " (p. 157). The author concludes that "the most salient objective of the GCC program is to achieve—eventually—a confederal framework in which the political economic and social policies of the member states are gradually integrated" (p. 101). The social and political conditions that dominate the region (as described in *The Gulf Cooperation Council)* seem to indicate that the realization of these objectives should not be expected within the near future.

Each of these works contains a wealth of information, and both are valuable for the benefits to be derived from their carefully documented scholarship. Both books try to answer the question, Is it possible to apply contemporary theories of regional integration and political participation to the practices of states in which the economic benefits of petroleum cause conflicts between development and tradition? The question is not fully answered and, therefore, confronts the reader throughout the authors' ambiguous treatments—simultaneously skeptical and optimistic—of their related subjects.

ROGER RIEBER

University of Utah

U.S. National Security Policy and the Soviet Union: Persistent Regularities and Extreme Contingencies. By Richard J. Stoll. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990. 256p. $39.95 cloth, $21.95 paper.

Any current book on U.S. national security policy risks being obsolete before it is published, forcing the reader to sift carefully for the elements that are time-bound and those that have enduring value. This book has both.

Two premises guide Stoll's efforts: (1) "a number of significant patterns and regularities can be seen in our national security policy"; and (2) "we can conduct systematic research on our national security policy" (p. 1). Pursuing those patterns, Stoll considers four major themes. Each yields interesting hypotheses that are tested using an eclectic array of methods, ranging from an in-depth case study to a computer simulation. While his efforts are undermined by the lack of recent data and lack of follow-through explanations to certain interesting empirical findings, he addresses a number of important questions.

The first theme is "the role of the military force in the nuclear era." The discussion of the use of force advances a number of interesting propositions regarding U.S. and Soviet/Russian conflict involvement in the pre- and post-World War II eras. The argument for comparing the behavior of these two countries in the century before World War II and the 45 years since is weak, and unfortunately the data are not conclusive. The discussion of the utility of force in the nuclear age is much less satisfying. Stoll ultimately breaks little new ground beyond the work of Blechman and Kaplan's *Force without War* (1978), as his findings are consistent with theirs. In asking, "Do nuclear weapons make a difference in the success of political use of force?" Stoll notes, "It is asserted that these changes [in the nuclear balance] can be turned into political-military leverage in a wide variety of situations" (p. 39). Unfortunately, no references or dates for these assertions are provided—which is disappointing, as many argue that their only real purpose is to deter other nuclear weapons. To his credit, Stoll considers why the data do not support his hypotheses about the impact of the strategic balance on the political use of military force.

The second theme is "domestic influences on national security policy." These two chapters are frustrating. They touch on interesting questions (public support for defense spending and organizational influences on military policy), but they illustrate a problem that is found throughout the book: an interesting empirical pattern is discovered, but the explanation of it is weak. Patterns in congressional and public support for defense spending and presidential actions need to be explained in further depth. Examining the combat specialties of the chiefs of each service sheds little light on the postwar experiences of the U.S. Armed Forces, although the discussion of the long-term impact of World War II on the development of the various services is quite useful.

The third theme is "strategic nuclear warfare," which covers a wide range of issues. Although the sections on strategic nuclear weapons policy and "declaratory, action, and procurement policy" are useful, the attempt to detail the relationship between these three strands is weak. For instance, Stoll simplistically compares shifts in declaratory policy, the number of planned targets, and the number of deliverable warheads and concludes that there is "only a weak connection between the three policies through time" (p. 120). While certainly plausible, evidence beyond what is presented would be necessary to support the conclusion.

One of the more interesting discussions concerns limiting nuclear war. Lack of data (thankfully) makes such discussions speculative, but Stoll tackles this problem in a creative manner. Using the Anglo-German Air War of 1939–41 as an example of a limited war that did not stay limited, he concludes that the prospects limiting nuclear war are not good. Further discussion of the scale differences involved is needed, since even the most limited use of nuclear weapons would inflict far greater damages than those seen in 1941, leading one to expect that escalation might in fact be constrained.

The effort to examine arms control and strategic stability systematically is a good introduction to the topic but arms control aficionados will find it troublesome. His argument—that *the* goal of arms control is strategic stability—is acceptable at only the most basic level, since arms control serves many goals. Stoll's intriguing question "Has arms control contributed to strategic stability?" is unfortunately tested in such a way that no definitive answer can be reached, since he limits his cases to three major agreements signed between 1969 and 1979 (ABM, SALT I, and SALT II). He attributes the significant decrease in the number of incidents in which the United States used force symbolically against the Soviet Union after 1979 (compared to before 1969) to arms control. However, this ignores the changing context of the U.S.-Soviet relationship—détente, Soviet parity, or opportunity.

The final theme is the defense of Western Europe. While this issue has been, to borrow a bit of Pentagonese, "OBE-ed" (overtaken by events), this is an accessible treatment of the United States' commitment to the defense of Europe. Stoll provides an intriguing discussion of possible European responses to a U.S. pullback from Europe—even though the hypothesized precipitant is U.S. domestic pressure, not the disintegration of the "Soviet bloc." The debate on force comparisons compellingly argues against static analysis, while the discussion of a WTO attack builds on, and extends, Epstein's conventional forces model in his *Calculus of Conventional War* (1985). The discussion of the model is clear, although more extensive notes or perhaps a brief appendix would have helped those not familiar with it.

Overall, this book provides a useful starting point for readers who wish to go beyond traditional approaches to U.S. national security policy. While lacking a broad substantive theme, it raises a number of interesting questions that will spark debate and further inquiry. The hypotheses advanced, as well as methods used to test them, are suggestive and quite novel. These are important contributions.

ROBERT B. MCCALLA

University of Wisconsin, Madison

Just Published for 1991 by HBJ!

Corwin and Peltason's
UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION
Twelfth Edition
J. W. PELTASON,
University Of California, Irvine
Paperbound. 1991

In this new edition of the most thorough brief text on the Constitution, the most recent Supreme Court decisions through 1990 are incorporated. Each Article and Amendment is examined in historical context in this revealing, nontechnical study. A new concluding chapter looks at politics and constitutional development. The Declaration of Independence is also covered.

POWER AND PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
GORDON C. SCHLOMING
Lewis and Clark College
Hardcover, 1991

Transcending the dated Cold War perspective of other textbooks in the field, this new book includes up-to-date information and analysis explicating the extraordinary events occurring in the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union from a strong historical perspective. Realism and Idealism are described, compared, and contrasted in a balanced view, with lively pro and con discussions on these viewpoints concluding each chapter. Theoretical and empirical materials are also well balanced.

Also Available From HBJ...

THE MODERN RESEARCHER
Fourth Edition
JACQUES BARZUN
and HENRY F. GRAFF
both of Columbia University
Paperbound. 1985

HBJ

Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.
College Sales Office
7555 Caldwell Avenue, Chicago, IL 60648
(708) 647-8822

"Hedrick Smith has done it again...Helps us understand these new and complex times."
— PROFESSOR MARSHALL GOLDMAN,
Associate Director, Russian Research Center, Harvard University



"We may have found Russia's Tocqueville — he lets us see a country realizing itself."
— ROGER ROSENBLATT

The Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and author of *The Russians* examines the results of *perestroika* and *glasnost* through a probing blend of personal interviews, history and fresh insights. It's an invaluable close-up portrait of a nation grappling with change — must reading for anyone who needs to understand the Soviet Union today.

"An insightful introduction to the actors and events that will be reshaping Russia in the 1990s."
— SENATOR BILL BRADLEY

A BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB MAIN SELECTION
$24.95, at your bookstore, or call 1-800-733-3000

RANDOM HOUSE

New from CQ Press

American Foreign Policy Since World War II

Twelfth Edition

John Spanier

The remarkable changes in the USSR and Eastern Europe provide the impetus for a new edition of this enduring classic on foreign policy. Spanier analyzes the reasons behind the abrupt changes in Gorbachev's Soviet Union as well as those in Eastern Europe in light of U.S. policy. This new edition concludes with a chapter devoted to analyzing whether or not the Cold War is over.

ISBN 0-87187-557-8. 441 pages. 1991.

Interest Group Politics

Third Edition

Allan J. Cigler
Burdett A. Loomis

This leading study of interest groups has been extensively revised to reflect new scholarly thinking about the impact of such organizations on the policy-making process. The authors look at how these groups have adjusted in the face of increased competition for congressional attention.

ISBN 0-87187-515-2. 423 pages. 1991.

The Opinion Connection: Polling, Politics, and the Press

Albert H. Cantril

Cantril explores the impact of polling on the way news organizations now cover elections and the influence of news organizations on the way pollsters go about their craft. He takes a fresh look at whether the polls have an impact on what it is they are trying to measure–public opinion itself.

ISBN 0-87187-583-7. Approx. 150 pages. 1991.

Divided Democracy: Cooperation and Conflict Between the President and Congress

James A. Thurber

Eleven respected scholars examine the relationship between the presidency and Congress to discover the causes, characteristics and consequences of presidential and congressional cooperation, conflict and change. This text provides readers with specific insights into this complex relationship–a mixture of opposition and collaboration in a constant state of evolution.

ISBN 0-87187-582-9. 323 pages. 1991.

Political Participation in the United States

Second Edition

M. Margaret Conway

What makes one person an activist and another a non-voter? Or one a political candidate and another a mere observer? In this second edition, Conway further examines who these participants are, what they do, and what they hope to accomplish. The book concludes with a discussion of whether participation makes a difference, either in its effects or on the policies and processes of government in the United States.

ISBN 0-87187-539-X. 204 pages. 1991.

The Emergence of a Senate Leader: Pete Domenici and the Reagan Budget

Richard F. Fenno, Jr.

This text charts the experience of a relatively unknown politician who became a national leader in a fascinating period. Using his trademark over-the-shoulder observations as he followed Domenici on Capitol Hill and in his home state of New Mexico, Fenno provides readers with the first book written about the budget process from a legislative, as opposed to executive, point of view.

ISBN 0-87187-592-6. 250 pages. 1991.

Parties, Politics, and Public Policy in America

Sixth Edition

William J. Keefe

In this newly revised edition, the author describes the major features of the parties, accounts for their form and functions, and examines and interprets their present condition. This text contains expanded coverage of the presidential nomination process and electoral behavior.

ISBN 0-87187-597-7. Approx. 300 pages. 1991.

To request your free examination copy, write to:

CQ Press
Customer Service, Dept. S5
300 Raritan Center Parkway
P.O. Box 7816
Edison, NJ 08818-7816
Or call 1-800-543-7793
Please indicate course name, start dates, and estimated enrollment.

CQ PRESS

AMERICAN POLITICS AND POWER



THE RIDDLE OF POWER Presidential Leadership from Truman to Bush
Robert Shogan
Drawing on 30 years of journalistic prowess, Shogan offers vivid portraits of the men and events that mark postwar presidential milestones, examining the key qualities—ideology, values, and character—that determine success or failure in the White House. 352 pp.
Dutton hardcover 0-525-24956-7 $21.95



GRASS ROOTS: One Year in the Life of the New Hampshire Presidential Primary
Dayton Duncan
This lively, behind-the-scenes account of the 1988 New Hampshire Presidential Primary focuses on the motives, expectations, and frustrations of the citizens choosing to participate. "A wonderfully rich and poetic portrait of what makes America work." —Hugh Sidey, *Time.* 288 pp.
Viking hardcover 0-670-81851-8 $22.95



RISE TO GLOBALISM American Foreign Policy Since 1938
Sixth Revised Edition
Stephen E. Ambrose
Reflecting the latest historical scholarship, Ambrose's masterful survey chronicles the evolution of American foreign policy from 1938 through the end of the Reagan presidency. 400 pp.
Penguin paperback 0-14-014770-5 $9.95

FIORELLO H. LAGUARDIA AND THE MAKING OF MODERN NEW YORK
Thomas Kessner
Penguin paperback 720 pp. 0-14-014358-0 $12.95



STRATEGY
Second Revised Edition
B.H. Liddell Hart
This classic examination of world military history focuses on WWII and on the strategy of direct approach. "Probably the most important book by one of the outstanding military authorities of our time."—*Library Journal.* 426 pp.
Meridian paperback 0-452-01071-3 $11.95



NAMING NAMES
Victor S. Navasky
Winner of the 1981 American Book Award, *Naming Names* dissects the motivations and results of the hearings of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and its 1950s investigation of Hollywood. 512 pp.
Penguin paperback 0-14-005942-3 $8.95



AMERICA ENTERS THE WORLD: A People's History of the Progressive Era and World War I
Page Smith
Beginning with Theodore Roosevelt's arrival in the White House and covering America's participation in the First World War, Volume 7 in Smith's *A People's History of the United States* series is "a remarkable achievement in the writing of popular history."—*Dallas Times Herald.* 1104 pp.
Penguin paperback 0-14-012263-X $16.95

THE ACTING PRESIDENT: Ronald Reagan and the Supporting Players Who Helped Him Create the Illusion That Held America Spellbound
Bob Schieffer and Gary Paul Gates
Dutton Trade Paper 426 pp. 0-525-48579-1 $9.95

Also of Interest:

SOCIALISM PAST AND FUTURE
Michael Harrington
Introduction by Irving Howe
Plume paperback 320 pp. 0-452-26504-5 $9.95

THE SAUDIS
Inside the Desert Kingdom
Sandra Mackey
Signet paperback 468 pp. 0-451-17051-2 $5.95

PENGUIN USA **Academic Marketing Department**
375 Hudson Street, New York, NY 10014-3657

The Best in Political Science

Now available in paperback—

“Our most brilliant commentator on the Presidency brings his diagnosis up to date in this witty, incisive and stylish book.”
—Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS
The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan

Richard E. Neustadt,
Harvard University


RICHARD E. NEUSTADT
PRESIDENTIAL POWER
AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS
THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN

1991 0-02-922796-6 $14.95 paper

Thirty years ago Richard Neustadt published *Presidential Power*, which became the most widely studied and most influential book on the theory and practice of presidential leadership ever written. Presidents themselves read it and assigned it to their staffs for study, as did the instructors of hundreds of thousands of students of government. Now Neustadt reexamines his theory of presidential power by testing it against events and decisions in the administrations of the later modern presidents who followed FDR, Truman, and Eisenhower. To the original study of presidential power Neustadt has added a series of fascinating chapters appraising the presidential styles and skills of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan in the light of his guiding belief that the President must consider the effect a decision will have on his prospects for the successful exercise of presidential power in the future.

“Neustadt's book remains the classic account of presidential leadership, and the latest edition has a bonus—two fascinating new chapters.”
—Fred I. Greenstein, Princeton University

“*Presidential Power* is a genuine classic. It set the terms of discourse 30 years ago and it remains the book to which all other presidency books are compared. Long live Neustadt.”
—Theodore J. Lowi, Cornell University

“This edition has still more keen insights into the American Presidency. The discussion of Iran-Contra reveals how profound was Dick Neustadt's original interpretation of Presidential power.”
—Paul E. Peterson, Harvard University

For VISA, MasterCard, or American Express orders, call toll-free 1-800-323-7445 or 1-800-257-5755

Fp THE FREE PRESS
A Division of Macmillan Inc., 866 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10022

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Best in Political Science

A QUESTION OF CHARACTER
John F. Kennedy in Image and Reality
Thomas C. Reeves, *University of Wisconsin*

Despite the many biographies of John F. Kennedy, none has attempted to reconcile the idealism of the nation's youngest president to the morally suspect conduct of the private man. Questioning how JFK's less then exemplary life related to his public career, Reeves locates the origins and development of Kennedy's character in his family, school, and military experiences, and traces the manifestations of these influences in his political ascent to the presidency. This extraordinary reappraisal of Kennedy's life and conduct penetrates the carefully wrought public image to reveal the most enigmatic public servant of our time—and explores the question of how a people, and history itself, ought to judge the relation between personal character and national leadership.

April 1991 0-02-925965-7 $24.95

QUICKSILVER CAPITAL
How the Rapid Movement of Wealth Has Changed the World
Richard McKenzie, *University of Mississippi* and Dwight Lee, *University of Georgia*

❝McKenzie and Lee show that it was technological change that doomed socialism. It is an argument of such manifest cogency that it will instantly be adopted by its opponents, who will claim to have known it all along.❞
—George Gilder, author of *Microcosm*

1991 0-02-920535-2 $22.95

STRUCTURES OF SOCIAL LIFE
The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations
Alan Page Fiske, *University of Pennsylvania*

❝Surely one of the most important scholarly books to be published in this decade. Of great import, not just for anthropology, but for all social sciences.❞
—Amitai Etzioni, George Washington University

1990 0-02-910345-2 $29.95

WAR BY OTHER MEANS
Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles
Jeffrey Herf, *Harvard University*

❝Herf's book helps us understand why the West—democratic and divided as it was—won the Cold War. Not only is this a clear and compelling narrative of the crisis surrounding the deployment of intermediate range forces to Europe; it is an innovative examination of the often hidden strengths of democracy.❞
—Eliot A. Cohen, author of *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*

1991 0-02-915030-2 $27.95

ILLIBERAL EDUCATION
The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus
Dinesh D'Souza, *American Enterprise Institute*

❝Academic freedom and indeed the very soul of American education are succumbing to a sinister McCarthyite assault of unprecedented proportions. With admirable restraint and civility, D'Souza has written an informative account that provides a rare combination of tough-minded analysis, principled judgements, thoughtful proposals and a humane sensitivity.❞
—Eugene Genovese, author of *Roll, Jordan Roll: The World the Slaves Made*

April 1991 0-02-908100-9 $19.95

THE IDEA BROKERS
Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite
James A. Smith

❝The best book ever written on American think tanks, demonstrating the dramatic growth of their power and influence on national policy.❞
—Martin Anderson, Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution

1990 0-02-929551-3 $24.95

For Visa, MasterCard, or American Express orders, call toll-free 1-800-323-7445 or 1-800-257-5755

Fp **THE FREE PRESS**
A Division of Macmillan Inc., 866 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10022

MICHIGAN MICHIGAN MICHIGAN

Keith Krehbiel

INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION

In this controversial book, Krehbiel challenges a view of Congress held by many academics, journalists, and members of the lay public: that Congress is organized to facilitate logrolling or "gains from trade" between legislators. He suggests an alternative "informational" theory that, unlike previous formal theories, highlights institutional needs and individual incentives for acquiring policy expertise.

"Krehbiel has made an impressive intellectual reach across the divide between formal theorizing and empirical research on the U.S. Congress. His book should be read by all Congressional scholars interested in generalizing about the institution."
—Richard F. Fenno, Jr., University of Rochester

"... a book that will enlighten as well as challenge all students of Congress no matter what their theoretical persuasions.... [It] truly pushes forward the frontiers of theorizing about Congress in particular and legislatures in general." —Joseph Cooper, Rice University

cloth $24.95

Forthcoming in June

C. Lawrence Evans

LEADERSHIP IN COMMITTEE

A Comparative Analysis of Leadership Behavior in the U. S. Senate

Based on personal interviews with U.S. senators and Senate staff persons, this new book compares the leadership styles of eight committee chairs and ranking members in the Senate. The result is a significant contribution to the literature on congressional politics, and the first book-length comparative analysis of legislative leadership behavior in the modern Senate.

cloth $29.95



MICHIGAN STUDIES IN POLITICAL ANALYSIS

Information and Legislative Organization

Keith Krehbiel

Also available

Morris P. Fiorina and
David W. Rohde, Editors

HOME STYLE AND WASHINGTON WORK

Studies in Congressional Politics

cloth $34.50

John W. Kingdon

CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS

Third Edition

cloth $37.50 / paper $13.95

Michigan residents, include 4% sales tax.

MICHIGAN **THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS**

Dept. MH P.O. Box 1104 Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

New **Significant** **Basic**

Now in Paperback!

BUREAUCRACY

What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It

JAMES Q. WILSON

"Wilson is a remarkably clear thinker. It is unlikely that anyone in the foreseeable future will master so much research about so many agencies at government level."
—Tom Peters, *The Washingtonian*

$12.95



Now in Paperback!

JUSTICE, GENDER & THE FAMILY

SUSAN MOLLER OKIN

Co-Winner of the American Political Science Assocation's 1990 Victoria Schuck Award for the best book(s) published in 1989 on women and politics

"An original and provocative book of great importance."—Joan C. Tronto, *American Political Science Review*

$10.95

MODELS OF MY LIFE

HERBERT A. SIMON

"A very unusual memoir, combining some of the most important intellectual developments of the twentieth century with a highly personal portrait of the values and character of an extraordinary man."
—Harvey Brooks, Harvard University

$26.95

NO ESCAPE

The Future of American Corrections

JOHN D. DIIULIO, JR.

"Taking his cue from corrections officials, DiIulio works out an answer to the vexing question of what should be done with convicted criminal offenders....A relentlessly honest vision of the limited options open to America in dealing with its 'prison crisis.'"
—Mark H. Moore, Harvard University

$22.95

Now in Paperback!

THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION

Public Ends, Public Means

JOHN D. DONAHUE

"Donahue sweeps away premises and prejudices that have long confounded the privatization debate and offers practical guidelines for when and how public functions can be turned over usefully to the private sector....A political-economic *tour de force!*"
—Robert B. Reich, Harvard University

$11.95

Coming in April!

THE CLASSROOM CRUCIBLE

What Really Works, What Doesn't, and Why

EDWARD PAULY

"Without question, Pauly has given us the most insightful, compelling analysis not only of power dynamics in classrooms and schools but also of how and why these dynamics have to be confronted by policy makers. This book will stand the test of time."—Seymour B. Sarason, Yale University

$22.95

Back in Print—
First Time in Paperback!

ARABIA, THE GULF & THE WEST

J.B. KELLY

"With this one book J.B. Kelly gives us a proper modern history of the peoples and rulers of the Arab half of the Persian Gulf, as well as the best account of the expansion of Saudi power over the Arabian peninsula yet seen in print."—E.N. Luttwak, *New Republic*

$11.95

At bookstores or from

BasicBooks

A Division of HarperCollins*Publishers*
10 E. 53rd St., New York, NY 10022
Toll-free with credit card 1-800-331-3761
Available in Canada from HarperCollins*Canada Ltd*

GLOBAL IMPACT OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE USSR

Economic Bulletin for Europe

This is the latest review of economic developments in Europe and North America, with special emphasis on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It describes the process of transforming centrally planned economies into decentralized market economies as well as a detailed analysis of the oil shocks emanating from the Gulf and another shock due in 1991 when the USSR begins to charge world prices in convertible currency for its oil exports to Eastern Europe.

E.90.II.E.37 92-1-116493-1
$55.00 120 pp.

Economic Reforms in Centrally Planned Economies and Their Impact on the Global Economy

The economic and political reforms in Eastern Europe and a number of Asian centrally planned economies prompted this overview and detailed analysis of requirements for full and equal participation in centrally planned economies. Included are the macro-economic adjustments and revised policy positions necessary for integration of these countries into the global economic framework.

E.90.II.A.9 92-1-104338-7
$27.50 349 pp.

Joint Ventures as a Channel for the Transfer of Technology

A chronicle of the experiences gained by senior government officials from developing countries and senior executives from developed market economies on issues including valuation, confidentiality, intellectual property protection, R&D, patenting, licensing and quality control, profit remittances, royalty payments and tax treatment of joint ventures and their resultant effect on the transfer of technology.

E.90.II.D.5 92-1-112290-2
$45.00 202 pp.

FORTHCOMING PUBLICATION:

Manual on Trading with the Socialist Countries of Eastern Europe

E.90.II.D.3 92-1-112288-0
$26.00 130 pp.

Send orders to:
United Nations Publications, Sales Section, Room DC2-0853 Dept. 650
New York, N.Y. 10017 Tel. (800) 553-3210, (212) 963-8302, Fax. (212) 963-3489.
Visa, MasterCard and American Express orders accepted for orders over $15.00.
Please add 5%, $3.50 minimum for shipping & handling.

United Nations Publications



The Burger Court

Political and Judicial Profiles

Edited by Charles M. Lamb and Stephen C. Halpern

What was the role of the U.S. Supreme Court in American life during the Vietnam war protests and the Watergate crisis? How did it rule on challenges to school busing and affirmative action? This volume offers valuable insights into these and other questions as they relate to the thirteen justices who served on the Supreme Court while Warren E. Burger was chief justice, from 1969 to 1986. Each chapter focuses on one of the thirteen, beginning with a brief introduction and biographical sketch and then analyzing the individual's contribution to major areas and issues of constitutional law such as First Amendment rights, separation of powers, equal protection, the rights of criminal defendants, the right to privacy, and due process, among others. The inclusion of tables detailing the justices' voting patterns enhances this collection, a valuable one for those interested in the workings of the nation's highest court and the records of those who have served on it.

"A welcome collection of well-written and illuminating original essays . . . written by sophisticated political scientists who offer a grand tour of the highway of law as it intersects with politics. The comprehensive tables and the in-depth analyses make this the authoritative work on the Burger Court." — Sheldon Goldman, author of *Constitutional Law: Cases and Essays*

Illus. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $18.95.

States and Urban-Based Revolutions

Iran and Nicaragua

Farideh Farhi

Farhi uses the recent revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua as case studies to explain the internal and external pressures that are imposed on states in underdeveloped countries and how those pressures contribute to the state's breakdown. The author's critique and reformulation of currently accepted thinking on revolution calls for increased attention to external dependency, the role of intermediate classes in urban areas, and a rethinking of the role of ideology in the process and outcome of revolution.

"A cogent, clear, and compelling example of comparative macro-analysis, its state-centrism nicely balanced by cultural and class considerations. It contributes significantly to ongoing scholarly debates about the causes of contemporary revolutions." — W.L. Goldfrank, professor of sociology, University of California at Santa Cruz

Cloth, $29.95.

Order toll free 800/545-4703 from

University of Illinois Press
P. O. Box 4856
Hampden Post Office
Baltimore, MD 21211

CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS SERIES

Edited in the Research Centre for International Law, Cambridge University, these volumes draw from a wide range of legal and historical materials to provide this timely collection of documents on the various facets of the current Gulf crisis.

VOLUME ONE

THE KUWAIT CRISIS: BASIC DOCUMENTS

edited by

E. Lauterpacht CBE QC, C. J. Greenwood,
Marc Weller and Daniel Bethlehem

The principal contents are:

- **An historical section** with material relating to the development and independence of Kuwait and the extent of its territory, as well as to the birth of Iraq as an independent State and the background to its present claim to Kuwait;
- **The legal positions** of the two sides: substantial memoranda stating their cases provided by both Iraq and Kuwait;
- **The United Nations response**: the Security Council resolutions, together with extracts from statements made in the Council debates, and other UN documents dealing with
  - — the implementation and consequences of economic sanctions
  - — the use of force against Iraq
  - — protection of individuals and their property in occupied Kuwait and in Iraq
  - — the issues of war crimes and reparations;
- The response of **other international organisations**, such as the Arab League, NATO, Western European Union and the International Civil Aviation Organisation;
- **National implementation** of the sanctions resolutions, covering legislation of the European Communities, Britain and the United States.

Approx. 320 pp. — To be published January 1991
Price: £35 (US $70) — ISBN 0 949009 86 5
Student Edition available for bulk purchase through University bookshops or direct from the publishers: £25 (US $50) — ISBN 0 949009 87 3

VOLUME TWO

THE KUWAIT CRISIS: SANCTIONS AND THEIR ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES

This volume contains an extended collection of legislation adopted by States, both Members and non-Members of the UN, implementing the Security Council sanctions resolutions directed against Iraq.

Reproduced here are the texts of the principal legislation, subordinate legislation, notices and orders adopted in more than 120 jurisdictions. In a number of cases, foreign language texts are accompanied by translations into English. The volume reproduces a number of letters to the UN Secretary-General from Members summarising the manner in which they are fulfilling the sanctions requirements. Also included are reports of the UN Secretary-General to the UN Sanctions Committee.

The volume also contains letters from a number of UN Members on the application of Article 50 of the UN Charter dealing with the solution of the special economic problems confronting them as a result of the enforcement measures taken against Iraq, together with reports of the special Security Council Committee charged with dealing with these problems.

The volume concludes with analyses of the economic aspects of the problem by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Approx. 700 pp. — To be published February 1991
Price: £75 (US $150) — ISBN 0 949009 88 1

Order from any bookshop or direct from
GROTIUS PUBLICATIONS LIMITED
P.O. BOX 115, CAMBRIDGE CB3 9BP, ENGLAND

AN ALL-STAR LINEUP

New From McGraw-Hill!

American Government

AMERICA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM:
A TEXT WITH CASES, 5/e
Peter Woll and Robert H. Binstock

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, ESSENTIALS AND PERSPECTIVES: THE SYSTEM WORKS!
Jack E. Holmes, Michael J. Englehardt, and Robert E. Elder, Jr.

THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
Thomas Patterson

State and Local Government

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 2/e
Richard D. Bingham and David M. Hedge

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, 4/e
David C. Saffell

Constitutional Law

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Louis Fisher

U.S. Foreign Policy

AMERICA AS A WORLD POWER:
FOREIGN POLICY IN A CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Loch K. Johnson

Introduction to Political Science

POWER AND CHOICE:
INTRODUCTION TO POLITICS, 2/e
W. Phillips Shively

For more information, please contact your local McGraw-Hill representative or write: McGraw-Hill College Division, Comp Processing and Control, P.O. Box 448, Hightstown, NJ 08520.

McGraw-Hill

POLITICAL SCIENCE FROM NORTHEASTERN

THE NEW RIGHT AND THE CONSTITUTION
Turning Back the Legal Clock
Bernard Schwartz
$32.50 cloth

INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION
The Debate Over Original Intent
Edited by Jack N. Rakove
$45.00 cloth
$16.95 paper

INDIRA GANDHI
A Personal and Political Biography
Inder Malhotra
$29.95 cloth

GENDER AND KNOWLEDGE
Elements of a Postmodern Feminism
Susan J. Hekman
$25.00 cloth

Revised Edition
ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE
The State, Sexuality, and Reproductive Freedom
Rosalind Pollack Petchesky
$14.95 paper

NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY PRESS • BOSTON

• GUNNELL • RIKER • ACHEN • LYNN •

WALKER • CONLAN • BEAM • HANSEN • BAUM • RUSSETT • EPSTEIN

INGLEHART • GITHENS • KEOHANE • REISELBACH • SHALALA • STOKES

APSA

announces the publication of

Political Science: The State of the Discipline

edited by

Ada W. Finifter

"a remarkable glimpse of a profession at work... An · invaluable resource for any student or practitioner of current politics and policy-making in the U.S. — and indeed elsewhere in the world."

***Choice** (February 1984)*

19 Chapters by many of the country's leading political scientists reviewing the present state and future directions of research in the subfields of the discipline.

614 pages with a detailed index to authors cited.

Paper:	$15.00* for APSA members $25.00 for non-members ISBN 0-915654-58-X
Cloth:	$35.00 ISBN 0-915654-57-1

*This rate effective for classroom adoptions placed through bookstores.

(Please include $2.00 to cover the costs of postage and handling)

Send your **prepaid order** to:

State of the Discipline
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

• HANCOCK • MIGDAL • ASHER • KINDER •

Pitt Series in Policy and Institutional Studies

Bert A. Rockman, Editor

New in the Series

How Does Social Science Work?
Reflections on Practice
Paul Diesing
$29.95 cloth / ISBN 0-8229-3661-5

Traffic Safety Reform in the United States and Great Britain
Jerome S. Legge, Jr.
$29.95 cloth / ISBN 0-8229-3662-3

Extraordinary Measures
The Exercise of Prerogative Powers in the United States
Daniel P. Franklin
$24.95 cloth / ISBN 0-8229-3672-0

Now in paperback

The Competitive City
The Political Economy of Suburbia
Mark Schneider
$14.95 paper / ISBN 0-8229-5452-4

Of Related Interest

Little Common Ground
Arab Agriculture and Jewish Settlement in Palestine, 1920–1948
Charles S. Kamen
$39.95 cloth / ISBN 0-8229-3668-2

The Economics of Cuban Sugar
Jorge Pérez-López
$39.95 cloth / ISBN 0-8229-3663-1

Anthropological Approaches to Political Behavior
Contributions from *Ethnology*
Frank McGlynn
and Arthur Tuden, Editors
$24.95 cloth / ISBN 0-8229-1162-0
$12.95 paper / ISBN 0-8229-6094-X

A Revolution Aborted
The Lessons of Grenada
Jorge Heine, Editor
$14.95 paper / ISBN 0-8229-5433-8

Cuba Under the Platt Amendment, 1902–1934
Louis A. Pérez, Jr.
$16.95 paper / ISBN 0-8229-5446-X

University of Pittsburgh Press
c/o CUP Services, Box 6525, Ithaca, NY 14850 • 800-666-2211



Abe Fortas

A Biography

Laura Kalman

"A **superb, penetrating, fair-minded and altogether fascinating** study of one of Washington's most brilliant insiders; an outstanding contribution to the history of American government that offers extraordinary insight into how things really work." —Charles A. Reich

"**Well-researched and insightful.**"—Frank Mankiewicz, *The Los Angeles Times Book Review* 34 illus. $29.95

Affirmative Action and Justice

A Philosophical and Constitutional Inquiry

Michel Rosenfeld

Critically examining the major existing philosophical and constitutional theories on affirmative action, Michel Rosenfeld elaborates a new theory that strongly defends the justice of affirmative action from the standpoint of both philosophy and constitutional law.

"**A major work.**"—David A.J. Richards
$30.00

Yale University Press
Dept. 530
92A Yale Station
New Haven, CT 06520

Announcing the first volume in the new **Human Rights Watch Books** *series, jointly sponsored by Yale University Press and Human Rights Watch*

Human Rights in Iraq

Middle East Watch

"This **cogent** study offers grim details of the systematic repression of its citizens by the Iraqi government over the last two decades...and since 1979 by the regime of Saddam Hussein."—Robert Richter, *The New York Times Book Review* $19.95

Now available in paperback

The CIA and American Democracy

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones

"**A sophisticated study** that should challenge us to take a more serious view about how our democracy formulates its foreign policy."—David P. Calleo, *The New York Times Book Review* $14.95

Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War

Paul K. Huth

"**A great book.** It deals with an extremely important problem much more rigorously than anyone else has so far....By not reading it, you make yourself illiterate in national security affairs."—Erich Weede, *American Political Science Review* $11.95

The Voice of Liberal Learning

Michael Oakeshott on Education

edited by Timothy Fuller

One of Britain's leading political philosophers "convey(s) the passion of a fierce defender of liberal education and the skepticism that makes liberal education possible in the first place. **It is a mixture much needed now.**"—Andrew Sullivan, *The Wall Street Journal* $9.95

available this Spring

THE DYNAMICS OF DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ARMS CONTROL:

THE SALT II TREATY RATIFICATION DEBATE

by Dan Caldwell

Using Salt II as a case study, the author investigates the process of international arms negotiations and the resulting domestic debates between the various agencies and departments within the executive branch, the Congress, interest groups, and the public. Included is material from interviews with key players in the Salt II treaty negotiation process. **256 pages, 6 tables. Cloth, ISBN #747-X, $34.95. (April)**

THE EVOLUTION OF THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

edited by Robert L. Rothstein

A series of essays by distinguished scholars in the field, this volume provides a perspective on the evolution of theory in international relations. Contributors include Lori Fisler Damrosch, Annette Baker Fox, Ernst B. Haas, Elizabeth C. Hanson, Louis Henkin, Robert Jervis, Morton A. Kaplan, Robert A. Ogrodnick, Donald J. Puchala, Robert L. Rothstein, Glenn H. Snyder, Kenneth N. Waltz, Mark W. Zacher, and William Zimmerman. **240 pages. Cloth, ISBN #762-3, $34.95. (May)**

BARGAINING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY: THE POSTWAR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS
by Lloyd Jensen
Cloth, ISBN #529-9, $32.95

NEGOTIATING NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL *by Lloyd Jensen*
Paper, ISBN #530-2, $17.95

BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL POLICY
by Marvin S. Soroos
Cloth, ISBN #474-8, $39.95
Paper, ISBN #478-0, $19.95

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S QUEST FOR GLOBAL COMMUNITY: BELIEFS AND THEIR IMPACT ON BEHAVIOR *by Jerel A. Rosati*
Cloth, ISBN #508-6, $29.95

CHIEF JUSTICE: LEADERSHIP AND THE SUPREME COURT
by Robert J. Steamer
Cloth, ISBN #482-9, $24.95

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
by M. Glenn Abernathy
Paper, ISBN #617-1, $32.95

THE DISINTEGRATION OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS: WAR AND REVOLUTION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
by Manus I. Midlarsky
Cloth, ISBN #466-7, $34.95

THE ELUSIVE QUEST: THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
by Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach
Cloth, ISBN #539-6, $34.95
Paper, ISBN #570-1, $17.95

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PARTISAN POLITICS
by Craig R. Smith
Cloth, ISBN #611-2, $34.95
Paper, ISBN #638-4, $14.95

INQUIRY, LOGIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
by Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr
Cloth, ISBN #613-9, $39.95
Paper, ISBN #630-9, $21.95

INTERNATIONAL EVENTS AND THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN POLICY *by Charles W. Kegley, Jr.; Gregory A. Raymond; Robert M. Rood; and Richard A. Skinner*
Cloth, ISBN #326-1, $24.95
Paper, ISBN #333-4, $5.95

ON GLOBAL WAR: HISTORICAL-STRUCTURAL APPROACHES TO WORLD POLITICS
by William R. Thompson
Cloth, ISBN #562-X, $39.95
Paper, ISBN #721-6, $21.95

POWER IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
by Michael P. Sullivan
Cloth, ISBN #632-5, $32.95

TO AVOID ISOLATION: AN AMBASSADOR'S VIEW OF U.S./JAPANESE RELATIONS
by Yoshio Okawara
Cloth, ISBN #646-5, $29.95

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: PERSONALITIES, PRINCIPLES, AND ISSUES
by Walter B. Mead
Paper, ISBN #523-X, $14.95

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND THE SOVIET UNION: PERSISTENT REGULARITIES AND EXTREME CONTINGENCIES
by Richard J. Stoll
Cloth, ISBN #678-3, $39.95
Paper, ISBN #698-8, $21.95

WHEN TRUST BREAKS DOWN: ALLIANCE NORMS AND WORLD POLITICS *by Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond*
Cloth, ISBN #644-9, $39.95
Paper, ISBN #688-0, $21.95

WORLD OF OUR MAKING: RULES AND RULE IN SOCIAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
by Nicholas Greenwood Onuf
Cloth, #626-0, $39.95
Paper, #680-5, $21.95

ISBN Prefix 0-87249


BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY
THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL POLICY
by Marvin S. Soroos
The United States Constitution
The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community
by Jerel A. Rosati
We the People
Civil Liberties Under the Constitution
THE DISINTEGRATION OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS:
WAR AND REVOLUTION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
by Manus I. Midlarsky

Call or write
for a free catalog.
These and other USC Press
titles may be purchased
from your local bookstore
or ordered directly
from the publisher.
Examination copies
available on request.

University of South Carolina Press

1716 College Street, Columbia, S.C. 29208, (800) 763-0089, FAX (803) 777-0160

Politics from Penn State

American Hegemony and World Oil

The Industry, the State System, and the World Economy

Simon Bromley



". . . a major contribution to the current debates on the nature of power in the international system. . . . Bromley dispels two myths—the purported loss of U. S. hegemony and the realistic conception of states. This book, drawing on a wide reading of social science literature, will be a must for students of international relations and of international political economy."— Fred Halliday

With a postscript written after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990

324 pages $39.50

State Theory

Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place

Bob Jessop

"This book makes a very substantial contribution to the literature on the state. . . . a magisterial tour through the development of state theory in the 1970s and 1980s, engaging virtually every significant current of theoretical work on the state in the period: Marxist structuralism, German state-derivation approaches, the French regulation school, discourse theories, statist analyses." — Erik Olin Wright

425 pages cloth $45.00 paper $14.95

State Failure

The Impotence of Politics in Industrial Society

Martin Jänicke *Translated by Alan Braley*

". . . provocative, well-argued, and likely to make a big impact on debates in the areas of theories of the state, comparative political economy, innovation, alternative politics, and environmental policy. At a time when Americans are realizing that simply deregulating everything may produce a large amount of dysfunction, *State Failure* offers a welcome corrective to lack of discourse in this area." — Christopher S. Allen

182 pages $29.95

The Central Intelligence Agency
An Instrument of Government, to 1950
Arthur B. Darling, *with Introductions by*
Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman

Written by the CIA's first historian, this is the first document that was released under the Agency's Historical Review Program, in November 1989. "This account of the Agency's establishment and early years should become a basic document in studies of U.S. government organization and power struggles of the late 1940s."
— *Publishers Weekly*

600 pages cloth $60.00 paper $17.50

Now in paperback, with a new preface by the author . . .

Undeclared War
Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power
Edward Keynes

"A fresh examination of the 200-year-old question of presidential and congressional powers in military action and foreign policy, looking particularly at the accretion of power in the hands of the President and the degree to which the judicial branch has attempted, or should attempt, to make decisions in the twilight zone. It is a searching inquiry, ranging from the early years of the republic to the Vietnam War."
— *Foreign Affairs*

". . . clearly written, conceptually tight, and a worthy addition to constitutional literature." — *American Political Science Review*

". . . well written and interesting. The summary of the litigation sparked by the war in Vietnam is valuable." — Judge Abraham D. Sofaer, *American Historical Review*

252 pages $12.50

Penn State Press

Barbara Building, Suite C, 820 North University Drive
University Park, PA 16802 (814) 865-1327

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WORLD ENERGY

A Twentieth-Century Perspective

by John G. Clark

In this timely study John Clark provides a historical context for current events by investigating the complex role of energy in the world economy from 1900 through the 1980s. "Clark offers fresh and provocative analysis for understanding the pattern of recurrent energy crises and the world we live in."—Dolores Greenberg

417 pp., $39.95 cloth,
$14.95 paper

ANTITRUST AND THE TRIUMPH OF ECONOMICS

Institutions, Expertise, and Policy Change

by Marc Allen Eisner

Marc Eisner demonstrates that the so-called Reagan "revolution" was but an extension of well-established trends in antitrust regulatory reform.

approx. 300 pp., $34.95

HARVESTING CHANGE

Labor and Agrarian Reform in Nicaragua, 1979–1990

by Laura J. Enríquez

While working in Nicaragua between 1982 and 1989, Laura Enríquez studied the attempts by the Sandinista government to promote balanced economic development and redistribute agricultural resources. In *Harvesting Change* she provides a unique analysis of the dilemmas of reform in an agrarian society.

approx. 260 pp., $37.50 cloth,
$12.95 paper

available at
bookstores or from

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS

Post Office Box 2288
Chapel Hill, NC
27515-2288

Toll-free orders:
1-800-848-6224

Oxford

World Resources 1990-91
World Resources Institute
"Will provide an excellent springboard for quality discussions of current environmental issues. Students can readily find data that would require endless hours together. It will best fit my class as an auxiliary text."—Darrel L. McDonald, *Stephen F. Austin State University.* The 1990-91 edition offers a special focus on global climate change and features a unique Greenhouse Index that ranks countries by emissions of gases that may lead to global warming, as well as concise accounts of environmental conditions in Latin America and the latest trends in population and health, human settlements, food and agriculture, and global systems and cycles.
1990 400 pp.; illus. paper $17.95 cloth $29.95



New!
Mandela, Tambo, and the African National Congress
The Struggle Against Apartheid, 1948-1990, A Documentary Survey
Edited by SHERIDAN JOHNS and R. HUNT DAVIS, Jr.
This timely documentary history provides a unique analysis of contemporary South African politics, covering the forty-two-year period between the ruling National Party's electoral victory of 1948 and the subsequent institution of apartheid, to the recent release from prison of Nelson Mandela.
1991 368 pp.; 2 illus. paper $13.95 cloth $35.00

New!
The Theoretical Evolution of International Political Economy
A Reader
Edited by GEORGE T. CRANE and ABLA M. AMAWI
Outlining the development of three schools of International Political Economy thought—Liberalism, Marxism, and Realism, this useful text brings together readings from the eighteenth century to the present, from Alexander Hamilton and Adam Smith to Immanuel Wallerstein and Stephen Krasner.
September 1991 320 pp.; 5 illus. paper $18.95

Women and Social Protest
Edited by GUIDA WEST and RHODA LOIS BLUMBERG
"An interesting collection of readings about women and the social protest movement....Should provide a springboard for lively classroom discussion."—Robert W. Langran, *Villanova University*
1990 416 pp. paper $18.95 cloth $49.95

Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War
Volume 2
Edited by PHILIP E. TETLOCK, JO L. HUSBANDS, ROBERT JERVIS, PAUL C. STERN, and CHARLES TILLY
The second volume of this noteworthy series explores the effect of changing international conditions on the potential for conflicts between small powers, the possibility that techniques of reassurance can supplement deterrence, and sources of moderation in Soviet security policy.
1990 384 pp.; 4 illus. paper $19.95 cloth $49.95

Promises to Keep
African Americans and the Constitutional Order, 1776 to the Present
DONALD G. NIEMAN
This unique text examines the paradoxical relationship blacks have had with the U.S. Constitution tracing it from the birth of the Republic to current battles over school segregation, voting rights, and affirmative action.
1991 304 pp.; 14 illus. paper $9.95 cloth $29.95

Immigration Reconsidered
History, Sociology, and Politics
Edited by VIRGINIA YANS-McLAUGHLIN
"An excellent overview of patterns and trends of migration throughout history."
—Carolyne W. Arnold, *University of Massachusetts, Boston*
1990 352 pp. paper $14.95 cloth $38.00

Prices and publication dates are subject to change.
To request an examination copy, write on school letterhead giving full course information, including course name, level, expected enrollment, and your decision deadline, to:

Oxford University Press
ATTN: College Sales Coordinator
200 Madison Avenue • New York, NY 10016

AMERICAN POLITICS

American Constitutional Law

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Cases and Interpretation

Third Edition

RALPH A. ROSSUM, Claremont McKenna College
G. ALAN TARR, Rutgers University, Camden Campus

A topically organized text for the American constitutional law course that focuses on constitutional interpretation. This edition is updated with constitutionally significant pronouncements of Congress since 1987. Accompanied by an annual supplement that summarizes important cases from recent Supreme Court sessions.

Hardcover. 768 pages. Just Published



NATIONAL SECURITY

Enduring Problems in a Changing Defense Environment

Second Edition

DONALD M. SNOW, U.S. Army War College, University of Alabama

A brief overview of U.S. national security policy that explains how defense issues and instruments of national power work as components in the formulation of that policy. The Second Edition covers the recent changes in the international environment, strategic use of conventional and nuclear arms, and economic issues as they relate to defense policy and national strength.

Paperbound. 320 pages. Just Published



RECONSTRUCTING CONSENSUS

American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War

RICHARD A. MELANSON, Brown University, Kenyon College

Reconstructing Consensus examines the reformulation of American foreign policy in the aftermath of the war in Vietnam. Organized by presidential administrations from Richard Nixon to George Bush, the book traces attempts to forge a new foreign policy consensus to replace what had been severely challenged by the American experience in Vietnam.

Paperbound. 248 pages. Just Published

SMP

ST. MARTIN'S PRESS
College Division, Department JR
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010
College Desk: 1-800-446-8923

THE PRESIDENT AS WORLD LEADER

BARBARA KELLERMAN, George Washington University,
Fairleigh Dickinson University
RYAN J. BARILLEAUX, Miami University

An evaluation of the presidency that focuses on the president as the national leader in the formulation of foreign policy, and the president as the key representative of American interests in the international environment. Case studies of five recent presidents examine their leadership abilities both at home and abroad with regard to some of the major foreign policy initiatives of their administrations.
Paperbound. 225 pages. Just Published



INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY

WORLD SECURITY

Trends and Challenges at Century's End
MICHAEL T. KLARE, Hampshire College
DANIEL C. THOMAS, Cornell University

World Security presents 17 original contributions (and 1 previously published article) from leading writers in international relations and peace studies. It is the first text or reader to present major issues in international politics from a consistent, globalist framework. The book's broad definition of world security includes a range of nonmilitary issues--human rights, famine, debt and development, and global ecology.
Paperbound. 448 pages. Just Published



SMP **ST. MARTIN'S PRESS**
College Division, Department JR
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010
College Desk: 1-800-446-8923



INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth

Second Edition

JEFFRY A. FRIEDEN, and DAVID A. LAKE, both of the University of California, Los Angeles

International Political Economy is the only available collection of readings on the politics of international economic relations. While having a consistent, critical focus on theory and analysis, the reader offers contemporary articles on a wide range of issues including multinational corporations, foreign investment, trade imbalances, and the fluctuating value of the dollar.

Paperbound. 470 pages. Just Published



AT ISSUE

Politics in the World Arena

Sixth Edition

STEVEN L. SPIEGEL, University of Los Angeles, California

An authoritative collection of 34 contemporary readings (all of which are new to this edition) by leading theorists and writers who deal with the most immediate issues in world politics today. The new edition includes selections on changes in superpower relations, the Pacific Rim economy, and the international drug war, and also provides expanded coverage of the environment and global ecology as a security issue. With a prologue and part introductions.

Paperbound. 518 pages. Just Published



AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Pattern and Process

Fourth Edition

CHARLES W. KEGLEY, JR., University of South Carolina
EUGENE R. WITTKOPF, Louisiana State University

A thorough introduction to the process and objectives of postwar American foreign policy. New to the Fourth Edition are expanded treatment of the Gorbachev era reforms and updated material on the international political economy and its implications for U.S. foreign policy.

Paperbound. 656 pages. Just Published

SMP **ST. MARTIN'S PRESS**
College Division, Department JR
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010
College Desk: 1-800-446-8923

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

NATIONS AND GOVERNMENTS

Comparative Politics in Regional Perspective
THOMAS M. MAGSTADT, Air War College


Thomas M. Magstadt
Nations and Governments
Comparative Politics in Regional Perspective

Nations and Governments provides a contemporary global context to help students compare the political settings, institutions, and trends in six world regions: Western Europe, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. Key nations in each region are highlighted as case studies to show how they exemplify or diverge from the region's characteristics. Includes coverage of the recent realignments in Europe and the Soviet bloc.
Hardcover. 544 pages. Just Published

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

PREFACE TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

A Search for Themes and Direction
RICHARD J. STILLMAN III, George Mason University


Preface to
Public
Administration
A Search for Themes and Direction
Richard J. Stillman II

Preface to Public Administration is a thoughtful consideration of the development of the theory and practice of public administration in America. The author examines the development of public administration from the late 18th century on, and contrasts the history of public administration in the U.S. with that of the public administration in Europe.
Paperbound. 242 pages. Just Published

SMP **ST. MARTIN'S PRESS**
College Division, Department JR
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010
College Desk: 1-800-446-8923

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES
from M. E. Sharpe

Benjamin Ginsberg and Alan Stone
DO ELECTIONS MATTER?
Second Edition

The institution of free elections is the keystone of democracy, but what difference do elections really make?

This new edition extends the coverage through the 1988 election.

272 pages Hardcover $39.95 Paper $15.95

Mostafa Rejai
POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES
A Comparative Approach

Rejai presents a framework for examining political ideologies, then examines the major political ideologies of our time: nationalism, fascism, Marxism, Leninism, guerrilla communism, and democracy (including democratic socialism, democratic capitalism, liberalism, and conservatism).

196 pages Hardcover $35.00 Paper $12.95

Jarol B. Manheim
ALL OF THE PEOPLE, ALL THE TIME
Strategic Communication and American Politics

ALL OF THE PEOPLE, ALL THE TIME examines the ways in which governments, politicians, journalists and media organizations, and others manipulate words, pictures, events, and one another to get what they want; about how and why that manipulation works; and about its consequences for our democratic society.

"Essential reading for all those who know that American politics is in trouble."
—Christopher Arterton,
The Graduate School of
Political Management

288 pages Hardcover $25.00

Mark H. Maier
THE DATA GAME
Controversies in Social Science Statistics

This book discusses the collection, use, and interpretation of statistical data. Separate chapters are devoted to data in the fields of demography; housing; health; education; crime; the national economy; wealth, income, and poverty; labor; business; and government.

256 pages Hardcover $39.95 Paper $13.95

Michael Sherraden
ASSETS AND THE POOR
A New American Welfare Policy

"Michael Sherraden...challenges conventional wisdom about the nature of welfare measures designed to reduce poverty."
—Neil Gilbert,
U. C. -Berkeley

In *ASSETS AND THE POOR*, Sherraden proposes a new approach based on the concepts of savings, investment, and asset accumulation rather than on the failed approach of income, spending, and consumption. Incomes feed people's stomachs, but assets change their heads.

336 pages Hardcover $34.95

Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley
EXPLORING REVOLUTION
Essays on Latin American Insurgency and Revolutionary Theory

The focus is on events since 1956. Specific topics include the rise and fall of guerrilla governments; terror and guerrilla warfare; consciousness-raising in revolutionary struggles; revolutionary outcomes and theories of revolution; what makes peasants insurrectionary; and adapting revolutionary theories to Latin American revolutions.

224 pages Hardcover $35.00

M. E. Sharpe, Inc.
80 Business Park Drive, Armonk, NY 10504
MasterCard and VISA accepted. Call 1-800-541-6563

THE BITTERSWEET CENTURY

Speculations on Modern Science and American Democracy

by Paul N. Goldstene

"In *The Bittersweet Century* Goldstene exposes the elitist core of liberal thought and practice with a radical critique that focuses on the opposition of liberals and conservatives alike to a genuinely democratic and egalitarian society. It is a powerful and penetrating indictment of liberalism in theory and practice...scintillating in analysis and exhilarating in style."
Rick Tilman, *Journal of Economic Issues*, September 1990

"[*The Bittersweet Century*] is not for mere reading but for studying, underlining, reorganizing the way we think about what is happening today in America.... A towering critique of liberalism by a radical, brilliant author." *Book Reader*, July-August 1989

Paul N. Goldstene is Professor of Government at California State University, Sacramento. He is the author of *The Collapse of Liberal Empire: Science and Revolution in the Twentieth Century* (Yale University Press, 1977; Chandler & Sharp, 1980) and *Democracy in America: Sardonic Speculations* (Bucknell House, 1988).

256 pp., 6x9", notes, indexes (names & topics)
ISBN 0-88316-560-0 (cloth) $22.95 ISBN 0-88316-559-7 (paper) $10.95

Other titles from Chandler & Sharp include: *The Enterprise of Public Administration* (Dwight Waldo), *Beyond Liberalism, Where Relations Grow* (Henry Kariel), *Understanding Politics* (William Stewart), and two books by Jane Bayes—*Minority Politics and Ideologies in the U.S.* and *Ideologies and Interest-Group Politics.*

Chandler & Sharp Publishers, Inc.
11A Commercial Blvd., Novato, CA 94949 • (415) 883-2353

Politics Past and Present

WOMEN, POLITICS, AND CHANGE
LOUISE A. TILLY and PATRICIA GURIN, eds.
"This substantial collection of leading political analysts' work thoughtfully and forcefully reveals the character of women's engagement in every sphere of political behavior from party politics to social activism." - Cynthia Fuchs Epstein
$45.00 688 pp. 0-87154-884-4

HOW PRESIDENTS TEST REALITY
Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 and 1965
JOHN P. BURKE and FRED I. GREENSTEIN
Winner of the 1990 Richard E. Neustadt Award
"[The] book makes an important contribution to the literature on presidential decisionmaking, particularly by highlighting the values of formal structutre and concommitant risks of informality."
—*American Political Science Review*
New in paperback, $14.95 340 pp. 0-87154-176-9

DUAL CITY
Restructuring New York
JOHN H. MOLLENKOPF and MANUEL CASTELLS, eds.
Bringing together an expert panel of scholars, this volume presents a rigorous examination of emerging patterns of inequality in the postindustrial city. These 17 original essays seek to translate the popular conceptions of the city into more subtle research questions about class, race, ethnicity, and gender.
$45.00 464 pp. 0-87154-606-X

POWER, CULTURE, AND PLACE
Essays on New York City
JOHN H. MOLLENKOPF, ed.
"Remarkably fine contributions...pathbreaking scholarship"—*Contemporary Sociology*
$40.00 319 pp. 0-87154-603-5

Russell Sage Foundation
112 E. 64th Street, New York, NY 10021
Toll-free ordering: 800-666-2211

★ *Find the money for research in...*

The Guide To Federal Funding For Social Scientists

Whether your specialty is demographic anthropology, political economy, or social psychology, the multidisciplinary *Guide to Federal Funding for Social Scientists,* 2nd edition, has a federal program to support your interests. Over 250 federally funded programs in the social sciences are indexed by agency and subject matter to simplify your search.

Program descriptions outline names of contacts, review processes, application procedures and deadlines, budget information, and examples of funded projects. Essays authored by agency insiders supplement the program descriptions and guide the researcher through the ins and outs of the main funding institutions. The Guide is an indispensable resource for both pre- and post-doctoral social scientists. The price is $30 for members and $50 for nonmembers.

★ Order Form ★

Enclosed is payment for _____ copy(s) of the *Guide to Federal Funding for Social Scientists* at the rate of:

_____ $30 + $2.50 shipping FOR MEMBERS _____ $50 + $2.50 shipping FOR NONMEMBERS

PAYMENT: _____ Check _____ Credit Card Visa/Mastercard No. ______________________ Exp. Date _______

MEMBERS OF THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS ARE ENTITLED TO MEMBER RATES:

American Anthropological Association
American Economic Association
American Historical Association
American Political Science Association
American Psychological Association
American Sociological Association
American Statistical Association
Association of American Geographers
Association of American Law Schools
Linguistic Society of America

NAME: ______________________ MEMBER AFFILIATION: ______________________

ADDRESS: ______________________ CITY/STATE/ZIP: ______________________

PHONE: ______________________

MAIL TO: PUBLICATIONS/APSA, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036 (202) 483-2512

MICHIGAN MICHIGAN MICHIGAN



Political Analysis

An Annual Publication of the Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association

VOLUME 2 • 1990

James A. Stimson, Editor

POLITICAL ANALYSIS

An Annual Publication of the Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association

VOLUME 2, 1990

Edited by James A. Stimson

Associate editors: Christopher A. Achen, University of Chicago; Nathaniel L. Beck, University of California, San Diego; Stanley Feldman, University of Kentucky; John A. Ferejohn, Stanford University.

Now in its second year, *Political Analysis* publishes scholarly articles on topics related to all areas of political science methodology as it is broadly defined, including statistical models, modeling, measurement, and research design. Volume 2 of *Political Analysis* addresses such issues as fallacy in comparative politics inquiry, classification of interstate conflict outcomes, and instrumental variables models and models of dimensionality, and presents a debate on the usefulness of R-square. The volume joins its predecessor as a publication of great value in communicating new methodical research.

cloth $42.50

Also available

VOLUME 1, 1989
cloth $42.50

Volumes are available at a 10% discount to members of the Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association.

Michigan residents, include 4% sales tax.

MICHIGAN THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS
P.O. Box 1104 Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

NEW FROM CHICAGO



The Noble Savage

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1754-1762

Maurice Cranston

The long-awaited second part of Cranston's definitive biography completes and corrects the story told in Rousseau's *Confessions* and offers an entirely new history and analysis of his most productive years.

Cloth $29.95 424 pages
16 halftones

Now in Paper

Jean-Jacques

The Early Life of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712-1754

Maurice Cranston

"[An] admirable biography, which is as meticulous, calm, reasonable, and judicious as its subject is passionate and tumultuous."—Keith Michael Baker, *Washington Post Book World*

Paper $17.95 382 pages
16 halftones

The Logic of Delegation

Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process

D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins

Drawing on economic and management theory, the authors persuasively challenge the notion that majority congressional parties cannot act as an effective policymaking force and that delegation of authority is tantamount to abdication.

Paper $12.95 320 pages
36 tables, 15 figures

American Politics and Political Economy series

Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement

Dennis Chong

Focusing on the social, psychological, and moral incentives of political activism often neglected by rational choice theorists, Dennis Chong persuasively demonstrates how and why the civil rights movement succeeded.

Paper $16.95 256 pages

American Politics and Political Economy

Law and Public Choice

A Critical Introduction

Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey

The authors present a remarkably rich and accessible introduction to the central principles of public choice and of the implications for the American legal system. They also critique arguments based on public choice for the "new conservative judicial activism."

Paper $13.95 176 pages
10 figures, tables throughout

The Limits of Rationality

Edited by Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi

This accessible introduction to rational choice theory contains essays by Jon Elster, Daniel Kahneman, Gary S. Becker, Robert H. Bates, Michael Taylor, and other leading researchers.

Paper $19.95 436 pages
35 figures, 13 tables

The Cynical Society

The Culture of Politics and the Politics of Culture in American Life

Jeffrey C. Goldfarb

"*The Cynical Society* is indispensable for all those concerned about the future of American democracy. The analysis of politics, the mass media, and education is incisive and points the way to the recovery of democratic values and a democratic process."—Robert N. Bellah, co-author of *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life*

Cloth $22.50 212 pages

Now in Paper

Down and Out in America

The Origins of Homelessness

Peter H. Rossi

The most accurate and comprehensive picture of homelessness to date, this study offers a powerful explanation of its causes and proposes short- and long-term solutions. "Far and away the best study of the homeless." —Michael Novak, *Forbes*

Paper $9.95 260 pages 51 tables

The Superpowers and Africa

The Constraints of a Rivalry, 1960-1990

Zaki Laïdi

Translated by Patricia Baudoin

Laïdi shows that superpower efforts to exert control over African politics were constrained by the internal political and economic circumstances of individual African nations. "A thorough and remarkably original book."—Aristide Zolberg, New School for Social Research

Paper $14.95 258 pages
4 maps, 13 tables

MacArthur's Japanese Constitution

A Linguistic and Cultural Study of Its Making

Kyoko Inoue

A remarkable cautionary tale of cultural misunderstanding, Inoue's research exposes a grand irony—the same linguistic and cultural barriers that hindered post-war negociations also made it possible for both sides to affirm a crucial document without ever agreeing on its fundamental meaning.

Cloth $39.95 392 pages

Majestic Failure

The Fall of the Shah

Marvin Zonis

Based on years of research and on primary sources unavailable until now, including interviews with the Shah, his family, and his staff, *Majestic Failure* is an outstanding example of responsible psychobiography and psychopolitical analysis.

Cloth $34.95 352 pages
24 halftones

Now in Paper

The Political Language of Islam

Bernard Lewis

"Lewis's own style, combining erudition with a simple elegance and subtle humor, continues to inspire. He stands alone as one who deserves, without qualification, the title of historian of Islam." —Martin Kramer, *Middle East Review*

Paper $9.95 176 pages

Max Weber and German Politics

1890-1920

Wolfgang J. Mommsen

Translated by Michael Steinberg

"Essential to an understanding of Weber."—Joseph W. Bendersky, *The Historian*

Paper $19.95 528 pages

The University of Chicago Press

5801 South Ellis
Chicago, IL 60637

Crane Russak
a Member of Taylor & Francis Group

The American Polity: Essays on the Theory and Practice of Constitutional Government

Edward J. Erler, Chairman, Department of Political Science,
California State University at San Bernardino

The collapse of totalitarian governments around the world has provoked renewed interest in the problems and prospects of constitutional government. This volume presents a clear and readable account of the theory and practice of constitutional government in the United States.

Understanding American constitutionalism within the context of founding principles, the author examines the essential elements of the American constitutional system, especially the separation of powers and the rule of law, the essential ingredients of constitutional government. This volume is an excellent text for courses on American political thought or as a supplementary text in American Government and constitutional law courses. Scholars will also find this book a valuable addition to their research libraries.

1991 • 160 pages
0-8448-1607-8 Hardcover $49.50 • 0-8448-1608-6 Softcover $19.95

Transitions from Dictatorship to Democracy: Comparative Studies of Spain, Portugal and Greece

Ronald H. Chilcote, Stylianos Hadjiyannis, Fred A. Lopez, III,
Daniel Nataf, and Elizabeth Sammis

These essays offer a retrospective assessment of the transition from dictatorship to democracy and on to socialism in the countries of Spain, Portugal and Greece. Examined are the current developments, with particular attention paid to the role of the state and social classes in the overthrow of the old dictatorships. Also highlighted are the evolution of representative democracy and political parties, and the formal integration of these countries into the European Economic Community and the international capitalist systems.

1990 • 370 pages
0-8448-1675-2 Hardcover $49.50 • 0-8448-1676-0 Softcover $29.50

To Order, Call, TOLL-FREE, 1-800-821-8312
Or Write to: Crane Russak,
c/o Taylor & Francis, 1900 Frost Road, Suite 101,
Bristol, PA 19007-1598

Oxford

Liberalism, Community, and Culture
WILL KYMLICKA, *University of Toronto*
"Highly recommended for upper-division undergraduates and above."—*Choice*
Kymlicka here presents the liberal view about the nature and value of community culture in an unusually explicit and systematic way, and links it to more familiar liberal views on individual rights and state neutrality.
1989 (1991) 288 pp. paper $19.95 cloth $49.95

1948 and After
Israel and the Palestinians
BENNY MORRIS, *The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC*
These essays by a leading Israeli "new historian" focus on Israeli decisions and the reasons behind the mass Arab exile from Palestine in 1948. Morris identifies and analyzes the major points of controversy between the "old" official Israeli histories and the "new" histories of the 1980s.
1991 304 pp. $69.00

The Critical Theory of Technology
ANDREW FEENBERG, *San Diego State University*
Feenberg argues that the degradation of labor, as well as many environmental, educational, and political problems, are rooted in the social values that preside over technological development. He offers an approach to understanding our disappointment with the largely unfulfilled promise of technology.
June 1991 256 pp. paper $12.95 cloth $32.50

Military Expenditure
The Political Economy of International Security
SAADET DEGER and SOMNATH SEN, *both of SIPRI*
This study analyses world military expenditures at the end of the 1980s and discusses its political and economic implications, paying special attention to recent events and the process of change that characterizes world military expenditure and its determinants.
1991 200 pp. $48.00

Mandela, Tambo, and the African National Congress
The Struggle Against Apartheid, 1948-1990, A Documentary Survey
Edited by SHERIDAN JOHNS, *Duke University*, and R. HUNT DAVIS, Jr., *University of Florida*
This documentary history provides a unique analysis of contemporary South African politics, covering the forty-two year period between the ruling National Party's electoral victory of 1948, to the recent release from prison of Nelson Mandela.
1991 368 pp. paper $13.95 cloth $35.00

Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy
Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe
GREGORY M. LUEBBERT
This book provides a sweeping comparative analysis of the political development of Western Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
1991 400 pp. paper $18.95 cloth $49.95

The Apartheid State in Crisis
Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975-1990
ROBERT M. PRICE, *University of California, Berkeley*
"This is an outstanding, timely manuscript. Its greatest strength is the way in which theory and narrative are interwoven to provide a clear and persuasive interpretation of political change in South Africa."—Michael Clough, *Council on Foreign Relations*
April 1991 352 pp. cloth $60.00 paper $15.95

Prices and publication dates are subject to change and good only in the U.S.
To order, send check or money order to: Department KLH
To order by phone using major credit cards, please call 1-800-334-4249 ext. 7106

Oxford University Press
200 Madison Avenue • New York, NY 10016

RIENNER

2nd Edition, fully revised and updated

Global Politics in the Human Interest

MEL GURTOV

"A much needed alternative to the usual treatment of world politics." — *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*

Completely updated to take account of the dramatic developments in world politics and the world economy since 1988 • 1991 • pb/$16.95

Women in Taiwan Politics

CHOU BIH-ER, CAL CLARK,
and JANET CLARK

1990 • hc/$30

The Western Alliance After INF

Redefining U.S. Policy Toward Europe and the Soviet Union

MICHAEL R. LUCAS

"Lucas's book could hardly be more relevant and timely . . . This well-written and provocative book is strongly recommended." — *Choice*

1989 • hc/$32

Revolution and Political Change in the Third World

edited by BARRY M. SCHUTZ and
ROBERT O. SLATER

1990 • hc/$35 • pb/$16.95

Soviet Naval Power in the Pacific

DEREK DA CUNHA

Challenging conventional wisdom on several points, da Cunha emphasizes the often ignored strengths of the Soviet fleet in relation to its U.S. equivalent • 1990 • hc/$35

The State of the European Community

edited by LEON HURWITZ and
CHRISTIAN LEQUESNE

1991 • hc/$49.95

Power and Insecurity

Beijing, Moscow, and Washington, 1949-1988

HARVEY W. NELSEN,
with a foreword by DONALD ZAGORIA

"The most comprehensive and up-to-date survey of this major triangular relationship." — *Political Science Quarterly* • 1989 • hc/$30 • pb/$15.95

Comparative Politics in the Post-Behavioral Era

edited by LOUIS J. CANTORI and
ANDREW H. ZIEGLER, JR.

"The editors have done a noteworthy job in selecting the essays and adapting them . . . traces the major intellectual debates in [the] field over the past three decades." — *Studies in Comparative International Development*

1988 • hc/$44 • pb/$19.95

Exploring Realpolitik

Probing International Relations Theory with Computer Simulation

THOMAS R. CUSACK and RICHARD J. STOLL

1990 • hc/$30

Alternative to Intervention

A New U.S.-Latin America Security Relationship

edited by RICHARD J. BLOOMFIELD
and GREGORY F. TREVERTON

"A fresh, serious, and thoughtful look at important inter-American security issues, examined from both U.S. and Latin American perspectives." — Jack Child • 1990 • hc/$26.50

Peacemaking in Civil War

International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980

STEPHEN JOHN STEDMAN

"The definitive work on the Zimbabwe negotiation process and an excellent study of the mechanics of mediation." — I. William Zartman

1990 • hc/$32

African Politics and Problems in Development

RICHARD L. SKLAR and C.S. WHITAKER

1991 • hc/$39

Political Change in Taiwan

edited by TUN-JEN CHENG and
STEPHAN HAGGARD

"A near requirement for the bookshelf of anyone interested in Taiwan." — Cal Clark • 1991 • hc/$30

Leo Strauss's Thought

Toward a Critical Engagement

edited by ALAN UDOFF

The most comprehensive picture available of the topics central to Leo Strauss's life and work.

1991 • hc/$39.95

Lynne Rienner Publishers

1800 30th Street • Boulder, Colorado 80301 • (303) 444-6684

Revised Second Edition...

Bulk Orders	APSA Departmental Service Member	Non-Member	Postal Rate
10 copies	$20.00	$22.50	$1.00
25 copies	$43.75	$50.00	$1.50
50 copies	$75.00	$87.50	$2.50

Single copies are available for $3.00 each, prepaid.

Order from:
Publications/APSA
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036



American Political Science Association

STORMING WASHINGTON

An Intern's Guide to National Government

Stephen E. Frantzich

Second Edition

Publishing an Article in Political Science? You need the APSA's...

revised and expanded edition of the guide to political science journals

A definitive guide to the journals that publish articles in political science, *Political Science Journal Information* describes the fields of research, as well as the specific review, manuscript preparation, and publication processes of these journals. This guide is an important reference for scholars and students.

The price is $18 for APSA members and $25 for nonmembers + $2.50 postage.

ORDERS MUST BE PREPAID.

Order from: **Publications/APSA**
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036



Political Science Journal Information

Third Edition

Fenton Martin
Librarian, Political Science Research Collection
Indiana University

and

Robert Goehlert
Librarian for Economics and Political Sciences
Indiana University

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

Looking For A Graduate School In Political Science?

Guide to Graduate Study in Political Science 1989

Over 300 schools in the U.S. and Canada describe their Ph.D. and masters programs in political science and related fields in the 1989 *Guide to Graduate Study in Political Science.* Each program description includes specializations, tuition charges and financial aid, admission and degree requirements. Faculty are listed with their areas of specialization.

The *Guide* has a faculty and institution index and data for each program on student applications and admissions, number of degrees awarded, and affirmative action efforts.

The price is $20 for APSA members and $30 for nonmembers + $2.50 shipping for each copy ordered.
ORDERS MUST BE PREPAID.

ORDER FROM: Publications/APSA
1527 New Hampshire Avenue NW • Washington, DC 20036

Alternative Careers For Political Scientists

Alternative Careers for Political Scientists contains practical advice for obtaining nonacademic employment. Chapters cover the federal government executive branch, Capitol Hill, state and local government, research and consulting, interest groups and associations, and corporate public affairs, as well as a general introduction to nonacademic careers. The price is $5 for APSA members and $10 for nonmembers. Bulk order rates are available.

ORDERS MUST BE PREPAID.

Order from:

Publications/APSA
1527 New Hampshire Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20036

EXPORTING DEMOCRACY

The United States and Latin America

edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal

Abraham F. Lowenthal and fourteen other noted scholars from the United States, Latin America, and Europe explore the motives, methods, and results of U.S. efforts to nurture Latin American democracy. Contributors focus on four periods when such efforts were most intense: the years from World War I to the Great Depression, the period immediately following World War II, the 1960s, and the Reagan years. The book tells a cautionary tale—revealing that U.S. efforts to export democracy in the Americas have met with little enduring success and often have had counterproductive effects.

$55.00 *hardcover*

In addition to the complete hardcover edition, *Exporting Democracy* is available in two paperback volumes, each introduced by Abraham Lowenthal and organized for convenient course use:

Themes and Issues	$12.95 *paperback*
Case Studies	$12.95 *paperback*

CHOOSING SIDES

Alignment and Realignment in the Third World

Steven R. David

Steven David introduces the concept of "omnibalancing" to examine international relations from the perspective of Third World leaders. In their overriding need to survive in power through complex balancing, these leaders have turned to one or the other superpower to counter internal—more often than external—threats.

$38.50 *hardcover*

THE COLD WAR AS COOPERATION

edited by Roger E. Kanet and Edward A. Kolodziej

Cold War rivalry was carefully controlled, as both sides strove to avoid global war while manipulating events to their mutual advantage. Roger Kanet and Edward Kolodziej bring together a distinguished group of regional experts to examine the tacit and explicit rules of engagement Moscow and Washington have observed to limit their regional conflicts throughout the world.

$48.50 *hardcover*

LONG-WAVE RHYTHMS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

Brian J.L. Berry

Is economic development a "random walk" or do underlying rhythms and cycles make it possible to anticipate long-term trends? Brian Berry has found new evidence for the reliability—and the value—of "long-wave" theory. He also explores cyclical phenomena in the stock market, voting behavior, incidence of wars, the rise and fall of great powers, and mass psychologies.

$19.95 *paperback* $49.50 *hardcover*

JOHNS HOPKINS

The Johns Hopkins University Press, 701 West 40th Street, Suite 275, Baltimore, Maryland 21211
To order, call 1-800-537-5487.

Cambridge University Press

Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability

The Stabilisation of European Electorates, 1885–1985

Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair

Recent thinking has stressed how traditional mass politics in Western Europe are in the process of transformation. This book demonstrates how this emphasis on change has been largely misconceived. The authors examine patterns of electoral persistence and change and assess what these patterns indicate about the persistence of traditional cleavages and how these patterns vary according to political, institutional and social factors.

38292-0 Hardcover $59.50

Yankee Leviathan

The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859–1877

Richard Franklin Bensel

"Bensel's perspective on the political economy of sectionalism seems inexhaustible as a source of fresh insight into the struggles of the Civil War era. In *Yankee Leviathan*, the irresistible conflict of the 1850s is not simply resolved in the North's favor, it is transposed into the structure and operations of new state formation."—*Stephen Showronek*, Yale University

39136-9 Hardcover $59.50 / 39817-7 Paper $18.95

Unity with Diversity in the European Economy

The Community's Southern Frontier

Christopher Bliss and Jorge Brage De Macedo, Editors

This important new book examines theoretical issues in the integration of a diverse economic region and the combined impact of EC membership, financial integration and the single market program on the joining countries.

Contributors: Christopher Bliss, Jorge Braga De Macedo, Michael Emerson, Paul R. Krugman, Anthony J. Venables, Andre Sapir, Alasdair Smith, William H. Branson, Vitor Gaspar, Jose Vinals, Louka T. Katseli, and Dani Rodrik.

39520-8 Hardcover $59.50

Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics

The Origins and Development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh

Bruce Graham

This book presents a comprehensive and perceptive study of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the most robust of the first generation of Hindu nationalist parties, through the first two decades of its history from 1951.

Cambridge South Asian Studies 47

38348-X Hardcover $44.50

The Return of Scarcity

Strategies for an Economic Future

H.C. Coombs

These essays draw attention to the changing role of governments, under pressure to conserve resources but also to exploit and develop them to satisfy consumption. Dr. Coombs argues a case for the economic system to serve social responsibilities more justly.

36373-X Hardcover $39.95 / 36896-0 Paper $17.95

Moscow and the Middle East

Soviet Policy Since the Invasion of Afghanistan

Robert O. Freedman

This important work provides an exhaustive account of Soviet policy in the Middle East from the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 to their withdrawal nearly ten years later. Following an introductory chapter that overviews the period from World War II to the invasion, the author examines policy outcomes in a broadly chronological approach. Specific attention is paid to Soviet policy toward the Iran-Iraq war, the Arab-Israeli conflict and intra-Arab policies.

35184-7 Hardcover $59.50 / 35976-7 Paper $16.95

The Origins of the Stalinist Political System

Graeme Gill

The author offers new and challenging perspectives on Soviet political development from the October Revolution of 1917 until 1941, by examining the relationship between institutional structures and the conventions which are created to shape the activities of individuals and by considering center/periphery relations.

Soviet and East European Studies 74

38266-1 Hardcover $64.50

International Environmental Diplomacy

The Management and Resolution of Transfrontier Environmental Problems

John E. Carroll, Editor

"For all who are interested in and practicing international environmental diplomacy, the book provides a very informative and critical analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of international treaties. As well, it offers objective synthesis of the issues which need to be addressed and hopefully resolved and a prognosis of increasing needs for more international cooperation, with better definition of the goals and contents."

—*Nay Htun, International Environmental Affairs*

39564-X Paper $24.95

Cambridge University Press

The Anthropology of War

Jonathan Haas, Editor

The book brings together a group of authors who address the nature and causes of warfare in simpler, tribal societies. The authors represent a range of different opinions about why humans engage in warfare, why wars start, and the role of war in human evolution.

Contributors: *Robert L. Carneiro, Napoleon Chagnon, R. Brian Ferguson, Thomas P. Gibson, Jonathan Haas, Clark Richard McCauley, Clayton Robarchek,* and *Neil Lancelot Whitehead*

School of American Research Advanced Seminar Series

38042-1 Hardcover $49.50

Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World

Robert H. Jackson

Professor Jackson examines the birth and survival of Third World nations since the end of the Second World War, describing these countries as "quasi-states," arguing that they exist more by the support and indulgence of the international community than by the abilities and efforts of their own governments and peoples.

Cambridge Studies in International Relations 12

35310-6 Hardcover $49.50

Democracy and Discontent

India's Growing Crisis of Governability

Atul Kohli

"The implications of Kohli's insightful analysis of the political dilemmas of development in the world's largest democracy extend well beyond the borders of India. This book is essential reading for anyone trying to understand state-society relations in the Third World."

—*Peter Evans,* University of California, Berkeley

39161-X Hardcover about $59.50 / 39692-1 Paper about $17.95

Hegel's Ethical Thought

Allen W. Wood

"This is an excellent treatment of a subject which has never been adequately dealt with in English...His book will be the most important study of Hegelian ethics since Bradley's Ethical Studies."

—*H.S. Harris,* York University

37432-4 Hardcover $49.50 / 37782-X Paper $16.95

The Origins of American Social Science

Dorothy Ross

"This is a big, complex, synthetic study by one of our ablest intellectual historians. It deserves the attention of all those interested in American history, social thought, and liberal theory."

—*Mary O. Furner,* Northern Illinois University

Published with the support of the Exxon Education Foundation

35092-1 Hardcover $29.95

Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan

Second Edition

Olivier Roy

"Roy, a French anthropologist who has made annual trips to Afghanistan since the 1980 Soviet invasion, blends the knowledge of the specialist with the timely information of the traveler to produce a brilliant and very important study of the Mujahidin." —*Orbis*

39308-6 Hardcover $49.50 / 39700-6 Paper $14.95

Democratizing France

The Political and Administrative History of Decentralization

Vivien A. Schmidt

The focus of this book is on the decentralization reforms legislated by the Socialist government in France from 1982 to 1986. These reforms redefined the role of the central state in the periphery and gave extensive new powers to territorial governments. The author examines these reforms and their impact in comparative historical perspective.

39156-3 Hardcover about $47.50

The State and Economic Knowledge

The American and British Experiences

Mary O. Furner and Barry Supple, Editors

This book addresses an important but inadequately recognized dimension of the activities of the modern state—the role it plays in producing the theoretical and practical knowledge necessary for economic policy making. This book brings together papers that reveal the ways in which modern states have helped to generate new economic knowledge and how that process interacts with economic changes, specific political institutions and ideological contexts.

Contributors: Michael J. Lacey, Mary O. Furner, Barry Supple, Donald Winch, John Lauritz Larson, William J. Barber, Robert M. Collins, Peter Clarke, George C. Peden, Ellis W. Hawley, Leslie Hannah, Jose Harris, W. Elliot Brownlee and Jay M. Winter

Woodrow Wilson Center Series

39424-4 Hardcover $44.50

Available in bookstores or write:

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011.
Call toll-free 800-872-7423.
MasterCard/VISA accepted. Prices subject to change.

Looking for Political Scientists in Colleges?

You'll find them in APSA's

1990 Directory of Undergraduate Political Science Faculty



Directory of
Undergraduate
Political
Science
Faculty
1990

The third revised edition of the **Directory** identifies political science departments and faculty at 580 colleges in the United States whose highest degree is the bachelor of arts. Each faculty member is listed with rank, highest degree, and three fields of specialization.

The **Directory** is a companion to APSA's **Guide to Graduate Study in Political Science,** which lists departments and the faculty who teach undergraduate and graduate students at universities conferring a B.A. and either an M.A. or both an M.A. and Ph.D. in political science.

Like the **Guide,** the **Directory of Undergraduate Faculty** is an important reference for advising students and locating political scientists for professional activities.

The cost of the **Directory** is $15 for APSA members and $25 for nonmembers. Please include $2.50 postage with your order. Members can order both the **Directory** and the **Guide** for $30 + $2.50 postage, A DISCOUNT SAVING OF $5.00. *Orders must be prepaid.*

Order from: ***APSA Publications***

1527 New Hampshire Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20036

NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE

Identity\Difference

Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox

By **WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY.** Connolly here explores some of the epistemic, moral, political, and social issues that the uneasy relationship between personal identity and difference poses for democratic politics. $27.50

Reclaiming Capital

Democratic Initiatives and Community Development

By **CHRISTOPER GUNN** and **HAZEL DAYTON GUNN.** This imaginative book documents ways in which communities have counteracted constraints of the capitalist economic system and succeeded in promoting democratic control of their resources. $24.95 cloth, $9.95 paper

Contested Ground

Collective Action and the Urban Neighborhood

By **JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS.** Over the last three decades residential communities in the United States and other Western nations have become veritable seedbeds of collective action. *Contested Ground* provides a new approach to understanding how and why such community-based action occurs. $45.00 cloth, $16.95 paper

Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy

By **FRITZ W. SCHARPF.** Translated by **Ruth Crowley** and **Fred Thompson.** With a Foreword by **Peter J. Katzenstein.** Scharpf provides an astute examination of what happened in four European social democracies—Austria, Britain, Sweden, and West Germany—during the worldwide crises of the 1970s and early 1980s. *Cornell Studies in Political Economy.* $49.95 cloth, $17.95 paper

The Prevalence of Deceit

By **F. G. BAILEY.** We have come to expect lies from politicians, Bailey says, but we are less willing to admit deceit and self-deception as a feature of everyone's life, a necessary part of our social and political systems. Bailey demonstrates that there is a vast confusion about "truth," that in politics claims to have a monopoly on truth can rarely be sustained. $24.95 cloth, $7.95 paper

Modernity and Ambivalence

By **ZYGMUNT BAUMAN.** Modernity has been haunted by an implied promise of clarity, transparency, and order—the qualities offered by classical reason. In this visionary book, Bauman offers compelling evidence that moral responsibility demands a radical acceptance of postmodern ambivalence, in private life and social science alike. $43.50

NEW IN PAPER

The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition

By DONALD KAGAN. Kagan examines the years between the signing of the peace treaty of Nicias and the destruction of the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 413. "Kagan's book will be welcomed by students and their teachers." —Robin Seager, *Times Literary Supplement.* $12.95

Opening Financial Markets

Banking Politics on the Pacific Rim

By **LOUIS W. PAULY.** "This excellent book succeeds admirably in explaining why advanced industrialized nations 'have moved so consistently during recent decades to open their traditionally protected national banking markets to foreign institutions.'"—*Foreign Affairs. Cornell Studies in Political Economy.* $13.95

Filipino Politics

Development and Decay

By **DAVID WURFEL.** "A masterful study."—*Journal of Asian Studies.* "Thoroughly researched, superbly organized, and balanced in its analysis, . . . this book is excellent. It is . . . prominent on my reading list for students, and it is informative for experts. It should remain as one of the authoritative texts on the martial law regime for years to come."—*Canadian Journal of Political Science. Politics and International Relations of Southeast Asia.* $12.95

CORNELL
UNIVERSITY
PRESS
124 Roberts Place • Ithaca • NY 14850

V.O.Key, Jr. and The Study of American Politics

Milton C. Cummings, Jr.
Editor

...with articles by Walter Dean Burnham, Philip E. Converse, Milton C. Cummings, Jr. and David R. Mayhew.

"This slim volume would, in my opinion, have been deeply gratifying to Key, for its brevity, its personally-prepared bibliography of publications, and for its editorial decision to focus on three evaluative essays constituting the body of work to the areas of his professional interests: American parties, elections and public opinion."

Avery Leiserson

"V.O. Key was one of the all-time craftsmen of political science. These fine essays recall Key's imaginative contributions and are written in the spirit of his superb work."

Nelson W. Polsby

"The publication is first-rate. The essays in the monograph summarize the nature of [Key's work] economically and insightfully. I hope the monograph gains an exceptionally wide professional readership."

Randall B. Ripley

"The work is not only a fitting intellectual tribute to a great political scientist, it contains important synthesizing analyses of the state of knowledge in the study of American parties, voting behavior and public opinion. Our colleagues and students should read it."

Seymour Martin Lipset

A single copy is $2.00 for APSA members and $4.50 for nonmembers. Please add $1.00 postage for each copy.

ALL ORDERS MUST BE PREPAID

ORDER FROM: ***APSA/Publications***
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036

Political Science

NEW FROM CALIFORNIA

Political Protest and Cultural Revolution

Nonviolent Direct Action in the 1970s and 1980s

BARBARA EPSTEIN

From her perspective as both participant and observer, Epstein examines the nonviolent direct action movement which, inspired by the civil rights movement, flourished in the U. S. from the mid-70s to the mid-80s.

$24.95

Transforming Free Speech

The Ambiguous Legacy of Civil Libertarianism

MARK A. GRABER

Graber challenges the worthiness, and indeed the very existence of one uninterrupted libertarian tradition. In re-examining the philosophical and jurisprudential foundations of the defense of expression rights he exposes the monolithic free-speech tradition as a myth.

$39.95

California's Salmon and Steelhead

The Struggle to Restore an Imperiled Resource

Edited by ALAN LUFKIN

Lufkin documents the reasons for the California salmon's decline as he offers practical suggestions about how the decline might be reversed. He presents the story in human perspective: its broad historical, economic, cultural, and political facets, as well as the biological, are all treated.

$24.95

Cocaine Politics

Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America

PETER DALE SCOTT and JONATHAN MARSHALL

"An intricate, compelling, and often shocking tale of narcoterrorism and corruption, and the leading role of the U.S. government in fostering the drug trade in the course of its terrorist operations in Central America. Their careful scholarship adds an important dimension to our understanding of the contemporary world." —Noam Chomsky, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

$24.95

Spain's Empire in the New World

The Role of Ideas in Institutional and Social Change

COLIN M. MacLACHLAN

New in paper—"A new and convincing interpretation which provides the intellectual framework for the recent economic and social research on colonial Spanish America." —William F. Sater, California State University, Long Beach

$11.95 paper

At bookstores or order toll-free
1-800-822-6657. Visa & MasterCard only.

University of California Press

Berkeley 94720

Political Science

NEW FROM CALIFORNIA

Second printing, with a new preface

Republic of Fear

SAMIR AL-KHALIL

"Essential reading for all . . . dealing with the current crisis in the Gulf."
—*London Sunday Telegraph*

"A sophisticated and brilliantly savage denunciation of Arab populist politics."
—*Times Literary Supplement*

"Not . . . a mere chronicle of atrocities committed by the Ba'th regime. It is an extremely subtle and erudite analysis of the way that regime actually thinks and functions."—*New York Review of Books*

$25.00 cloth

Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East

Edited by PHILIP S. KHOURY and JOSEPH KOSTINER

Tribes and State Formation is the first effort to bring together the disciplines of history, anthropology, and political science around a major topic that none of these alone is adequately equipped to address. How and why did certain tribal societies metamorphose over time into states?

$45.00 cloth, $14.95 paper

African Successes

Four Public Managers of Kenyan Rural Development

DAVID K. LEONARD

What accounts for Kenya's successes while much of Africa has stagnated? Here Leonard illustrates the way public policy is made and implemented in Kenya by focusing on four public officials who have had a great impact on rural development.

$55.00 cloth, $18.95 paper

Rhetoric and Ritual in Colonial India

The Shaping of a Public Culture in Surat City, 1852-1928

DOUGLAS HAYNES

How did the Indian elites of 19th-century Surat City in western India fashion their ideas of what constituted justice and authority? Haynes asserts that they appropriated the political rhetoric of their British rulers. His examination of this rhetoric provides a window into the causal relationship between colonial domination and the production and reproduction of cultural forms by the colonized.

$49.95

From the Fat of Our Souls

Social Change, Political Process, and Medical Pluralism in Bolivia

LIBBET CRANDON-MALAMUD

This investigation of medical pluralism is also a history of class formation and the fluidity of both medical theory and social identity in highland Bolivia, and it is told through the often heartrending, often hilarious stories of the people who live there.

Comparative Studies of Health Systems and Medical Care $45.00

Political Science

NEW FROM CALIFORNIA

The Gorbachev Phenomenon

A Historical Interpretation

MOSHE LEWIN

From reviews of the first edition—"A broad historical analysis of Lewin's kind makes the Gorbachev phenomenon far less extraordinary an event, by replacing it within the continuum of historical trends of which he is the expression and which are being achieved through him . . . [enabling] us to anticipate or hypothesize the probable future by identifying the forces currently locked in battle."—*Times Literary Supplement*

$22.50 cloth, $10.95 paper

Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles

CHARLES W. FORNARA and LOREN J. SAMONS II

Fornara and Samons unravel the intricacies of the conflicting ancient sources to show how the development of both democracy and empire were interdependent in Athens's multifaceted evolution.

$29.95

Cicero's Social and Political Thought

An Introduction

NEAL WOOD

New in paper—"Presents the complex character of this scholar-politician and the relation of his life to his writings in greater depth than any recent study. . . . A quantum improvement over the one-dimensional portrayals of the past."

—*American Political Science Review*

$13.95 paper

Steeltown, USSR

Soviet Society in the Gorbachev Era

STEPHEN KOTKIN

"In *Steeltown, USSR,* Kotkin catches the flavor and the reality of the terrible downhill slide that brought Stalin's and Lenin's state to the collapse of 1990. For a close-up, wide-eyed, unstuffy look inside Russia, this book can't be beat."

—Harrison E. Salisbury

$24.95

New Expanded Edition

Thinking Fragments

Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West

JANE FLAX

New in paper—"Advances theoretical dialogue across a number of difficult borders. Of special importance is its sustained interrogation of postmodern and psychoanalytic theory from the perspective of feminist theory." —Christine Di Stefano, University of Washington

$13.95 paper

At bookstores or order toll-free
1-800-822-6657. Visa & MasterCard only.

University of California Press

Berkeley 94720

Princeton

Richard H. Ullman

What should be the security arrangements for the new Europe of the 1990s, now that the world is no longer afraid of a significant "hot war" beginning there? Who needs to be secure against what kinds of threats? What roles will be played by the United States and the Soviet Union? What place will nuclear weapons occupy—not only the weapons of the superpowers but those of the two European nuclear "middle powers," the United Kingdom and France? And how will the task of making Europe secure be affected by the processes of economic integration?

In a penetrating essay on these issues, Richard H. Ullman maintains that the era Europe is now entering will be qualitatively different from any it has known before. Questioning those who believe that future European international politics will be reminiscent of the turbulent decades before the two World Wars, he shows how and why tomorrow's patterns will radically depart from yesterday's.

A Twentieth-Century Fund Book

Cloth: $19.95 ISBN 0-691-07891-2



Roman Laba

In July 1980, two weeks before the Gdansk shipyard strikes, Roman Laba arrived in Poland. He stayed there for almost two and a half years before he was arrested and expelled from the country for "activities noxious to the interests of the Polish state." Laba had set himself the ambitious task of documenting the history of Poland's free trade union. Martial law was in force for the last year of his stay, but even during that time he continued his rescue of the unique historical materials that contribute so much to *Roots of Solidarity.*

The book uses this hard-earned information to challenge the commonly accepted view of the Polish intelligentsia as the driving force behind Solidarity and to demonstrate that the roots of the movement go back a decade earlier than the 1980 strikes.

$24.95 ISBN 0-691-07862-9



Princeton


SIGNALS OF WAR
The Falklands Conflict of 1982
LAWRENCE FREEDMAN AND VIRGINIA GAMBA-STONEHOUSE

Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse

The 1982 Falklands War was one of the most extraordinary military confrontations of recent years. This unusual book makes it possible for us to follow the development of the war from both sides, as two leading experts from the belligerents present an integrated, authoritative, and engrossing account of its origins and course.

The work unravels the complex series of events leading to the occupation of the Falkland Islands on April 2, 1982 by Argentine forces and then follows the conflict through to their surrender to the British on June 14. The authors weave together the development of the military confrontation with the attempts by Americans, Peruvians, and the United Nations to help find solutions.

Paper: $14.95 ISBN 0-691-02344-1
Cloth: $45.00 ISBN 0-691-07890-4
Not available from Princeton in the U.K. and Europe



Charles L. Glaser

With sweeping changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe having shaken core assumptions of U.S. defense policy, it is time to reassess basic questions of American nuclear strategy and force requirements.

In a comprehensive analysis of these issues, Charles Glaser argues that even before the recent easing of tension with the Soviet Union, the United States should have revised its nuclear strategy, rejecting deterrent threats that require the ability to destroy Soviet nuclear forces and forgoing entirely efforts to limit damage if all-out nuclear war occurs. Changes in the Soviet Union, suggests Glaser, may be best viewed as creating an opportunity to make revisions that are more than twenty years overdue.

Paper: $16.95 ISBN 0-691-02312-3
Cloth: $45.00 ISBN 0-691-07828-9

Princeton

Edited by Gary Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman

Few observers of Mexico and Brazil in the 1930s, or South Korea and Taiwan in the mid-1950s, would have predicted that these nations would become economic "miracles" several decades later. These newly industrializing countries (NICs) challenge much of our conventional wisdom about economic development and raise important questions about international competitiveness and export success in manufacturing industries. In this volume economists, sociologists, and political scientists seek to explain the growth of the NICs in Latin America and East Asia and to reformulate contemporary development theory through an in-depth analysis of these two dynamic regions.

Paper: $16.95 ISBN 0-691-02297-6
Cloth: $49.50 ISBN 0-691-07788-6



MANUFACTURING MIRACLES

Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia

Edited by
GARY GEREFFI and
DONALD L. WYMAN

Howard M. Leichter

Each of us is, to a certain extent, dangerous to his or her own health, but how far do we want the government to curb our freedom to be "foolish"? In a look at such highly charged health issues as smoking, alcohol, road safety, and AIDS, Howard Leichter analyzes the efforts of the United States and Great Britain to confront the seemingly constant tension involved with this question. Leichter contends that both governments are now paying less attention to providing access to health care and more to forcing or encouraging people to change their behavior. The result has been a transformation of health politics from a largely consensual to a largely conflictual enterprise

Cloth: $35.00 ISBN 0-691-07867-X



FREE TO BE FOOLISH

Politics and Health Promotion
in the United States
and Great Britain

HOWARD M. LEICHTER

Princeton



THE CHILD AND THE STATE IN INDIA

MYRON WEINER

Myron Weiner

India has the largest number of non-schoolgoing working children in the world. Why has the government not removed them from the labor force and required that they attend school, as have the governments of all developed and many developing countries? To answer this question, this major comparative study first looks at why and when other states have intervened to protect children against parents and employers. After examining Europe of the nineteenth century, the United States, Japan, and a number of developing countries, Myron Weiner shows how cultural, not economic, conditions account for India's unique situation.

Paper: $14.95 ISBN 0-691-01898-7
Cloth: $45.00 ISBN 0-691-07868-8



STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

for American National Security

BRUCE D. BERKOWITZ AND ALLAN E. GOODMAN

New in paperback

With a new afterword by the authors

Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman

Bruce Berkowitz and Allan Goodman draw on historical analysis, interviews, and their own professional experience in the intelligence community to provide an evaluation of U.S. strategic intelligence.

"While covert operations grab the headlines, intelligence analysis, carried out by CIA officers and their colleagues who are more professorial than conspiratorial, is more important to America's security. This is a primer to that analytic function."—*Foreign Affairs*

Paper: $12.95 ISBN 0-691-02339-5
Cloth: $35.00 ISBN 0-691-07805-X

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

41 WILLIAM ST. • PRINCETON, NJ 08450 • (609) 258-4900
ORDERS: 800-PRS-ISBN (777-4726)
OR FROM YOUR LOCAL BOOKSTORE

Chatham House Publishers

Box One, Chatham, New Jersey 07928 Telephone: (201) 635-2059

The Bush Presidency

First Appraisals

Colin Campbell, S.J., *Georgetown University,* and **Bert A. Rockman,** *Brookings Institution*

For all courses on the Presidency, a timely report on the Bush administration at midterm by an impressive list of scholars that includes Joel Aberbach, Giles Alston, Larry Berman, Colin Campbell, George Edwards, Bruce Jentleson, Charles O. Jones, Anthony King, Paul Quirk, Bert Rockman, and Barbara Sinclair. *Forthcoming*

0-934540-91-8 $14.95 *paper* 9-934540-90-X $25.00 *cloth*

Business and Politics

A Comparative Introduction

Graham K. Wilson, *University of Wisconsin, Madison*

"A well-conceptualized, well-written, and concise description of the varied government-business relationship in several industrial democracies."

0-934540-82-9 $14.95 *paper* **Michael D. Reagan,** *University of California, Riverside*

Dogmas and Dreams

Political Ideologies in the Modern World

Nancy S. Love, *Pennsylvania State University*

Nancy Love has compiled a comprehensive anthology of political ideologies covering Liberalism and Democracy, Conservatism, Fascism, Socialism, Anarchism, and Feminism.

0-934540-84-5 $19.95 *paper*

The Moral Imagination and Public Life

Raising the Ethical Question

Thomas E. McCollough, *Duke University*

What is the relationship between ethics and the making of public policy? Is this relationship a healthy and effective one? McCollough tackles these difficult questions with sensitivity.

0-934540-85-3 $14.95 *paper*

The Politics of the Administrative Process

James W. Fesler, *Yale University,* and **Donald F. Kettl,** *University of Wisconsin, Madison*

"An eclectic and valuable book. Readers will find that any one of several chapters in this volume provide the best overview of the subject." **Francis E. Rourke,** *Johns Hopkins University*

0-934540-81-0 $24.95 *paper*

The Politics of Public Budgeting

Getting and Spending, Borrowing and Balancing

Irene S. Rubin, *Northern Illinois University*

"I strongly endorse *The Politics of Public Budgeting* for undergraduate and graduate courses in American politics. I will adopt it this fall for my American public policy class."

0-934540-69-1 $16.95 *paper* **James A. Thurber,** *The American University*

For further information about these and forthcoming titles, please contact the publisher, **Edward Artinian, CHATHAM HOUSE PUBLISHERS,** Box One, Chatham, NJ 07928. Phone: (201) 635-2059. Fax: 635-9366

INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRIBUTORS

The *American Political Science Review* aims to publish scholarly research and writing of exceptional merit. Contributions must demonstrate the highest standards of excellence in conceptualization, exposition, methodology, and craftsmanship. Because the *Review* reaches a diverse audience of scholars and practitioners, contributors must demonstrate how their analysis or exposition illuminates a significant research problem, or answers an important research question, of general interest in political science.

Article Manuscripts

Article manuscripts should be submitted to the Managing Editor, Professor Samuel C. Patterson, *American Political Science Review,* Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, 112 Derby Hall, Columbus, Ohio 43210-1373. Four copies must be submitted, and none can be returned. Manuscripts must be typed double-spaced, on one side of the paper only, and include an abstract of no more than 150 words. The author's name and affiliation should not appear on the copies submitted, but only on a separate covering sheet. In general, the *Review* considers manuscripts of up to 30 pages in length. Moreover, the *Review* does not consider manuscripts submitted to other publications.

Manuscripts should be prepared following the guidelines of the *Style Manual for Political Science,* a publication of the American Political Science Association's Committee on Publications. It is available from the association's office. Otherwise, authors should follow the *Chicago Style Manual* and the example of recent issues of the *Review.* Graphs and tables should be presented on separate pages, with their location in the manuscript indicated, e.g., the notification "Table 1 about here," at the proper places.

Book Reviews

Books intended for review and all book review correspondence should be sent to the Book Review Editor, Professor Helen M. Ingram, *American Political Science Review,* Department of Political Science, University of Arizona, Social Sciences 315, Tucson, Arizona 85721.

Other Correspondence

Information, including news and notes, for the Association's news journal *PS,* should be sent to Dr. Robert J-P. Hauck, Editor, American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Advertising, reprint, and circulation correspondence should be sent to the Executive Director at the Washington office. Domestic claims for nonreceipt of issues must be made within four months of the month of publication; overseas claims, eight months. Advertising information and rates are available from Ann V. Peyser, Advertising Manager, APSA, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Indexing

Articles and notes appearing in the *Review* before the June 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature.* Current issues are indexed by *International Political Science Abstracts, United States Political Science Documents,* and *Social Sciences and Humanities Index.* Microfilm of the *Review,* beginning with Volume 1, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. A *Cumulative Index of the Review,* Volumes 1–62, 1906–1968, also may be obtained from University Microfilms. Articles appearing in the *Review* are listed in *ABC Pol Sci* and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences.* Book Reviews are indexed in *Book Review Index.*

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

Redeeming American Political Theory
Judith N. Shklar 3

U.S.-Soviet-Chinese Relations: Routine, Reciprocity, or Rational Expectations?
Joshua S. Goldstein & John R. Freeman 17

Lobbying for Free Trade in 19th-Century Britain: To Concentrate or Not
Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey 37

The New Household Economy
William James Booth 59

The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics
Timothy Mitchell 77

Declarations of Independence: Arendt and Derrida on the Problem of Founding a Republic
B. Honig 97

Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness
John T. Scholz 115

A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems
David P. Baron 137

The Impact of Presidential Campaigning on Midterm U.S. Senate Elections
Jeffrey E. Cohen, Michael A. Krassa & John Hamman 165

RESEARCH NOTES

Macropartisanship: An Empirical Reassessment
Paul R. Abramson & Charles W. Ostrom, Jr. 181

Do Endorsements Matter? Group Influence in the 1984 Democratic Caucuses
Ronald B. Rapoport, Walter J. Stone & Alan I. Abramowitz 193

Debunking the Myth of Interest Group Invincibility in the Courts
Lee Epstein & C. K. Rowland 205

CONTROVERSY

Feminism and Liberal Theory
Richard C. Sinopoli & Nancy J. Hirschmann 221

REVIEW ESSAY

Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Toward Complementarity
Elinor Ostrom 237

BOOK REVIEWS

Defenders of the Constitution 251
Political Theory 257
American Politics 279
Comparative Politics 304
International Relations 332